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PROLOGUE
THE AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION OF 1920
“This cock-eyed world," a favorite  expression of Americans 
afte r world War I put into words th e ir general puzzlement with a world 
gone awry. Mark Sullivan, chronicler of the era, called the world of 
1920 "unbalanced" and America "unhappy."^ New York banker Paul Warburg, 
sim ilarly  disenchanted, observed in January 1922, "During the long 
months of the struggle, we often wondered how the world could finan­
c ia lly  and economically endure another year of the horrors and waste of 
the War. Since the Armistice we have often wondered how i t  could
p
survive another year of this kind of peace." Indeed, few things 
worked out w ell—the war, the peace, the economy. No wonder "normalcy," 
with its  nostalgia proved invincible in 1920.
The economy seemed especially "cock-eyed" as the nation fretted  
over the high cost of post-war liv in g —an economic pain most newspapers 
abbreviated to "h .c .l."  As consumers revolted against the more than 
100 percent increase in the cost of liv ing  since 1914, "h .c .l."  mani­
fested its e lf  in buyers and renters strikes.^ Housewives paid 30#
Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925,
Vol. VI: The Twenties (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935),
pp. 2, 155.
2paul M. Warburg,.The Federal Reserve System: Its  Origin and
Development, Vol. I I  (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 753.
^New York Times, 22 August 1920, I I ,  p. 2.
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2rather than lO i a pound for sugar, and shoes which before the war sold 
for $3 brought $10  to $12 in 1 9 2 0 .4  consumers resorted to almost s i l ly  
extremes in th e ir  demands that "profiteering" stop. In New York C ity , 
housewives staged a boycott to force down the price of meat, and the 
New York Times praised citizens for refusing to buy a t "skyscraping" 
prices.5 Beginning in the South and spreading throughout the nation, 
men demonstrated their concern with a symbolic donning of cotton over­
a lls  instead of woolen suits. Frugality became fad as the "overalls 
brigade" invaded church services on Easter Sunday. Georgia Congressman 
W illie  Upshaw even appeared in the new fashion on the floor of 
Congress.G William Gibbs McAdoo, former Secretary of the Treasury, was 
photographed with suspiciously new-looking patches adorning his expen­
sive trousers.7 Not to be outdone. Governor Frank Lowden, son-in-law 
of George Pullman, delighted the Women's Division o f the Fair Price 
Committee of I l l in o is  with the announcement that he would continue to 
wear his then three-year-old overcoat until prices declined.® Soon 
women made i t  great fashion to be unfashionable, wearing dresses and 
hats from previous years.
, ^Sullivan, Our Times, V I, 163.
^New York Times, 3 July 1920, p. 17; and 20 May 1920, p. 12.
P. G. Harding, The Formative Period of the Federal Reserve 
System: During the World Crisis (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1925),
p. 170.
^Sullivan, Our Times, V I, 165.
^New York Times, 21 February 1920, p. 3.
3In the Senate, Oklahoma's neo-Populist, Robert Owen, perhaps 
fo r the only time in his l i f e ,  resembled a hard-money man when he 
commented, "In order to bring s ta b ility  . . . i t  w ill be necessary to 
deflate the c u r r e n c y . T h e  Senate ra llie d  behind th is sentiment and 
passed the McCormick Resolution as a means of asking what the Federal 
Reserve Board intended to do about "the existing in fla tion  of currency 
and credits and consequent high prices."^0
Before the end of 1920, ta lk  of "h .c .l."  vanished. A pair of 
shoes again sold for $3, and men wore faded overalls, not as a show of 
protest, but often because of necessary frug a lity . Four months a fter  
his January call fo r currency contraction, Owen, Chairman of the 
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, fu lly  repented of his deflation­
is t  aberration and blasted the Federal Reserve Board for its  pursuit 
of a tig h t money policy. Within a year the McCormick Resolution seemed 
a great incongruity. Such ironies resulted from the reappearance of a 
fam iliar development in American history—the boom-bust cycle. In fla ­
tion recoiled into deflation , and "h .c .l."  once again gave way to hard 
times.
The depression of 1920 in the agricultural sector resulted from 
a long l is t  of complex economic influences: downward readjustment in 
the price level from its  war-inflated plateau, termination of government 
defense spending, removal of the government price guarantees on farm 
commodities, diminished need of European nations for American farm
9|J. S ., Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., January 16, 
1920, 1607.
lO lb id ., 66th Cong., 2d Sess., May 17, 1920, 7145-46.
products, increased a b ility  of other agricultural nations to compete 
with American producers fo r world markets, and cessation of government 
foreign loans which had served as a stimulus fo r commodity exports. 
Included in the milieu underlying the depression were such diverse 
influences as change in the American d ie t, a slowing of population 
growth, and the new farm technology which resulted in overproduction 
and low prices for agricultural commodities.
By the suraner of 1920, most farm leaders conceded that the 
economy was in a slump. Various economic indices recorded the scope 
of the depression as the gross farm income skidded from $17.7 b illio n  
in 1919 to just under $10.5 b illio n  in 1921. By harvest time, most 
agricultural products sold a t what Secretary of Agriculture, Henry C. 
Wallace, termed "bankruptcy l e v e l s . cattle  that averaged $54.54 
per head in 1919 brought only $30.39 in 1922. Corn averaged $1.52 a
ITSee the U. S ., Congress, House, Joint Commission of Agricul­
tural Inquiry, Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 
pt. 1, The Agricultural Crisis and Its  Causes, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 
House Report 408, 1921; John D. Hicks, Rehearsal fo r Disaster (Gaines­
v i l le :  University of Florida Press, 1961), Chap. I l l ;  G ilbert C. F ite ,
George N. Peek and the Fight fo r Farm Parity (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 10-13; G ilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, An 
Economic History of the United States. 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), pp. 221-229; Theodore Saloutos and John D. 
Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 100-09; Edward L. and Fred­
erick H. Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa: The Agrarian Years. 
1910-1940 (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1968), Chap. V;
James H. Shidler, Farm C ris is , 1919-1923 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1957), pp. 46-581; Clarance Alton Wiley, Agriculture 
and the Business Cycle Since 1920; A Study in the Post War Disparity 
of Prices (Madison: University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social 
Sciences and History, No. 15, 1930), p. 14 f f .
T2u. S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 1922 (Washington,
D. C ., 1922), p. 2.
5bushel in 1918, but collapsed to 52ÿ by 1921. Wheat dropped from its  
1918 level of $2.05 per bushel to by 1923. Cotton, also a victim  
of the deflation, fe l l  from a 1919 average of 35(t per pound to 16$ in 
1920. Most farmers witnessed more than a 50 per cent plunge in the 
price of th e ir produce in 1920-21.
In the suraner of 1921, a Congressional committee, the Joint 
Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, undertook a study of the agricul­
tural c ris is . The Commission reported that while farmers were 
sustaining an "avalanche of descending prices," the economy continued 
to discriminate against them even in depression. "In the recent per­
pendicular decline," the Commission report disclosed, "the prices of 
farm products declined more rapidly and went to a lower level than the 
prices of other commodities. This fact increased the margin between 
the prices of what he had to sell and the prices of the commodities he 
had to buy."^^ Farm leader Arthur Capper described the deteriorating 
circumstances of most farmers when he observed th at, "During the period 
of high prices in 1919 . . .  a farmer could get fiv e  gallons of gasoline 
for a single bushel of corn. A year la te r that bushel of corn would 
buy only one gallon of gasoline; and two years la te r  the same bushel of
T3u. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical S tatistics  of the 
United States, 1789-1945 (Washington, 0. C ., 1949), pp. 99-111. The 
1920-1921 collapse has been characterized as "the sharpest price 
decline . . .  in the whole history of the United States." See Milton 
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United 
States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 197l]l
p. 232.
T^Report of Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, Pt. I ,
p. 13.
corn would buy about ha lf a gallon of g a s o l i n e . D u r i n g  the twelve­
month period a fter October 1920, the farmer's do llar, in terms of 
purchasing power, was worth less than in any preceding twelve months 
in th ir ty  years.
The deflation in farm prices was a ll the more devastating 
because i t  followed the World War years which climaxed a Golden Era of 
prosperity fo r agriculture. Confronted with technological advances and 
war-stimulated commodity prices, farmers rushed into debt during 1918 
and 1919 only to plunge into depression in 1920. In 1924, Secretary 
of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace noted that the depression "struck 
American agriculture in a transition period." In the decade preceding 
the price collapse farmers increased production 15 per cent, introduced 
the tractor and implemented improved programs of breeding and disease 
control. Iron ica lly  the increased productive efficiency "brought b itte r  
fru it"  for the commodity collapse of 1920 increased debt burdens and 
forced the farmer to abandon the modernization program. "In short, 
the condition by the end of a decade of extraordinary progress in agri­
cultural efficiency was the reverse of what might have been log ically  
expected."17
Thus, in 1920 the Golden Era faded into normalcy fo r the farmer. 
Confronted with the hopeless prospect of bearing a debt incurred during 
a period of high prices at a time when his own wealth was rapidly
l^Arthur A. Capper, The Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt 
Brace and Company, 1922), p. 38.
l^ Report of Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, Pt. I ,
p. 13.
17u. S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 1924, p. 17.
shrinking, he faced the ultimate resu lt—bankruptcy and mortgage fore­
closure. Between 1920 and the spring of 1923, a Department of 
Agriculture survey found that in fifte e n  corn and wheat producing 
states 23 per cent of the owner farmers were bankrupt and 8.5 per cent 
of the bankrupt group had already been evicted. Of 26,000 tenant 
farmers surveyed, more than 14 per cent had lost th e ir property. An 
additional 21 per cent were spared loss only through the leniency of
th e ir  creditors.
Depression has victimized farmers throughout American history 
and Jefferson's chosen people have an especially intimate relationship  
with hard times. From Shay’ s Rebellion to modern farm strikes, low 
commodity prices stimulated farmers to challenge and change the status 
quo through d irect p o litica l action. The agricultural depression of 
the 1920s was no exception. As the depression grew into the farm 
c r is is , agricultural interests began searching fo r the cause of th e ir  
predicament and subsequently fo r its  remedy. The search for a pros­
perous agriculture proved elusive as would-be therapists confronted a 
maze of problems related to the production, c red it, and marketing 
phases of the industry. In the twenties, urben prosperity contrasted 
so v iv id ly  with rural poverty that agrarian America demanded a redress 
of grievances. These demands thrust the farm problem into the national 
consciousness where, as a liv e  issue, i t  attracted the attention of the 
nation's po litica l and economic leadership. Consequently the Prosper­
i ty  Decade contributed an expanded vocabulary to the new discipline of
TBu. S ., Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., January 18, 
1924, 1081.
sagricultural economics which included such terms as the farm bloc, 
p arity , McNary-Haugenism, the export debenture scheme, and the Federal 
Farm Board. Farmers also insisted upon reviving earlie r panaceas such 
as cooperation, cred it leg is la tion , and an easy money policy. Frus­
trated a t the fa ilu re  to participate in the affluence of the New Era, 
farmers determined to right their "cock-eyed" world—to create a 
genuinely prosperous agriculture.
CHAPTER I
THE CRIME OF 1920: THE FARMER AND THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE CONSPIRACY MYTH
As in past periods of depression, farmers campaigned in the 
Dollar Decade for a national monetary policy sympathetic to debtor 
interests. As the depression worsened, that great interrogative, the 
money question, revived and farmers once again prepared to battle  
"Shylockism" and creditor interests. Citing the plethora of in fla tio n ­
ary leg islation pending in the lame-duck session of the 66th Congress, 
the New York Times ed itoria lized  against "cornfield banking" policies.^ 
Henry A. Wallace, editor of Wallaces' Farmer, who was close to the 
pulse of farmers, described those in the Middle West as "restive" and 
observed that "conditions are ripe for a wave of Populism such as was 
experienced in the seventies [ s i c ] . D o n a l d  R. Murphy, a Wallace 
associate, cited the trend in an a r t ic le , "Is the Greenback Movement 
Coming Back?" The analogy between the Greenback-Populist era and the 
in fla tio n is t fervor of the 1920's has some v a lid ity , but Woodrow 
Wilson's New Freedom had contributed a new instrument in national mone­
tary policy—the Federal Reserve System. A majority of those who
^New York Times, 15 December 1920, p. 14.
Z ib id ., 29 May 1921, p. 15.
^Donald R. Murphy, "Is the Greenback Movement Coming Back?," 
Wallaces' Farmer, XVIIL (March 31, 1922), p. 1.
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demanded an in flationary monetary policy saw the Federal Reserve as 
simply replacing the Gold Standard as the instrument of oppression and 
deflation. Like the debtors of the 1890s, the in fla tion is ts  of the 
New Era were convinced that they were about to suffer martyrdom at the 
hands of creditor interests, th is time on a cross conceived in the 
boardroom of the Federal Reserve System. Former Republican Chairman of 
the House Banking and Currency Committee, Charles N. Fowler, recognized 
the new conflic t over the old issues: "I assert that the Federal
Reserve Act and its  management involve a ll that was at stake in the 
four presidential elections of 1836, 1868, 1876, and 1896. The ques­
tion is , w ill we meet the issue of Bryanism now as we did in 1896?"^ 
Farmers also resented the growing in fe r io r ity  of rural America 
as the dynamic force in American l i f e .  The census of 1920 reflected  
demographically this trend when, for the f i r s t  time, i t  found more 
Americans liv ing  in urban environments than in the countryside.
Although migration from farm to c ity  became a concern of rural leaders 
during the decade, they seemed powerless to "keep the boy on the farm." 
Reacting to economic and social forces beyond th e ir control, they 
preached with an almost grim zeal the doctrines of agrarian fundamental­
ism, a type of occupational egotism that farmers had indulged in since 
the days of Jefferson.^
4u. S ., Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., May 15,
1920, 59, 7238. Another conservative who saw a lin k  between the Green­
back agitation of the 1870's and the agrarian movement of the 1920's 
was Ohio Republican Senator Simeon D. Fess. See U. S ., Congressional 
Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1926, 11931.
^Clifford B. Anderson, "The Metamorphosis of American Agrarian 
Idealism in the 1920's and 1930's," Agricultural History, XXXV (October, 
1961), pp. 182-188.
nReflecting this mood, the farm bloc of 1922 adopted the Bryan- 
esque motto, " I f  you help the farm, the farm w ill take care of the 
nation."® One rural congressman boasted that farmers "are nature's 
noblemen, shorn of a ll  c l a p t r a p . Ne b r a s k a n  George Norris concluded, 
" I t  is a t the rural firewide that v irtue , morality and patriotism have 
reached th e ir  highest s t a t e . A s i d e  from the sp iritual purification  
of rural liv in g , agrarian fundamentalism emphasized the physiocratic 
b e lie f that farming was the "basic industry" since farmers were the 
primary producers of raw materials. The proponents of agrarian funda­
mentalism believed that unless farmers prospered, the rest of the 
economy would eventually lag. Cattleman George W. Armstrong proclaimed, 
"The American farmer is now the chief cornerstone of capitalism and of 
c iv iliz a t io n ."9 Typically, the Farmers' Union staked out the following 
claims fo r th e ir industry at the ir 1922 annual meeting: "Agriculture
is the sun of the solar system of the American industries and as such 
i t  must be ever held to be the controlling power that keeps the indus­
tr ie s , that revolve around i t ,  moving normally in th e ir orbit."T®
^Horner E. Socolofsky, Arthur Capper: Publisher, P o litic ia n , 
and Philanthropist (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1962), p. 153.
^U. S ., Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., January 17, 
1924, LXV, 1081.
^Quoted in Norman L. Zucker, George W. Norris, Gentle Knight 
of American Democracy (Urbana: University of I l l in o is  Press, 1966).
^George W. Armstrong, The Crime of ' 20: The Unpardonable Sin
of Frenzied Finance (Dallas: Press of the Venny Company, 1922), p. 222.
l^National Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 
Minutes of the Eighteenth Annual Session, Lynchburg, V irg in ia , Novem­
ber 21, 1922, p. 67.
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With fa ith  in the righteousness of th e ir own way of l i f e  and 
confidence in th e ir economic indispensability, farmers had d iff ic u lty  
accepting any part of the blame for the economic despondency of th e ir  
industry. Most agreed that overproduction was not the c a u s e . A s  the 
old agrarian, Tom Watson, told his Senate colleagues in 1921, "This 
country can never produce too much wheat or too much cotton, so long as 
there is a single person who has not enough to eat or enough to wear."^^ 
In his book defending the formation of the farm bloc. Senator Capper 
bluntly stated the theme: "Over production was not the cause of the
decline in farm prices.
Agrarian fundamentalism collided with the erosion of rural 
influence on national l i f e  and the economic re a lity  of the depression. 
That co llis ion , no doubt, intensified rural America's resentment of 
urban institu tions. This animosity p a rtia lly  explained the vitupera­
tion and wrath farm spokesmen heaped upon the Federal Reserve System. 
Henry A. Wallace was not the only rural leader who complained that,
"the Federal Reserve System is evidently prim arily a c ity  man's
TTHenry C. Wallace was an exception. He wrote: "Some contend
that there is no such thing as overproduction. . . .  On the same line  
of reasoning, i t  can be argued that the production of automobiles w ill 
be inadequate until every man and woman and every boy and g ir l of high 
school age owns one." U. S ., Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1922 (Washington, D. C .: Government Printing O ffice,
1922), p. 4.
T2u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., August 5, 
1921, LXI, 7411.
T3Arthur A. Capper, The Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1922), p. 7.
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in s titu tio n ."14 Like the issues of prohibition, evolution, and the 
Ku Klux Klan, the farmers' contest to reform the national monetary 
system illu s tra ted  a basic theme of the twenties—geographical section­
alism and class d is tru s t.1^
One other factor in the post-war era led farmers to focus 
attention on the Federal Reserve System. As farming evolved toward a 
specialized, mechanized, and commercialized industry, the credit needs 
of agriculture expanded rapidly. "High land values, land improvements, 
drainage developments, better seed, more fe r t i l iz e r ,  modern farm 
machinery and equipment—a ll require money," noted American Farm Bureau 
President J. R. Howard in 1920.1® Since the farmer realized cash 
income from his labor only periodically, credit was v ita l to his oper­
ation.
I f  the depression, anti-urban sentiment, and the need for 
cred it helped focus attention on the Federal Reserve, its  alleged
14"Country Bank Experience with the Federal Reserve Board," 
Wallaces' Farmer, XVIL (October 7, 1921), p. 5. See also 0. M. K ile, 
"The Money Question: Is the Farmer Getting His Share of Available
Credit? I f  Not, Why Not?," Successful Farming, XX (January, 1921), 
pp. 5, 36.
l®William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 7-10, 132-33. That 
"class fric tion " arose over the deflation issue was also recognized by 
Henry A. Wallace in "Reducing the Reserve Requirements of the Federal 
Reserve System," Wallaces' Farmer, XVIL (July 8, 1921), p. 4. An exam­
ple of deflation presented as a sectional issue is B. C. French, "What 
Getting Back to Normalcy Means . . . Able Exposition of Principles 
Underlying Expansion and Contraction of Credits," Iowa Homestead 
(July 28, 1921), reprinted in ]J. S^ ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 
1st Sess.j November 9, 1921, 7559-7560.
IG j, R. Howard, "Farmer's Financial Problems as Viewed by the 
American Farm Bureau Federation," Successful Farming, XIX (November, 
1920), p. 9.
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deflation policy of 1920-1921 ignited the battle to reform the system. 
The Federal Reserve Board reacted sluggishly to post-war economic 
in s ta b ility  and in fla tio n , but f in a lly  permitted the Reserve Banks in 
November of 1919 to raise th e ir discount rates from 4 per cent to 4.75 
per cent. In la te  January 1920, discount rates were dramatically 
boosted an additional 1.25 per cent, the steepest single rise in a ll 
federal reserve history. The following June, the rates were elevated 
yet another point to 7 per cent where they remained for the next eleven 
months.
The decision to boost discount rates and the in it ia l  effects 
of the Depression of 1920 came almost simultaneously. Farmers believed 
that the high discount rate and the fa l l  in th e ir  commodity prices 
provided a classic example of cause and e ffec t. Farmers viewed the 
"Great Contraction" of cred it and currency as a premeditated and vicious 
assault of the "money trust" on the farming class. Idaho's Senator 
Frank Gooding saw the connection when he announced, "The conspiracy of 
the Federal Reserve Board worked better than they knew. I t  brought the 
greatest cris is  this country has ever known . . . and in the last three 
years, taking 1919 as a basis ,there  has been a shrinkage in the value 
of farm products and farm lands of more than $34,000,000,000."^®
T^Milton Freedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary 
History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: University of
Princeton Press, 1963), pp. 221-31. These rates caused extensive debate 
over th e ir d es irab ility . For a survey of the lite ra tu re  related to the 
controversy see Chapter I I I ,  below.
1 O
U. s.. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., Febru­
ary 28, 1923, 4855.
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Though varying in degree of s tric tu re , v ir tu a lly  a ll farm 
journals, agricultural organizations, and rural po litic ians joined in 
attributing a t least a portion of the fa l l  in farm prices to the activ­
it ie s  of the Federal Reserve System. John S. Wanamaker, President of 
the American Cotton Association, termed the System's decision to raise 
the discount rate "financial tyranny and commercial crim inality."^^  
Senator Tom Watson of Georgia indicted the Reserve and its  discount 
rate as "secret, unlawful, and ruinous."20 His Senate colleague from 
Alabama, J. Thomas H eflin , called the Reserve decisions "miserable, 
inexcusable, and indefensible."2? In Nebraska, the Democratic State 
Convention o ff ic ia lly  resolved that the policy to raise the discount 
rate resulted from "a perversion and misuse of powers,"22 while the 
Kansas Farmers' Union charged i t  was " a r t if ic ia l ly  and crim inally pre­
c ip ita ted ."23 Both the Congressional Progressive and Farm Blocs 
condemned the discount policy rate and the action in farm circles was 
soon anathematized as "the Great Conspiracy" or the "Great Deflation," 
or most popularly, "the Crime of 1920."
As in the Gilded Age, farmers in the 1920s explained the 
draconic forces threatening the ir world with an uncritical acceptance
T N^ew York Times, 23 August 1921, p. 26.
20u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 19, 
1921, 4031.
2 ^ I b i d . , December 19, 1921, 517.
2 2 % b i d . ,  August 28, 1922, 11791.
23n0w York Times, 15 July 1921, p. 10.
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of a conspiracy m o t i v e . T h o u g h  in the aggregate "the Crime of 1920" 
conspiracy proved myth, certain fragments of the thesis contained 
truth“ Or a t least ostensible truths. The composite of truth and exag­
geration enhanced the c re d ib ility  of the myth among rural Americans 
suffering from hard times, ignorance and governmental insensitiv ity  to 
real needs. The myth and economic frustration promoted among farmers 
not only demands for in fla tio n  but a concern that the Federal Reserve 
System, the alleged perpetrator of the "Crime" be exposed and rehabil­
ita ted .
Farm spokesmen indicted the "Deflation Twins"—two Wilson 
appointees. Secretary of Treasury David F. Houston, and Federal Reserve 
Board Governor William P. G. Harding, as the most prominent of those 
responsible for "the Crime of 1920." Addressing the 1921 National 
Farmers' Union Convention at Topeka, President Charles S. Barrett 
described Houston and Harding as "tools of mysterious, in v is ib le , but 
immensely powerful interests." Through "cunningly formulated plans, 
these do llar worshippers . . . determined that deflation must become an 
accomplished fa c t. . . . They saw only one thing, prices must come 
down and the farmers must pocket the loss."^^
Although farm spokesmen in general were antagonistic toward the 
Federal Reserve System, a quartet of sleuths exposed the alleged details  
of "the Crime of 1920." The four included Richard Henry Edmonds,
24n. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party
P o lit ic s , 1877-1896 (Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press, 1969),
p. 386.
Z^National Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of 
America, Minutes of 17th Annual Session, November 15, 1921, p. 8.
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editor of Manufacturer's Record, John Skelton Williams, Comptroller of 
the Currency, Alabama Senator J. Thomas H eflin , and cattleman George 
Washington Armstrong. Their collective testimony provided a popular 
rationale for the plight of the American farmer.
Just as they had in the nineteenth century, farmers in the 
1920's received support in th e ir critic ism  of the nation's monetary 
policies from manufacturers and re ta ile rs  who were also feeling the 
stric ture  of tig h t money during eras of deflation . The editor who con­
tributed to "The Crime of 1920" explanation fo r the agricultural 
depression was not a farm spokesman a t a l l ,  but in the trad ition of 
Henry W. Grady, promoted the gospel of industrialism for the New South. 
Editor of the Manufacturer's Record of Baltimore and c r it ic  of the 
Federal Reserve System, Richard Henry Edmonds spoke for in fla tio n is t  
business interests. Accusing the Reserve of catering to myopic and 
selfish interests and of fa ilu re  to furnish cred it resources during the 
post-war c r is is , he ed ito ria lized :
The Federal Reserve System financed the war; i t  could not 
finance the peace. So is the record w ritten; so is i t  written  
in shame. Out of our vast resources flowed in endless streams 
the means to drive back the Huns. Then almost overnight Governor 
Harding and his associates decided that the onslaught of approach­
ing economic disaster should not be financed, that the reservoirs 
should be closed and decided on a course of action that f a c i l i ­
tated d isaster.26
Edmonds argued that the Reserve requirements ought to have been 
lowered. "What is a reserve for?" he asked his readers. To him the 
answer was obvious.
26[d itoria l dated June 9, 1921, reprinted in U. S. Congressional 
Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess,, August 15, 1921, 5017.
18
Edmonds made his principal contribution to the conspiracy motif 
when he published a summary of the minutes of the May 18, 1920 Federal 
Reserve Board meeting with the Class A directors of the System at 
Washington, D. C.Z? This provided c ritic s  of the Board's discount pol­
icies with evidence that the decision to raise the discount in the 
spring of 1920 was reached through devious, i f  not dishonest, means. 
T itlin g  his expose "An Amazing Revelation of Secret Financial Meeting,” 
he charged that this meeting, which had discussed the slowing down of 
the economy through the raising of the discount rates, "was one of the 
most fateful meetings in the financial history of the world," and that 
i t  "reached its  conclusions in secret and withheld its  conclusions 
from the public." Edmonds quoted the cautious warning of Reserve Board 
Governor W. P. G. Harding at the conclusion of the day-long session:
I would suggest, gentlemen, that you be careful not to give 
out anything about any discussion of discount rates. That is 
one thing there ought not to be any previous discussion about, 
because i t  disturbs everybody, and i f  people think rates are 
going to be advanced there w ill be an immediate rush to get 
into the banks before the rates are put up, and the policy of 
the reserve board is that that is one thing we never discuss 
with a newspaper man. I f  he comes in and wants to know i f  the 
board has considered any rates or is lik e ly  to do anything about 
rates, some remark is made about the weather. . . . You can go 
back to your banks and of course te ll  your fellow directors as 
frankly as you choose what has happened here today, but caution 
them to avoid any oremature discussion of rates as s u c h . 28
2?U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., Febru­
ary 28, 1923, 4858-66.
28ib id . , 4859. The meeting was a regular quarterly meeting of 
the Federal Advisory Council and the Federal Reserve Board. Invited 
to the meeting were the "Class A" or banker directors of each Federal 
Reserve Bank. Governor Harding gave the following defense for his 
closing remarks to the conference: " . . .  I cautioned those present
to refrain from making any statements which might give the impression 
that a further advance in rates was contemplated. I t  was not certain
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Claiming that "these closing words of a fatefu l conference are 
the most damning indictment of the management of the Federal Reserve 
System which could be penned," Edmonds blasted the Board's secrecy on 
two counts. The possibility  existed that those with inside information 
could use the ir knowledge for private gain; and he protested that those 
present at the May 18 meeting were v ir tu a lly  a ll bankers. Aligning 
with many c ritic s  of the Federal Reserve System, Edmonds, calling the 
system too banker oriented, pointed out that its  ac tiv itie s  affected 
a ll classes—merchants, manufacturers, laborers, and farmers. They 
should a ll be consulted on monetary policy, not just a banker e li te .
Edmonds' revelation of the details of the May 18 conference 
received eager approval from a number of farm spokesmen who had long 
held to the conspiracy m otif, but had never had the evidence to match 
th e ir accusation. Senator Heflin of Alabama, in response to the pub­
lication  of the Edmonds a r t ic le , admitted, " I did not have that 
document when I was making the fig h t here for nearly two years; but I 
told about what had happened at th is meeting without rea lly  knowing a ll 
of the inside fa c ts ."29 Senator Gooding intoned, "I think this con­
spiracy is of such importance . . . that i t  should have the attention  
of the President," and immediately requested a Senate investigation of 
the whole m atter.30
that the rates would be advanced, and i t  was obvious that . . . any pub­
l ic  discussion of the possibility by any member of the conference would 
have a disquieting effect without producing any good result." William 
Proctor Gould Harding, The Formative Period of the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem (Boston and New York: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1925), p. 179.
29u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
February 28, 1923, 4869.
3Qlbid., 4854.
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The fact that the conspiracy conference followed by only a day 
the passage of the McCormick Resolution in the Senate further strength­
ened the predisposition of many toward a conspiracy rationale for the 
depression. Many rural leaders saw no mere coincidence in the two 
events. Heflin la te r observed that the Chicago senator who introduced 
the resolution had a selfish interest in "striking dead the agricul­
tural business and the cattle  business of the West." He further 
charged, " I have said here a dozen times that there must have been some 
understanding that that action should be taken here in the Senate the 
same day th is advisory council was in oath-bound secret session in 
Washington." In conclusion, he called the McCormick Resolution "a 
nucleus around which they hoped to hang de fla tio n ."31 J. I .  Holleman 
of Atlanta, Georgia, descriptively recalled the conference when he 
wrote that the farmers were deflated "promptly, completely, s c ie n tif i­
c a lly , unmercifully. . . . One meeting and the work was done."^^ Nine 
years a fte r the famed meeting, Oklahoma's Republican Senator W. B. Pine 
evidently s t i l l  found attractive p o litic a l mileage in the conspiracy 
ta le . "On May 18, 1920," he alleged to one Oklahoma City audience, 
"F ifty -s ix  men assembled in a room in Washington and secretly changed 
the credit policy of the Nation. When the f if ty -s ix  sat down in that 
room the farmers were prosperous; never more prosperous in a ll
^Ib id . ,  4870. Governor Harding insisted the May 18 meeting 
of Reserve o ffic ia ls  and the passage of the McCormick Resolution was 
"merely a coincidence." W. P. G. Harding, Formative Period, p. 180.
32u. S ., Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., January 10, 
1927, 1398.
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the ir lives . When the f i f ty -s ix  rose from the table the farmers were 
bankrupt."33
The infamy of the May 18 conference became an integral part of 
the legend of the Great Conspiracy of 1920, offering proof to believers 
that the ir predispositions were ju s tif ie d . The farmers' Union empha­
sized the conspiracy idea more than the other major farm organizations. 
One of the Union's emerging leaders, Milo Reno, found his f i r s t  live  
issue in the conspiracy p lot. He undertook his "baptism of fire "  in 
agrarian po litics  during the early twenties with a tour of Iowa where 
he warned farmers of Wall S treet's diabolical plot to deflate them. 
Plunking a swollen satchel on the lectern, Reno shouted to his audience 
that the mysterious valise contained evidence which proved his allega­
tions. Witnesses reported that audiences grew tense as he proceeded 
dramatically, putting on his great horn-rimmed glasses and solemnly 
reading the s ta tis tics  of the reduction in the amount of money in c ir ­
culation from its  war-swollen highs. Such a show put Reno in great 
demand as a speaker a t farm gatherings throughout the midwest and i l lu s ­
trated the widespread acceptance of conspiracy as a causative agent of
the depression.34
Another of the four contributors to the "Crime of 1920" myth, 
John Skelton Williams, served as the thirteenth Comptroller of
33 lb id . , 71st Cong., 1st Sess., April 30, 1929, 684.
34oale Kramer, The Wild Jackasses, The American Farmer in Revolt 
(.New York: Hasting House Publishers, 1956), p. 191-92. S t i l l  another
version of the conspiracy meeting is detailed in Colonel George W. 
Armstrong's The Crime of ' 20, Chap. 12, "The Advisory Council is Called 
Together to Approve Deflation." He claimed the plot was approved by 
o il speculators and railway employees as well as the "conspirator bank­
ers" with each group desirous of "kicking the producer's 'noun dog aroun'.'
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the Currency.  ^ Williams encountered a unique situation as comptroller, 
fo r the Federal Reserve System began operating during his tenure.
Almost from its  inception, the Federal Reserve clashed with the older 
bureau, the Office of the Comptroller. Friction between the two govern­
ment banking authorities resulted from oblique statutes which granted 
overlapping authority to the riva l agencies, from the aggressiveness of 
the younger institu tion  over jurisd ictional questions, and from williams* 
splenetic and tactless m a n n e r .
As comptroller, Williams, who had aided in drafting the Glass- 
Owen B i l l ,  enjoyed an ex-o ffic io  membership on the Federal Reserve 
Board and though frequently scuffling with the system, he seemed gen­
e ra lly  satisfied  with its  overall management until the spring of 1920. 
Then, for enigmatic reasons which probably included his genuine distress 
at the depressed state of agriculture, he began to attack the Board's 
management.37 At the May 18 conspiracy conference Williams wondered 
aloud whether a higher rate of in terest would harm only legitimate 
business, while having l i t t l e  e ffect upon speculation. In June he told 
the Maine Bankers Association that the Federal Reserve Banks held an 
unused lending power of $7 b illio n  and suggested that a 10 per cent
35williams served from February 2, 1914 to March 2, 1921.
36ross M. Robertson, The Comptroller and Bank Supervision;
A Historical Appraisal (Washington, D. C .: The Office of the Comp­
tro lle r ,  1968), pp. 107-115.
37lb id . , U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 
February 28, 1923, 4861. Governor Harding rather unconvincingly sug­
gested that Williams became disenchanted with the Board only a fte r he 
fa iled  to gain reappointment as Comptroller. W. P. G. Harding, Forma­
tive  Period, pp. 201-02. Williams c ritic ized  the discount policy as 
early as May, 1920. He fa iled  reappointment in December, 1920.
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reduction of the reserve requirements would increase the "unused" lend­
ing power of the system by "two thousand m illion do llars ."38 Talk of 
restriction  of credit because of weakening reserves was nonsense to 
Williams.
In a widely publicized le tte r  written in la te  December, 1920, 
Williams said that current policy must be changed to avert "demoraliza­
tion and d i s a s t e r . " 3 3  Specifically , he recommended lowering the 
rediscount rate from 7 per cent to 5 per cent in a ll commercial and 
agricultural paper. "There appears," he complained, "to be a scarcity 
of money, and of credit in the great agricultural and producing sec­
tions." He added that New York City caused the drought of cred it in 
agricultural regions and bankers were getting a disproportionate share
38 ib id ., 4861. Whether or not to lower the reserve requirement 
was a central issue between the advocates of tig h t and easy money dur­
ing the cris is  of 1920. Typical of the arguments defending the Board's 
decision not to suspend the reserve requirements is this apology from 
Governor Harding; "The Board may have been overcautious, but those who 
profess to see no danger in permitting reserves to fa l l  below a 
prescribed minimum, arbitrary though i t  be, should remember the predica­
ment of tne second Cleveland Administration, when the Treasury's gold
reserve fe ll  below the traditional $100,000,000. The courageous steps
taken by President Cleveland, with Congress refusing to aid to restore 
the gold reserve, alone enabled the Treasury to continue redemptions of 
legal tender notes in gold, and saved the country from a s ilver c ris is ."  
He concluded, " i f  the situation warranted steps which might result in 
placing the country upon a paper money basis, the responsibility for 
such action should be assumed by Congress." W. P. G. Harding, Forma­
tive Period, p. 200. Among recent interpreters, Friedman and Schwartz 
have disputed the claim that the reserve position of the System ju s t i­
fied a tigh t money policy in 1920-21, explaining that the Board
maintained a restric tive  monetary policy long a fte r the reserve picture 
had significantly  improved. Furthermore, they w rite , the Board could 
have suspended the reserve requirements temporarily "at only negligable 
cost." Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, pp. 237-8.
83w. P. G. Harding, Formative Period, 102-04.
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of service and credit from the Federal Reserve System. He charged that 
"individual New York banks are borrowing from the Reserve System . . . 
twice as much as the total some of the Reserve Banks have been lending 
recently to a ll the member banks in the ir d is tr ic ts ."  Williams 
revealed records which proved his accusations citing that durino the 
month of November one bank in New York borrowed $134 m illion , about 
$20 m illion mors than the amount lent to the 1091 member banks in the 
tenth Federal Reserve d is tr ic t headquartered a t Kansas C ity, an area 
covering most of seven states. Such favoritism, according to the 
Comptroller, resulted in a scarcity of cred it for the in terio r and 
wasteful speculation in the plush environs of the Eastern financial 
centers.40
Williams waged continuous critic ism  against the System in a 
crescendo of le tte rs , press releases, and speeches. The climax of the
40williams, of course, fa iled  to consider the re lative  size of 
the disputed banking establishments. See Harding, Formative Period, 
p. 207. A persistent theme of c ritic s  lik e  Williams was that agricul­
tural regions suffered a greater curtailment of cred it during the era 
of deflation than industrial sections. Contrary to such sentiment, the 
Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry reported that, "liquidation  
of bank loans and discounts in the agricultural sections of the country 
was less than in the industrial sections, and in fact that but l i t t l e  
actual liquidation of loans and discounts had taken place in the agri­
cultural sections of the country as a whole up to May, 1921." The 
report continued, "This does not mean that there was no pressure for 
liquidation in agricultural loans as well as industrial and commercial 
loans. I t  means rather that the prices received by the farmer for the 
goods he had to sell during this period were not suffic ient to liq u i­
date the debts he had made in producing the crop and in extending his 
plant and operations during the more prosperous period which preceded 
the c ris is ."  One indication of the pressure for liquidation in agri­
cultural areas is shovm by the fact that the reduction of total deposits 
in agricultural counties was 11.1 per cent as compared with 4.4 per cent 
in industrial counties. Report of Joint Commission of Agricultural 
Inquiry, I I ,  pp. 14-15, 117; see Arthur S. Link, "The Federal Reserve 
Policy and the Agricultural Depression of 1920-1921," Agricultural 
History, XX (July, 1946), pp. 166-75=
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ex-Comptroller's offensive came in an address delivered to the Georgia 
Press Association in July, 1921. Noting that there had been much 
paternalistic ta lk  regarding the improvident spending of the common 
people during 1919, Williams opened his speech with the observation 
that i t  was not ju s t the farmer and the laborer who contributed to the 
spending spree, for indeed the "seers and high priests of our finance" 
spent lavishly also. A fter a war, Williams remarked, "poorer men go 
to s ilk  shirts . . . those better o ff go to bubbles." I t  was the 
"bubble chasers" [speculators]], he thought, who most damaged the econ­
omy. The post-World War experience was not unpredictable, fo r a 
sim ilar orgy of speculation had ensued a fte r a ll American wars. But 
Williams was dissatisfied with the economy's performance:
We are not recovering as rapidly and as smoothly as we should 
have done. I question nobody's motives. The dismal, cold fa c t, 
as i t  seems to me, is that the Federal Reserve Act, which was 
designed to provide a system of banking and currency supply, 
pliable and e lastic  . . . became s t i f f  and inelastic . . . 
injurious where i t  should have been helpful, and dangerously 
lenient where i t  should have been repressive.
The fa u lt lay not with the system, but with the "administra­
tion of that system by individuals who have not measured up; awkward 
and in e ffic ie n t, victims of the disease 'bureaumania.'"*!
Proof of maladministration, Williams continued, was the fact 
that the Federal Reserve banks imposed ruinous interest rates on the 
small rural banks of the country. One "valiant l i t t l e  country bank in 
Alabama," he stated, "was forced to pay up to 87% per cent per 
annum. . . . Certain small banks in Colorado, Kansas, Texas, Louisiana,
4Tu. S . ,  C ongress iona l Record, 67 th  C ong.,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  J u ly  20,
1921, 4087.
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Alabama, and other states were charged by th e ir reserve bank amounts 
. . . from two to five  times . . .  as much as the rates charged by any 
government bank in any c iv ilized  country on the globe." This credit 
stringency fo r rural America came at a time when New York City banks 
were plied with huge funds for speculative purposes. Williams warned, 
"The policy of the Federal Reserve . . . seemed to be that i f  certain  
big banks wanted anything, why le t  them have i t  promptly and no ques­
tions asked; but i f  a l i t t l e  bank or a farmer needed funds, comb him 
w ell; make him give up everything he has as security . . . and then 
make the directors as well; guarantee the loans for a ll they are 
w o r t h . W i l l i a m s  cited Governor Harding's informal discussion before 
the Board urging disfranchisement of the only two Federal Reserve Banks 
in the South—banks a t Atlanta and Dallas—as further proof of the 
Board's bias against the South. When warned that their deflation  
policy would probably ruin many small rural banks, Williams reported 
the response of one board member; "Let them f a i l . "43 Williams advised
4^ Ib id . The examples Williams cited of interest rate exploita­
tion were victims of the System's short-lived progressive discount 
policy. The policy proved an inept attempt to penalize banks for bor­
rowing in excess of the ir basic line of cred it from their Reserve bank. 
Voluntarily abandoned by the Reserve in 1921, the practice was o f f i ­
c ia lly  terminated when Congress accepted a Heflin amendment to the 
Agricultural Credits Act of 1923, specifica lly  repealing the authoriza­
tion for the Reserve to impose such rates. See Report of Joint 
Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, I I ,  pp. 55-62; U. S ., Congressional 
Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., January 29, 1923, 2649-59; Ib id . ,
January 30, 1923, 2704.
43u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 20, 
1921, 4089. Williams attributed the statement, "Let them fa i l ,"  to 
Edmund P la tt, former Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Com­
mittee and Reserve Board member. U. S ., Congressional Record,
February 28, 1923, 4873-4.
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farmers and rural merchants that the Federal Reserve System was unequiv­
ocally stacked against them. He reminisced, "I heard much ta lk  while 
I  was a member of the Federal Reserve Board about forcing the farmer to 
sell . . . but I  do not recall a single occasion during the past year 
or two of deflation when the board ever discussed seriously the impor­
tance of requiring the big banks in New York City . . .  to liq u id a te ."^  
The accusations of Williams, a founder and former member of the 
Federal Reserve Board, gave credence to "the Crime of 1920" thesis.
As an alleged financial expert, Williams' inside information seemed 
authentic. A Wallaces' Farmer headline proclaimed, "He Ought to Know," 
and the a r tic le  stated, "the more we look into the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem, the more we are convinced that i t  w ill not do to permit the board 
to be composed solely of bankers, economists, and newspaper men who are 
densely ignorant of agricu lture ."45 Other farm journals, organizations, 
and politic ians universally accepted Williams' testimony as va lid . 
H eflin , Edwards, Armstrong, Senator Smith W. Brookhart of Iowa, and 
others re lied  heavily on Williams for s ta tis tics  and lines of argument 
in developing th e ir own diatribes against the system.45
44u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 20, 
1921, 4088. Williams' charge that a shortage of cred it for legitimate 
enterprises was due to excessive loans to stock market speculators was 
frequently repeated by other rural spokesmen. See "Gambling With the 
Nation's Wealth," Capper's Weekly, XLVII (November 6 , 1920), p. 4. The 
Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry found such charges to ta lly  
without merit. Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, I I ,  pp. 15,
133 f f .  Williams also accused the Federal Reserve System of paying 
extravagant salaries and wasting money on construction projects. See 
Chapter IV , below.
45wallaces' Farmer, XLVI (August 12, 1921), p. 4.
45|j. S . ,  C ong ress iona l Record , 67 th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  August 15,
1921, 5014. I b i d . , 6104.
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The third member of the quartet who made the Federal Reserve 
System the cause of the Depression was the Southern cattleman and banker. 
Colonel George Washington Armstrong. Personal financial misfortune 
which saw the price of his more than 5,200 ca ttle  decline from $125 per 
head in 1917 to $25 per head in 1922, and the writings of Williams and 
Edmonds, inspired Armstrong to write The Crime of ' 20: The Unpardonable 
Sin of Frenzied Finance."? An admirer of Henry George and an o ld-line  
Populist whose zeal fo r free s ilver remained untarnished, he blamed the 
financial system, particu larly  the Eastern banking establishment, fo r 
the deflation. "Wall S treet," he wrote, "is not a myth; l i t e r a l ly  i t  
is only a short, narrow, crooked street in the financial d is tr ic t of 
New York C ity, with a graveyard at one end and a river a t the other, 
inhabited by many narrow, crooked men."4% Armstrong developed the 
theme that Wilson and McAdoo accepted the Federal Reserve System 
because of deception and pressure from Wall Street interests. Instead 
of ridding the nation of the Pujo Committee's "Money Trust," Armstrong 
contended that the Federal Reserve System established the "sordid, 
usurious, grafting, mighty money power" more firm ly than ever as arb iter 
of the nation's financial p o l i c i e s . 49 Relying heavily on antisemitic 
propaganda supplied by Henry Ford, Armstrong concluded that the Federal 
Reserve Act was the product of the international Jewish conspiracy and
47George Washington Armstrong, The Crime of ' 20: The Unpardon­
able Sin of Frenzied Finance (Dallas: Press of the Venny Co., 1922),
p. 6 . The volume was dedicated to Richard H. Edmonds: " I f  we recover
our freedom from the rule of the Money Lords . . . the victory w ill be 
due largely to his vision, courage, in co rru p tib ility , and sturdy Amer­
icanism." (Preface)
48 ib id ., p. 31. 49 ib id .
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its  lieutenants Paul Warburg and Bernard Baruci. In one sensational 
passage, he accused Wilson of agreeing to the Federal Reserve Act in 
order to keep secret some "undisclosed dark a ffa ir"  in his past.50 
More important, Armstrong analyzed the parallels between "the Crime of 
1873" and the Great Deflation of 1920. He observed that "the same 
in terest and the same greed that brought about the demonetization of 
s ilver brought about the enactment of the Federal Reserve Law and the 
deflation program in the same stealthy and fraudulent manner." The 
lesson of history was clear: Unless farmers organized and gained con­
tro l of the Federal Reserve Board they would face another th irty  years'
war paralleling the last th ird of the nineteenth cen tu ry .51 Armstrong's
position afforded exertion of some influence among farmers. A p ro lific  
w riter fo r the inflationary cause and Chairman of the Texas Southwestern
Cattle Raiser's Association Committee to Save the Industry, he fre ­
quently spoke before farm groups and cattlemen. His views were probably 
given th e ir widest circulation in the anti-Reserve outbursts of Alabama 
Senator J. Thomas H e flin .5%
This quartet of c ritic s  was largely responsible for developing 
"the Crime of 1920" thesis. Each dispersed and advanced the anti-Fed­
eral Reserve cause in his own particular, i f  not sometimes peculiar, 
way. Many farmers accepted as authentic the sta tis tics  and research 
of former Comptroller Williams. Edmonds brought the support of
SO lb id ., p. 80-83. S lib id ., p. 241.
S^u. S ., Congressional Record, 6 8 th Cong., 2d Sess.,
February 20, 1925, 4226-27; Armstrong, Crime of '20, p. 135; George W. 
Armstrong, "The Remedy," The Cattleman, X (March, 1924), p. 8 .
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in flationary business elements to the movement while Armstrong articu­
lated a revived Populism. The fourth member, Alabama's junior senator 
J. Thomas H eflin , who synthesized the arguments of the other three into 
widely noticed propaganda for the cause, became the chief orator of an 
anti-Reserve movement in the early twenties.
The classical southern p o litic ia n , H eflin , with his long ha ir, 
pince-nez, black frock coat, and white vest, proved one of the most 
popular orators of the era. One Senate opponent acknowledged that when 
Heflin spoke, the flags waved and the f i f e  and drum pulsated with patrio­
tism. His flamboyant s ty le , laced with B iblical quotations, homey 
poetry, and frequently with racist stories involving some hapless Negro, 
earned him a place in anthologies of demagogues and made him a hero to 
southern white farmers. An unfriendly, but fascinated, northern press 
dubbed the Alabamian "Tom Tom" or "Tom Quixote" for his penchant for
going on dithyrambic warpaths, often for lost causes.53 In the sutimer
of 1921, the Senator read John Skelton Williams, and found a new
cause.54 During the next four years he became the most vocal c r it ic  of
the Federal Reserve in Congress, often making a speech a week in a 
repetitive blasting of the Reserve System.
Heflin loved to appear as the defender of the people, who were 
exclusively white and Protestant. He had some genuine empathy for the ir
53john S. E zell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1963), p. 377. R. T. Tucker, "Don Tom of Alabama," North 
American Review, CCXXVI (August, 1928), pp. 8 , 57. Her!in D. M erritt, 
"Incredible H eflin ," Outlook, CXLVIII (February 1, 1928), p. 173.
W. Davenport, "Tom Quixote," C o llie rs , CLV (August 13, 1930), pp. 566-68.
54u. S . ,  Congress iona l Record , 67 th  Cong., 1 s t  S e s s . ,  J u ly  20,
1921, 4085.
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plight and displayed his best form when fighting against, the alleged 
injustices of Wall Street or the eastern establishment.^® He often 
quoted "Hickory Jackson," who, according to H eflin , told "Old Biddle," 
" I f  you do [contract the currency], damn you, I  w ill hang you." Heflin  
quickly made the Oackson-Biddle feud pertinent to the 1920's. "The men 
who inspred this deflation conspiracy in 1920 were criminals. They
deserve to be hanged."®®
H eflin 's criticisms of the Federal Reserve System were rooted 
in the economic conditions of his cotton-growing constituency, in 
regional prejudice, and in an acceptance of Populist economic doctrines, 
particularly the quantity theory of money. V irg in ia 's  conservative 
senator Carter Glass accused Heflin of advocating "printing press 
e c o n o m i c s . "®7 in fa c t, Heflin believed some deflation from the World 
War price levels inevitable, but i t  should have proceeded "slowly, 
gradually, and systematically" over "eight to ten years." Heflin also 
called the Federal Reserve System a "great" in s titu tio n , but through 
"maladministration" i t  became "perverted" into "an instrument of oppres­
sion and torture." The "hasty, drastic, and reckless" deflation proved 
the Board's mismanagement, resulted in catastrophe for the nation's 
common people and perpetrated "a crime against the people."®®
5®U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 17, 
1922, 1251.
56lb id . ,  February 28, 1923, 4871.
57lb id . , January 16, 1922, 1245.
58ib id . , 67th Cong., 1st Sess., August 15, 1921, 5013; Ib id ., 
6 6 th Cong., 3d Sess., December 13, 1920, 274.
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No "crime" Is without cause, and Heflin worked hard to inform 
the public of the motives which prompted the disastrous decisions of 
the Board. He firm ly believed in the conspiracy theory and thought 
that the deflation policy resulted from "secret meetings" and "star- 
chamber" proceedings. Secret meetings were necessary to hide the 
machinations of "greedy Wall Streeters," who "made m illions on the 
fa llin g  prices of farm products."5? i f  th is was not true, he asked, 
why had the Board delayed the announcement of its  new policy until 
a fte r  the farmer had his crop in the ground? I f  farmers had known the 
Board planned deflation , they would have avoided large-scale buying, 
embarrassing the eastern corporations. He cited the spring of 1920 
"when the farmer bought his fe r t i l iz e rs  a t top notch price," and asked 
"Where were the deflation ists then?" The Board deliberately waited 
un til the farmer was "tied up hard and fast and then, just a t the begin­
ning of the crop-moving time [J u ly ] , commenced its  deadly deflation  
p o licy ."60
Heflin believed that the "deadly deflation" was worse because 
i t  discriminated against a ll agriculture, especially cotton, which 
deflated " fu lly  f i f t y  per cent," compared with most commodities "which 
deflated probably 30-35 per cent." The Board refused to grant the 
cotton representatives' request to provide additional credits to enable 
farmers to withhold th e ir crop and wait fo r a rising market. The "mar­
ket manipulators of New York knew that i f  the Federal Reserve Board
59Ib id.
G O lb id . , 67 th  C ong .,  1 s t  S e s s . ,  A ugust 15, 1921, 5014.
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refused to le t  the cotton farmer borrow money . . . they would get i t  
at a low price real soon."61 Heflin 's habit of making his point as 
personal as possible made his style and appeal popular. "An individual 
farmer in my state . . . with ten bales of cotton at 40^ a pound had 
$2,000 worth of cotton. Under the deflation policy of the Federal 
Reserve Board, the price of that cotton was decreased by July, 1921, 
to an average price of $45 a bale or $450 for ten bales, so that 
three-fourths of the value of the farmer's cotton crop was destroyed 
in twelve months." Then he delivered his punch lin e , "Does [anyone] 
quarrel with me for fighting to relieve my people from the cruel bond­
age of such a board?"62
Heflin linked two of the alleged motives behind "the Crime of 
1920" to bonds and Republicans. He held that the farm recession of 
1920 played a partial role in a Republican plot to win the election 
for President Warren G. Harding. Rumors claimed that William P. G. 
Harding, governor of the Federal Reserve Board and a Wilson appointee, 
supported the Republican ticket against Cox and Roosevelt. Heflin  
charged that "the service he [W. P. G. Harding] rendered the Republican 
Party through his deadly deflation policy cost the Democratic Party 
hundreds of thousands of votes." To H eflin , the fact that the Repub­
licans retained the governor for over two years a fte r they took office
61According to the Bureau of Labor S tatis tics  Index, from June 
1920 through June 1921, prices of a ll commodities decreased 44.9 per 
cent, and prices of farm products declined 53.9 per cent. See Joint 
Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, Pt. I I ,  pp. 54-55.
62u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 17, 
1922, 1252.
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more than proved the accusation.63 H eflin , oblivious to the fact that 
the Depression of 1920 began while Wilson was President, attempted to 
place a ll blame for the agricultural recession on Republicans.
Heflin also blamed the Federal Reserve System for a policy
which drove the Liberty and Victory bonds out of the hands of the small
investor and into the clutches of "the bond sharks of Wall S treet."
He explained that once the depression h it:
The poor l i t t l e  fellow who held a bond could not borrow money on
his cotton. He could not borrow money on his c a ttle , and he
could not borrow money on his grain; and what did he do? His good
wife said to him, "John, I  believe I  would borrow some money on 
your Liberty Bond." He went down to the bank with the gilt-edged 
security of his Government, a gold bond, and presented i t ,  where 
he was told when he purchased i t  that he could present i t  and 
obtain money; and what did they te ll  him? They said, "The Federal 
Reserve Board w ill not allow us to lend money on government 
securities. They have stopped th a t."64
Consequently, the small investor, forced by the circumstances 
of a tight-money market, sold his bonds below par. Such a policy bene­
fite d  the speculator, not the patrio t. Heflin charged, "I believe that
63 lb id ., 1255.
64 lb id . , 67th Cong., 1st Sess., October 25, 1921, 6723. The 
bond policy of the government during the 1920-1921 deflation era was 
questionable and drew strong protest from both rural and progressive 
spokesmen. For example, see Robert La F o lle tt's  criticism s in the 
Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 27, 1922, p. 1769-71. 
John D. Hicks has w ritten, "The government was tightening up credit by 
buying up its  own bonds at discount rates, by June, 1920, $1,043 
m illion worth of them for $933 m illion . Why instead of these somewhat 
unethical transactions, could there not at least have been some re lie f  
from taxation?" John D. Hicks, Rehearsal for Disaster, p. 75. By 
increasing the discount rate on paper secured by government war bonds, 
the Federal Reserve System induced liquidation and depressed the price 
of Liberty and Victory Bonds. The Treasury reported that bonds declined 
from 95.31 in January 1919 to 85.99 in December 1920. See Report of 
the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, Pt. I I ,  pp. 77-79.
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the Federal Reserve Board proceeded with that deflation policy in part 
for the benefit of the bond sharks."65
H eflin 's prolonged and v it r io l ic  oratory had a cathartic but 
uncertain e ffec t. A member of the minority party, he brought about 
only minor changes in the Federal Reserve System. But he was a prime 
mover in organizing the farm bloc in the Senate and a popular speaker 
on the Democratic hustings in 1 9 2 2 . 6 6  Though his efforts fa iled  to 
achieve any major leg is la tion , his constant hammering against the evils  
of the Federal Reserve and Wall Street wore thin with the Republican 
Senate majority. During a discussion of farm credits leg islation in 
1923, Heflin delivered a typical acerbic attack on Republicanism and 
deflation and subsequently was declared out of order and requested to 
take his seat. The remarks that offended the Republicans were not 
unlike others Heflin had made dozens of times before, but Vice Presi­
dent Coolidge, over the protests of several farm Senators, took the 
unusual position that H eflin 's  attitude and bodily expression [ j i f  not 
his choice of words] constituted unseemly conduct for a United States 
Senator. Unchastened, Heflin thundered a characteristic re to rt when 
broached with the idea of apologizing to the offended senators:
65u. s . .  Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., October 25, 
1921, 6723; Ib id . , 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 17, 1922, 1252-53 and 
August 2, 1922, 10885.
6 6 chairman, Democratic National Committee, Cordell H ull, 
Washington, D. C ., February 16, 1923 to Senator J. Thomas H eflin; Jim 
McClintie, Chairman, Speakers Bureau of the Democratic National Con­
gressional Committee, Washington, D. C ., November 10, 1923 [s ic ] ,  to 
Senator J. Thomas Heflin; A. B. Rouse, Chairman, Democratic National 
Congressional Committee, Washington, D. C ., November 10, 1922 to Hon.
J. Thomas H eflin , U. S ., Congressional Record, March 3, 1922, 67th 
Cong., 4th Sess., 5285.
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"Apologize! I would see them further down yonder In the hot regions 
than a greyhound could run in a hundred years before I apologize."67 
A chorus of southern and western senators, a ll with basically  
rural constituencies, joined Heflin in condemning the Federal Reserve 
System. Among the f i r s t  to attack the discount policies of the Board 
was Oklahoman Robert Owen, co-author of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
In A p ril, 1920, as Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Commit­
tee, Owen began a chain of correspondence with the Federal Reserve 
Board objecting to the discount policies of the System. Contrary to 
the claims of the Federal Reserve apologists, the Chairman maintained 
that the imposition of a higher discount rate would have l i t t l e  effect 
on the speculator, "because the speculator has a specific p ro fit in 
sight . " 6 8  Owen believed that the higher rate hindered only legitimate 
business. On November 18, 1920, in a widely read le t te r ,  Owen con­
tended that the System ought to gear its  cred it arrangements to the 
needs of legitimate industries rather than base them on the lim itations  
of an arb itrary  reserve requirement. He reasoned that the basic dis­
agreement over Reserve policy between "liberals" lik e  himself, and 
"conservatives" like  Harding, was that conservatives wanted the System 
run "from the bankers view" rather than as a "public service."69
67jb id . , February 1, 1923, 2831-33; Ib id . ,  February 2, 1923,
2864-69.
6 8 jb id . ,  6 6 th Cong., 2d Sess., May 14, 1920, 7199.
69 lb id . , 7039-43; Senator Owen develops his attack in Ib id . , 
7199-7211; W. P. G. Harding's reply is found in Harding, The Formative 
Period, pp. 195-200.
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Other leading rural senators quickly concurred with Owen and 
H eflin . In the summer of 1921, Tom Watson of Georgia, in one of the 
las t battles of his colorful career, called fo r the removal of the 
en tire  Federal Reserve Board. He enunciated the old Populist demand 
for a national currency issued under exclusive authority of the govern­
ment.70 Maryland's Senator John W. Smith adjudged, " I t  ([deflation]] 
has gone too fa r. They D^RSj scattered th e ir  shot too much. They shot 
a t one class of people and are h itting  another c l a s s . " 7 1  in May, 1920, 
Ellison "Cotton Ed" Smith of South Carolina complained that farmers 
could not get cred it. " I f  you want to lower a house," he explained, 
"you can put jackscrews under i t  and le t  i t  go down gradually and in a 
proper manner, and you s t i l l  have your house when you have i t  lowered. 
But i f  you attempt to lower i t  from the top with a sledge hammer, you 
can lower i t  a ll r ig h t, but when you get i t  lowered you have not any 
house."72 Obviously, Smith thought the discount policies of the Board 
were smashing the agricultural industry almost beyond repair.
Again and again the conspiracy theme haunted much of the dis­
cussion regarding the a c tiv itie s  of the Federal Reserve Board.
V irtu a lly  every farm bloc spokesman reiterated the motif in some ver­
sion as did many of the progressives. George Norris condemned the 
"wrongful manipulations of the power vested in the Federal Reserve
7PNew York Times, 20 July 1921, p. 6 , contained one such 
address; see U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 
August 5, 1921, 4711-14; Ib id . , October 7 , 1922, 6104; Ib id . , S. J. 
Res. 84, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4031.
71u. S ., Congressional Record, May 14, 1920, 7042.
7 2 l b i d . ,  May 31, 1920, 7975.
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Board, through th e ir control over Federal Reserve B a n k s . C a mp a i g n ­
ing as the Progressive party candidate fo r President in 1924, Robert La 
Follette attacked the "conspiracy of wealth and deflation" that occurred 
about 1920. According to him, "the predatory group of banks and monop­
olies" through its  deflation program, caused bankruptcies, and destroyed 
labor and the f a r m e r . T w o  Republican senators who especially verbal­
ized the conspiracy nature o f "the Crime of 1920" represented the 
"radical Republicanism" of the Dollar Decade. Senator Edwin Freemont 
Ladd of North Dakota, who could speak as long as anyone on the subject, 
advocated nationalization of the entire system. Summarizing his fe e l­
ings, he called the deflation policy of the Federal Reserve "an immoral 
and conscienceless conspiracy against the people . . . almost treason."75 
The fie ry  Smith W. Brookhart also successfully used the conspiracy 
theme as the main thrust of his stump oratory during his Iowa campaigns 
in the twenties.76
7%enator George Norris, Washington, D. C ., December 11, 1922, 
to Hon. Frederick C. Howe, Machinists' Building, Washington, D. C ., 
George Norris Manuscripts, Library of Congress.
7 N^ew York Times, 9 October 1924, p. 3; U. S ., Congressional 
Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 26, 1922, p. 1769-71.
75u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
February 23, 1923, 4361 I 4357-70 1; Ib id . , 57th Cong., 2d Sess., June 21, 
1922, 9091-9100; Ib id . .  67th Cong., 3d Sess., November 22, 1922, 28-30; 
Ib id . , 67th Cong., 4th Sess., January 19, 1923, 1981-85; Peter Norbeck, 
a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, expressed simi­
la r  views. See G ilbert C. F ite , Peter Norbeck: Prairie Statesman
(Columbia: University of Missouri Studies, XXII, No. 2, 1948), . .
pp. 103-04.
76New York Times, 3 September 1925, p. 6 ; Reinhard H. Luthin, 
"Smith Wildman Brookhart of Iowa: Insurgent Agrarian P o litic ian ,"
Agricultural History, XXV (October, 1951), p. 190; U. S ., Congressional 
Record, 70th Cong., 2d Sess., January 17, 1924, 1081-86; Ib id . , Feb­
ruary 12, 1929, 3301-10.
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H eflin 's  accusations against the Federal Reserve found sympathy 
and support in farm circles. In one twenty-two page insert into the 
Congressional Record, the Senator published dozens of le tte rs  and edi­
to ria ls  from supporters across the land.7? "Go to i t , "  urged the 
Democratic State Chairman of Ohio, "and show up this conspiracy between 
Wall Street and the special interests. . . . "  and an attorney from 
South Dakota claimed the deflation of 1920 "places the so-called "Crime 
of '73" in the kindergarten class by comparison." A South Carolinian 
turned to Biblical precedent, "The Federal Reserve Board," he wrote, 
"has placed the South and West exactly where Joseph placed Egypt 4,000 
years since. He f i r s t  took the ir money; second, th e ir ca ttle ; and 
f in a lly , the ir land."
Messages of support also came from notable politicians and farm 
leaders. Among the la tte r  were le tte rs  from J. I .  Reed, President of 
the Minnesota Farm Bureau Federation, J. S. Wanamaker, President of the 
American Cotton Association, and U. T. Blackwell, publisher of the 
Cotton and Cotton Oil News of Dallas. Senators Cordell Hull of Tennes­
see, C. C. D ill of Washington, and former Senators James H. Lewis of 
I l l in o is  and W. E. Chilton of West Virginia also offered their encour­
agement to Heflin . Chilton boasted, " I own the largest Democratic 
paper in West V irg inia," with which he promised to "hammer" the issue 
of defla tion .78 Congressman-elect Tom D. McKeown of Oklahoma, one of
77u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., March 3, 
1923, 5284-5306.
78w. E. Chilton, Charleston, W. Va., February 7, 1922 to Hon. 
J. Thomas Heflin; Ib id ., 5299.
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several who enthusiastically offered to jo in  the battle with H eflin , 
chortled, "You have sure taken the hide o ff that bunch . . . you have 
pulled the mask o ff , so that people can see and understand the real 
fac ts ."79 Two other significant names which should be lis ted  among 
those who publicly endorsed H eflin 's position were ex-governor E. C. 
Stokes of New Jersey, a banker of considerable influence, and Henry A. 
Moehlenpah of Wisconsin, President of Milwaukee's Bankers' Finance 
Corporation. Like John Skelton Williams, Moehlenpah served as a member 
of the Federal Reserve Board under Wilson.80
The agricultural press held a common resentment against the 
Federal Reserve System. Successful Farming, Iowa Homestead, Capper's 
Weekly, American A gricu ltu ra lis t, The Progressive Farmer, The Cotton 
and Cotton Oil News, and Wallaces' Farmer excoriated the Federal 
Reserve. The Progressive Farmer, a southern journal dating back to the 
heyday of Populism, reacted early against the Reserve's deflation  
program. In June, 1920, editor Clarence Poe cautioned, "The Federal 
Reserve Board is pursuing a seriously mistaken policy in its  plan for 
restoring loans and cred it. . . . "  Admitting the necessity of some 
deflation of finished items like  cotton goods, Poe denounced any 
attempt to deflate the prices of raw commodities.81 He believed the 
credit resources available to agriculture were in s u ffic ie n t.82
79jom D. McKeown, Ada, Okla., April 29, 1922 to Hon. J. Thomas 
Heflin; Ib id . , 5298.
80h . a . Moehlenpah, President, Bankers' Finance Corporation, 
Milwaukee, Wis., September 25, 1922, to J. Thomas Heflin; Ib id . , 5306-07.
81The Progressive Farmer, XXXV (June 12, 1920), p. 14.
82 lb id ., XXXVI (May 21, 1921), p. 8 .
41
A fter reviewing the effects of the Depression of 1920 on the farmer,
E. T. Meredith, founder and editor of Successful Farming concluded:
I t  seems to me that one of two things is evident. Either 
those responsible for the interpretation of the [_Federal Reserve] 
Act are fa ilin g  to give farmers the treatment they need and 
deserve, or the Act fa lls  short of serving farmers, and steps 
should be taken to amend i t . 83
Capper's Weekly, the a lte r  ego of Kansas Senator Arthur Capper, devoted 
considerable ed itoria l space to denouncing the administration of the 
Reserve. During the summer of 1921, the weekly predicted an optimistic 
future but pouted that "in the meantime the less said about what the 
Federal Reserve did for agriculture the better for the temper of the 
men who know precisely what i t  did and how i t  did it."® ^ In his per­
sonal column. Senator Capper characterized the Reserve thusly: "The 
Federal Reserve renders a to ta lly  inadequate credit service to farmers 
where i t  renders any. I t  is a commercial banking in s titu tio n . Its  
paper shows i t  is providing one dollar of cred it fo r this country's 
eighty b illio n  dollar farming industry, to one thousand dollars of 
credit extended elsewhere."85
Henry A. Wallace, son of Harding's Secretary of Agriculture, 
maintained a more than casual interest in the money question. As edi­
tor of the family-owned Wallaces' Farmer, he relished a deserved 
reputation as a farm economist. Consequently, the magazine devoted
83[. T. Meredith, "Agriculture and the Bank, A Statement and 
Comment on the Federal Reserve Act," Successful Farming, XIX (December,
1920), pp. 11, 65.
G^ Capper's Weekly, XLVIII (August 13, 1921), p. 4.
85Arthur Capper, "K illing the Engine," Capper's Weekly, XLVII 
[January 15, 1921), p. 1 .
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more space than its  competitors to the relation of the Federal Reserve 
and monetary policy to the farm problem. As early as June, 1920, 
Wallaces' Farmer informed readers that "the Federal Reserve Board has 
gone just about fa r enough in the raising of the interest rates . " 8 6  
The magazine hinted that a 2 per cent reduction in the discount rate 
was in order. During the next year and a h a lf, Wallace scarcely 
allowed an issue to pass without inserting some reminder of the "wholly 
inadequate credit" resources available to farmers. In such editorials  
as "In fla tion  the Cure," "Federal Reserve Deflation," "The Menace of 
the Deflationists," and "How We Were Deflated," Wallace reflected the 
popular rural resentment of the Reserve System.87 Reminiscent of 
H eflin 's  arguments, Wallace stated that though the Reserve "is the best 
system we have ever had . . . i t  w ill be necessary to modify the law 
under which the system operates or to remove a large number of the 
Federal Reserve o ff ic ia ls  who are now interpreting the law . " 8 8
In more re flec tive  moments, Wallace understood that rural dis­
tress was not the sole responsibility of the Federal Reserve System. 
Though caustic in appraising the administrative leadership of the 
Federal Reserve System he recognized th e ir alleged blunders as only a 
partia l answer for the bleak economic picture which faced the farm 
industry. Whether his readers were as sophisticated in evaluating the
8 6 "What Tight Money Means," Wallaces' Farmer, XLV (June 18, 
1920J, p. 1611.
87"The Federal Reserve System," Wallaces' Farmer, XLVI (March 4,
1921), p. 4; and Ib id ., XLVI (June 10, 1921), p. 4.
8 8 "Country Bank Experience With the Federal Reserve Board," 
Wallaces' Farmer, XLVI (October 7, 1921), p. 5.
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role of the Reserve System in the depression was doubtful. Certainly 
Wallaces' Farmer did nothing to allay the farmer's suspicions of the 
Reserve System.89
Two of the "big three" national farm organizations, the Farmers' 
Union and the American Farm Bureau Federation, agreed that the perfor­
mances of the Federal Reserve System deserved harsh review.90 At its  
national convention in 1921, the Union adopted a report which condemned 
the leadership of the Federal Reserve for "d ictatoria l and unreasonable 
lim itation of agricultural credits." "This policy," the report 
explained, "is simply the continuation of the long standing scheme to 
dominate and control the nation's businesses, through financial manip­
ulation dictated by the great financial interests centered in Wall
89$ee le tters  by W. B. D. and H. P. M ille r , both in Wallaces' 
Farmer, XLV (December 31, 1920), p. 2891; Letter fay M. D. Wolcott, XLVI 
(February 4, 1921), p. 223. See the following ed itoria ls  in Wallaces' 
Farmer ; "Interpreting the Federal Reserve Act," XLVI (May 13, 1921), 
p. 5; "Better Credits for Farmers," XLVI (June 17, 1921), p. 6 ;
"Reducing the Reserve Requirement of the Federal Reserve System," XLVI 
(July 8 , 1921), p. 4; " In fla tion  the Cure," XLVI (July 15, 1921), p. 4; 
"How We Were Deflated," XLVI (December 23, 1921), p. 4; "Let's Go," XLVI 
(August 5, 1921), p. 4; "The Country Banker and Deflation," XLVI (Sep­
tember 30, 1921), p. 6 ; and an a rtic le  by Carl N. Kennedy, "Rediscount 
Rates Must Come Down: Revival of Farm Business Waits on More Liberal
Federal Reserve Policy," XLVI (September 23, 1921), p. 3.
90/\t its  1920 convention, the Grange, the most staid of the 
"big three" farm organizations, contented i ts e lf  with the adoption of 
a resolution urging Congress to pass "A personal short-time credit 
system for farmers, to enable them to meet the ir short-time credit 
needs for both the production and the orderly marketing of their crops 
throughout the year. . . . "  Patrons of Husbandry, Proceedings, National 
Grange, 54th Annual Session, Boston, November 10-18, 1921, p. 153.
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Street, New York."^! H o s tility  toward the Federal Reserve grew within 
the Union during the next decade. In 1923 a t the national convention 
at Omaha the Union fa iled  "by a small margin" to adopt a resolution 
calling for nationalization of the Reserve System.9% In 1927 at Des 
Moines, the Farmers' Union convention f i r s t  listened to "General"
Jacob Coxey and then resolved that "the government immediately take 
over the Federal Reserve Banking System . . . and that in fla tion  and 
deflation of currency and credits shall be absolutely in control of 
Congress."93 They not only opposed the alleged deflation program of 
the Reserve, but advocated outright in flationary proposals such as the 
soldier bonus and increasing the quantity of money in circulation to 
$50 per capita. The vigorous efforts of the Union to found cooperative 
agricultural banks provided further evidence that the organization fe l t  
alienated from the Reserve. The farmer banks they proposed were not 
only to compete with commercial banks but more fundamentally they were 
to provide "a means through which agriculture can control its  own
money."94
91New York Times, 15 November 1921, p. 7.
S^National Farmer's Educational and Cooperative Union of 
America, Minutes of the Nineteenth Annual Session, Omaha, Nebraska, 
November 20-22, 1923, p. 56.
93lb id . , 23rd Annual Session, Des Moines, Iowa, November 15-17, 
1927, pp. 8 , 47.
94ib id . ,  18th Annual Session, Lynchburg, V irg in ia , November 21-23, 
1922, pp. 68-70. See also Ib id . , 20th Annual Session, Oklahoma City, 
November 18-20, 1924, p. 6 ; and Charles S. Barrett, Uncle Reuben in 
Washington [Washington, D. C .: The Farmer's National Publishing Co.,
In c ., 1923), Chapter XIV, "The Deflation Debacle of 1920-21."
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The American Farm Bureau Federation, no bastion of Populism, 
differed from the Farmers' Union in its  b e lie f that the Federal Reserve 
System needed reform, not elimination. A fter studying the cred it s it ­
uation during the la tte r  part of 1920, the Bureau concluded that the 
depressed commodity and livestock markets resulted from two primary 
causes: the deflationary policy of the government, and the loss of 
foreign markets.95 J. R. Howard, Bureau President, wrote:
We have contended that the Federal Reserve has been to some 
extent responsible for an enforced liquidation and that i t  has 
not extended a proper proportionate cred it to the farmer. While 
the Federal Reserve Bank has been of tremendous benefit to the 
whole country i t  has not measured up to its  opportunities. I t  
has been too much an overflow tank fo r banks, and too l i t t l e  a 
reservoir of national credits functioning with the broad vision 
of a ll sectional needs.96
The rather temperate criticisms of Howard surfaced in the following
resolution adopted a t the Federation's 1920 National Convention: "We
are opposed to the policy of drastic and precipitate deflation, which
seems to have been instituted by our Federal Reserve Board. . . .
Reasonable contraction was necessary but drastic deflation as now
practiced has caused widespread d isaster."97
0. M. K ile , agricultural columnist and public relations repre­
sentative for the Bureau, expanded on the Federation's position in an
95j. R, Howard, "Farmer's Financial Problem As Viewed by the 
American Farm Bureau Federation," Successful Farming, XIX (November, 
1920), p. 9.
9GWeekly News Letter, No. 23 (June 9, 1921), p. 4.
S^The American Farm Bureau Federation, Resolutions Adopted at 
the Second Annual Meeting, 1920. Also see Gray S ilve r, The Money 
Question From the Farmer's Viewpoint (Chicago: American Farm Bureau
Federation Pamphlet No. 2, 1920), cited in Shideler. Farm C ris is , 
p. 41.
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a rtic le  for Successful Farming in January 1921.98 He wrote that 
farmers were indeed victims of cred it discrimination. While farmers 
owned one fourth of the entire wealth of the country and produced an 
annual gross wealth almost equal to that of a ll manufacturing and 
mining, they received "probably less than fiftee n  per cent" of the 
to tal cred it available through the Federal Reserve. As a partial explan­
ation for th is neglect of the credit needs of farmers, he charged that 
"the existing cred it system was devised and developed largely by urban 
bankers for urban needs. I t  was never planned to meet the farmer's 
needs. . . . "  The Federal Reserve made the urban orientation of the 
banking industry obvious, he said, when i t  only discounted paper of 
six months or less maturity. The farming business, Kile noted, "with 
its  long turnover periods," needed longer term credit than what was 
available. He also observed that high in terest rates and the decision 
of most country banks to stay outside the Reserve prevented "the bene­
f i t s  of the Federal Reserve System" from reaching "the Farm Borrower." 
During 1921-1923 the Farm Bureau determined to make the Federal Reserve 
more sensitive to the financial needs of the agricultural industry.
"The Crime of 1920" myth s ign ifican tly  influenced farm po litics  
of the twenties. By the end of 1922 v ir tu a lly  every southern senator, 
with the obvious exception of Carter Glass of V irg in ia , and most 
western senators of a progressive bent, jointed in an in flationary bloc 
in Congress. The myth and the bloc would prove su ffic ien tly  powerful
980. M. K ile , "The Money Question: Is the Farmer Getting His
Share of Available Credit? I f  Not, Why Not?," Successful Farming, XX 
(January, 1921), pp. 5, 36.
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to wrench several concessions from an antagonistic Federal Reserve 
System and a hesitant national administration. In the meantime, the 
term "the Crime of 1920" joined its  predecessor, "the Crime of '73" as 
a slogan representing conspiracy, in justice, and bankruptcy to the 
American farmer.
CHAPTER I I
UNCLE REUBEN IN WASHINGTON: THE FARMER LOBBY 
FOR EASY CREDIT, 1920
Throughout American history farmers were "foul weather friends," 
joining together during times of common d iff ic u lty  to demand re lie f .
Two new developments influenced the effectiveness of organized agricul­
ture in the 1920s. For the f i r s t  time since Jamestown, rural people 
comprised a minority of the total population, which contributed to a 
growing sense of class consciousness among farmers. They also devel­
oped more effective organizational structures. Between mid-1919 and 
mid-1920 at least four farm organizations installed permanent offices 
in Washington. These lobbyists included the Farmers' National Council, 
the Grange, the National Board of Farm Organizations (a llie d  with the 
Farmers' Union), and the youngest but most powerful, the American Farm 
Bureau Federation. These groups, and emphasis on establishing market­
ing cooperatives, gave the farmer better organizational tools than at 
anytime in the past.^
TMurray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790- 
1950 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), pp. 175-178; 
O rville  Merton K ile , The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades (Baltimore: 
Waverly Press, 1948), p. 64; James H. Shi deler, Farm Crises, 1919-1923 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), p. 26. For a his­
torical sketch of each of the organizations see Theodore Saloutos and 
John D. Hicks, Twentieth Century Populism: Agricultural Discontent in 
the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1951).
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The farmer's emphasis on cooperative marketing, farmer lobbies, 
and mutualization of rural interests, was an e ffo rt to imitate the 
business methodology which seemed responsible fo r the inauguration of 
the New Era of prosperity. The decade's emphasis on efficiency and 
cooperation enticed farmers to apply the magic formula, "business-like 
methods," to the ir own operations. In 1921, at the request of the 
Kansas State Board of Agriculture, Wall Street financier Bernard Baruch 
studied the problems of agriculture and concluded that a major fa ilin g  
of the industry was that farmers were individualists in an age of con­
solidation. Baruch wrote in his memoirs:
I t  was clear to me, as I studied the farm situation, that 
here was a glaring example of the ev ils  of unbridled competition.
. . . The great corporations of America, although often eloquent 
in praise of competition have nevertheless been b u ilt through 
cooperation, consolidation, and integration. I was so intrigued 
with the idea that farmers could take th is page from industry's 
book. 2
The advice to farmers to emulate businessmen and organize and combine 
was given so often during the decade that the phrase tended to become 
bromidic and superfic ial. Certainly few disagreed with Senator Carter 
Glass when he admonished, "Why not te ll  the farmer the truth and advise 
him, i f  he would escape the consequences of another such disaster he 
should organize."3
The campaign to transform the farmer into an organization man 
was based on the assumption that agriculture needed government aid to
2Bernard Baruch, Bernard Baruch: The Public Years, Vol. I I  
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I960), p. 156.
^U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2d Sess., Jan­
uary 17, 1922, p. 1242.
50
revive and prosper. As the whirlpool of depression sucked commodity 
prices to ever lower levels, farmers demanded that Washington rescue 
them from the ir predicament.^ But winning governmental favor proved 
d if f ic u lt  fo r the nation's fanners. Farmer's Union President Charles 
Barrett, in a book explaining his role as defender of "Uncle Reuben" 
(the farmer] at the Capitol, observed "In Washington things are done 
by the use of one or more of a t r in ity  of influences: the club, the
merit in the question submitted, and the t r a d e . B u t  the "bright­
eyed, keen eared, and soft-tongued" lobbyists of other interests were 
more dexterous at securing government largess than the disorganized 
"Reubens" of the country.® " I f  the farmers," Barrett lectured, "had 
taken the same in terest in legislation as did the railways, the Chamber 
of Commerce, [and ] the National Manufacturer's Association . . . the 
Federal Reserve Board would not have dared to disregard agriculture  
as i t  did las t year."? Farm spokesmen also suspected that the paucity 
of wealth in rural regions d irectly  resulted from the p a rt ia lity  behind 
government favors. One farm Congressman complained:
More than 80 percent of the wealth of the United States is 
located within less than one-fifth  of geographical area. . . .
The people within that zone do not work harder to produce th e ir
4oavid F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920, 
I I  (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., In c ., 1925), p. 103.
^Charles S. Barrett, Uncle Reuben in Washington (Washington,
D. C ., Farmers National Publishing Co., In c ., 1923), p. 69.
^National Farmer's Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 
Minutes of the Twentieth Annual Session, Oklahoma C ity , Oklahoma, 
November 15, 1921, p. 14.
?Ibid. , Minutes of the Seventeenth Annual Session, Topeka, 
Kansas, November 15, 1921, p. 14.
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large p ro fit  than the people in agricultural sections. . . .
The difference is that the people in the industrial zone have 
fo r long years enjoyed the benefit of special leg islation  
which gave them an advantage over the people engaged in agri­
cultural pursuits . 8
Early in the decade, farmers grew determined to shed th e ir  stepchild 
status and claim th e ir rightfu l inheritance. Agricultural leaders 
agreed that the key to such recognition would be found only in cooper­
ative e ffo rt.
Although the plea for government assistance sounded fa m ilia r, 
the plea contained a new insistence as farmers blamed the wartime pol­
icies of the government for th e ir post-war p light. In his annual 
address to the 1924 national convention of the Farmers' Union, Barrett 
complained that Washington had portrayed "a hungry, anxious Europe" to 
farmers "as a ba it to further the production effort" even into the 
crop of 1920. "Then came the fear of in fla tio n  tendencies . . . the 
depressive policy of the Federal Reserve Board and . . . the crash."9 
B arrett, as did most farm spokesmen, also blamed the government for 
rising taxes and for increased railroad fre igh t rates as a result of 
the Esch-Cummins Act of 1920. Senator Capper agreed that the govern­
ment mistreated farmers. The Kansan told the readers of his column;
We can finance a 26 b illio n  dollar European War . . .
European governments . . . American railways and . . . wild and 
wooly speculation. But we've got no money to lend to the hard- 
pressed young farm family struggling to pay fo r a home, nor to
8 y. S ., Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 2d Sess.,
January 7, 1929, p. 1296.
^National Farmer's Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 
Minutes of the Twentieth Annual Session, Oklahoma C ity, Oklahoma, 
November 18-20, 1924, p. 6 .
52
save from bankruptcy the men who have the ir a l]_ in  wool, the ir  
cotton, the ir livestock, or their grain. . . . ' 0
A disgruntled South Carolinian most tersely expressed the 
farmers' displeasure with Washington when he complained, "We are getting 
what's coming to us before time. Saint and sinner are squirming. . . . 
When the Government needed us i t  took us, now we need the Government 
and i t  is nowhere to be found, and the question naturally arises, 'What 
is  the use of such a one-sided a ffa ir? '
The impression that theirs was indeed an unrequited a ffa ir  
seemed underscored when the 1920 Democratic Platform fa iled  to respond 
to farmer complaints. Between the major party platforms in 1920, agri­
culture received better treatment from the Republicans, whose 
agricultural plank was the work of Henry C. Wallace. The Democrats 
seemed satisfied to rest their appeal on the past accomplishments of 
the New Freedom.
Agricultural representatives, b itte r ly  resentful of the Admin­
is tra tio n 's  insensitiv ity to the farm problem, found credence for the ir  
accusations in the attitudes of the Federal Reserve Board Governor 
William P. G. Harding and Secretary of the Treasury David P. Houston.
lOArthur Capper, "Just a Few Facts," Capper's Weekly, XLVII 
(November 10, 1920), p. 1.
T^ W. A. James, Bishopville, South Carolina to Senator E. D. 
Smith, Washington, D. C ., December 15, 1920, reprinted in U. S ., 
Congressional Record, 6 6 th Cong., 3d Sess., January 10, 1921, p. 1185.
TZshideler, Farm Crises, p. 34. For a discussion of Wallace's 
role in the election see Donald L. Winters, Henry Cantwell Wallace as 
Secretary of Agriculture, 1921-1924 (Urbana: University of I ll in o is
Press, 1970y, pp. 44-51.
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In his address at the 1920 national convention of the Farm Bureau, 
Harding did l i t t l e  to ease the strain when he defended the Reserve 
system from charges of discrimination against agriculture and urged 
farmers, suffering from the worst price break in a generation, to have 
"no feeling of undue depression or despair." He concluded that "indi­
vidual e ffo rt must solve the c r is is ."13 Secretary of Treasury David P. 
Houston proved equally devoid of constructive ideas in his testimony 
before a jo in t session of the agriculture committees of Congress. 
Houston frankly affirmed that his department had no solution for the 
problems facing the farmer—a position Eugene Meyer, a New York Banker 
and War Finance Corporation d irector, charged constituted "a confession 
of complete impotence in the present c r i s i s . "14
Farmers experienced more frustration during the las t months of 
the New Freedom as the lame-duck government doggedly pursued a policy 
of inaction. In September, wheat, livestock, and cotton producers 
personally petitioned the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury asking 
that something be done to enable producers to withhold th e ir produce
l N^ew York Times, 8  December 1920, p. 2.
14lbid. In his memoir, Houston asserted: "There was not a
great deal which could be done, except of a temporary character to aid 
the people in distress. Time alone, and the readjustment of the indus­
try  of this nation and of the world, could bring the necessary re lie f ."  
Eight Years, I I I ,  p. 108.
Houston, who had served as Secretary of Agriculture before his 
appointment to the Treasury, b itte r ly  disappointed farmers with his 
seeming aloofness during 1920. Barrett s a tir ic a lly  wrote that Houston 
had "one qualification which he regarded as of higher value than any 
ta lent a cabinet o fficer could bring to the aid of his associates. He 
had poise , . . during a ll the tortures in flic ted  on agriculture he 
never forgot, no matter what else was lo st, to take care that there 
should be no sacrifice of poise." Uncle Reuben, pp. 78-79.
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from sale until cotton rebounded to 40 cents a pound and wheat to $3 a 
bushel. On September 15, 1920, John S. Wannamaker, president of the 
American Cotton Association, led a delegation that called upon Governor 
William P. G. Harding at his Federal Reserve offices in Washington.15 
These representatives of the "hold the crop" movement hoped to gain a 
sympathetic response from Harding, a fellow Southerner, to suggestions 
that the Reserve System grant assurance that i t  intended to free ly  
discount warehouse receipts based on cotton. The delegation hoped that 
such assurances would result in increasing the amount of cred it ava il­
able to Southern farmers and help in maintaining prices for th e ir  
staple crop. But Harding believed the suggestion unwise and refused 
to acquiesce in the request.15 Wannamaker dejectedly reported that 
" . . .  a ll efforts to secure re lie f  proved absolutely unavailing."17 
, In mid-October, the American Cotton Association, the Grange, 
and the Farmers' Union invited a delegation of "d irt farmers" to 
Washington. During audiences with the Federal Reserve Board they 
requested a lower discount rate and easier credit. In a dramatic in ter­
view with Secretary Houston, the farm delegation applauded the 
emotional appeal of Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith of South Carolina when
15john S. Wannamaker's account of these meetings is found in 
U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 
Stabilizing the Prices of Certain Products: Hearing on S. 2964, 67th
Cong., 2d Sess., February 2, 1922, pp. 15-16.
15y. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., August 15, 
1921, p. 5016; W. P. G. Harding, ihe normative Period of the Federal 
Reserve System [Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1925), pp. 187-88.
1?U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forest­
ry , Stabilizing Prices of Certain Agricultural Products, Hearings on 
2964, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 1922, p. 15.
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he challenged the administrator: "You. Mr. Secretary, are the only
one who can speak the words to liberate us, God help you i f  you don't 
do I t .  We face ru in , and i t 's  monstrous and an o ffic ia l crime not to 
stop i t . "  Specifically the delegates asked that Houston approve the 
revival of the War Finance Corporation, thereby enabling farmers to 
finance th e ir European e x p o r ts .T h e s e  farm delegations fa iled  to 
affec t the policies of the Wilson Government. Disappointed, they 
reported the administration had received them with but "scant courtesy.
November and December 1920 witnessed no improvement in the 
relations between farmers and the administration. The national conven­
tion of both the Farmers' Union and the American Farm Bureau condemned 
the government's credit policies and the chorus of complaint was broad­
ened in testimony before a jo in t session of the Senate and House 
agriculture committees.20 At the national governor's conference annual 
meeting in December the condition of agriculture, variously described as 
"acute," "alarming," and "tragic," was the principal topic of guberna­
to ria l oratory. At the request of Governor W. L. Harding of Iowa, the 
conference, attended by more than half of the nation's statehouse exec­
utives, resolved that i f  necessary, "Congress should at once amend the
..19
TSNew York Times, 15 October 1920, p. 1.
T^Ibid. , 18 October 1920, p. 14; American A gricu lturalist CVI 
(October 23, 1920), p. 12; National Farmer's Educational and Coopera­
tive  Union of America, Minutes of the Seventeenth Annual Session, 
Topeka, Kansas, November 15, 1921, p. 14. Houston's account of these 
conferences is found in Eight Years, I I ,  pp. 103-105.
ZPNew York Times, 5 December 1920, p. 16.
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Federal Reserve law so as to temporarily supply additional currency^ 
and afford more time in which to pay to debtors in d is tress ."21 The 
governors also agreed to break trad ition  and send representatives to 
Washington to ask Congress to aid agriculture. Aside from easing 
cred it, the conference wanted Congress to create a foreign trade com­
mission to help finance commodity exports . 2 2
A fter suffering the rebuff of the Administration farmers looked 
to the fin a l session of the S ixty-sixth Congress for a redress of their 
grievances. The lame-duck Congress convened in December 1920 and 
immediately rural congressmen introduced numerous proposals for the 
re l ie f  of agriculture. At least seven representatives introduced reso­
lutions c ritic iz in g  the Federal Reserve and its  response to the recent 
commodity break. One resolution demanded that the Board lim it its  
maximum discount rate to 5 per cent, and another asked that Congress 
create a commission to investigate "the withdrawal of c re d it ."23
The major battle between the Administration and the advocates 
of farm r e l ie f  during the th ird session of the S ixty-sixth Congress 
concerned the revival of the War Finance Corporation. During the war, 
the corporation advanced money to railroads, u t i l i t ie s ,  and other busi­
nesses engaged in work thought necessary fo r the prosecution of the war. 
Due to the exhaustive use of the trad itional money sources by the
21 Ib id . , 4 December 1920, p. 12.
2^1bid. , 2 December 1920, p. 10.
23u. S ., Congressional Record, 6 6 th Cong., 3rd Sess., H. R. 
14480; S. 4560; H. J. Res. 397; H. J. Res. 400; H. J. Res. 401; H. Con. 
Res. 65; and H. Res. 623.
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government, such firms were unable to obtain money through ordinary 
banking channels. After the armistice, the War Finance Corporation 
received authorization to grant loans to American firms which extended 
advances to foreign buyers of domestic farm products. The post-war 
role of the corporation contained a double purpose. The revival of 
cash-short Europe allegedly depended on the flow of American farm prod­
ucts to the war-devastated countries. And by advancing credits to 
European customers, the government hoped to avoid a sudden drop in 
American e x p o r t s .B u t  Secretary Houston, anxious to get the govern­
ment out of the banking business, suspended the major functions of the 
corporation on May 1 0 ,  1 9 2 0 . 2 5  The suspension of the corporation's 
export credit functions tended to weaken the a b ility  of Europeans to 
pay for American commodities just about the time that the great defla­
tion of 1 9 2 0  got u n d e r w a y . 2 6
24Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, pp. 178-179; 
Eugene Meyer, J r . ,  "Uncle Sam, Money Lender: A Message from the United 
States Government to the American People," The Independent, ClI 
(April 17, 1920), pp. 82, 113-114, U. S. Congress, House, Eugene Meyer, 
J r . ,  "Financing Agriculture During the Emergency," Report of the Nation­
al Agricultural Conference: House of Representatives Document 195,
67th Cong., 2d Sess., 1922, pp. 63-70.
Z^Houston, Eight Years, I I ,  p. 108.
26[xport s ta tis tics  illustrated  that although the appetite for 
American farm products remained undiminished, a fter the withdrawal of 
aid , Europeans were unwilling to buy at wartime prices. The result was 
a shrinkage in the value i f  not the volume of American exports. For 
example, the value of the 12,846,000 bushels of wheat exported in June 
of 1920 was $37,509,000 as compared with 25,235,000 bushels exported in 
June of 1921 for only $39,921,000. Altogether between 1919 and 1922 
the value of farm exports dropped 50 per cent while the volume of agri­
cultural exports actually increased s ligh tly . Successful Farming, I I  
(October, 1921), p. 8; U. S ., Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 1935 
(Washington, D. C ., 1935), p. 633.
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Caught with abundant crops and poor prices, farmers sought 
foreign markets. Farm lobbyists convinced the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry to revive the War Finance Corporation (Decem­
ber 1920), "with the view of assisting in the financing of the 
exportation of agricultural products to foreign markets."2? Section I I  
of the resolution clearly demonstrated that the Corporation's rehabil­
ita tio n  involved the farmer's unhappiness with the Federal Reserve.
The section directed the Federal Reserve Board to "grant libera l exten­
sions of credit to the farmers of the country" and "at the lowest 
possible rate of in te re s t."28 According to the preamble the rationale 
fo r the resolution was based upon the in a b ility  of farmers to dispose 
of th e ir commodities "at prices that w ill pay the cost of production." 
Renewal of the Corporation was also needed because "The banks of the 
country are unable to extend credit to the farmer in order that the 
farm products may be held until they can be sold in a fa ir  and reason­
able market."29 The preamble and section I I  showed the conviction that 
the Federal Reserve System had somehow fa iled  and that a new credit 
resource for farmers needed to be created.
Although the Federal Reserve Board and the Wilson Administra­
tion opposed the revival of the War Finance Corporation, there was
27u. S ., Congressional Record, S. J. Res. 212, 6 6 th Cong., 
3d Sess., December 7, 1920, p. 18.
28 i b i d . 
2 9 l b i d .
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never much doubt about Congress approving Its  rehabilitation.^^ I f  
nothing else, i t  appeared a safe method of appeasing an aroused agri­
cultural industry. Much of the congressional debate centered upon the 
administrative and financial technicalities of the corporation.
Section I I  of the resolution directed the Federal Reserve to extend 
more libera l credits and brought sharp disagreement in the Senate— 
argument that reflected the divisive sectionalism produced by the 
Federal Reserve issue.
C ritics of section I I  claimed i t  was an ambiguous statement 
f i l le d  with imprecise phrases. Opposition senators disliked the notion 
that the Reserve System was somehow lax in performing its  duties and 
thereby responsible for the price break in farm products. Senator 
Carter Glass warned that section I I  "proposes to put the country not 
upon a reserve banking system, but upon an investment banking system,"3% 
because of the implication that the Reserve ought to finance the 
farmer while he held his crop for higher prices.
Defenders of the controversial section were frank in accepting 
some version of the "Crime of 1920" Federal Reserve Conspiracy thesis.
3Qcattlemen, V II (December 1920), p. 31. The cabinet was s p lit  
over the revival issue, but the President firm ly backed Houston in his 
opposition to the corporation. Houston described Wilson as becoming 
impatient with the topic at one cabinet meeting interrupting discussion 
of the subject by in terjecting , "Let's ta lk  about something more in ter­
esting. I t  is no use trying to reason with people into whose minds 
reason has never entered." Eight Years, I I ,  p. 110.
3^0. S ., Congressional Record, 6 6 th Cong., 3d Sess., Decem­
ber 10, 1920, pp. 157-170.
32 ib id . , December 7, 1920, p. 24.
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Senator Capper of Kansas asserted. "Lack of credit is choking agricul­
ture to death," and further concluded that the farmer had been made the 
"goat" of the deflation process.33 Capper's neighbor. Senator George 
Norris of Nebraska, argued that though "the two sections work together," 
the adoption of section I I  of the resolution was of more importance 
than the section reviving the War Finance Corporation. " I f ,"  he 
asserted, "the Federal Reserve section were adhered to , I have no doubt 
that most of these products w ill come up somewhat in value."34 During 
the debate nearly a dozen Southern and Western senators urged adoption 
of section I I  of the resolution. These farm state representatives 
stressed the discriminatory nature of the deflation process against 
agriculture, the need for a more generous credit resource for farmers 
and the hostile management of that "Frankenstein which has destroyed 
us," (.to quote Smith of South Carolina), the Federal Reserve System.35 
The opposition, however, forced the Agriculture Committee to 
revise section I I ,  c larify ing  the language, but more fundamentally, 
reducing the status of the resolution from that of a congressional 
directive to a mere expression of leg is la tive  opinion. George Norris 
produced the revised text. The compromise resolution read:
That i t  is the opinion of Congress that the Federal Reserve 
Board should take such action as may be necessary to permit the 
member banks of the Federal Reserve System to grant liberal 
extensions of cred it to the farmers of the country upon the 
security of the agricultural products not held by them by per­
mitting the rediscounting of such notes of extension at a fa ir  
and reasonable rate of in te res t.36
33lb id . ,  Dec. 10, 1920, p. 168. 34%^^,, Qgc. 13, 1920, p. 266. 
35lb id . ,  Dec. 20, 1920, p. 556. 36 ib jd . ,  Dec. 13, 1920, p. 257.
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In a classic example of sectional voting the Senate accepted 
the Nebraskan's te x t, 47 to 16. Not a single majority vote came from 
north of the Mason-Dixon Line or east of Wisconsin. Cotton, c a ttle , 
and corn remained united to pass the entire resolution, which was then 
sent to the lower h o u s e . 37
The resolution was assigned to the House Banking and Currency 
Committee and that committee struck, though not without some protest, 
both the preamble and section I I  from the document.38 The Senate 
agreed to the diluted version of the resolution because many who wanted 
section I I  were, nevertheless, anxious for the War Finance Corporation 
to resume operations.39 The mere revival of the War Finance Corpora­
tion was both a slap at the Federal Reserve and a t the Wilson 
Administration who had opposed the measure. J. Thomas H eflin , for one, 
looked upon the success of the resolution as a d is tin ct reprimand to 
the Reserve. "Do you know why we revived the War Finance Board?" he 
questioned. "We revived i t  purely and wholly because the Federal 
Reserve Board was not functioning properly."40
President Wilson, a fte r consulting Secretary Houston, vetoed 
the b i l l ,  stating that i t  was time to restore the "usual business 
methods." His veto message laconically observed, "One sad thing about 
war is that i t  leaves behind i t  a legacy of economic i l l s  and of
3 ? I b i d . ,  p. 282. 3 8 i b i d . ,  December 20, 1920, p. 550.
39"jo Sell Europe Our Surplus on a Tick," Literary Digest, 
LXVIII (January 22, 1921), p. 15.
40u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess.,
January 17, 1922, p. 1251.
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suffering from which there is no escape."41 Not w illing  to admit to 
such pessimism Congress quickly overrode the veto by a vote of 53 to 5 
in the Senate and 250 to 6 6  in the House.4% By ignoring the wishes of 
the President, the las t session of the S ixty-sixth Congress revived 
both the War Finance Corporation and the hopes, i f  not the immediate 
fortunes, of the nation's farmers.
41 Ib id . , 6 6 th Cong., 3d Sess., January 3, 1921, p. 876.
42ihe Senate vote is Ib id . , January 3, 1921, p. 878; the House 
vote is Ib id . , January 4, 1921, p. 949.
CHAPTER I I I
FARMERS AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EASY MONEY, 1921
During the Interregnum before the inauguration of Warren G. 
Harding, agriculture sought a program to present to the incoming admin­
is tra tion . V irtua lly  a ll of the farm group proposals gave some prio rity  
to the need to reform the Federal Reserve System and to improve credit 
fa c il it ie s  for farmers. In December 1920, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation announced that "after three months of observation and study" 
i t  had formulated a four-point program for the revival of the industry. 
The primary recommendation was that Congress amend the Federal Reserve 
Act, "giving the Reserve Board power to classify loans and vary rates 
on the basis of essentia lity ." Presumably the amendment would have 
denied funds to speculators and released funds to basic producers— 
especially fanners. The remaining three recommendations stressed sup­
port for the War Finance Corporation, the granting of credits to the 
former Central Powers equal to a portion of the funds held by the alien 
property custodian, and revision of the Federal Farm Loan Act, making 
i t  possible to discount securities based on warehouse receipts through 
the Federal Reserve System.^ Senator Arthur Capper presented another 
view of agricultural needs in his column of January 1921.
^Alastair Montgomery, "Ferreted Facts for Farmers," Successful 
Farming, XXIX (December, 1920), p. 8 .
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The Federal Reserve Act should be so amended that farmers may 
have equal benefit with business from this system. I t  should 
provide preferential rates for loans fo r productive purposes.
I t  should provide for loans on warehouse receipts that farmers 
may market the ir products in an orderly way. I t  should provide 
personal credit for improvements, machinery, improved livestock, 
seed, e tc . 2
Although Wallaces' Farmer agreed with the four-point program of 
the Farm Bureau, i t  campaigned throughout the winter of 1920-21 for a 
lowering of the discount rate fo r, as one a rtic le  asserted, "No other 
action w ill be as important in bringing to an end the financial storm 
through which we are now passing." In addition, the a rtic le  observed 
that lower discount rates would not become a rea lity  "unless the people 
demand them." "The practical thing for the farmers of the country to 
do," the magazine urged, "is to bring pressure to bear in every pos­
sible way to bring about such action.
In April 1921, organized pressure was applied when delegates 
from sixteen farm groups, representing th ir ty  states, arrived in 
Washington for ten days of conferences on the farm depression. During 
meetings with President Harding and his cabinet, such problems for the 
farm industry as fre ight rates, taxes, and credit were discussed. The 
farmer delegates seemed especially concerned about the relationship of 
the Federal Reserve System to th e ir  industry. Governor Harding of the 
Federal Reserve Board led many of the delegates in a round-table
ZArthur Capper, "K illing the Engine," Capper's Weekly, XLVII 
[January 15, 1921), p. i .
3Wallaces' Farmer, XLVI (February 4, 1921), p. 23; Carl N. 
Kennedy, "Rediscount Rates Must Come Down: Revival of Farm Business
Waits on More Liberal Federal Reserve Policy," Wallaces' Farmer, LXVII 
(September 23, 1921), p. 3.
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discussion on the topic of banking and agriculture. On April 22, a 
Farmers' Union contingent adopted a lengthy resolution which denied thi 
existence of agricultural surpluses. Instead, i t  cited the following 
"principal d irect causes" of the depression:
1. Unnecessary profiteering of middlemen, which includes specu­
la tiv e  gambling.
2. The arbitrary restrictions of cred it by the Federal Reserve 
Bank and the holding up of the Federal land banks by l i t ig a ­
tion.
3. The unreasonable rise in railroad rates.
"All o f these causes," the report announced, "have been created by 
autocratic economic power exercised under unjust laws." The document 
illu s tra ted  the discrimination farmers received from the nation's 
bankers by alleging that, though farmers furnished about 50 per cent 
of the deposits of the country, they received only 14 per cent of the 
Reserve system's total discounts. "The remedy for th is ,"  the broad­
side announced, "is to amend the law and require the Federal Reserve 
to a llo t  cred it in proportion to resources, and deny a ll credit 
d irectly  or indirectly  to speculation." The resolution fa iled  to say 
how the Federal Reserve System might e ffec tive ly  distinguish between 
speculative and nonspeculative loans.4
Aside from presenting the farm viewpoint to the new adminis­
tra i on, the April meetings should have put the "soft-tongued" crowd 
on notice that in the future they would have new competition for the 
favors of government. Farmers' Union President Charles Barrett, one
4u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., June 23, 
1921, p. 2963; Ib id . , June 7, 1921, p. 2208; New York Times, 12 April 
1921, p. 17; and 21 April 1921, p. 17; "Our Banking System and the 
Farmer," The Progressive Farmer, CXXXVI (May 21, 1921), p. 8 .
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of the principal organizers of the April lobbying e ffo rts , gloatingly 
boasted of th e ir achievements. "Many of you," he told the national 
convention of his organization in November 1921, "were at the great 
Farmers' Union meeting in Washington las t A pril. I t  has been declared 
by many authorities to have been the most impressive gathering of pro­
ducers ever assembled at the Nation's cap ita l. To that meeting is 
properly traceable the beginning of the end of the David P. Houston— 
[W. P. G.3  Harding policies." Barrett concluded that i t  was due to 
the agitation of organized agriculture that "the brakes were put on"— 
that the Federal Reserve was forced to ha lt its  deflationary policy.^ 
That B arrett's  recollections were more than vacuous bombast was 
attested to , interestingly enough, by Governor Benjamin Strong of the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank. Reviewing the events of A p ril, 1921, 
Strong, in a le t te r  to a friend, wrote: "Enormous pressure has been
f e l t  in Washington from the agricultural sections of the country that 
measures be taken to ease up credit conditions. . . . They made an 
impressive showing and th e ir complaints reached a ll classes of Con­
gressmen and executive officers of the government right up to the 
President." Though Strong believed i t  would have been wiser to "wait 
a few weeks longer" before lowering the discount ra te , he re a lis tic a lly  
admitted, "A bull-headed resistance in this situation is always liab le  
to invite  p o litic a l re ta lia tio n . . . ."^
^National Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 
Minutes of the Seventeenth Annual Session, Topeka, Kansas, November 15, 
1921, p. 10.
^Quoted in Lester V. Chandler, Benjamin Strong, Central Banker 
(Washington, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1958), p. 175.
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Governor Strong was not the only o ffic ia l who recognized that 
organized agriculture had to come to town. Toward the end of A p ril, 
President Harding directed the Federal Reserve Board to study the prob­
lem of deflating industrial values without also deflating the interests 
of agriculture. A New York Times correspondent reported that because 
of the directive from the President and the "determined pressure" of 
agricultural groups, the Federal Reserve Board discussed lowering the 
rediscount rate , readjusting railroad rates, and providing short-term 
credits for farmers based on warehouse receipts on stored farm commod­
i t ie s .7
In fac t, during April the Republican administration became con­
vinced that a lowering of the discount rate was in order. On March 29, 
Secretary Andrew Mellon announced that such a step would soon be neces­
sary, and in early April President Harding informed reporters that,
"The Federal Reserve Board has to lower rates generally to help the 
farmers. " 8  Before the April conferences adjourned, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston reduced its  rate on commercial paper from seven to six 
per cent and the following month the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
lowered its  rate from 7 to 6h per cent. Other reductions made during 
1921 reduced the general rate to per cent by December of that year. 
In May, the administration, a fter a v is it  by a delegation of eastern
^New York Times, 29. April 1921, p. 19.
^Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History 
of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
196377 p. 243.
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bankers, indicated that the financial men i t  had consulted were v ir ­
tu a lly  unanimous in the ir be lie f that the Reserve Board "held the key" 
to recovery.9 The implication that the discount rate ought to be 
lowered was welcomed by Wallaces' Farmer as proof that its  continuing 
campaign against high rates was c o r r e c t .T h e  conversion of the 
Federal Reserve System to an easier money policy seemed complete when 
Governor Harding Issued a statement sim ilar to the i l l - fa te d  section I I  
of the War Finance Resolution. "The banks of the country," the gover­
nor announced in June, "are urged to bear in mind the needs of the 
livestock industry, and to extend as libera l accommodations as circum­
stances w ill p e r m i t .C o t t o n  growers, remembering his opposition to 
a sim ilar statement for the ir industry in October 1920, must have been 
reminded that economic cycles do not always foster theoretical consis­
tency.
The major p o litica l development of the special session of 
Congress convened in April 1921 concerned the birth  of the farm bloc. 
Loyalty to special interests rather than to the common good was nothing 
new in American p o litic s , but the frank and professional way in which 
farm representatives organized the nonpartisan farm clique during the 
f i r s t  session of the sixty-seventh Congress surprised many po litica l 
commentators.12 The movement demonstrated a be lie f that government
9Wew York Times, 28 May 1921, p. 1. 
l OWallaces' Farmer, XLVI (June 10, 1921), p. 4.
11 New York Times, 7 June 1921, p. 16.
12$ee Successful Farming, XX (October 1921), p. 7.
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had fa iled  to show serious concern for the troubled farmer and was a 
natural reaction to hard times. Senator Capper, one of the organizers 
of the bloc, explained the origins of the movement when he wrote; "This 
crysta lliz ing  of sentiment is the natural outgrowth of long-present, 
long-accumulating, evil economic conditions affecting the agricultural 
industry, which precipitated by war, have culminated in the present 
cris is ."  Using a favorite analogy. Capper concluded, "Agriculture is 
sick and the farm group in Congress has organized to administer the 
needed remedies."^3
Henry C. Wallace, the incoming secretary of agriculture, 
in itia ted  the formation of the farm bloc which, iro n ica lly , was des­
tined to cause so much d iff ic u lty  for the Harding Administration which 
he served. After the November elections, Wallace met with various 
agricultural groups in his home state of Iowa and urged that a nonpar­
tisan farmer alliance be formed in the new Congress whose f i r s t  p rio rity  
would be "the solution of the country's agricultural p r o b l e m . "14
Gray S ilve r, lobbyist for the Farm Bureau, and Senator William 
Kenyon of Iowa presided over the in it ia l  meeting of the farm bloc.
May 9, 1921. Meeting at the Washington o ffice of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, two representatives of Secretary Wallace, a dozen 
southern and western senators, and Farm Bureau o ffic ia ls  discussed the 
possib ilities of farm re lie f  leg islation in the sixty-seventh Congress.
13"Farmers Party in Congress," Literary Digest, LXX (July 1921),
p. 14.
l^Donald L. Winters, Henry Cantwell Wallace As Secretary of 
Agriculture, 1921-1924 (Urbana: University of I l l in o is  Press, 1970),
p. 72.
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The group divided into four committees to expedite the passage of 
favorable leg is la tion . The committee to investigate "proposed changes 
in the Federal Reserve Act" was comprised of Ellison D. Smith (South 
Carolina), Frank Gooding (Idaho), and John Kendrick (Wyoming), a ll 
senators who had proven themselves articu late c ritic s  of the Board's 
deflation policies of 1 9 2 0 .
"The invisib le empire which now seems to be ruling us . . . the 
Ken-Cap-Klan," as Senator George Moses of New Hampshire disparingly 
referred to the William Kenyon-Arthur Capper led Senate farm bloc, 
confronted its  f i r s t  major challenge on July 5, 1 9 2 1 . ^ 6  On that date, 
majority leader Henry C. Lodge introduced a resolution to adjourn the 
Senate until the House acted upon the administration's t a r i f f  and tax 
b i l ls .  Agricultural bloc members realized that such a recess would 
probably k i l l  th e ir hopes fo r securing any re lie f  leg islation and 
opposed the move. After receiving telegrams from the 1,500 country 
Farm Bureau organizations who were alerted to the administration's move 
through the efforts  of bureau lobbyist Gray S ilve r, several Republicans 
joined the Democratic minority in resisting adjournment. The natural 
urge to escape the insufferable July heat led Senator Kenyon to admit 
he was "wondering why the Capitol was located in Washington anyway.
I N^ew York Times, 11 May 1921, p. 19. The other committees 
established by the bloc were Transportation, Commodity, Financing and 
Miscellaneous Agricultural B ills . See Arthur Capper, The Agricultural 
Bloc (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., In c ., 1922), pp. 9-12.
T6 u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., October 19, 
1921, p. 6471.
T^Ibid ., July 5, 1921, p. 3239.
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Yet, as Senator La Fo llette  observed, conditions in constituencies with
farmer m ajorities might make i t  ju s t as scorching fo r any senator who
enjoyed a vacation without f i r s t  passing legislation to a llev ia te  the 
18farm depression. Furnifold Simmons of North Carolina stated the
underlying question over adjournment was:
Does the Republican Party propose to throw up its  hands and 
say to the farmer, "We are unable to enact any legislation that 
w ill relieve you from the distressing situation in which you find 
yourselves" although that situation has been very largely brought 
about by . . .  an agency of th is Government—the Federal Reserve 
Board.19
The bloc's wishes prevailed, and the adjournment resolution fa ile d ,
24 to 27.20
The a b ility  of the Senate to remain in session despite the 
oppressive heat and the Republican administration proved crucial to the 
cause of organized agriculture. In the six weeks a fte r  the decision of 
July 5, rural leaders successfully directed six major b ills  through 
Congress. Half of them sprang d irec tly  from the "Crime of 1920" thesis 
and emphasized cred it as the primary instrument necessary to relieve  
agriculture. They were an amendment making Federal Farm Loan Bonds 
more marketable by raising th e ir in terest rate from 5 to 5% per cent, 
a b i l l  increasing the working capital of the Federal Farm Loan System 
by $25 m illion , and a b i l l  granting the War Finance Corporation more 
extensive powers to loan money fo r a variety of agricultural purposes.2 1
I S l b i d . ,  p. 3335. I ^ I b i d . ,  p. 3339.
20 l b i d . ,  p. 3341.
21John K. Barnes, "The Man Who Runs the Farm Bloc," World's 
Work, LXV (November, 1922), p. 51; Saloutos and Hicks, Twentieth Century 
Populism, p. 325.
72
George Norris, Nebraska's maverick Republican, as chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry inadvertently proved 
to be the catalyst which forced the Harding Administration to back a 
farm re lie f  measure of its  own in July 1921. After ten days of hear­
ings on the emergency conditions facing the farmer, Norris' committee 
endorsed a b il l  calling for the creation of a government-owned export 
corporation capitalized at one b illio n  dollars. The new public corpor­
ation would buy domestic surpluses and sell them on generous terms of 
credit to foreign buyers. The Norris b il l  also called for the export 
corporation to have free use of the merchant shipping b u ilt by the 
government during the war. To Norris the plan promised restoration of 
a mutually beneficial equilibrium between the half of the world that 
was starving and the half that was suffering, iron ica lly  enough, from
Op
surpluses. In addition to reducing surpluses a t home and providing 
r e lie f  abroad, Norris hoped the corporation would enable the farmer to 
liq u ify  his frozen assets—his commodities. " I t  is an absolute impos­
s ib ility ,"  the Nebraskan observed, "in large sections covering more 
than several states for a man to borrow a cent a t the b a n k s . T h e  
f i r s t  affirm ative speaker for the Norris b i l l ,  J. Thomas H eflin , pur­
sued the same thought, stressing the need for the export corporation 
because the "crazy curtailment of credits" had produced "slaughterhouse 
conditions" for farmers.
ZZCeorge W. Norris with J. E. Lawrence, Fighting Liberal: The 
Autobiography of George W. Norris (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945),
pp. 278-285.
23u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 19, 
1921, pp. 4043-44.
Z^ibid., July 18, 1921, p. 3977.
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Norris acknowledged that his was an extraordinary proposal:
"this is an emergency measure," he explained, " I would not under normal 
conditions favor this b ill."^ ^  The Harding Administration, especially 
Henry C. Wallace and Andrew Mellon, looked upon the measure as a rad­
ical innovation—not called for even in the cheerless circumstances of 
depression. They objected that the b i l l  "put government in business" 
and constituted an inexcusable misuse of government. ^ 6  After hearing 
warnings that unless some alternative to the export corporation b il l  
was substituted the b i l l  might receive Congressional approval, the 
Harding Government announced i t  favored yet another revival of that 
Lazarus of early twenties farm leg islation—the War Finance Corporation.
The rejuvenation of the corporation over Wilson's veto in 
December was limited and tentative—awaiting the new administration's 
review of the agency. Six months a fte r its  December restoration the 
corporation had planned financing for only $63 m illion worth of commod­
it ie s , a rather small percentage of the approximately $7 b illio n  of 
American goods exported during the year. In the six-month interval 
afte r its  resurrection, the corporation financed no wheat and only 
about 2 per cent of a ll cotton exports. Its  miniscule impact prompted 
Senator Gilbert Hitchcock to liken the corporation's effect on American 
exports to "a mere f ly  b ite ."27 Nevertheless the Harding Administration
2 5 l b i d . ,  July 19, 1921, p. 4043.
26por Wallace's opposition to the Norris b ill see Winters,
Henry Cantwell Wallace, pp. 83-84.
27u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., August 3, 
1921, pp. 4574-81.
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proposed to resuscitate and substitute the War Finance Corporation for 
the Norris plan.
Essentially the administration's Kellogg b i l l  proposed lim ited  
assistance in the marketing and financing of farm crops. Specifically  
the Kellogg b i l l  empowered the War Finance Corporation to lend money 
to a large variety of producers and handlers of agricultural commodi­
ties and livestock including individuals, businesses, cooperatives, 
banks, and trust companies. The b il l  authorized the War Finance Cor­
poration to buy agricultural paper from these same concerns (provided 
i t  was properly secured) up to a to tal of $1 b illio n . I t  was hoped 
that the loans and enhanced liq u id ity  of farm paper would have a salu­
tary e ffect on the industry.28 The Norris plan and the Kellogg b i l l  
differed in several ways. The Norris b i l l  promised d irect r e l ie f ,  
creating an export corporation to pay cash to farmers for the ir crops 
and livestock fo r sale abroad. Norris also hoped to stimulate pur­
chases through extending generous cred it terms to foreign buyers. The 
Kellogg b i l l  proposed indirect r e l ie f ,  lim iting the role of the War 
Finance Corporation to that of a cred it agency which hoped to promote 
a more orderly marketing of farm products. The b i l l  lim ited loans to 
domestic borrowers. The real choice between the Norris and the Kellogg 
b ills  was one of scale--a decision between "big and l i t t l e  action ."29
Reviewing the struggle of farmers during the post-war years, 
the New Republic concluded in 1924 that "The farmer as a whole is not
28 lb id ., July 26, 1921, p. 4289. 
29$hideler, Farm C ris is , p. 159.
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yet a class. He is only a crowd."^0 The debate over the Norris and 
Kellogg b ills  demonstrated the sagacity of the magazine's observation. 
Once again the historic d iff ic u lty  of uniting the divergent elements 
within agriculture behind any specific policy was underscored. In the 
fig h t over the Norris and Kellogg b i l ls ,  farmer partisans displayed a 
zest for intramural brawling which le f t  the farm bloc increasingly 
splintered and impotent.3^
The strategy of the administration against the Norris b i l l  
hinged on fragmentizing the farm bloc. The administration especially 
courted cotton senators. As the debate heated, the War Finance Corpor­
ation fortuitously announced new loans fo r cotton exports and President 
Harding in itia te d  fla tte rin g  discussions with leading southern senators. 
These overtures met success. The Senate Agricultural and Forestry 
Committee reversed its  ea rlie r decision and voted ten to two to replace 
its  chairman's export corporation proposal with the Kellogg b i l l .  The 
cotton bloc, perhaps hesitant at the frankly experimental nature of 
the Norris approach, was attracted to the apparent generous credit 
features of the administration-sponsored b i l l .  Senator Furnifold M. 
Simmons, one of the leading deserters of the Norris position, argued 
that "the export problem was not by any means the most important prob­
lem" facing farmers. "The most important problem today," he affirmed, 
"is the financing of the domestic requirements of agriculture."
30"The Farmer is Waking Up," New Republic, XXXVIII (April 16,
1924), p. 198.
31 For s ta tis tica l proof of the lack of farm bloc cohesiveness 
see Patrick G. O'Brien, "A Reexamination of the Senate Farm Bloc, 1921- 
1933," Agricultural History, XLVII (July, 1973), pp. 248-263.
76
Simmons explained that "vaults have been fu ll of what the Reserve 
Board has declared to be frozen credits, excluded from the Federal 
Reserve Banks by reason of the fact that they were lent upon what the 
Board called speculative ventures. . . . "  The principal advantage of 
the Kellogg b i l l ,  Simmons maintained, was that "these securities would 
a ll  be made available fo r the purpose of borrowing money from the
Finance Corporation."32
The following comment from a southern farm paper, the Progres­
sive Farmer, further illu s tra ted  the tenacious hopes many 
agricu lturalis ts  placed in the War Finance Corporation:
The significant facts of its  Tthe War Finance Corporation] 
operation are that i t  w ill serve as a check upon the extreme 
deflation as practiced by the Federal Reserve Board, and w ill 
open an outlet through which farmers benefit by gradually 
marketing the farm products they are now holding.33
Cotton senators and others who had taken the lead in exposing the 
"Crime of 1920" were s t i l l  more intent upon correcting the credit short­
age than in facing the problem of that wretched abundance--the crop 
surplus.
Senator Kellogg, with the aid of parliamentary trickery and the 
connivance of Vice President Calvin Coolidge, introduced the adminis­
tration  b i l l  on July 26, 1921. The tactics surprised and embittered 
Norris and resulted in acerbic and personal polemics between the
32u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 28, 
1921, pp. 4345-46.
33progressive Farmer, XXXVI (January 15, 1924), p. 8 . Another 
southern journal to support the WFC primarily because of its  credit 
features was The Cattleman. See V II I  (May, 1922), p. 32, and V III  
(A p ril, 1922), p. 31.
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two senators. Norris, "the Gentle Knight." In a furious three-day 
address disparaged, among other things, Kellogg's farm credentials.
The Nebraskan scathingly observed that his adversary "was always doing 
something for the farmer, being a real farmer himself—a sc ien tific  
farmer, with a large lib rary  of farming books." Among the volumes one 
might find in Kellogg's collection, Norris needled, were "a morocco- 
bound volume entitled  'The Relation of Golf to Chicken Raising' and 
'Hoyle on Other G a m e s . A s  fo r the administration b i l l ,  the Nebras­
kan conceded, " I t  is better than nothing. . . . But this new b i l l ,  
with a halo of regularity about i t ,  provides nothing for the producer." 
Instead, "the b i l l  deals with bankers, with middlemen, and with trust 
companies, and confers a ll its  favors upon them."35 His opponents 
reciprocated the lack of gentlemanliness, and the fig h t le f t  him ex­
hausted, i l l ,  and defeated as Congress adopted the administration 
substitute. Norris la te r recalled, "The defeat of that legislation  
was the greatest single disappointment of a ll of my public service in 
Congress."35
The revived War Finance Corporation, before its  liquidation in 
1929, lent $296,997,962.47 for agricultural purposes. The money made 
l i t t l e  impact on agricultural exports during the decade. The corpora­
tion did rediscount the paper of country banks which had proved
34g. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 28, 
1921, p. 4378.
3 5 l b 1 d . ,  p. 4376.
35Norris, Fighting L iberal, p. 284. Of course the farm bloc 
soon incorporated the Agricultural Emergency Act of 1921 into its  cata­
log of achievements. See Weekly News Letter, I (September 1, 1921).
78
temporarily uncollectible because of the general economic slump.3?
By the end of 1921 the corporation had created an auxiliary banking 
system composed of th irty-three agencies scattered around the agricul­
tural regions of the country with the responsibility of approving the 
securities offered for discount. The cost to the farmer-borrower,
8  per cent in terest, and the fact that loans were granted only upon 
sound collateral convinced many that the War Finance Corporation was 
not very helpful. The Fargo Courier News, reflecting the views of its  
Non-Partisan League sponsors, insisted that the corporation was "a gold 
brick fo r farmers," commenting that i t  was "controlled by big business" 
and "permitted gamblers to rob both American producers and European 
c o n s u m e r s . "38 Nevertheless, the reinforcement of weaker banks through 
the corporation's rediscount fa c il it ie s  helped some country banks 
remain solvent and undoubtedly enabled, though in d irec tly , many farmers
37War Finance Director Eugene Meyer, J r . ,  te s tifie d  that from 
January 4, 1921, to April 29, 1922, the corporation had lent an aggre­
gate of $341,697,000. Of that sum, $63,784,000 represented advances 
to cooperative marketing associations, $268,947,000 went to banking 
and financing institu tions, while only $8,966,000 was lent to exporters. 
Meyer explained that about 80 per cent of the corporation's loans were 
granted to state bank and trust companies--usually rural ones. The 
director concluded: "This indicates the need of a rediscount fa c il ity
for the country's banks." He further indicated that one reason such a 
fa c il i ty  was needed was that only 1,595 of the 11,000 state banks had 
jointed the Federal Reserve System. U. S ., Congress, House, Committee 
on Banking and Currency, War Finance Corporation: Hearings, 67th Cong.,
2d Sess., May 3, 1922, pp. 3-15.
^^Literary Digest, I I I  (September 17, 1921), p. 13. The Grange 
also protested against the high cost of War Finance Corporation loans. 
See Journal of Proceedings of the National Grange of the Patrons of 
Husbandry, F if ty - f i f th  Annual Session, Portland, Oregon, 1921.
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to escape mortgage foreclosure,^^
In April 1921, the Washington Farmers' Conferences petitioned 
Congress for the appointment of a jo in t commission of inquiry to deter­
mine "what is wrong with agriculture" and to recommend corrective 
leg islation to combat "discovered and established e v ils ."^0 In response 
to that request, the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, composed 
of five  members from each house, began hearings in August under the 
authority of a Senate concurrent resolution.41 Representative Sydney 
Anderson of Minnesota chaired the Commission's proceedings.
Determined to get the view of the d ir t  farmer before the com­
mission, the American Farm Bureau conducted hearings in more than 500 
counties during mid-July. The hearings were mock inquests into the 
depression with the local agricultural county agents generally serving 
as the prosecuting attorneys. Farmer testimonies frequently cited the 
Federal Reserve Board and its  policy of deflation as an accomplice in 
the "Crime of 1920." The tabulated results of the tr ia ls  were sent to 
the jo in t commission for its  perusal fo r, as one farmer urged, "Let us 
hurry up and set down just what we farmers have been saying and thinking 
before someone comes along and argues us out of i t . "42
39House, War Finance Corporation, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., May 3, 
1922; Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, pp. 179, 183; 
Eugene Meyer, J r . ,  "Lending Two M illion a Day," Country Gentleman, 
LXXXVII (April 8 , 1922), pp. 12, 24; Saloutos and Hicks, Twentieth 
Century Populism, pp. 330-31; Shideler, Farm Crises, pp. 195-97.
4PNew York Times, 21 April 1921, p. 17.
41u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., June 7,
1921.
4^H. R. O'Brien, "Farmer Woes," Saturday Evening Post, XIX 
(October 22, 1921), p. 21; Weekly News L e tte r, I iJuly 7, 1921).
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Among the f i r s t  witnesses to appear before the jo in t commission 
was former Comptroller John Skelton Williams. In two days of inflamma- 
tory testimony Williams developed the "Crime of 1920" thesis, claiming 
there was "abundant ground fo r complaints of discrimination by farmers 
generally" against the Federal Reserve System. As Williams presented 
his views before an audience divided between senators and representa­
tives a llie d  with the farm bloc, and Federal Reserve o ffic ia ls  and 
th e ir  associates, warm shouts of "lies" and other disclaimers pene­
trated the discussion. During one such verbal interchange the New York 
Times reported: "Governor Harding charged across the committee room,
swinging his f is t ,  but was halted by struggling associates just in 
front of his adversary [W illiam s] who remained cool, but was rising for 
the threatened encounter."43 The commission was as divided as the 
audience over Williams' accusations against the Reserve. When Chairman 
Anderson sustained a point of order raised against the inclosure in 
the printed record of artic les  and speeches in which Williams took 
issue with the Reserve, an appeal on the ruling s p lit  the commission 
fiv e  to four in favor of printing the Williams m ateria l.*4
More valuable to the commission than the oratorical joustings 
were the s ta tis tica l compilations and studies of a group of economists 
headed by Wilfred I .  King of the University of Pennsylvania. Based on
43New York Times, 3 August 1921, p. 21; and 4 August 1921, p. 1
44Those voting to prin t the Williams data were Senators Pat 
Harrison, Miss., Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., and Congressmen Ten Eyck, 
New York, Frank H. Funk, 111., and Hatton Summers, Texas. Those 
opposed were Senators Arthur Capper, Kan., Charles McNary, Oregon, 
and Congressmen Sydney Anderson, Minn., and Ogden M ills , New York.
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th e ir  research and on the hearings of the commission, four copious 
reports were issued which provided a d e fin itive  examination of the 
status of the agricultural industry.*5 The second report entitled  
C redit, issued in January 1922, contained a history and evaluation of 
the relationship between the Federal Reserve System and the agricul­
tural depression. The study exonerated the Reserve from charges of 
conspiracy or intentional discrimination against the farmer, though the 
report stated d iff ic u lt ie s  experienced by the agricultural industry 
"are due in a measure to the credit restrictions and lim itations of the 
past eighteen months, and in part to the fact that the banking machinery 
of the country is not adequately adapted to the farmer's require­
ments. " ^ 6  In summary the report accused the reserve of committing 
"mistakes of judgment . . . which the clearer judgment of retrospect 
would change."47
Specifically the commission described reserve o ffic ia ls  as 
sluggish and inexpert in developing a discount policy in both 1919 and 
1921. Reviewing events of 1919, the commission accused the Treasury 
Department of cajoling the Reserve System into maintain ng an a r t i f i ­
c ia lly  low discount rate until November 1919, in order to expedite the 
sale of Victory Bonds and to ease the refinancing of the government debt.
45issued from December 1921 to March 1923, the reports were: 
Part 1, The Agricultural Crisis and Its  Causes; Part 2, Credit; Part 3, 
Transportation; and Part 4, Distribution and Marketing.
46u. s ., Congress, House, Joint Commission of Agricultural 
Inquiry: House Reports, Vol. 3, Part 2, C redit, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1921, p. 7.
4 7 i b i d . ,  p. 15.
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Instead of raising the discount rate e a rlie r  in 1919, the Federal 
Reserve Board relied on moral suasion, imploring banks to discriminate 
between essential and speculative loans. By midyear the economy, 
suffering from in fla tio n , speculation, and imprudence, demonstrated 
the ineffectiveness of a policy based on voluntary restra in t. The 
Reserve, however, continued its  policy of inaction. The Joint Commis­
sion of Agricultural Inquiry's report on cred it specifica lly  condemned 
the Reserve's la issez-fa ire  position. The report noted, " I t  is the 
opinion of the Commission that a policy of restriction  of loans and 
discounts by advances in the discount rates of the Federal Reserve 
Banks could and should have been adopted in the early part of 1919." 
Had such a policy been adopted, "Much of the expansion, speculation 
and extravagance which characterized the postwar period could have 
been avoided."48
The Commission also accused the Reserve of miscalculating when 
i t  delayed lowering discount rates until April 1921, almost a year 
afte r farm prices began to f a l l .  The Commission believed that both 
bank reserves and deflation were su ffic ien t to allow for an e a rlie r  
reduction in the discount r a t e . 49 In short, the Reserve compounded
48 i b i d . , p. 12. Not a ll agriculturists were impressed with 
such a conclusion. Representative Otis Wingo, Arkansas, the ranking 
Democrat on the House Banking and Currency Committee, complained of 
the Joint Commission's report: "In other words, the farmer was skinned
a year too la te ."  U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 
May 23, 1922, p. 7503.
49Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry,
Part 2, Credit, p. 13.
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i ts  mistakes. After fa ilin g  to boost rates once in fla tio n  became 
obvious in 1919, the Reserve reversed its  error through its  sluggish 
response to the deflationary trough of 1920-1921.50
Representative Ogden L. M ills dissented from the majority report 
and in a minority opinion defended the Federal Reserve from the com­
mission's accusations. Hoover's future secretary of the treasury wrote 
that he disagreed with the assumption that had the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem lowered the discount rate la te  in 1920, deflation would have been 
ameliorated. He argued that the Federal Reserve System, through its  
cred it fa c il it ie s  (including discount rates), v/as impotent to affect 
the level of prices. He f e l t  that the in a b ility  of the Reserve to 
assert firmer control over the economic milieu of 1920 was due to two 
developments: (1) that only about a th ird  (9,480 of 28,210) of the
SOrhe experience of 1920-1921 represented the f i r s t  attempt by 
the Reserve to manipulate the discount rate under normal circumstances. 
Prior to the war the system was engaged in organizational work. From 
the outbreak of war and through most of 1919 the Reserve was subordi­
nate to the demands of the treasury. The 1920-1921 experience was the 
f i r s t  attempt by the Reserve to handle the discount rate free of 
abnormal conditions and some clumsiness marked the board's e ffo rts . 
Their confused and contradictory pronouncements regarding the efficacy  
of the discount rate as a means of cred it control were documented by 
Anna Youngman who marveled at the "catholicity" of the Reserve's incom­
patible policy statements issued during 1919-1920. See Anna Youngman, 
"The Efficacy of Changes in the Discount Rates of the Federal Reserve 
Banks," American Economic Review, XI (September 1921), pp. 469-70.
Closely associated with the freshman qualities of inexperience 
exhibited by the Reserve was the fact that the system suffered from 
structural defects. Paul M. Warburg, v;ho helped the Wilson government 
create the Reserve, complained that Congress, out of fear of Wall 
Street domination, established a system that was too fragmented.
Warburg argued that decentralization proved detrimental to both the 
agricultural reserve d is tric ts  and to a Federal Reserve Board that was 
"not entire ly  master in its  own house." Warburg, The Federal Reserve, 
I I ,  pp. 761-63.
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nation's banks belonged to the Reserve System; (2) that the Reserve's 
discount rates were continuously below market rates during 1920. "For 
instance," M ills  asked, "what efficacy can the decrease in the redis­
count rate of a Federal Reserve Bank from 7 to 6 per cent have on a 
western or a southwestern bank charging 8, 10, or 12 per cent?" To 
M ills the obvious conclusion was that since the situation was beyond 
the Reserve's a b ility  to control, i t  [th e  Reserve] should not be held 
accountable for the depression of 1920. He summarized;
F ina lly , while i t  can not be conclusively proved that credit 
stringency was not an in it ia l  contributing factor to price 
deflation , there is no evidence to show that i t  was. By this I 
do not mean to state that once prices started to drop, i t  was 
not the cause of much hardship and, in many cases of increased 
losses. Quite the contrary, i t  was. But I  do not believe that 
increased interest rates and contracting credit were the primary 
causes of the sharp price deflation which characterized the 
second half of the year 1920.51
The Commission's in a b ility  to agree on the relationship of the 
Federal Reserve to the farmer and deflation foreshadowed an encompassing 
controversy that embroiled both contemporaries and historians of the 
farm c ris is . Wallaces' Farmer, the champion of lower discount rates, 
in response to the Part 1 of the Joint Commission's report.
51 Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 
"Minority Report of Ogden L. M ills ,"  Part 2, C redit, pp. 158-59.
Perhaps the most frequently cited study of the postwar agricul­
tural crises and the Federal Reserve is Arthur S. Link, "The Federal 
Reserve Policy and the Agricultural Depression of 1920-1921," Agricul­
tural History, XX (July 1945), pp. 166-75. In his essay Professor Link 
fu lly  embraced the views of Ogden L. M ills , the Joint Commission's lone 
dissenter. "Ogden L. M ills . . . in my opinion," wrote Link, "offers 
a fa ir ly  conclusive answer to the Joint Commission's inuendo that there 
was a connection between increased discount rates and fa llin g  farm 
prices." Ib id . , p. 171.
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ed ito ria lized  that the document "is fu ll of information pointing to the 
need for further reduction of discount ra tes ."52 William P. G. Harding, 
governor of the Reserve Board, discovered that taken as a whole the 
findings of the Commission were "a d is tinct disappointment to its  [th e  
Reserve's] c r it ic s ,"  though the governor believed that some of the 
opinions contained in the document were "concessions to b ias."53 The 
reports of the Joint Commission of Inquiry, though an immense source of 
information, changed few minds regarding the role of the Federal 
Reserve during the agricultural c ris is . Because of this enigma, the 
Commission and its  findings, like  most everything else connected with 
the "Crime of 1920," became an object of controversy.^^
Among farm spokesmen, Charles S. B arrett, president of the 
Farmers' Union and the in it ia l  promoter of an investigation into the 
status of agricultural a ffa irs , vociferously c ritic ized  both the
52Kennedy, "Rediscount Rates Must Come Down," Wallaces' Farmer, 
XLVI (September, 1921), p. 1.
53william Proctor Gould Harding, The Formative Period of the 
Federal Reserve System (Boston and New York: Houghton M ifflin  Co.,
1925), pp. 220-21.
S^The "Crime of 1920" has been revisited by several scholars. 
Relevant works not specifica lly  referred to elsewhere in this chapter 
are George W. Dowrie, "Did Deflation Ruin the Farmer and Would In fla tion  
Save Him?," Journal of Farm Economics, V II (January, 1925), pp. 67-79. 
Professor Dowrie answered, no to both questions. The diverse views of 
contemporary academic economists regarding the use of the discount 
rates are reflected in H. G. Moulton, "Banking Policy and the Price 
Situation," American Economic Review, Proceedings Supplement, X (March
1920), pp. 156-175; 0. M. W. Sprague, "The Discount Policy of the 
Federal Reserve Banks," American Economic Review, XI (March 1921), 
pp. 16-29; and Youngman, "The Efficacy of Changes in the Discount Rates." 
Books of a more general nature are W. R. Burgess, The Reserve Banks and 
the Money Market (New York: Harper, 1927); C. 0. Hardy, Credit Poli­
cies of the Federal Reserve System (Washington: The Brookings
In stitu tio n , 1932); Winfield W. R ie fle r, Money Rates and Money Markets 
in the United States (New York: Harper, 1930;.
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conclusions and the procedures of the Joint Commission of Agricultural 
Inquiry. " I had hoped," he wrote, "that the Commission, which had been 
given so wonderful an opportunity for constructive service, would be 
able to te l l  the country who and what had robbed and plundered both the 
producers and the consumers." Instead, Barrett reported that Chairman 
Sydney Anderson, "a one-time progressive," in i t ia l ly  proposed elimina­
tion of public hearings and restriction of the commission's investigation 
to a search for data by economists and other specialists. "The idea of 
searching in the mouldy, moth-eaten f ile s  of the departments and bureaus 
of Government for truth" was repugnant to Barrett and at his insistence 
Anderson reversed his decision and public hearings were held. Besides 
Anderson, the Farmers' Union leader critic ized  Commission panelist 
Ogden L. M ills . Barrett complained that M ills , director of banks, 
trusts , and railway companies, was loyal to Wall Street and not to the 
farmer. " I f  Mr. M ills ,"  Barrett asserted, "had been retained counsel 
of the Interests attacked by witnesses fo r the National Farmers' Union, 
he could not have more vigorously, energetically, and earnestly defended 
them." Barrett also disliked the reception the Farmers' Union star 
witness, John Skelton Williams, received from the commission. Barrett 
complained further: "To say that the former Comptroller of the Treasury 
was treated much as a pettifogging lawyer would treat a witness in a 
chicken stealing case, is to keep well within the fa c ts ."55
55Barrett, Uncle Reuben, pp. 128-30, 131, 134. A frequent 
defense of those who sought to discredit the Joint Commission's c r i t i ­
cisms of the Federal Reserve asserted that the panel was staffed with 
members already prejudiced against the system. The charge has been 
repeated by Arthur S. Link, "Federal Reserve Policy," pp. 166-75. Link 
described the Commission as "allegedly heavily 'loaded' against the
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While some, like  Barrett, hinted that the investigation of the 
Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry was a whitewash, those who 
helped formulate Reserve policy during the agricultural cris is  were 
naturally inclined to defend the system and to attack its  detractors. 
The leading congressional defender of the Reserve was Carter Glass, who 
had served as secretary of the treasury until January 1920.56 jj^g V ir­
ginian characterized the unwarranted attacks upon the Reserve as 
"Ignorance run madl" In 1922, he delivered his classic defense of the 
Reserve System, observing that "in a ll th is fanfare of prejudice and 
vituperation, there has not been one authenticated fact or figure to
Federal Reserve System ( Ib id . , p. 171). Later in his essay, without 
providing any documentation to sustain the point. Link accepted the 
allegation as fact by characterizing the Commission "unfriendly" towards 
the Reserve ( Ib id . , p. 175). As to the criticism s of the Commission 
against the sluggish use of the discount rate by the Reserve, Link 
comments: "One wonders whether p o litic a l considerations or economic
fact dictated this conclusion" ( Ib id . , p. 171). No doubt the Commis­
sion was favorable to agriculture and had a genuine interest in its  
revival, but the five  to four vote regarding the printing of the 
Williams documents and the criticisms of Barrett against the Commission 
suggest that at least those two gentlemen believed the Commission was 
not biased enough in its  treatment of the Reserve! Furthermore, as the 
testimony before the Commission of Governor Harding of the Reserve 
Board, Governor Benjamin Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
and Governor J. Z. M ille r, J r . ,  of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, illustrated  that the Reserve o ff ic ia ls  were courteously given 
every opportunity to present their case in exhaustive de ta il. F inally , 
as a thankful Governor Harding acknowledged, the panel refused to 
pursue the more emotional charges against the Reserve of corruption, 
extravagant salaries and misuse of building funds. Harding, Formative 
Period, p. 220.
66oavid F. Houston, who became secretary of the treasury in 
January 1920, also attacked "the ignorant part of the community, includ­
ing many demagogues in and out of public l i fe "  who had blamed the 
treasury and the Reserve for the deflation of agricultural prices.
His basic argument was that of Glass, i . e . ,  the Reserve had followed 
an expansive policy during 1920 and in no way had discriminated against 
the farmer. Eight Years, pp. 105-07.
88
ju s tify  the assertion that the Federal Reserve banking system was 
appreciably delinquent or in any degree oppressive."57 According to 
Glass, an analysis of the paper held under discount for member banks 
of the system as of January 1, 1920, and January 1, 1921, and a com­
parison of the volume of Federal Reserve notes in circulation for the 
same period proved that there was no contraction of cred it during the 
months of the agricultural price break. On New Year's Day, 1920, the 
total amount of rediscounted paper held by the twelve regional banks 
was $2,215,305,000. The former secretary noted, "Instead of deflating  
the ir credits, as has been charged, these banks as of January 1, 1921, 
had increased th e ir accommodations to member banks in the aggregate of 
$2,687,393,000, an expansion of $472,088,000 in the twelve-month 
period." During the same in terva l, the senator explained, the regional 
Reserve banks expanded notes in circulation by $328,403,000. The co­
author of the Federal Reserve Act concluded:
Thus i t  w ill be noted that so fa r from the truth is the accusation 
that the Federal Reserve Board "tumbled" the prices of farm prod­
ucts by a cruel policy of deflation, i t  is shown that during the 
whole period of fa llin g  prices, the Federal Reserve Banks were 
supplying largely increased credit fa c il i t ie s  and issuing a con­
stantly increasing volume of Federal Reserve n o t e s . 58
Glass not only believed that the Reserve followed an expansive 
credit policy during 1920, but he contended that the extension of credit
57u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 16 
and 17, 1922, pp. 1235-50. Iron ica lly , Glass had been the recipient of 
similar accusations, for as secretary of the treasury he had opposed 
the raising of the discount rate as late as November and December 1919, 
which lead Governor Strong of the New York Reserve Bank to view the 
Virginian as the representative of unsound money. Chandler, Benjamin 
Strong, p. 163.
58u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 16, 
1922, p. 1239.
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occurred primarily in agricultural d is tric ts  rather than in industrial 
regions. Loans of Federal Reserve Banks on agricultural and livestock 
paper increased from $56,905,000 in January 1920, to $246,940,000 in 
December. These figures represented loans on notes having six months 
maturity. In addition. Glass quoted the Federal Reserve Board as 
maintaining that thousands of farmers were beneficiaries of ninety-day 
commercial loans so that the aggregate loans to farmers during 1920 
was a t least $1,980,063,000 as against $729,266,000 during 1919. "The 
truth in one sentence," Glass told the Senate, "is that fa llin g  prices 
caused the deflation of credits and currency such as we have witnessed 
since January of las t year, and not deflation of credits the fa l l  in
prices."59
59 lf credit was as abundant as the Glass data (provided him by 
Governor Harding) seemed to indicate, why were there so many complaints 
against the credit policies of the Reserve? Ignorance, prejudice, and 
the necessity fo r a scapegoat, no doubt, played a major role in the 
protests, but also of significance was the fact that the Reserve, the 
Glass s ta tis tics  notwithstanding, pursued a policy of contraction, not 
expansion, during the cris is  period. The Reserve had applied pressure 
on banks to liquidate and most Reserve o ffic ia ls  believed and announced 
that some deflation was not only necessary but desirable. (See Chand­
le r ,  Benjamin Strong, pp. 181-82, and Chapter IV, below.) In spite of 
the alleged expansionist policy of the Reserve, i t  was d if f ic u lt  to get 
farm loans. J. Thomas Heflin, in his own prosaic style , spoke to the 
point when he began his rebuttal to the Glass apology by describing 
cred it conditions in the South and West, stating, "When I heard him 
[G lass i  say in his speech that the Federal Reserve Board's policy had 
saved agriculture . . .  I said, God grant us deliverance from such a 
plan of salvation."
Of course, the Glass s ta tis tics  do not present an entire ly  
accurate po rtra it of credit conditions during the depression era.
Murray R. Benedict, fo r example, has discovered deflationary implica­
tions even within the data used by Glass (and la te r by Arthur Link) in 
th e ir defense of the Reserve. Benedict wrote: "The increase of
Reserve bank credit based on agricultural paper reflects the pressure 
on the banks in the rural areas. Faced with declining demand deposits 
and slow collections on the ir outstanding notes, they turned to the
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Reserve defenders found yet another renunciation against the 
allegations of agriculturalis ts in the fact that the depression was 
worldwide--so pervasive that i t  obviously could not be blamed on the 
central bank decisions of one country. Paul M. Warburg, Reserve Board 
member until 1918 and an original promoter of central banking in the 
United States, told one audience: "Any unbiased student knows that
world phenomena were at play, whose power extended far beyond those of 
central banks in general and the Federal Reserve Board in p a rticu la r."60 
Farmers in Canada, Great B rita in , and Japan were suffering, as well as 
the agricu lturalis ts of the United States. The World War had world 
repercussions. The cycle was a fam ilia r one, originating with a scar­
c ity  of goods for the duration of the fig h ting , then an orgy of buying 
and speculation a fte r the armistice, and f in a lly  the "day of reckoning,"
Reserve banks for additional funds, while, at the same time, they made 
every e ffo rt to bring about a reduction in the loans due them from 
farmers. Thus, while the reserve banks were increasing th e ir lendings, 
the total loans of a ll national banks declined from $13,544 m illion in 
1920 to $11,465 m illion in 1921." Farm Policies of the United States, 
p. 186. Economists Friedman and Schwartz observed that "from the las t 
week in October 1920, to the end of 1921, weekly reporting member banks 
cut th e ir loans (unadjusted fo r seasonal) by one-sixth." A Monetary 
History of the United States, p. 235. Furthermore, they conclude that 
the total stock of money fe l l  8 per cent from September 1920 to July 
1921. Paul McCracken, past chairman of President Nixon's Council of 
Economic Advisors, referred to both the decline in the monetary stock 
and the diminished Government spending during the post-World War I era
when he summarized: "The remarkable thing is not that there was a 1921
recession, but that our economic system survived this massive fiscal 
and monetary whipsaw." Time, CIXIV (December 19, 1969), p. 68.
GOpaul Warburg, The Federal Reserve System: Its  Origins and
Growth, Vol. I I  (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 757.
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when governments were forced to halt the promiscuous Issuance of 
currency and easy credit to escape bankruptcy.®^
The German-born Warburg, a frequent world traveler, perceived 
perhaps more than others how closely interlocked and interdependent the 
economic problems of a ll countries were. In 1922, he presciently 
observed, "England and we have the most v ita l interest in seeing eco­
nomic chaos avoided in Germany." To him the Farm Bloc was anathema, 
even to the interests of the American farmer. " I t  is nothing less than 
a national disaster," he stated, "that the birth of this combination of 
proponents of provincialism and class interests should have occurred 
ju s t at the time when in our national policy a world point of view is 
required."62 Unfortunately for Warburg, not only the farmer, but most 
of the world was entering an era of economic national ism.63
6?Friedman and Schwartz in th e ir Monetary History of the United 
States disagreed with those who advanced the worldwide depression 
explanation for the contraction of 1920-1921. The two economists con­
tended that America was so economically dominant during the postwar era 
that i t  in itia ted  world movements as well as responded to them. After 
reviewing the relationships between Federal Reserve discount rates and 
international gold shipments, the authors concluded that the contrac­
tion of 1920-1921 was in itia ted  "primarily" in the United States and 
that the indictment of Federal Reserve Policy contained in the majority 
Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry was correct 
( Ib id . ,  pp. 228,360).
62warburg, The Federal Reserve, Vol. I I ,  p. 755.
63ib id . , p. 765. I t  could be argued that the farmer, because 
he depended upon world markets, v/as ahead of other interests in pushing 
the world view.
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The paramount accusation of the Joint Commission of Agricul­
tural Inquiry that Reserve discount policy during the postwar crisis  
was maladroit received a mixed critique from o ffic ia ls  of the Reserve. 
Governor Harding denied that the board could have raised rates ea rlie r  
in 1919 in spite of Treasury objections. "The board fe l t  that i t  was 
its  duty to cooperate with Treasury authorities," he protested. Had 
the Reserve ignored the needs of the government, he observed, "the 
Board would have heard from the Overman Act"--the act which granted 
the President extraordinary powers for the execution of w a r . 64
Another Reserve insider, E. A. Goldenweiser, director of the 
Reserve Board's Division of Research and S ta tis tic s , agreed with Hard­
ing that the necessities of Treasury financing prevented the Reserve 
from raising rates e a rlie r  in 1919. Yet with words reminiscent of 
those of the Commission, the economist concluded:
I t  is probably true, looked a t in retrospect, that the System, 
not having raised the rates adequately in 1919, would have done 
better by not taking drastic action in the spring of 1920, when 
the speculative bubble was ready to burst. Also at some of the 
Federal Reserve Banks over-enthusiastic officers brought unnec­
essarily heavy pressure on borrowers. I t  appears further that, 
a fte r the rates were raised in the spring of 1920, they could 
and should have been reduced more rapidly than was done, which 
was not until almost a year a fte r  the a d v a n c e .
64harding, Formative Period of the Federal Reserve, p. 223.
65E. A. Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., In c ., 1951), pp. 136-37. Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury Russell C. Leffingwell presented views that were simi­
la r  to Harding's, see "Discount Policy of the Federal Reserve Banks," 
American Economic Review, Vol. 11 (March 1921), pp. 30-36. Friedman 
and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, p. 228, strongly 
contradicted the notion that the Reserve had no choice but to go along 
with treasury decisions in 1919. Both Harold L. Reed, The Development 
of the Federal Reserve Policy (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1922),
pp. 298-301, and Clark Warburton, "Monetary Control Under the
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Several conclusions may be drawn from the discord that encom­
passed the "Crime of 1920" thesis, the Joint Commission of Agricultural 
Inquiry's subsequent investigation and the rejoinders of the Reserve's 
defenders. There was no villainous Reserve plot to bankrupt the farmer 
or anyone else. Nor was the Reserve responsible for the recession of 
1920 as some post-war readjustment seemed inevitable. But the Reserve's 
response to the crises of 1920-1921 was awkward and American monetary 
management during the era displayed a dubious quality. Due to inexpe­
rience, structural defects, lim ited vision and Treasury interference, 
the Reserve fa iled  to adequately promote economic s ta b ility . In his 
excellent study of the early years of the Federal Reserve, Professor 
Lester V. Chandler posed the question:
How are we to explain the deflationary policies of the Fed­
eral Reserve during the 1920-1921 depression? They must seem 
incredible to anyone who accepts the theory that the primary 
function of a central bank is to use its  powers continuously 
and positively to promote maximum employment, the highest sus­
tainable rate of economic growth, and stable price levels. But 
in 1920-1921 the Federal Reserve had not yet developed this 
concept of its  function. . . . Any such suggestion would have 
been considered heretical.®®
During the farm crisis of 1920-1921 the more in te llig en t farmer c ritics
of the Reserve's deflation policy were not only heretics, but in some
Federal Reserve Act," P o litica l Science Quarterly, LXI (December 1946), 
pp. 505-534, discuss the unhappy consequences of the board's
surrender to the Treasury in 1919. Professor Reed concluded that the 
Federal Reserve Board fa iled  "to perceive the correct relation between 
expanding credits and rising prices" during the inflationary spiral of 
1919 (Ib id . , p. 300). I f  that was true, the issue of subservience 
probably was irre levant, for the board would have been re la tive ly  slow 
to apply an ti-in fla tion ary  policies even without the lim itations  
imposed by the Treasury.
®®Chandler, Benjamin Strong, p. 183.
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instances prophets, as they demanded that the Reserve f u l f i l l  the role 
Chandler described. Was not the essence of the Joint Commission's 
indictment that the Reserve had done l i t t l e  to promote s ta b ility —to 
diminish either in fla tio n  or deflation? I t  was, a fte r  a l l ,  a 
provocative i f  premature complaint.
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE FOR ACCOMMODATION: FARMERS AND
MONETARY POLICY, 1922-1923
Low prices and the contraction of credit a fte r the spring of 
1920 prompted angry farmers to demand not only the end of deflationary  
monetary policies but also greater farm influence in future national 
monetary decisions. Farmers' Union President Charles S. Barrett 
expressed the general farm temper when he wrote, " I f  the farmers w ill 
take what really  belongs to them . . . policies w ill be formulated by, 
not for them. Uncle Reuben must seize a place on the Ship of State.
But he w ill not be given. He must take."^ During 1922, farmers made 
deflation and lack of control over th e ir own financial circumstances 
a major election issue. They demanded that the banking leadership of 
the country be made more responsive to th e ir  needs. As a part of the 
la t te r  campaign they clamored for the appointment of a farmer repre­
sentative on the Federal Reserve Board and lobbied to block the 
reappointment of Reserve Board Governor William P. G. Harding. F inally , 
th e ir protest resulted in leg is la tive  accomplishment--the Agricultural 
Credits Act of 1923.
Described as a "Hel1-Raiser's Year," a "cyclone," a "revolt,"  
the elections of 1922 found voters disgruntled and angry. As in past
^Charles S. Barrett, Uncle Reuben in Washington (Washington, 
D. C .: The Farmers' National Publishing Company, In c ., 1923), p. 15.
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eras of low commodity prices the Midwest displayed a p o litica l conten­
tiousness that fe lled  standpatter politicians of both parties .% Among 
the major victories of the farmer-labor coalitions were the re-election  
of Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin who carried with him his 
candidate for governor, John J. Blaine. La Fo lle tte , who had opposed 
American entrance into World War I and had voted against the d raft law, 
made a surprising recovery which placed his followers in solid control 
of Wisconsin state government. In North Dakota, Non-Partisan leaguer 
Lynn J. Frazier, recalled as governor the preceding year, rebounded to 
defeat the veteran senator. Porter J. McCumber. Burton K. Wheeler of 
Montana, described by one frightened editor as "the reddest Bolshevik 
that ever came out of Russia to destroy the people of his own state," 
won a senate seat over Congressman Carl W. Riddick.3 In Minnesota, 
Senator Frank B. Kellogg, a nationally respected lawyer and former 
"trust-buster" in the Roosevelt Administration was defeated by Henrik 
Shipstead, a dentist. Shipstead, a self-styled "calamity howler," 
campaigned on the third party Farmer-Labor ticket and used much of his 
oratory protesting corporation control of government. Farmers no doubt 
took notice that while Kellogg toured the state in his Pierce Arrow,
2por information of the election of 1922, see: "The Revolt of
November 7," Current Opinion, LXXIII (December 1922), p. 702; "Why the 
Voter Voted Discontent," Literary Digest, LXXV (November 25, 1922), 
pp. 8-9; Chester H. Rowell, "Why the Middle West Went Radical," World's 
Work, XLVI (June 1923), pp. 265-74; Rowell, "La Fo lle tte , Shipstead 
and the Embattled Farmers," World's Work, XLVI (August 1923), pp. 408-15; 
James H. Shi deler. Farm Crisis 1919-1923 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1957), pp. 217-42.
3h . M. Hedges, "The Liberal Sweep in the West," The Nation, CXV 
(November 22, 1922), p. 543.
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Shipstead drove a Ford. In Iowa the "cowhide radical," Smith W. Brook- 
hart, easily led a f ie ld  of candidates anxious to succeed William S. 
Kenyon as senator. In Nebraska, Robert B. Howell, "radical" Republican, 
and "Brother Charles" Bryan, "radical" Democrat, were elected senator 
and governor respectively. Kansas elected a "d irt farmer" Democrat, 
Jonathan M. Davis, as governor. Significant farmer-labor-progressive 
votes were also cast in South Dakota, Idaho, Washington, Colorado, 
Pennsylvania, and Michigan. Reviewing the election results the liberal 
journal The Nation gloated, "The libera l block . . .  is here and i t  is 
in the saddle. . . . Wherever the progressive or farmer-labor movement 
appeared in strength, there i t  was victorious."4
The p o litic a l upheaval of 1922 was based on campaigns which 
stressed bad economic conditions among farmers and the ir c a u s e s . 5 
In addition to the ever-present matrix of local p o litica l issues, the 
major themes insurgents recounted included opposition to the Esch- 
Cummins Act and the Ship Subsidy b i l l ,  demands for lower property taxes, 
and open dissatisfaction with the Federal Reserve System, which was 
held responsible for the deflation of prices and especially for its  
discrimination against the farmer. Farmers opposed the Esch Cummins 
Act and the Ship Subsidy b ill  because they seemed to promise government 
guarantees to everyone but the farmer. The anti-Federal Reserve theme.
^"Election by Disgust," The Nation, CXV (November 22, 1922),
p. 540.
Spbr example, one scholar discovered a "positive correlation 
between mortgage indebtedness and votes for Brookhart" in Iowa. See 
Jerry Alvin Neprash, The Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa, 1920-1926:
A Study in the Motivation of P o litica l Attitudes (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1932), p. 88.
98
replete with the "Crime of 1920" thesis, also proved a dominant issue 
leading the New York Times to complain against the revival of the old 
issues dating back to Jackson and the bank and Bryan and free s ilver. 
"Now the ancient cries are heard again," the Times lamented. " I t  is the 
West against the East, the farmer against the banker."6
The anti-Reserve System motif was especially pronounced in the 
campaigns of a Midwestern quartet of new senators propelled into office  
in 1922. Smith W. Brookhart of Iowa, Robert Beecher Howell of 
Nebraska, Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota and Lynn J. Frazier joined 
incumbent c r itic s  of the Reserve System such as La Fo llette  and Heflin  
in frequent roastings of the System before campaign audiences.? 
Brookhart, whom the New York Times described as "almost as b itte r  as 
Heflin" on the issue, denounced Wall Street control of the Reserve 
System and suggested that an ideal Federal Reserve Board would be com­
prised of three representatives of farmers, two representatives of 
labor, two representatives of l i t t l e  business and one representative 
of big business.8 Not to be outdone, Shipstead advocated apportioning 
the board on the basis of the sources of bank deposits. Such a formula, 
he asserted, would give the board three farmer members, three labor 
members, two small business members and but one representative from 
big business. "This would prevent," he argued, "manipulation of the
N^ew York Times, 19 January 1922.
^La Follette had voted against the original Federal Reserve Act 
in 1913 and remained suspicious of the institu tion  to his death. See 
Belle Case La Follette and Fola La F o lle tte , Robert M. La F o lle tte ,
Vol. I (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1953), pp. 485-87.
^New York Times, 26 November 1922.
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currency volume in favor of big business and against farmers and 
labor."9 The "Crime of 1920" emphasis, combined with low commodity 
prices, contributed s ign ificantly  to the progressive victories of 1922.
Concurrent with the farmers' success in the 1922 electoral wars, 
rural America engaged in a campaign to reform the banking system. 
Fundamentally, farmers demanded an end to deflationary monetary po li­
cies. As a repercussion of that demand, they insisted that the banking 
interests must be made more responsive to rural Anerica. Farmers 
believed they were victims of deflation, at least in part, because they 
were unrepresented in the Federal Reserve System.
The demand to participate in formulating monetary and banking
policy p a rtia lly  originated in the h is to rica lly  suspicious attitude of
farmer-debtors toward th e ir creditors. Correspondent Mark Sullivan
toured the corn belt in 1922 and observed:
I t  is the man on the farm against the man in the town. . . .
The farmer has come to be suspicious even of his local grocer and 
dry goods merchant. The farmer thinks that they, and everybody 
else who is in the business of selling things to the farmer, has 
some kind of advantage over him, some kind of invisib le govern­
ment in which the farmer is exploited by virtue of some kind of 
economic freemasonry. . . .TO
Complaining of the exploitive commercial relationships between 
the East and the Midwest, Minnesota's Henrik Shipstead remarked, "New 
York sits back and looks upon the rest of the world much as Great 
B ritain  looks upon I n d ia . " T 1
Olbid. , 6 December 1922. Shipstead's views on the Reserve 
System are also presented in Robert L i t t r e l l ,  "Henrik Shipstead," New 
Republic, XXXIII (January 3, 1923), pp. 146-47.
TOf.iark Sullivan, "The Corn Belt From a Car Window," World's Work, 
XLV (November, 1922), p. 219.
T T ii t t r e l l ,  "Henrik Shipstead," p. 147.
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The banking profession, never popular during periods of depres­
sion and panic, was a special target fo r approbrium. Kindred feelings 
during the Great Depression of the Th irties produced Woodie Guthrie's 
savagely sa tir ica l ballad, "Jolly Banker," and made fo lk  heroes of such 
bank marauders as Pretty Boy Floyd. Reflecting a sim ilar regional 
prejudice, cattleman George Washington Armstrong described the bankers 
of 1922 in the following unflattering precis:
No greater calamity can befall a people than to have the ir  
prosperity under the control of a bunch of aged bankers, as 
we now have, with power to expand and contract i t .  I t  w ill 
usually be contracted. . . . Age sees prosperity only as a 
short-lived mushroom existence that is due for a speedy f a l l ,  
and i t  thinks the sooner i t  occurs the better. To age, enter­
prise is speculation and a Ford car rank extravagance.'2
Perhaps Senator Edwin F. Ladd of South Dakota provided the most 
whimsical expression of anti-banker iconoclasm when he proposed that 
postmasters act as federal bankers, eliminating bankers altogether 
from the administration of the Federal Reserve System. Amused a t the 
suggestion, the Fargo Forum asked the senator i f  he also objected to 
engineers because they held a monopoly on bridge building or to sen­
ators because they ran the senate!^^
An irra tional parochialism was not the only motive underlying 
the clamor fo r expanded farmer influence on banking policies. The 
inept banking system of the Twenties which produced an unconscionably
T2George Washington Armstrong, The Crime of ' 20: The Unpar­
donable Sin of Frenzied Finance (Dallas: Press of the Venny Company,
1922), p. 34.
13New York Times, 12 September 1921.
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large number of bank failures did not deserve plaudits.14 Bankers had 
contributed the ir share to the incendiary rhetoric frequently heard 
during the years of the farm cris is . One banker indiscreetly announced 
that "after election his bank proposed to call in farm paper and to 
see to i t  that wheat and other commodities came down to where they 
belong." He added that "the farmer needed to be shown his place once 
more almost as badly as did labor."15 other bankers angered farmers 
with palliatives which were obviously incongruous with the re a lity  of 
hard times. W. R. Heath of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank in jud i­
ciously asserted before one farm gathering that "what Iowa needs is 
less fault-find ing and more hard work. The situation w ill straighten 
out only when we get down to business, work harder, and ta lk  less ."15 
During the economic cris is  farmer and banker indulged in reciprocal 
misunderstanding which only diverted attention from more substantive 
issues.
Farmers also commonly complained about the ir r ita tin g  eagerness 
with which bankers had welcomed the deflation of 1920. The unrestrained 
elation with which some banking leaders greeted the in it ia l  collapse of 
farm prices exasperated farmers. At the famous May 18, 1920 gathering 
of Reserve o ff ic ia ls , Robert Wardrop of the Cleveland Reserve Bank
14john Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash: 1929 (Boston:
Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1954), pp. 184-85.
ISquoted in John D. Hicks, Rehearsal for Disaster (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1961), pp. 75-76.
TGwallaces' Farmer, CXLVI (June 17, 1921), p. 6. See sim ilar 
remarks by Governor W. P. G. Harding before the American Farm Bureau 
Federation National Convention reported in New York Times, 2 December
1921.
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reflected the attitude of many bankers when he said, "I think a rea­
sonable depression in business w ill be a good thing for the country."
He added, "I rea lly  think we would do better i f  we could get down to a 
lower basis, a d ifferent basis, and then from that we can work up 
a g a i n . "17 At the same meeting, however. Governor Harding had warned: 
"We should be careful . . . not to overdo this matter of liquida­
tion . . . . "  Farmers remained convinced that America’s banking 
leadership invited and approved the postwar price declines.^®
Rural spokesmen were generally correct in their appraisal of 
banker disenchantment with the price levels of 1919 and early 1920.
By the beginning of 1920, most bankers, economists, and reserve o f f i ­
cials shared the notion that both the price level and bank credit were 
too expansive and that some retrenchment was necessary. The fact that 
the call for deflation was so devastatingly answered embittered farmers 
and persuaded them that those who had asked for such a policy were 
responsible for its  existence. Expressions like  those at the May 18 
conference convinced farmers that deflation was a premeditated and 
purposive policy. To many farmers, banker and deflation represented 
cause and effect.
17u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
February 28, 1923, p. 4862.
l^Also see Representative Philip Swing's condemnation of the 
Reserve's postwar "deflationary program." Ib id . , 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 
May 23, 1922, p. 7517.
T^Link acknowledged that the statements of reserve and govern­
mental o ffic ia ls  to the effect that commodity prices were too high and 
ought to be lowered was one of four major grievances farmers held 
against the reserve system. See Arthur S. Link, "The Federal Reserve 
Policy and the Agricultural Depression of 1920-1921," Agricultural 
Hi story, XX (July 1946), pp. 165-175.
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I f  farmers were suspicious of the banking profession in general, 
they reserved special anger for the Federal Reserve Board—holding i t  
accountable fo r implementing the "Crime of 1920." In July 1921,
Senator Tom Watson of Georgia introduced a resolution requesting, as 
he la te r reiterated , "the President to remove these robbers [board 
members] from o ffic e ."20 The resolution directed the President to 
replace the Reserve Board with "competent and honest" men who were not 
bankers nor "mere assiduous servitors of the Morgan interests, the 
Standard Oil interests, the packer in terests, the steel trust in terests, 
or any other legalized marauders upon the common people of the Repub­
l i c . "2? Watson, though often eccentric, was not alone in his be lie f 
that the Federal Reserve suffered from mismanagement as well as Wall 
Street provincialism. Farmers believed the system was too e l i t is t  to 
be interested in the general economic welfare—especially the welfare 
of agricu ltura lis ts! On the day of President Harding's inauguration, 
Wallaces' Farmer ed itoria lized:
I f  the Federal Reserve Board is to be allowed to continue to 
exercise such a powerful influence over the business of the 
country, then the members of the board should not be bankers 
alone but representatives of the various industries, the most 
in te llig en t representatives who can be found in the entire 
nation. There should be one or two farmers on the board, 
because farm prices are more easily influenced by the action of 
the Federal Reserve than prices of anything e lse .22
Senator Arthur Capper expanded on the same theme when he informed his
readers that:
20u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 
October 24, 1921, p. 6668.
2 lNew York Times, 20 July 1921.
22wallaces' Farmer, XLVI (March 4, 1921), p. 4.
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Under a Federal Reserve Board largely dominated by financial 
rather than commercial interests, we have experienced during our 
period of credit starvation an injurious apportionment of credit 
rations. I t  is to avoid a repetition sometime in the future of 
another such unfortunate experience that I have introduced the 
b ill  to add to the membership of the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Commerce, in order 
that general business and agriculture shall hereafter be sure of 
a proper representation on the board. Had there been such a 
board at the head of the Federal Reserve system, i t  is incon­
ceivable that we should have arrived a t our present c r it ic a l 
situation and s t i l l  be praying for r e l ie f .“
By December 1921, the suggestion that an agricultural representative
be appointed to the Federal Reserve Board had o f f ic ia lly  been made part
24of a seven-point program advocated by the farm bloc in Congress.
Debate on a b i l l  to force Presidential appointment to the 
Federal Reserve Board of "a person experienced in and whose business 
and occupation is farming" began in the Senate on December 19, 1921.^5 
The measure enjoyed the support of the farm bloc and the floor leader­
ship of Democrats Ellison D. Smith and J. Thomas Heflin and also of 
Republicans William S. Kenyon and Arthur Capper. While the farmer- 
member b i l l  provided additional evidence of the pervasiveness of the 
"Crime of 1920" thesis, i t  also proved the determination of the farm 
bloc to expand farm influence in future national monetary decisions.
23ç a p p e r 's  Weekly, XLVIII (June 4, 1921), p. 1.
Z^Successful Farming, XX (December 1921), p. 8. The National 
Agricultural Conference convened by the Harding Administration in 
January 1922, also resolved that agriculture be granted greater "recog­
nition . . .  in the selection of the Federal Reserve Board and directors 
of Federal Reserve banks." "The National Agricultural Conference," 
Journal of Farm Economics, IV (January 1922), p. 61.
25u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., Decem­
ber 19, 1921, p. 505.
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The Harding Administration responded to the farmer-member 
proposal with ambiguity. During a January conference with Senators 
Kenyon, Capper, and Frank B. Kellogg of Minnesota, the President stated
that he opposed any b i l l  which would make i t  mandatory for him to name
26a representative of any special class to a position on the board.
When i t  became apparent that the Smith b i l l  would pass the Senate, 
Harding invited the farm bloc leadership to the White House on 
January 16 for negotiations. The conference resulted in agreement on 
a compromise b i l l  that altered the Federal Reserve Act in several 
respects. The original act established a seven-man board which included 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller as ex -o ffic io  members. 
The 1913 act stipulated that "at least two" of the five  appointive 
members "shall be persons experienced in banking and finance." In addi­
tio n , the Glass-Owen Act stated that in selecting personnel for the 
board, the President should have "due regard to a fa ir  representation 
of the d ifferen t commercial, industria l, and geographic divisions of 
the country." During the conference with Harding, farm senators agreed 
to drop the categorical demand contained in the Smith b i l l  that the 
President appoint a farmer to the board. The conferees agreed to 
lib e ra lize  the occupational qualifications an appointee might possess 
to include experience in either finance, commerce, industry, or agri­
culture. The negotiators agreed to repeal the requirement that at 
least two members be bankers, and the farm senators secured the Presi­
dent's pledge to support a proposal to enlarge the board from seven to
Z N^ew York Times, 6 January 1922.
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eight members. President Harding promised that he would appoint an 
acceptable farmer representative to the resulting vacancy on the board. 
The compromise, labeled the Kellogg b il l  a fte r its  Senate sponsor,
Frank B. Kellogg of Minnesota, gave each side what i t  wanted most. The 
President retained, undiminished, his prerogatives of appointment, and 
the bloc obtained the promise from the Chief Executive that i f  the b i l l  
passed Congress, a genuine "d irt farmer" would be appointed to the 
Reserve Board.^7
The capitulation of the President to the wishes of the farm 
bloc followed a month of Senate debate on the farmer-member measure.
The question of the proposed farmer invasion of the Federal Reserve 
Board was but a vehicle to debate the more central issue, which was the 
performance of the Reserve System during the recent c ris is . Both sides 
argued strenuously, and both sides exaggerated. The System was char­
acterized, depending upon the sympathies of the speaker, as "savior" 
or "destroyer," as "victim" or "criminal." During the course of the 
oratory. Senator Glass delivered a two-day address that many considered 
the classic apology for the Reserve System. Farm bloc members H eflin , 
Capper, and Smith replied, welcoming the debate as an occasion to 
mount a spirited fusillade against the Reserve System for its  alleged 
responsibility for the farm depression. As the arguments developed, 
a ll of the nuances that comprised the "Crime of 1920" conspiracy theory 
were vigorously revived, resulting in a fresh burst of anti-Reserve 
System rhetoric.
27lb id . , 17 January 1922; Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: 
Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1959), pp. 215-15; U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th 
Cong., 3rd Sess., January 16, 1922, pp. 1183-89.
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Advocates of the Kellogg b ill advanced the notion that the 
Federal Reserve Board committed "amazing waste and extravagance" in 
the areas of building construction and salaries. Former Comptroller 
John Skelton Williams had reported "four officers of one Reserve bank 
are allowed to draw salaries exceeding the aggregate salaries paid the 
President of the United States, the Vice President, the Chief Justice 
and General Pershing." Aside from plush salaries and unlimited expense 
accounts, Williams c ritic ized  the $26 m illion "temple of banking" 
planned for New York C ity, replete with auditoriums, a gymnasium, club 
quarters, restaurants, and a rt "that w ill make Solomon's temple of old 
seem quite cheap by comparison."^8
During debate over the Kellogg b i l l  Senator Lee Overman of 
North Carolina expanded on the Williams allegations. The North Caro­
lin ian  quoted government documents to prove that Federal Reserve 
salaries had increased $7 m illion between 1919 and 1921, and that the 
system had spent more than $36 m illion fo r building fa c ilit ie s  during 
a sim ilar period. Senator Overman also disliked the New York Reserve 
bank fa c ilit ie s  with the ir luxurious appointments, including bronze 
doors valued at $25,000. The senator maintained that the Reserve Act 
"was the greatest piece of constructive leg islation passed in a hundred 
years," but he expressed fears that " i f  they go and continue spending 
money in the way they have done in the past they w ill lose the confi­
dence of the people." The way to rebuild confidence in the board was
28u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., July 20, 
1921, LXI, 4090.
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clear to the North Carolinian. "I think," he asserted, "we ought to 
have a farmer on that board, in the hope that he may be able to bring 
about certain much-needed reforms."29
Several colleagues welcomed Overman's assault on the spending 
practices of the Reserve System. Senator William J. Harris of Georgia 
thought the issue of the System's extravagance important enough to 
attach an amendment to the farmer-member b ill requiring the consent of 
Congress on a ll future Reserve System building projects exceeding 
$250,000.30 Besides opposing the alleged promiscuous construction pro­
gram of the System, several senators expressed disapproval of the 
unique privilege of the Federal Reserve to establish its  own salary 
rates free from congressional scrutiny. Rural senators also complained 
of the impropriety of the System's flush spending practices at a time 
when the remainder of the country experienced a depression encouraged 
in part by the Federal Reserve's own discount policies.31 George 
Norris spoke the position of many critics  of the System when he pro­
claimed:
In my judgment they are paying extravagant and morally sinful 
salaries to a great many of their employees. They propose to 
build an office building with money belonging to the people of 
the United States, contributed by those who are compelled to 
borrow money out of the banks. They are now going to use that 
money to build a marble p a l a c e . "32
The alleged excesses even seemed to embarrass V irg in ia 's Carter Glass.
" I absolutely agree . . .  no building operations ought to be undertaken
29lb id. : 67th Cong., 2d Sess., December 19, 1921, p. 505-12. 
30lbid. , January 17, 1922, p. 1269.
31 Ib id . ,  January 16, 1922, p. 1185. ^ ^ IM d ., p. 1198.
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at this time by any branch of the Government; = = Sentiment was
su ffic ien t to pass, by a vote of 40 to 33, the Harris Amendment grant­
ing congress watchdog powers over future major Reserve construction 
contracts.
Farm bloc senators were unabashed in th e ir advocacy of the
farmer-member proposal. William Kenyon asserted that the fundamental
purpose of the amendment was to put "one representative of agriculture"
on the board and "there is no use putting the cards under the ta b le ."34
Senator Smith of South Carolina acknowledged that the proposal was
"extremely simple." He wrote, "Everyone knows that we are trying . . .
to laymanize this Board."35
Arthur Capper stated the reason farm senators were convinced
the board needed la ic ization :
I  think i f  we had had on the Board a big, broad, fair-minded 
farmer, a man who had an intimate knowledge of conditions as 
they actually existed in the West, the farmers and stockmen of 
the Middle West would not have been compelled to dump their  
grain and livestock on the market a year ago at the most 
c r it ic a l time and compelled to take ruinous p r i c e s . 36
Expressions of such frank partisanship invited the charge that farm
spokesmen were merely seeking class-interest leg islation. But the
sting of the accusation was muted when the complaint emanated from
33 ib id . Glass hastened to explain, however, "that a bank cannot 
be conducted by hod carriers; you cannot even run i t  with a Congressman
in charge. . . . You have to get expert banking and technical s k il l ."
Ib id . , January 19, 1922, p. 1243. Also see William P. G. Harding, The 
Formative Period of the Federal Reserve System (Boston and New York: 
Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1925), p. 550.
34 jb id . ,  January 17, 1922, pp. 1266-1267.
35lb id . , December 19, 1921, p. 521.
3 6 lb id ., December 20, 1921, p. 586.
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those closely aligned with business or manufacturing interests. Rural
senators also based th e ir rebuttal on the doctrines of agricultural
fundamentalism. Typical of such retorts is the following Arthur Capper
pro-Kellogg b i l l  e d ito ria l:
Please understand that I am making no special plea for our 
farmers; I am not asking a single favor for them. I am as much 
opposed to "class legislation" as the stiffest-backed an ti- 
paternalistic American who ever lived. I t  is in no sense class 
leg islation that I am advocating. I would put the argument on 
fa r  higher ground--the very highest-national welfare. Take 
care of the farm and the farm w ill take care of the nation.37
George Norris was one of the few farm spokesmen who viewed the 
farmer-member issue with total skepticism. "To my mind," he informed 
his colleagues, "the b i l l  has been given an importance vastly beyond 
what i t  deserves." Though he admitted he supported those who contended 
the Federal Reserve had mistreated agriculture, he believed the Kellogg 
b i l l  fa iled  to redress farm grievances against the System. He pre­
dicted that farmers "w ill get fooled again." Norris asserted, " I t  is 
said we w ill have a farmer on the Federal Reserve Board and a fte r that 
everybody in agriculture w ill prosper." The Nebraskan maintained, 
however, that the President could f u l f i l l  the terms of the law and 
s t i l l  "select a farmer who is more reactionary than any Wall Street 
banker that ever lived" and he doubted the power of one member to 
effect substantial change on an eight-member b o a r d . 38
37çapper's Weekly, XLVIII (January 21, 1922), p. 1.
38u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., January 16, 
1922, p. 1195. A sim ilar ambivalent attitude toward the measure was 
expressed in the House of Representatives by Representative Henry 
Steagall. See Ib id . , May 23, 1921, p. 505.
mBut the Senate fa iled  to share Norris' cynicism and passed the 
Kellogg b il l  64 to 10, sending the measure to the House of Representa­
tives.^^ A front-page story in Capper's Weekly carried the gloating 
announcement: "The agricultural bloc has scored another triumph in the
[Senatel passage of the b ill  putting a farmer on the Federal Reserve 
Board. Look out for another explosion in the East."40 I t  was a curious 
jab from a magazine that denied any connection between the b ill  and 
class interests.
Louis T. McFadden, chairman of the House Banking and Currency 
Committee, publicly denounced the Harding-farm bloc compromise of 
January 18 and announced: "I am going to fig h t the b i l l  a ll the v/ay;
I don't believe in such a measure."41 During the McFadden Committee 
hearings on the Kellogg b i l l ,  March 15 and 16, administration spokesmen 
added more confusion to the situation when they offered contradictory 
testimony. Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, opposed enlarge­
ment of the board because he thought a larger membership would make for 
less administrative efficiency. Mellon also disliked the idea of class 
representation on the board and te s tified  that he was convinced that 
the Reserve System had dealt with agriculture in a fa ir  and nondiscrim- 
inatory m a n n e r . 42 Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace spoke in 
favor of the b i l l ,  explaining that he viewed the Federal Reserve Board 
as a policy-making body as well as an administrative board.
39lb id ., January 17, 1922, p. 1269; New York Times, 18 January
1922.
4Qcapper's Weekly, XLVIII (January 21, 1922), p. 1.
4^New York Times, 19 January 1922.
42ib1d., 16 March 1922.
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Wallace believed that because the policies of the board could have a 
"direct influence upon prices and upon business in general," the board 
should represent a "cross-section of our industrial l i f e ,  including 
agriculture." The Secretary commented: " I t  is highly desirable that
the membership should be su ffic ien tly  large to bring into the councils 
of that board a direct personal knowledge of the business and indus­
tr ie s  in which the people in the various sections of this country are 
engaged." As for the qualifications of the man who should represent 
farmers on the board, Wallace observed that i t  was not necessary that 
he be a farmer, but that he ought to be “agriculturally  minded"—a man 
"who understands and is appreciative of agricultural conditions, and 
at the same time has real training as a banker."43
Secretary Wallace's argument fa iled  to sway the House Banking 
and Currency Committee as i t  struck the authorization to enlarge the 
board from the Kellogg b i l l .  The action n u llifie d  the intent of the 
farmer sponsors of the b i l l .  Without expansion, there would be no room 
fo r a farmer appointee because no vacancy existed on the board. (The 
committee also eliminated the section which provided for congressional 
scrutiny over major Reserve building projects.) Even with the deletions, 
McFadden could not bring himself to vote for the b i l l ,  which, neverthe­
less, escaped with his committee's approval by a 13-8 vote.44
Debate on the floor of the House of Representatives, then, 
centered on whether to accept the stronger Senate version or the McFadden
43u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., May 23, 
1922, p. 7513.
44n6w York Times, 7 April 1922.
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Committee's amendment altering the farmer-member measure. During these 
arguments over the Kellogg b il l  in the lower house, a ll the implications 
of the "Crime of 1920" thesis, examined ea rlie r in the Senate, were 
rehashed. About the only novel accusation against the Federal Reserve 
which emerged from the House debate was presented by Representative 
Carl Vinson of Georgia. He charged that the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta had attempted to force the state banks in its  d is tr ic t to jo in  
the System or to go out of business. The method of warfare against the 
nonmember state banks was reminiscent of Nicholas Biddle's stratagems 
against the wildcat banks of the Jacksonian period. The Atlanta 
Reserve Bank intentionally accumulated a large number of checks drawn 
on the nonmember bank before presenting them en masse for clearance.
The policy forced nonmember banks to carry large amounts of vault cash 
which lessened th e ir lending power and th e ir p ro fit. The United States 
Supreme Court stopped the practice and reprimanded the Reserve System 
fo r sanctioning this sort of warfare against "re la tive ly  feeble compet­
ito rs ."45 The war against state banks, Vinson contended, decreased the 
a v a ila b ility  of credit to farmers at a crucial time, provided another 
example of injury to the rural community by the Reserve System and
45$ee American Bank and Trust Co. y_. Federal Reserve Bank of 
A tlanta, Georgia, e ; ^ ^ . , 255 U. S. 350, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499 (May 16,
1921), 983. Also at issue was the System's practice of par clearance 
of checks. Customarily rural banks had charged a service fee called 
exchange when checks were presented for payment by out-of-town corres­
pondents. The exchange included handling fees and a small p ro fit 
which provided an important income for small banks. The Reserve banks 
were forbidden by the Glass-Owen Act to make such charges and refused 
the country banks' demand for exchange fees.
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evidenced the need fo r farmer representation on the Federal Reserve
Board.46
There were several incongruities reflected in the House r o l l -  
ca ll votes on the farmer-member b i l l .  The voting demonstrated an 
alliance between President Harding and House Democrats versus the major­
ity  of House Republicans. Observers also witnessed the curious spectacle 
of Democrats promoting a b ill  that proposed to give a Republican Pres­
ident additional patronage. Representative Otis Wingo, the ranking 
Democratic member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, led the 
floor fig h t which demanded rejection of the committee's amendments to 
the Senate measure. The vote for rejection was approved 19 to 90.
46u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., February 9, 
1922, pp. 2356-57. A fter the decision of May 16, 1921, the Atlanta 
Federal Reserve Bank, in an amended answer, disclaimed any u lte rio r  
purpose in its  method of collecting checks and agreed to modify its  
clearance procedures so as to refrain  from creating undue stress on 
smaller banks. After reviewing the evidence a second time, the court 
discovered that "the evidence was insuffic ient to sustain any charge 
that the Federal Reserve Bank was exercising its  rights so as to injure  
or oppress p la in t if f  banks." Yet the court acknowledged the sheer e f f i ­
ciency of the Reserve System's clearinghouse fa c il it ie s  provided another 
blow to the profits of rural banks. The new fa c il it ie s  so shortened 
the time required to collect checks that the trad itional benefit of 
using the depositors' money during the period the check was circulating  
was almost eliminated. The refusal to pay exchange rates and the 
efficiency of the new system were but two ways the Reserve System 
reduced the profits of rural bankers. Thus the rural bank, like  the 
family farm, was disadvantaged by powerful economic and social forces 
called "progress." Justice Brandeis observed, "Country banks are not 
entitled  to protection against legitimate competition. Their loss here 
shown is of the kind which business concerns are commonly subjected to 
when improved fa c il it ie s  are introduced by others, or a more e ffic ie n t 
competitor enters the f ie ld ."  See American Bank and Trust Co. y_.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Georgia, 262, U. S ., 643, 43 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 649 (June 11, 1923), 1153.
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The House by voice vote then approved the Senate version of the Kellogg 
b i l l  which President Harding signed on June 5, 1922.47
President Harding kept the bargain he had made with the farm 
bloc and appointed Milo D- Campbell of Coldwater, Michigan, to the 
vacancy the Kellogg Amendment created on the board. Campbell, described 
by the White House as a genuine " d ir t  farmer," was president of the 
National Milk Producers’ Association as well as an experienced state 
leg is la to r. The farm bloc supported the appointment as did a few 
Eastern newspapers. The New York Globe ed itoria lized: "The course of
the Reserve Board may not be changed because of the presence of a d ir t  
farmer upon i t ,  but at least the Board w ill understand in advance the 
opinions of the agricultural interests and perhaps the farmers w ill 
also understand the reasons behind the action of the Board. This w ill 
be general gain ."48
The Senate confirmed Campbell's appointment on January 24, 1923. 
Unfortunately, the 71-year-old Michigan native suffered a cerebral 
hemorrhage while playing golf and died less than a week a fte r taking 
the oath of o ffic e .49
On May 5, President Harding, at the urging of Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry C. Wallace, appointed Edward H. Cunningham as the 
"d ir t  farmer" member of the Reserve Board. Wallace described
47u. s . .  Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess,, May 23, 
1922, p. 7521; New York Times, 24 May.1922; Ib id . , 6  June 1922.
48The Literary Digest, January 17, 1923, p. 16
49ngw York Times, 13 January 1912; Ib id . , 26 January 1923; 
Ib id .,  23 March 1923.
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Cunningham, formerly speaker of the Iowa House of Representatives and 
president of the Iowa Farm Bureau, as "eminently satisfactory to the 
farmers of the West," and yet having the confidence of the farm leaders 
in Washington as w e l l . 50
The farmer battle to reconstitute the Federal Reserve Board was 
but half won with the adoption of the Kellogg Amendment and the appoint­
ment of a farmer member to the board. During the summer of 1922 the 
farm bloc began an intense and sometimes v it r io l ic  campaign to block 
the reappointment of Federal Reserve Board Governor William P. Gould 
Harding. Harding's term expired on August 9, but the President delayed 
the announcement of his choice for the position until January 1923. 
Encouraged by th e ir success in the farmer-member matter and given the 
opportunity by the President's indecisiveness, the farm bloc mounted a 
"dump Harding" movement. William P. G. Harding, an Alabamian, was 
viewed as a tra ito r  not only to his region, but also as the ring leader 
of the "Crime of 1920" conspiracy. The odium reserved for the governor 
led to the use of acrimony as farm spokesmen enthusiastically christened 
him William "Poison Gas" Harding for the unsporting way they believed he 
had made war on the f a r m e r . 51 J. Thomas H eflin , a fellow Alabamian, 
came to the forefront of those who found the banker personally obnoxious.
SONew York Times, 17 April 1923; 6  May 1923; 27 May 1923; and 
11 December 1923.
5lMilton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History 
of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963), p. 229; Lester V. Chandler, Benjamin Strong: Central Banker
(Washington, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1958), pp. 43-44;
Harding, The Formative Period, pp. 245-47; New York Times, 4 August 1922; 
U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., August 27, 1922,
p. 1182.
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Heflin often devoted two to three Senate speeches a week condemning the
Reserve and Governor Harding in p articu lar.5% At the climax of one
such sulfurous exercise, H eflin , with apocalyptic fervor, concluded;
In the name of right and justice and in the name of plundered 
m illions, I call upon the President to cast this man overboard.
I f  he w ill do that, millions of people w ill l i f t  up the ir voices 
and out of millions of grateful hearts w ill exclaim: "The pale
horse and his rider are cast into the sea. All praise Jehovah,
His people are free!"53
Opponents of Governor Harding used more than cosmic visions to
thwart his reappointment to the board. At the request of state Farm
Bureau organizations, a dozen western Republican senators met with the
President in September and indicated to him that the appointment of
Harding to a new term would be "objectionable." Kansas Senators Arthur
Capper and Charles Curtis led the group and received assurances that
Harding would not be reappointed to the post.^^
Not only did the farm bloc manage to force Harding's retirement
from the board, but th e ir candidate to replace him, Comptroller of the
Currency Daniel R. Crissinger, won the job of governor of the board in
January 1923.55 Reviewing the success of the bloc, one correspondent
exclaimed, "The hand that guides the plow is in a fa ir  way to be the
52por an example, see U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 
2d Sess., December 6, 1922, pp. 131-32; Ib id . , January 15, 1923, pp. 
1752-53; Ib id . ,  February 28, 1923, pp. 4869-75.
53jb id . , September 20, 1922, pp. 12991-2.
5^New York Times, 23 September 1922; Ib id . , 17 October 1922; 
Capper's Weekly, XLIX (October 14, 1922), p. 14; Successful Fanning, 
XXI (December 1922), p. 10.
S^ New York Times, 21 January 1923.
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hand that guides our national f i n a n c e s . "56 Undoubtedly, Crissinger, 
an old friend and fellow townsman of the President, did not owe his 
appointment solely to the promotional propensities of the Congressional 
farm leadership, nevertheless they viewed his selection with satisfac­
tion and approval.57 Capper's Weekly reported that Crissinger " . . .  
comes from the West and has not come up in the Wall Street atmosphere. 
In Washington he is known to have great sympathy for producers."5- 
Crissinger lived up to expectations, promoting a low-rate 
discount policy that was mildly in fla tionary , at least until the begin­
ning of the infamous bull market of 1927-28.59 By the end of January 
1923, i t  appeared that the pale horse and his rider, i f  not cast into  
the sea, were at least under tighter re in .50
The crusades of 1922—the victory of maverick po liticos, the 
farmer-member measure, and the forced retirement of William P. G. 
Harding from the Reserve Board--were fundamentally negative perfor­
mances. Towards the end of the Sixty-Seventh Congress, the farm bloc 
replaced negativism with genuine accomplishment-agricultural credits 
leg is la tion .
55Literar.y Digest, LXXVI (January 27, 1923), p. 16.
57Heflin's enthusiasm for the Crissinger appointment is found 
in U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., February 18, 
1923, p. 4871.
58capper's Weekly, XLIX (March 31, 1923), p. 4.
59Galbraith, The Great Crash, p. 32.
50[viuch to the chagrin of his c r it ic s , William P. G. Harding, 
in January 1923, became governor of the Federal Reserve Bank at Boston 
at a salary which more than doubled his income as governor of the 
Federal Reserve Board.
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The need for a more e ffic ie n t and suitable credit fa c il ity  
designed especially fo r the peculiar requirements of the agricultural 
industry seemed to receive almost universal recognition by the winter 
of 1922-23.61 The depression of 1920, the Joint Commission of Agricul­
tural Inquiry, and the temporary revival of the War Finance Corporation, 
had underscored the inadequacy of the Federal Reserve and other finance 
agencies to aid the farmer. Rural credits reform, given its  final 
impetus by the farmer-labor election v ic to ries , was an idea supported 
by the total spectrum of American p o litic a l leadership—everyone from 
the President, Andrew Mellon, and Bernard Baruch to Henry Ford, Robert 
La F o lle tte , and 0. Thomas Heflin . On December 2, 1922, the La Follette  
farmer-labor bloc appointed Oklahoma Senator Robert Owen chairman of a 
committee to deal with the whole question of rural credits. On the 
same day. President Harding announced that his administration intended 
to secure additional re lie f  measures fo r the f a r m e r .62 The ensuing 
"lame duck" session of the 67th Congress saw at least ten rural credits 
b ills  introduced for its  consideration.
In a confusing display of leg is la tive  pyrotechnics during Jan­
uary and February of 1923, the Senate passed a b i l l ,  a resolution, and 
yet another b i l l  relating to rural cred its , while the House of
61 In November 1922, the Grange, fo r example, resolved: "We
urge legislation turning the functions of the War Finance Corporation 
over to the Department of Agriculture until a permanent short-time rural 
cred it system is provided by Congress. . . . "  Journal of Proceedings 
of the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, F if ty - f if th  Annual 
Session, Portland, Oregon, 1922, p. 147. See also Gray S ilve r, "Farm 
Finance to the Front," Successful Farming, XXI (December 1922 ), 
pp . 5 ,  62.
62john W. Owens, "The Progressives," New Republic, XXIV 
(March 14, 1923 ),  pp. 51-62.
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Representatives independently molded its  own version of a credit re lie f  
measure.
The Senate's f i r s t  action came when i t  passed the Capper- 
McFadden b i l l  on January 19, 1923. According to its  sponsor, Arthur 
Capper of Kansas, the b i l l  was designed "to accomplish in the fie ld  of 
agricultural cred it what the national banking system was designed to 
accomplish in the banking f i e l d . "63 Receiving the endorsement of both 
the National American Livestock Association and Secretary of the Trea­
sury Andrew Mellon®^ (because the b il l  required no federal monies), 
the Capper-McFadden b i l l  contained at least five  p r o p o s a ls :65 ( i ) i t  
raised from $10,000 to $25,000 the amount which a Federal Land Bank 
might lend one borrower; (2) i t  renewed the l i f e  of the War Finance 
Corporation through the winter of 1923-24; (3) i t  made i t  easier for 
rural banks to jo in  the Federal Reserve System by lowering the capital 
requirements fo r small banks; (4) i t  extended the term of e lig ib le  
agricultural paper for rediscount by the Federal Reserve System from 
six to nine months; and (5) i t  provided fo r the incorporation of agri­
cultural cred it corporations by private citizens to purchase or discount 
agricultural paper secured by agricultural commodities or livestock.
This las t provision was designed to provide a sounder basis to livestock 
financing and authorized National Agricultural Credit Corporations,
63u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., January 15, 
1923, p. 1756.
6 ^New York Times, 2 January 1923.
GSyhe b il l  is reprinted in U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th 
Cong., 4th Sess., January 15, 1923, pp. 1758-59.
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with minimum capita lization of $250,000 to operate under the auspices 
of the Comptroller of the Currency. The b il l  was based on the experi­
ence of the War Finance Corporation in financing farm products and had 
the blessing of that corporation's d irector, Eugene Meyer. Because the 
b ill  called for re la tive ly  painless reforms, (no federal money or addi­
tional bureaucracy), i t  passed the Senate without opposition . 6 6  Many 
advocates of rural cred it legislation believed that the Capper-McFadden 
b il l  was insuffic ient to fu lly  solve the cris is  of farm finance. Subse­
quently, on February 3, the Senate passed the Lenroot-Anderson b i l l .  
Ervine Lenroot and Sydney Anderson had been co-chairmen of the Joint 
Commission on Agricultural Inquiry that had concluded that credit av a il­
able to farmers was "not adequately adapted to the farmer's 
requirements."67 Farmers were lim ited to borrowing from either the 
Federal Reserve System and state banks, which could discount agricul­
tural loans for a maximum of six months, or the Federal Farm Loan 
System, which offered long-term loans based on mortgaged property.
After its  investigations, the Joint Commission concluded, according to 
Senator Lenroot, that "there was a gap, in between, running from six
6 6 New York Times, 20 January 1923. On the same day the Senate 
approved the Capper-McFadden b i l l ,  i t  passed a resolution offered by 
George P. McLean of Connecticut, chairman of the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee. The McLean resolution reflected the concern of 
many who fe l t  the Federal Reserve System had fa iled  to serve smaller 
banks and provided for the appointment of a jo in t inquiry to ascertain 
the reasons why rural and state banks fa iled  to jo in  the Reserve System. 
See U. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., January 19,
1923, p. 3935.
67|j. S ., Congress, House, Joint Commission of Agricultural 
Inquiry: House Reports, Vol. 3, Part 2, Credit, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1921, p. 7.
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months to three years, as to which there is no credit fa c il i ty  at a l l ,"  
available to fa r m e r s . 6 8
The Lenroot-Anderson b il l  created a credit system composed of 
twelve farm loan banks with independent capital and l ia b i l i t ie s ,  under 
the aegis of the Federal Farm Loan Banking System. Each Federal In te r­
mediate Credit Bank was to be capitalized to the extent of $5 m illion  
by the Secretary of the Treasury and was authorized to sell trust 
debentures to the amount of ten times its  capital and surplus. The 
main function of each bank was to rediscount agricultural paper, with 
a maturity from six months to three years.69
While the Senate debated the merits of the Capper-McFadden and 
the Lenroot-Anderson proposals, the House debated and passed a b ill  
sponsored by James G. Strong of Kansas. The Strong b il l  included fea­
tures of Capper-McFadden and called for the reorganization of the 
management of the Federal Land Banks to give debtor members greater 
representation. I t  also suggested that the Federal Farm Loan System
6 8 u. S ., Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 4th Sess., January 25, 
1923, p. 2397; New York Times, 20 January 1923.
69See Murray Reed Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 
1790-1950 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), p. 185;
Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Twentieth Century Populism: Agri­
cultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1951), pp. 337-340; also two contemporary artic les :
G. C. Henderson, "The Agricultural Credits Act of 1923," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, XXXVII (May 1923), pp. 518-22, and V. N. Valgreen, 
"The Agricultural Credits Act of 1923," American Economic Review, X III  
(September 1923), pp. 442-60. The principal monograph is Frieda Baird 
and Claude L. Benner, Ten Years of Federal Intermediate Credits 
(Washington, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1933), 416 pp.
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increase its  maximum loan from $1 0 , 0 0 0  to $16,000 and, in some excep­
tional cases, to as much as $25,000.70
Throughout the congressional debate on various b ills  the need 
fo r agricultural credits leg islation seemed inextricably joined to the 
"Crime of 1920" thesis. While speaking on the Lenroot b i l l .  Senator 
Furnifold Simmons of North Carolina proclaimed that he wanted the 
farmer given an "adequate credit and financial opportunity and not more 
sop." Then the North Carolinian reiterated a theme frequently mentioned 
by speakers in the ir demand for credit reform--the discriminatory 
nature of the American banking system.
We have a banking system [Simmons explained] which affords a ll 
the credit that is needed by our commercial and our industrial 
a c tiv itie s . The farmer is without the means of obtaining any­
thing lik e  adequate credit. I t  is th is unbalanced condition 
. . . that is very largely responsible fo r the fact that we see 
certain occupations very prosperous while the farming operations 
of the country are in a state of depression. . . .71
South Carolina's Ellison D. Smith was one of several who emphasized
the anti-Reserve System theme during comments on the Lenroot b i l l .
Though acknowledging the salutary effects of the Federal Reserve during
the War, the South Carolinian complained, "From May, 1920, up until a
few months ago that source of re lie f  to the people v;as practically
a rb itra r ily  shut. Where i t  was not a rb itra r ily  shut, the fear of a
70Valgreen, "The Agricultural Credits Act of 1923," p. 450; 
New York Times, 21 February 1923.
71u. S ., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.,
December 12, 1922, p. 345. See also the remarks of Representative 
Louis T. McFadden, Ib id . , February 28, 1923, pp. 4887-88. The in ab il­
i ty  of the Federal Reserve System to meet the credit needs of farmers 
is summarized in J. T. Holdsworth, "Farm Credits," Journal of Farm 
Economics, IV (January 1922), pp. 26-27.
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repetition of what had occurred kept men from embarking in the business 
once again under conditions which ruined them."?^ Concurring with 
Smith, Senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma presented his version of the 
"Crime of 1920" thesis to the Senate. "What has taken place," he 
asserted, "is an industrial depression, in fin ite ly  emphasized by the 
action of the Federal Reserve Board . . . using th e ir influence with 
the banks of the country to re s tr ic t credits. When they did, i t  had 
the e ffect of bringing the market prices down below the cost of produc­
tio n , and brought on a ruinous condition which has a ll the effect of a 
panic."73 As the discussions developed regarding the need fo r re lie f  
leg islation i t  became clear that dissatisfaction with the performance 
of the system during the postwar crises v;as in trins ic  in the 1923 push 
fo r agricultural credits leg is la tion .
On March 1, 1923, a nearly exhausted Congress, urged by Presi­
dent Harding and major farm organizations, agreed to an amalgamation of 
the various rural cred it proposals into one omnibus act—the Agricul­
tural Credits Act of 1923. The proposals of Capper-McFadden, Lenroot- 
Anderson, Strong, McLean, and others were la id  end-to-end without much 
e ffo rt to integrate then. President Harding, nevertheless, signed the 
act on March 4, 1923. The agricultural Credits Act created two parallel 
systems of agricultural cred it: the Federal Intermediate Credit banks
and the privately financed National Agricultural Credit Corporations.
7 2 % b i d . , December 16, 1922, p. 552. 
73ibid.
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Altogether, i t  was a substantive e ffo r t by Congress to meet the credit
needs of farmers.
As farmers reviewed the ir efforts to gain a more accommodating
monetary policy during 1922 and 1923, they could ta lly  a number of
achievements. Farmers helped defeat an unusual number of unacceptable
incumbents in the 1922 elections, they forced the ir farmer-member
measure on a recalcitrant President, and they blocked the reappointment
of Reserve Board Governor William P. G. Harding. In addition, the
Agricultural Credits Act of 1923 provided farmers with a reasonably
e ffic ie n t intermediate credit system. Louis J. Taber, Master of the
National Grange, gloated:
In the seventies and eighties, those uninformed or with selfish  
interests, ridiculed our Order for advocating the elevation of 
the commissioner of agriculture, to a place in the President's 
cabinet; for demanding rural delivery; asking creation of the 
in ter-s tate  commerce commission, and sim ilar leg islation.
History has clearly demonstrated that this legislation was not 
only fo r the good of agriculture, but of the nation. We venture 
to predict that in another quarter of a century those who today 
have opposed cooperative marketing, the placing of a farmer on 
the federal reserve board, rural c red it, and sim ilar sound legis­
lation championed by the Grange and organized agriculture, w ill 
find these accomplishments as unassailable from the standpoint 
of sound public p o l i c y . 75
74some scholars concluded that the role of credit was overempha­
sized in the early twenties, and consequently the Agricultural Credits 
Act of 1923 has not been looked upon as extremely significant. See 
Benedict, Farm Policies, p. 186. Valgreen, however, estimated that 
total farm indebtedness in the 1921-1922 period stood at less than 20 
per cent of the gross value of farm property. He claimed that most 
industries used borrowed capital at a ratio  of one-third to two-thirds 
of the capitalized value and thus implied that additional credit was 
needed by farmers. Valgreen, "Agricultural Credits Act of 1923," p. 459. 
Baird and Benner concluded that the accomplishments of the Intermediate 
Credits system had been "modest." They did grant that the system had 
provided lower interest rates and greater accessibility of credit to 
certain classes of farmers. See Ten Years, pp. 371-83.
75,journal of the Proceedings of the National Grange of the Pa­
trons of Husbandry, 58th Annual Session, Atlantic C ity, November, 1924.
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The accomplishments of 1922-1923, though aggressive and authen­
t ic ,  proved less spectacular than Taber predicted. Nevertheless, 
national monetary planners of both the Harding Administration and of 
future depression regimes should have been alerted that farmers intended 
to exert influence over th e ir own financial destinies.
CHAPTER V
AGRICULTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
MONETARY THEORY 1920-1930
The "Crime of 1920" controversy, the farm depression and the 
demands for banking and monetary reform during the Harding Administra­
tion stimulated renewed debate on monetary theory. These discussions 
gathered fresh intensity as a result of the Crash of 1929 and continued 
into the th ir t ie s . Some of the monetary speculations were quixotic 
amateurism while many represented a reincarnation of Populist bimetallic  
and inflationary propaganda. Meanwhile, in an e ffo rt to apply science 
to the money question economists investigated the variants and poten­
tia ls  of a managed currency system. Both the neo-Populists and the 
managed currency advocates relied on farmers for support of the ir  
respective programs. As a consequence of the economist's need for 
p o litica l support and the unhappy status of agriculture the professor 
and the farmer began a dialogue during the twenties that eventually 
helped produce many of the monetary accomplishments of the New Deal.
Among the neo-Populist theorists, none received as much public 
notice as the tandem of Henry Ford and Thomas A. Edison.! The two
iFor additional neo-Populist thought in the 1920's, see Donald R. 
Murphey, "Is the Greenback Movement Coming Back?," Wallaces' Farmer,
XLVII (March 31, 1922), p. 1; and U. S ., Congressional Record, H. Res. 
4575, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., June 29, 1922, 9734. The resolution, pro­
moted chiefly by Jacob S. Coxey, S r ., asked that the government issue 
legal-tender notes secured by noninterest-bearing 25-year bonds.
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friends, products of rural Michigan, leaned toward Populist monetary 
views and were widely respected in farm c irc le s .% Ford, hoping to see 
the agricultural industry rehabilitated and anxious to acquire the dam 
at Muscle Shoals entered the quarrel over monetary policy in la te  1921. 
On December 4, a fte r touring the Muscle Shoals fa c il i ty  with Edward A. 
O'Neal, head of the Alabama Farm Bureau, Ford explained that his motives 
fo r wanting the plant were based on more than a desire for enhanced 
electrica l or industrial productivity. "The one big thing which I see 
in Muscle Shoals," he told reporters, "is an opportunity to eliminate 
war from the world." When asked what he meant Ford replied, " I t  is 
very simple. . . . The cause of a ll wars is  gold. We shall demonstrate 
to the world through Muscle Shoals . . . the des irab ility  of displacing 
gold as the basis of currency and substituting in its  place the world's 
imperishable natural wealth." Specifically  the in dus tria lis t suggested 
that the government could finance the completion of the Muscle Shoals 
complex through issuing "redeemable noninterest bearing currency." The 
e le c tr ic ity  the project produced would generate suffic ien t income to 
re tire  the paper currency within twenty years. The project could be 
financed without the government spending tax monies or selling interest 
bearing bonds to the loan sharks of Wall S treet.^ Edison quickly
^Reynold W. Wik, "Henry Ford and the Agricultural Depression 
of 1920-1923," Agricultural History, XXIX (January 1955), p. 15. Wik 
illu s tra ted  Ford's influence on farmers but omitted references to the 
in d u s tria lis t's  monetary views. Matthew Josephson, Edison: A Biography
(New York: HcGraw H ill Book Co., In c ., 1959), p. 464, noted the inven­
to r's  Populist leanings but also ignored his subject's monetary thinking.
^New York Times, 5 December 1921; also Reynold W. Wik, Henry 
Ford and Grass-Roots America (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1972), pp. 113-14; and Henry Ford, My Life and Work, in collaboration 
with Samuel Crowther (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), pp.
169-83.
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approved this suggestion with the quip, "Gold is a re lic  of Julius 
Caesar and interest is an invention of Satan."4 The news that f ia t  
money advocates resented the gold standard was less than s ta rtlin g , yet 
almost anything Ford and Edison did or said in the twenties gained 
national public ity.
A few weeks a fte r his Alabama tour, Ford, whose antisemitic 
slurs had already earned him notoriety, announced that he was termina­
ting his expose of "The International Jew" and in itia tin g  a fig h t for 
money reform.5 The auto maker asked Edison to see i f  he "could not 
invent some plan for helping the fa r m e r .E d is o n  empathized with 
Ford's anxiety over rural conditions, te llin g  reporters: "We ought to
do something about the farmer. I t 's  a moral obligation. He doesn't 
know anything about figures. He gets skinned.
Edison recalled that he approached his new assignment with the 
same methodology he had used to achieve other inventions—"get a ll the 
facts as fa r as possible, and then see what can be done to solve the 
problem." The inventor, reading two lines at a time, spent "twelve 
weeks, fourteen hours a day," studying the money question and the farm 
problem. The gris t fo r his study included: "The Greenback acts, five
^New York Times, 6  December 1921.
^Ib id . , 17 January 1922. See also Allen Nevins and Frank Ernest
H i l l ,  Ford: Expansion and Challenge 1915-1933, I I  (New York: Charles
Scribner and Sons, 1957), p. 316. Nevins and H ill fa iled  to mention 
Ford's monetary schemes in the ir account of the Muscle Shoals episode.
T^homas A. Edison, A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Reserve
Banking System: Plan and Notes (Orange, N. J . ,  1923), p. 1.
N^ew York Times, 16 July 1922 and 20 February 1922.
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histories of banking, the history of the Bank of England, and the works 
of a ll the economists from Adam Smith to John Stuart M ill and Herbert 
Spencer. " 8
On May 19, 1922, Edison outlined the results of his labors to a 
subcommittee of the Senate Agricultural bloc.9 The Edison Plan undoubt­
edly sounded fam iliar to most of the Senators as i t  resembled the 
Subtreasury scheme of the Alliance and Populist movements. The inventor 
suggested that the government build twelve concrete warehouses, six in 
cotton regions and six in the wheat be lt, where farmers could deposit 
th e ir commodities. After a t r ia l  period the program could be expanded 
both in the number of warehouses and the commodities e lig ib le  for 
storage.TO
Edison's proposal, a commodity dollar scheme, included a s e lf­
canceling currency feature. Upon depositing his crop at the warehouse 
where i t  was weighed and graded the farmer received two receipts—one 
receipt en titled  the holder to receive from any national bank Federal 
Reserve notes equal to 50 per cent of the average value of the stored 
commodity during the preceding 25 years. This loan, repayable within 
1 2  months, incurred only a nominal service charge and was secured by a 
lien  on half of the deposited crop. The second receipt ce rtified  the 
farmer's equity on the unmortgaged half of his commodity. The farmer 
might s e ll, hold or borrow against the equity c e rtific a te  at
8 lb id . ,  18 June 1929. ^ Ib id ., 20 May 1922.
TO[dison, Amendment to the Federal Reserve Banking System,
17 pages. See also Dagobert David Runes, ed ., The Diary and Sundry 
Observations of Thomas Alva Edison (New York: Philosophical Library,
1948), pp. 192-202.
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his d is c re tio n .W h o e v e r owned the equity ce rtific a te  could present 
i t  together with the amount loaned on the commodity and receive the 
stored goods from the warehouse. As soon as the government disposed of 
the commodity an amount of money equal to the original loan was 
destroyed. In sum, Edison proposed that the Federal Reserve issue 
money based upon 50 per cent of the value of these stored commodities. 
" I t  may be," Edison envisioned, "we could ship Government graded wheat 
and cotton to pay balances in many cases where we now ship gold bars."^^
Edison claimed two principal advantages accrued to farmers in 
this plan. Achieving year round financing the farmer could avoid the 
traditional price depressing glut of the market a t harvest time. The 
plan also offered the advantage of impartial and low cost grading of 
the farmer's product.13 in addition, Edison might have added, the 
in flationary and easy credit features of the warehouse system made his 
proposal attractive to debt-burdened farmers.
Both c ritic s  and admirers of the two friends reacted to the 
Ford-Edison monetary proposals. The day following Ford's suggestions 
regarding Muscle Shoals and f ia t  money. New York banker Samuel Unter- 
myer exploded, "I have long leaned to the charitable point of view that 
Ford's great money success had driven him crazy, but I never believed 
that even an impaired mind could harbor such a combination of unbounded 
egotism, ignorance, bigotry, and impudence as is disclosed in this
11 Edison, Amendment to the Federal Reserve Banking System, p. 6 . 
IZ lb id ., p. 1 2 . 13 lb id . ,  p. 1 1 .
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la tes t piece of s e n s a t i o n a l  i s m . "14 Benjamin Strong. Governor of the 
New York Reserve Bank, in a le t te r  dated February 1922, wrote: "The
most dangerous menace now before the Federal Reserve System, and the 
country generally is . . .  a coalition . . . between Henry Ford,
Thomas A. Edison, William J. Bryan . . . in a deliberate campaign for 
cheap cred it." Strong informed his correspondent "in confidence" that 
"we are quietly arming fo r the co n flic t."  The Governor admitted a le r t­
ing certain committees in Washington to the inflationary menace and 
concluded that the whole controversy "is the unfortunate outgrowth of 
deflation , so called, whatever that may be."15 Equally alarmed, the 
American Banker's Association undertook in July 1922 a countrywide cam­
paign to warn against "printing press" money of the Ford-Edison 
va rie ty .16
Farmers also responded to the Ford-Edison monetary suggestions. 
On December 16, 1921, Senator Edwin Ladd of North Dakota founded with 
W. H. "Coin" Harvey of Arkansas the National Honest Money Association. 
The Association endorsed Ford's opposition to the gold standard and 
praised his suggestions regarding f ia t  m o n e y . I n  general the Ford- 
Edison schemes appealed to the more depressed ag ric u ltu ra lis t—just the
14n9W York Times, 5 December 1921.
l^Quoted in Lester V. Chandler, Benjamin Strong, Central Banker 
(Washington, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1958), pp. 201-02.
l N^ew York Times, 12 July 1922. The best contemporary critique  
of the Ford-Edison proposals was William Trufant Foster, "Edison-Ford 
Commodity Money," Proceedings of the Academy of P o litica l Science, X 
(January 1923), pp. 187-205.
l^ New York Times, 17 December 1921. Also see U. S ., Congres­
sional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., January 19, 1923, pp. 1981-82.
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type of individual who comprised the membership ro lls  of the Farmers'
Union. The Farmers' Union a f f i l ia te  in Oklahoma ed itoria lized:
We wish every farmer would read the Dearborn Independent which 
is Mr. Ford's personal paper. He has the money, and the heart 
to spend that money in getting the facts. . . . When he advo­
cates a complete change in the money system of our country,
"Big Big" cannot say i t  is some socia list bolshevist, or hard 
up farmer wail of woe.
The ed itoria l concluded that Ford ought to be the farmer candidate for  
President in 1924.^8
The money ideas of Ford and Edison enjoyed longevity in the 
minds of many rural Americans. After Edison's death in 1931, Milo Reno 
of Iowa republished the decade-old commodity dollar and warehouse plan 
as a tribute to the inventor. Reno enthusiastically described the 
money scheme as "the greatest service [Edison] rendered his fellows of 
the present, and of the future. . . . "  The Iowan then urged subscribers 
"to read i t  [the Edison warehouse plan] carefully . . . and then compare 
this with the teachings of your own organization. . . During the
early New Deal days Jacob Baker, Assistant Administrator of the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration, attempted to revive the Edison ware­
house plan, recalling its  history and recommending i t  to Henry A. 
Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, as "an excellent plan for commodity 
i s s u e . "20 As la te  as 1938, farmers in Kansas used the name of Edison
TBoklahoma Union Farmer, IV (June 1, 1923), p. 1.
l^Milo Reno, "Change in Money System Was Favored by Edison," 
Oklahoma Union'Farmer, X II (November 1, 1931), pp. 1, 4.
ZOgaker to Honorable Henry A. Wallace, October 2, 1935, Washing­
ton, D. C ., Record Group 16, "Records of the Secretary of Agriculture: 
Money Orders," Archives, Washington, D. C. The in fla tio n is ts  organiza­
tion , the Committee for the Nation, attempted unsuccessfully to form an
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as documentation for th e ir in flationary cause. One rural family wrote 
Representative C lifford  Hope of Kansas, "We as farmers of Kansas demand 
that you help the American people take over the Federal Reserve 
Bank. . . . "  Congressman Hope's constituent warned, "We w ill not vote 
fo r any man that upholds our present satanic and Jew controlled money 
system. . . . Edison said i f  government can print a dollar bond i t  
can prin t a do llar b i l l ,  i f  you want our vote, act now to preserve 
c iv iliz a tio n .
The appeal of the Ford-Edison schemes rested on th e ir tra d i­
tional Populist monetary philosophy and on the unquestioned stature of 
the authors—perhaps rural America's foremost public figures. But, in 
spite of conservative nightmares, the money ideas of the two colleagues 
never got beyond the discussion stage.
I f  businessmen lik e  Henry Ford were the saints of the New Era, 
the Lords Spiritual of the decade were its  economists. Given fresh 
stature as the result of the emphasis on national planning during the 
war, economists attained a new professionalism which stressed that the
alliance with Ford in the campaign for money reform during the mid-1930s. 
See Edward A. Rumely to Henry Ford, July 12, 1934, Dearborn, Michigan, 
Rumely Papers, L i l ly  Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana; 
Rumely, "Open Letter to Henry Ford," July 15, 1935, Elmer Thomas Papers, 
Manuscripts Division of the University of Oklahoma Library, Norman, 
Oklahoma; Fred Sexauer to Edsel Ford, August 7, 1935, D etro it, Michigan, 
Dairymen League Papers, The Collection of Regional History and Univer­
s ity  Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
Z^Mr. and Mrs. Jacob Diehl to Hope, June 23, 1938, Brookville, 
Kansas, Hope Papers, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas.
An almost identical le t te r  is Sena Cumberland to Hope, May 30, 1938, 
Brookville, Kansas, Ib id .
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discip line could be both an inductive and pragmatic s c ie n c e . 2 2  " i look 
upon the economists of today," boldly declared one practitioner in 1921, 
"as the priests of a religion of material salvation which must be suc­
cessfully preached throughout this land i f  we are to survive the 
disastrous consequences of the great w a r ."23 i t  was an optimistic 
credo. Beginning about 1918, the discipline seemed less dismal as 
economic activ ists agreed i t  was necessary to take action--"to do 
something" about the i l ls  of the postwar economy.24
In th e ir search for relevancy and impact on public policy econ­
omists discovered at least two areas that begged investigation. The 
money question, trad itionally  a popular matter for study, probably 
attracted the energies of more economists than any other subject in the 
postwar p e r io d .25 i t  allowed theoreticians to confront practical and 
current problems which were not only complex but important to an indus­
tr ia liz e d , creditor nation. The "farm problem" also received intensive 
scrutiny from economists during the 1920s and 1930s. The American Farm
22por a discussion of the New Economics, its  emphasis on current 
problems and its  reliance on empirical tools, see Henry Steele Commager, 
The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character 
Since the 1880's (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 227-46;
and Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American C iv iliza tio n : 1918- 
1933, V (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), pp. 463-64.
23r, c. Leffingwell, "Discount Policy of the Federal Reserve 
Banks," American Economic Review, XI (March 1921), p. 30.
24one illu s tra tio n  of the revived interest in economics is seen 
in the emphases in Dorfman's history of American economic thought since 
1606. Two of Dorfman's five volumes are reserved for the fifteen  years 
beginning in 1918. See Dorfman, The Economic Mind, IV, V (1959).
25 ib id . , IV, pp. 276-77. Both the Annual Meeting of the Academy 
of P o litica l Science, November 1922, and the American Economic Associa­
tio n 's  annual convention in December 1927 were dedicated to monetary
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Economie Association founded in January 1919 emphasized the new scien­
t i f i c  methodology. The "phenomenal" development of agricultural 
economics in the postwar era merited the recognition i t  received when 
the Department of Agriculture created the Bureau of Agricultural Eco­
nomics in 1 9 2 2 . 2 6  j|^g e^w training in agricultural economics 
transcended the e a rlie r preoccupation with the management of individual 
farms and emphasized the cosmic and often complex forces affecting  
agricultural welfare. On several occasions the monetary and agricul­
tural economists were in each other's in tellectual bailiwicks as 
monetary and credit issues seemed inextricably fused in most programs 
of farm re lie f .
Yale University economist Irving Fisher illustrated  the v ita l­
ity  of the response of the new economics to liv e  issues and in the 
process became an improbable hero to farmers. Fisher, a thoroughly 
proper Ivy League gentleman founder of the Econometric Society, Presi­
dent of the American Economic Association (1918), hygienist, eugenicist, 
prohibitionist and World Leaguer, concentrated most of his energies 
after the War on the crusade to stab ilize  the purchasing power of money. 
Christened the "Honest Money" campaign, the stabilization movement
26see Henry Charles and Anne Dewees Taylor, The Story of Agri­
cultural Economics in the United States, 1840-1932 (Ames: The Iowa
State College Press, 1952), X II,  p. 490. Also Albert G. Black, 
"Agricultural Policy and the Economist," Journal of Farm Economics, 
XVIII (May 1936), pp. 311-19; George F. Warren, "The Origin and Devel­
opment of Farm Economics in the United States," Journal of Farm 
Economics, XIV (January 1932), pp. 2-9.
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honored Fisher as its  major theoretical contributor and earned the 
Yale economist great respect in farm c irc le s . 7^
As early as 1911.. Fisher became intrigued with the evils and 
possible cures of the in fla tion -défla tion  business cycle which had 
produced what he called the "Jumping Jack" do llar, the "dance of the 
do llar,"  or a dollar that was "the great pickpocket, robbing f i r s t  one 
set of people and then another , . . creating class antagonisms, 
p o litica l unrest and business uncertainty. The gold d o llar, he argued, 
was a unit of weight, not a unit of value. "What good does i t  do us to 
be assured that our do llar weighs ju s t as much as ever? . . . What we 
rea lly  want to know is whether the dollar buys as much as e v e r . "28 
Fisher proposed the dollar be stabilized through his Compensated Dollar 
plan—a scheme with variations he would advocate until his death in 1947.
27pisher, a prodigious author, wrote at least 48 artic les  and 
13 books on monetary themes. See Arthur 0. Gayer, ed.. The Lessons of 
Monetary Experience: Essays in Honor of Irving Fisher (New York:
Farrar and Rinehart, In c ., 1937), pp. 448-50. The fu ll scope of 
Fisher's work is cataloged in Irving Norton Fisher, A Bibliography of 
the Writings of Irving Fisher (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951),
543 pages. The best history of his crusade for monetary reform is par­
t ia l ly  autobiographical. See Irving Fisher, Stable Money, a History of 
the Movement, assisted by Hans R. L. Chorssen (New York: Adelphi Co., 
1935), 484 pages. Irving Norton Fisher, My Father Irving Fisher (New 
York: Comet Press, 1956), 352 pages, provided useful family history.
Other studies of Fisher included Dorfman, The Economic Mind,
I I I ,  pp. 365-375; Ib id . , IV , pp. 288-302; Joseph Stagg Lawrence, Sta­
b iliza tion  of Prices: A C ritica l Study of the Various Plans Proposed
for S tabilization (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928), pp. 59-63;
Joseph Reeves, Monetary Reform Movements (Washington, 1943), 404 pages; 
Max Sasuly, "Irving Fisher and Social Science," Econometrica, XV (Octo­
ber 1947), pp. 255-278; Joseph Alios Schumpter, Ten Great Economists 
from Marx to Keynes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951),
pp. 222-228; R. B. Westerfield and Paul H. Douglas, "Memorials," Amer­
ican Economic Review, XXXVII (September 1947), pp. 656-663.
28irving Fisher, S tabilizing the D ollar: A Plan to Stabilize
the General Price Level Without Fixing Individual Prices ^New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 82.
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According to Fisher, the stable do llar—one nearly always con­
stant in terms of purchasing power, could be achieved through varying 
the gold content of the dollar inversely with price fluctuation based 
on a market-basket commodity index. Analogous to the compensated pen­
dulum, Fisher's plan would increase or decrease the weight of the gold 
dollar a percentage point for every one per cent of deviation of the 
index number from par. To keep the dollar from shrinking in value 
Fisher would add to its  weight and conversely to keep the dollar from 
growing in value he would decrease its  weight in terms of gold. "To 
keep the price level of other things from rising or fa llin g ,"  he wrote, 
"we make the price of gold fa l l  or rise."^^
The Compensated or Commodity Dollar scheme contained both tra d i­
tio n a lis t and innovative implications. Its  theoretical base rested on 
a recasting of the old quantity theory of money while its  major crea-
30tiv e  influence was to hasten the coming of a managed currency system.
Fisher realized that accurate s tab ilization  required more 
sophisticated adjustments than those incidental to the compensated 
dollar plan. He saw gold as but the "foundation" of the "monetary 
structure" and its  stabilization essential. But the Yale economist also 
agreed to the necessity of stab iliz ing  the "super-structure" of the 
money system--paper money and credit including bank deposits subject to 
check. Fisher urged the government to "resist the wiles of the printing
29Ib id . , p. 105.
SOpisher recast the quantity theory into what he called the 
"equation of exchange." The equation is reviewed in Eugene E. Agger, 
"Gold, Money and Prices," Proceedings of the Academy of P o litical 
Science, X (January 1923), p. 9.
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press" and called upon the Federal Reserve System to actively regulate 
the flow of credit. A combination of regulation of the superstructure 
and stab ilization  of gold, he concluded, might not "precipitate a 
millennium, but i t  would be a seven-league stride in progress."3^
By 1920 both, the American Economic Association and the American 
Banker Association had studied and rejected the Fisher stab ilization  
scheme as impractical.'*^ Undeterred, and always the irrepressible  
crusader, Fisher undertook the " f irs t  organized e ffo rt toward even­
tually  realizing the dream of stable money" when he established the 
Stable Money League in early 1921.33 The Stable Money League underwent 
metamorphosis, becoming the National Monetary Association in 1922 and 
the Stable Money Association in 1925. The Stable Money Association, 
lik e  its  predecessors, maintained an impressive membership l is t  includ­
ing prominent economists, bankers and businessmen, both in the United 
States and B rita in . Though the three organizations campaigned for no 
specific plan of stabilization they were dedicated to educating the
3Tlrving Fisher, "Stabilizing the D ollar," Harper's Monthly 
Magazine, CXLVIII (March 1924), pp. 512-13; Fisher, Stabilized Money, 
pp. 396-97.
32see "Objections to Monetary Standard Based on Index Numbers," 
The American Economic Review, I I I  (March 1913), pp. 1-19; "Report of 
the American Bankers Association Currency Commission on Dr. Irving 
Fisher's Plan to S tabilize the Dollar," Journal of the American Bankers 
Association, X II (November 1920), pp. 239-40. Fisher's response to 
the la tte r  report is found in the New York Times, 29 May 1921. Among 
the most interesting reactions to the Fisher proposals was Allen A. 
Young, review of S tabilizing the D ollar, by Irving Fisher in The Quar­
te rly  Journal of Economics, XXXIV (May 1920), pp. 527-32.
33Fisher, Stable Money, A History, pp. 104-09.
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public to the consequences of in fla tion  and deflation and the need for 
a constant standard of v a l u e . ^4
The stabilization concepts of Fisher and groups like  the Stable 
Money Association eventually discovered a most enthusiastic reception in 
the Agricultural industry. The 1920 commodity price catastrophe drew 
protests from farm leaders throughout the remainder of the decade and 
th e ir desire to prevent a recurrence of such radical price fluctuations 
enhanced the appeal of stabilization doctrines. Fisher seemed sympa­
thetic to the farm industry acknowledging that its  grievances against 
the monetary system was real. Regarding the recent outbursts of 
"Greenbackism, free-silverism  and Henry Fordism," he wrote in 1923,
"All three were howls of rage of those whose toes had been stepped on 
by deflation." Fisher warned "At present there is grave danger of 
upsetting our Federal Reserve System. The farmers believe that, 
instead of accommodating them, i t  has oppressed them. What is the 
answer? Not de fin ite ly  to say 'We'll keep the system, deflation, in fla ­
tion and a l l , '  but rather to say 'W e'll make i t  s tab le .'"35
Fisher served the stable money cause as both prophet and patron 
contributing not only ideology but more than one hundred thousand
34$ee George Cox, How to Thwart the Fluctuating Dollar (New 
York: Stable Money Association, December 30, 1926); H. G. Guthmann,
Insuring Against Business Tornadoes (New York: Stable Money Associa­
tion , March 1927); New York Times, 1 January 1921; 29 May 1921;
26 December 1922; 11 April 1925; 7 June 1930.
35jrving Fisher, "On Stabilizing the Dollar," Independent, I I I  
(July 21, 1923), pp. 22-23.
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dollars to the movement.36 The Yale Economist frequently te s tifie d  
before Congressional committees, often at the invitation of farm po li­
tic ians. Rural spokesmen and farm journal editoria l writers not only 
honored the professor as "an authority" on monetary matters but liked  
his prohibitionist convictions as well. In 1934, as Fisher once again 
set about to present his theories on money to treasury o ff ic ia ls , an 
admirer reported, "As I saw him, a man past 70, going cheerfully, 
eagerly on this mission, I  could not help but feel admiration for the 
enthusiasm and devotion to the ideal of better money that has actuated 
Fisher's entire adult l i f e . "37 Even his frankest contemporary c r it ic  
conceded, "His efforts have provided a popular education in monetary 
theory to thousands."38
In his history of the stable money movement published in 1935, 
Fisher observed, "The organized farm population of the country has 
become the most outspoken advocate of s tab ilization . . . ."38 i t  was 
not always that way. In general, organized agriculture moved sluggishly 
during the twenties to integrate the Fisher proposals into th e ir own 
farm re lie f  programs. The real commitment to monetary stabilization  
awaited the fresh disaster of 1929 and its  deflationary aftermath.
Yet during the Harding-Coolidge years the in it ia l  agricultural converts
36westerfield and Douglas, "Memorials," American Economic 
Review, p. 658.
3^Edward A. Rumely to Fred Sexauer, October 3, 1934, New York 
C ity, Dairymen League Papers, The Collection of Regional History and 
University Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
38Lawrence, Stabilization of Prices, p. 59.
38pisher, Stable Money: A History, p. 63.
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to the stabilization cause were won and they were the precursors to 
the larger e ffo rt.
Henry A. Wallace, editor of Wallaces' Farmer, became Fisher's 
principal disciple among farm spokesmen. Elected a Vice-President of 
a ll three stable money organizations, the young ed itor, only weeks 
a fte r Fisher launched the Stable Money League, urged upon farmers the 
importance of stable money to the ir industry. Wallace reported, "Very 
few representatives of the farm interests were at the f i r s t  meeting of 
the Stable Money League. This is rather strange," he observed, "for 
the farmer rea lly  has more to gain from stable money during the next 
th irty  years than any other class of society."40 During the decade 
that followed, Wallaces' Farmer seldom missed an opportunity to preach 
the good news of s tab iliza tio n , confidently predicting that "Sooner or 
la te r  we shall inevitably be driven either to the Fisher stabilized  
dollar or some other form of a commodity d o lla r ."41
The f i r s t  national farm organization to endorse monetary sta­
b iliza tio n  was the American Farm Bureau Federation at its  national 
convention in November 1921.4% in January 1922, President Harding's 
National Agricultural Conference also demonstrated awareness of
40"The Stable Money League," Wallaces' Farmer, XLVI (June 10,
1921), p. 858; New York Times, 29 May 1921.
41Wall aces' Farmer, XLVI (July 8 , 1921), p. 944. See also 
"The Value of Money," Ib id . , (July 24, 1921), p. 905; "Stabilizing the 
Dollar," Ib id . , (December 2, 1921), p. 1441.
4%American Farm Bureau Federation, Resolutions Adopted at the 
Third Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, November 21-23, 1921.
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stab ilization  concepts when spokesmen inveighed against "radical flu c ­
tuations" in the price level and resolved "That this conference 
recommends that Congress appoint a special investigating committee to 
examine various plans for stab iliz ing  the do llar. . . ."43 Congress 
could not be chided for responding too lig h tly  to the request as the 
House Banking and Currency committee sponsored protracted hearings on 
stab ilization  in 1922, 1924, 1926, 1928 and 1932. These investigations 
produced not only a d e fin itive  review of the stable money controversies 
but a thorough reexamination of the role of the Federal Reserve System 
in American economic l i f e .
Representative Thomas Alan Goldsborough of Maryland, the f i f th  
Congressman from a family whose p o litica l service to the Eastern Shore 
began in the Continental Congress, introduced the Fisher Compensated 
do llar scheme to Congress in 1922. In so doing, Goldsborough began an 
association that would involve him in the wars over monetary s tab iliza ­
tion through the climactic 1935 battle on banking reform. "Now that we 
have this splendid banking system," he told Congress in 1922, " i t  seems 
to me that the next step should be an attempt to prevent gradual rises 
or fa lls  in general commodity prices . . . causing a ll concerned 
misery . . . and culminating in makeshift leg is la tion , radicalism, and 
sometimes even in revolution and w a r ."44 The Maryland Congressman 
seemed especially cognizant of the effects of in s ta b ility  on his
43Report of the National Agricultural Conference, January 23-27, 
1922, House Document 195,  67th Cong., 2d Sess., (Washington, D. C .,
1922), p. 138.
44u. s . .  Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., May 23,  
1922, p. 7506.
144
rural constituency. In a speech In February 1923, Goldsborough con­
tended that though the farmer's cost of liv ing  had risen 76 per cent 
between 1914 and 1922, the prices of the commodities he sold had 
actually fa llen  below prewar levels. He argued that the stab ilization  
of the general price level would not only restore profits  to the farm 
but would lessen the burden of debt farmers incurred during the era of 
war-generated in fla tio n . He concluded, "Let us act now before the 
lessons of the las t three years are en tire ly  forgotten.
Goldsborough managed to obtain a hearing on his stab ilization
proposals from the House Banking and Currency Committee in December
1922, and again in February 1924. On both occasions Fisher served as
the featured witness. Testifying at the f i r s t  Goldsborough hearing
Fisher explained:
The idea of the b il l  is simply th is: Let us s tart out with a
certain price level as standard . . . ca ll i t  100 percent. In 
two months the computing bureau . . . assesses the situation; 
i t  calculates the price leve l. Suppose i t  finds the price level 
is then not 100 percent but 101 percent. What does that mean?
I t  means that there is a deviation above par of 1 percent, show­
ing in fla tio n  is beginning. In other words . . . the dollar is 
a short dollar; i t  only buys 99 percent of what i t  should. This 
is  remedied by the mint as soon as reported. I t  puts 1 percent 
more gold into the do llar and brings i t  up to par. . . .
Should the computing bureau discover that deflation rather than in f la ­
tion were reflected in its  indices i t  would ask the Mint to "unload the
copy of the speech is contained in correspondence from 
Goldsborough to Honorable Louis T. McFadden, House of Representatives, 
January 24, 1924, Washington, D. C ., H. R. 494, ACC Papers, Archives, 
Washington, D. C. See also T. Alan Goldsborough, "Proposed Legislation 
to S tab ilize the Dollar," Proceedings of the Academy of P o litica l 
Science, X (January 1923), pp. 32-34, and Goldsborough, "Speech to the 
Maryland State Banker's Association," reprinted in U. S ., Congressional 
Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., May 28, 1928, pp. 10339-10341.
145
dollar" of 1 per cent of its  gold content every two months until the 
dollar reached par. "So i t  is just like  steering a bicycle or an auto­
mobile," the Yale professor lectured, " i f  i t  deviates a l i t t l e  you turn 
the wheel s ligh tly  and i f  that is not enough you turn i t  some more. . . . 
Nobody can steer a machine with absolute straightness; but i t  is amaz­
ing how straight you can steer i t  i f  you only touch the wheel a l i t t l e  
here and there. . . ."46
When the second Goldsborough hearing concluded in February 1924, 
there were indications that farm leadership had become more aware of the 
stabilization controversy. Wallaces' Farmer had supported Golds­
borough' s in it ia l leg islative drive for the Fisher stabilized dollar.
The journal editoria lized during the f i r s t  Goldsborough b i l l  hearings 
in 1922, "While i t  is too much to expect that the b il l  w ill pass at 
this session of Congress, i t  is to be hoped that the hearings w ill edu­
cate many Congressmen as to the fundamental truth that i t  is the 
alternating periods of in flation  and deflation which cause so many 
troubles concerning which they legislate so fu t ile ly ."  The editors 
asked subscribers to write their Congressmen to support the Fisher plan 
as a "step in the right d irection."47 in late 1922, the Montana State
46u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Bank­
ing and Currency, Stabilization of the Purchasing Power of Money, 
Hearings on H. R. 11788, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., Washington, 1922, 
pp. 24-25. A sympathetic review of the Goldsborough b ill hearings is 
contained in Fisher, Stabilized Money: A History, pp. 152-57. A polem­
ic a l, sprightly and decidedly an ti-s tab iliza tion  analysis of the 
hearings is presented in Lawrence, Stabilization of Prices: A C ritica l
Study, pp. 79-92. Lawrence concluded, "Fisher's testimony is a triumph 
of advocacy over scholarship." Ib id . , p. 191.
47wallaces' Farmer, XLVII (August 25, 1922), p. 985.
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Farm Bureau resolved, "We believe that farmers and the agricultural 
industry suffer tremendously, perhaps more than any other industry from 
the fluctuation in the purchasing power of money." The Montana group 
urged a Congressional investigation to study "the fe a s ib ility  of the 
stab ilization  of the d o l l a r . "48 other agricultural leaders wrote the 
Banking and Currency Committee requesting copies of the Goldsborough 
h e a r i n g s .49 The f i r s t  two Goldsborough b i l ls ,  in contrast to sim ilar 
legislation the Maryland Democrat sponsored in the 1930s, received at 
best only sporadic support from organized agriculture and both the 1922 
and 1924 versions died in committee.
The Goldsborough hearings did en lis t Congressman Olger B. Burt- 
ness into the ranks of stab ilization  advocates. Burtness, Republican 
from North Dakota, introduced his own monetary stab ilization  b il l  to 
Congress in December 1923.80 The Burtness b ill  owed its  inspiration to 
Dana J. Tinnes of Grand Forks, North Dakota, an economist whose s ta b ili­
zation convictions predated those of Fisher. The Tinnes plan differed
48The Montana resolution is contained in a le t te r  from A. H. 
Stafford, President of the Montana State Farm Bureau to Professor 
George F. Warren, Cornell University, January 19, 1923, Ithaca, New 
York, Warren Papers, The Collection of Regional History and University 
Archives, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
4^ Among those requesting copies of the Goldsborough hearings 
were Chester C. Davis, Commissioner of Agriculture for the state of 
Montana and Lessing J. Rosenwald of Sears Roebuck and Co., whose in ter­
est in a prosperous agricultural industry involved both he and his 
company in supporting monetary stabilization in the 1930s. See Senator 
Thomas J. Walsh to Hon. Louis T. McFadden, Chairman, Committee on Bank­
ing and Currency, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C ., Record 
Group 46, Archives, Washington, D. C .; Ruth Nichols, Secretary to Rosen­
wald, to Banking and Currency Committee, April 18, 1923, Philadelphia, 
Ib id .
80u. S ., Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., December 5, 
1923, p. 34.
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from the Goldsborough b i l l  in only unimportant procedural matters as 
i t  also called for the achievement of monetary s ta b ility  through manip­
ulating the gold content of the do llar. To Burtness the need for 
stab ilization  was evident. "We need," he informed Congress, "only 
recall to mind farmers residing within our own d is tric ts  who borrowed 
money during the World War . . . and then found when they had to pay 
the same amount back in 1922 or 1923 that they had to repay money which 
to them was twice as dear as that which they had borrowed."51 Though 
an aggressive witness for s tab ilization  a t the second Goldsborough 
hearings, Burtness never managed much of a following and remained at 
the periphery of the stab ilization  movement.52
After the fa ilu re  of the second Goldsborough b i l l  in 1924 the 
leadership of the stabilization movement passed momentarily to Wisconsin 
University economist John Rogers Commons. Commons, notable labor econ­
omist and disciple of the New Economics, had associated his career with 
such causes as the social gospel, populism and La Fo llette  progres- 
sivism. He opposed la issez-fa ire  ana favored social and economic 
planning--a position which squared with his conversion to managed cur­
rency doctrines.53 Commons renewed his monetary investigations as a
51 Ib id . , 68th Cong., 2d Sess., March 3, 1925, p. 5361.
52por an explanation of the differences between the Fisher and 
Tinnes b ills  by Burtness, see Ib id . , pp. 5360-64. For an explanation 
of the Tinnes plan, see D. J. Tinnes, "The Market Gage Dollar," Ameri­
can Economic Review, IX (June 1919), pp. 263-66. Burtness fa iled  
reelection in 1932 and thus was removed from Congress just as the 
demands for monetary reform intensified.
53Lafayette G. Harter, J r . ,  John R. Commons; His Assault on 
Laissez-faire (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1962),
pp. 37-44.
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result of the boom-bust cycle of 1919-1920. After his own experiments 
with wholesale commodity indices Commons reported that he looked upon 
the money question "as the most important of a ll labor p r o b l e m s . "54 
Upon reading Fisher and other s tab ilization is ts  Commons "joined the 
labor problem with the money problem" recognizing that the business 
cycle devastated both the worker and his boss. "The most important 
labor problem," he concluded in 1927, "was the stab ilization  of the 
average of employers' wholesale p r i c e s . "55
Commons enlisted in the crusade for stab ilization  in the early 
twenties serving as president of the National Monetary Association, 
1922-1924. The Association, a successor to Fisher's Stable Money 
Association, suffered from conservative members seemingly more intent 
on preventing in fla tion  than deflation and dissolved in 1925.56 More 
successful as a propagandist and teacher fo r the money reform cause. 
Commons contributed the prestige of his scholarship to the movement in 
a rtic le s , speeches and in testimony before Congressional committees.57 
His most conspicuous role in the stab ilization  cause, however, was that
54john R. Commons, Myself (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934),
p. 189.
55 lb id ., p. 190.
56lb id . , p. 191; Fisher, Stable Money: A History, pp. 105-06.
57$ee John R. Commons, "Farm Prices and the Value of Gold,"
North American Review, CCXXV (January-February, 1928), pp. 196-211; 
Commons, "Price Stabilization and the Federal Reserve System," The Annal­
i s t , XXXIX (April 1, 1927), pp. 459-462; Commons, "Stabilization of 
Prices and Business," American Economic Review, XV (March 1925), 
pp. 43-52; Commons, Institutional Economics (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1934). An excellent summary of Commons* overall contribution to mone­
tary thinking is contained in Dorfman, The Economic Mind, Vol. IV, 
pp. 383-87.
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of a one-man brain trust for Congressman James George Strong, Repub­
lican of Kansas. Strong continued the leg is la tive  fig h t for stable 
money begun by Goldsborough. The Kansas Congressman frequently con­
sulted Commons regarding s tab ilization  matters—the two men cooperating 
to draft the Strong stab ilization  b ills  of 1926 and 1928 .58
The f i r s t  Strong b i l l ,  introduced into Congress January 18, 
1926, began yet another round in the s tab ilization  controversy. The 
new stab ilization  b i l l ,  p a rtia lly  out of p o litic a l expediency, dropped 
the gold manipulation features of the Compensated Dollar scheme. 
Emphasizing credit control rather than gold control, the measure con­
tained only a Congressional directive to the Federal Reserve System to 
use "a ll of its  powers" to promote "s ta b ility  in the price le v e l."^9 
The Strong b i l l  and its  subsequent revisions resulted in hearings 
before the House Committee on Banking and Currency in both the 69th and 
70th Congresses. The Committee hired Commons as an economic advisor 
and allowed him to te s tify  at length in support of s tab iliza tio n . The 
Strong b i l l  hearings, i f  nothing else, proved the tenacious interest of 
students in the stab ilization  question as they spanned more than two
58commons, Myself, pp. 191-92; Harter, Commons, pp. 75-76; 
Fisher, Stable Money: A History, pp. 170-71; U. S ., Congressional
Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., March 17, 1928, p. 4926.
59The text of H. R. 7895 accompanied by Congressman Strong's 
exegesis is found in U. S ., Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 
February 20, 1926, pp. 4301-03. Strong's views on s tab ilization  are 
also recorded in Ib id . ,  71st Cong., 1st Sess., April 17, 1929, pp.
72-73, and his interview with the press a fte r v is iting  President Cool- 
idge regarding s tab ilization  is  recorded in New York Times, 18 April 
1927.
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years and occupied 40 days of committee sessions. Translated into 
three languages the testimony f i l le d  1568 p a g e s . GO
Throughout the testimony presented during the f i r s t  Strong hear­
ings (March 1926 to February 1927), s tabilization advocates recounted 
the d iffic u ltie s  of the farmer to bolster th e ir arguments fo r money 
re fo rm .G 1  All affirm ative witnesses agreed that the advent of stable 
money would prove a blessing to agriculture-some asserting that the 
Strong proposal was the best "farm re lie f  b ill"  before C o n g r e s s . G 2  
The most extensive argument on the benefits farmers could expect from 
stabilization  were provided by Commons. The Wisconsin economist
GQsee U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Stabilization: Hearings on H. R. 7895, pts I ,  I I ,  69th Cong., 1st Sess.,
March 24, 25, 30, 31; April 1, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 22, 27, 30;
May 3, 4, 5, 6; June 10, 1926 and February 4, 1927; Ib id . , S tab iliza- 
tion: Hearings on H. R. 11806, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., March 19, 20, 21;
April 30; May 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 , 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, 1928. A
sympathetic treatment of the Strong hearings is found in Fisher, Stable 
Money: A History, pp. 157-83. A good summary of the arguments made by 
both sides is Charles 0. Hardy, Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1932), pp. 200-26. 
An ably w ritten, i f  skeptical review of the f i r s t  Strong hearings is 
Lawrence, Stabilization of Prices: A C ritica l Study, pp. 113-40. 
Unfortunately, Lawrence's publishing date prevented him from comment on 
the second Strong hearings. Lawrence's views on farm r e l ie f ,  s tab iliza ­
tion and production controls are recorded in "Stabilization of Prices 
and the Farmer's Income: The Need for Control of the Farm Supply,"
The Annals of the American Academy, CXLII (March 1929), pp. 158-69.
A review of the quantity theory of money and a defense of Fisher's 
position is contained in Arthur F. Burns, "The Quantity Theory and Price 
Stab ilization ," The American Economic Review, XIX (December 1929), 
pp. 561-79. A balanced review is provided in Lionel D. Edie, "The 1928 
Hearings on the Strong B il l ,"  Journal of P o litica l Economy, XXXVII 
(June 1929), pp. 340-54. See also M. K. Graham, "The Strong B il l ,"  
Southwestern P olitical and Social Science Quarterly, X (March 1930), 
pp. 401-08.
G^ Hearings on H. 7895, pp. 19, 57, 139-40.
GZ l b i d . ,  pp. 48, 222.
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theorized that nearly a ll businesses and labor organizations had 
achieved a degree of stabilization through cooperation and combination. 
Unfortunately farmers had remained atomistic and disorganized. "The 
consequence is that any oscillation of the volume of credit by the 
Federal Reserve System w ill s p ill over into the agricultural fie ld  
. . and he thought effect the ir prices more rapidly than those 
industries that enjoyed combination.63 The principal opposition w it­
ness to the Strong b i l l ,  Benjamin Strong, Governor of the New York City 
Federal Reserve Bank,also used an agricultural reference to debate the 
merits of s tab ilization . "What disturbs me about this proposal . . . 
is th is ,"  he admitted, "much of the discussion of prices recently has 
arisen from the great misfortune which the farmers of the country have 
suffered. . . . "  The reserve o ff ic ia l questioned whether the b ill  
would encourage farmers to hold the Federal Reserve System responsible 
fo r every decline in commodity prices regardless of the cause. He com­
plained that the b i l l  granted the system tremendous responsibility, 
without providing the necessary means, which he doubted existed, to 
meet the new obligations placed on the nation's money m a n a g e r s . ^4
Stab ilization ists  were more sanguine than Governor Strong in 
th e ir estimation of the a b ility  of the Federal Reserve to control price 
levels. The two witnesses with the most d irect ties to agriculture at 
the f i r s t  Strong hearings, George H. Shibley of I l l in o is  and Western 
Starr, lobbiest fo r the Farmer-Labor Party, accepted the "Crime of 1920" 
myth and believed that at its  discretion the Federal Reserve could halt
63jb id . , pp. 1116-17. 64 ib id . ,  pp. 293-301
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in fla tion  or deflation—as the system proved, they alleged, when i t  
precipitated the crash of 1920 .6 5  More sophisticated stab ilization ists  
lik e  Professors Commons, Fisher and the University of Missouri's James 
Harvey Rogers placed lim itations on the a b ility  of the System to main­
tain s ta b ility . Fisher, fo r example, distrusted the Strong b i l l 's  
reliance upon credit supervision as the exclusive means of attaining  
stab ilization . He s t i l l  hoped for the adoption of his compensated 
dollar scheme but the Yale professor agreed that through the use of open 
market transactions, the substitution of gold certifica tes  for Federal 
Reserve notes, the rediscount rate and moral suasion, the Federal 
Reserve could influence credit and achieve at least partial monetary 
stab ilization . Along with other s tab iliza tio n is ts , Fisher and Commons 
looked upon the Strong proposal as "a f i r s t  s t e p . " 6 6  yhey hoped the 
Strong b ill  would commit the nation to s tab iliza tio n . Once s tab iliza ­
tion was the acknowledged objective of national monetary policy, 
reformers could reopen the question as to how such a program might be 
implemented.
Upon conclusion of the f i r s t  Strong hearings. Commons remained 
in Washington five  months researching and writing new drafts of the 
stab ilization  b i l l .  Consulting with various authorities including 
Governor Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Commons and 
Congressman Strong f in a lly  produced the "twelfth revision of the sixth 
revision" of the b i l l . 67 The new b i l l ,  introduced into Congress on
66$hibeley's testimony is Ib id . ,  pp. 16-17; S tarr's  is Ib id . ,
p. 231.
66lb id ., pp. 71-75.
67Hearings on H. 11806, p. 7; Commons, Myself, pp. 191-92.
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March 6, 1928, required the Federal Reserve to "maintain a stable gold 
standard," to publicize a ll decisions that might affect cred it, and to 
research the proper methods and goals of a managed currency system.68 
The second Strong b i l l  became the subject of House Banking and Currency 
committee hearings in the Spring of 1928.
Henry A. Wallace and Andrew Shearer represented farmers at the 
second Strong hearings when they convened in March 1928. Wallace 
lis ted  his credentials to the committee as editor of Wallaces' Farmer, 
president of the Stable Money Association and secretary of the Corn 
Belt Meat Packers' Association. The Iowa editor acknowledged interest 
in the concept of stable money ever since he had read a Fisher a rtic le  
on the subject in 1913. He te s tif ie d  that there "is a gradual and 
growing interest of farmers in this problem of money," and he saw the 
maturing interest in stable money as analogous to the post c iv il war 
era when deflation f in a lly  forced farmers to become conscious of mone­
tary issues. Wallace confessed that he and many other farm spokesmen 
favored stabilization because they were "suspicious that the Federal 
Reserve System may at any time s tart further deflation." He explained, 
"We are a l i t t l e  fearful . . . that the people who work with money . . . 
a ll have an instinctive and unconscious bias toward enhancing the pur­
chasing power of money . . . just as," he admitted, "farm people have 
an unconscious bias in the direction of . . . in fla tio n ."  He concluded
68yhe b ill  is reprinted in Hearings on H. 11806, pp. 1-2.
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that stab ilization  represented the only reasonable alternative to the 
trad itional tug-of-war over monetary p o l i c y . 69
Andrew Shearer spoke to the committee on behalf of the three 
largest farm organizations of his native state--the Grange, the Farmers' 
Union and the Kansas Farm Bureau which he served as vice-president.
In addition he presented resolutions from the Kansas Committee of Farm 
Organizations, the Kansas State Board of Agriculture and the Kansas 
Livestock Association, endorsing stable money and the Strong b i l l  in 
p a rtic u la r.70 Shearer supported s tab ilization  essentially on two 
grounds. Farming was a long-term commercial proposition necessitating 
some p red ic tab ility  of price levels. And he endorsed Commons' argument 
that farmers, unlike other business groups, had fa iled  to combine and 
consequently were more susceptible to price in s ta b ility .71
Though both Strong b ills  died in committee, the interest among 
farm groups in stab ilization  intensified. The Il l in o is  Farmers' In s ti­
tu te , a month before the f i r s t  Strong hearings convened, resolved in 
favor of s tab ilization  and urged Congress to act upon the m a t t e r . 7%
In December 1927, during the recess between the f i r s t  and second Strong 
hearings, Andrew Shearer revived the Farm Bureau's interest in stable 
money. Shearer, a delegate to the Annual Meeting of the American Farm
69Hearings on H. IR. 11806, pp. 193-201.
70rhe date and text of each resolution is printed in Ib id . ,
pp. 201-02.
7 1 l b i d . ,  pp. 202-10.
7^The text of the resolution is reprinted in Fisher, Stable
Money: A History, p. 114.
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Bureau Federation, took his demand for a stable money resolution to 
the floor of the convention. The Kansan, an elderly gentleman and 
former Populist, in a speech described as "eloquent" by observers, 
argued that stable money "is of v ita l importance to the United States 
of America and especially to agriculture." Shearer gave credit to the 
Stable Money Association for its  educational work on the issue and then 
challenged his hearers: "You farmers must understand, that i t  is the
avowed purpose of the creditor money lending class to gradually lower 
the price leve l. . . ." He claimed that the "creditor class" was con­
tent to lower the price level "one or two per cent a year" so that 
"your debts are not much harder to pay and the property of the creditor 
classes is worth much more." Shearer's motion fo r the adoption of a 
stable money resolution received endorsement from a fellow delegate 
who noted, "He [Shearer] is backed up by such men as [[Frank] Lowden, 
Irving Fisher, Henry Wallace, and numerous others in whom we have con­
fidence." The motion carried .73 The Farm Bureau also resolved in 
favor of stable money at its  1928 Annual Meeting and in 1930, the Bureau 
recommended that President Hoover establish a commission composed of 
farmers and other economic interests "to study plans and report thereon 
to Congress to stab ilize  the value of the do llar. . . ."74
73w. R. Ogg, Comp., History of Farm Bureau's A ctiv ities for 
Monetary Reform (Chicago: American Farm Bureau Federation, Department 
of Information, 1934), mimeographed pamphlet, p. 1; Minutes of the 
Ameri can Farm Bureau Federation, Ninth Annual Meeting, Chicago, 111., 
December 5, 6, 7, 1927, pp. 221-225.
74[vjinutes of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Tenth Annual 
Meeting, November 1928; Ib id . , Twelfth Annual Meeting, Boston, Mass., 
December 5-10, 1930.
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The in it ia l  response of the Farmers' Union to stabilization  
occurred a fte r  the f i r s t  Goldsborough hearings adjourned. The Union's 
1923 national convention resolved in favor of a "safe, sane, honest 
and stable money."75 In 1928, the concept of stab ilization  seemed more 
precise in the minds of Farmers' Union members as th e ir national con­
vention affirmed:
We believe that Congress should take such steps as are necessary 
to define and direct the powers of the Federal Reserve System in 
the in fla tion  and deflation of the currency, and that within those 
defined lim its , s tabilization of the currency w ill best serve the 
public in te re s t.76
National President Charles E. Huff, in his "Annual Report" to the 
Farmers' Union convention in 1930, complained that stable money needed 
even more intensive investigation and support from farmers than i t  had 
received. " I wish," he reported to the convention, "the Farmers' Union 
might quite defin ite ly  . . . through the action of its  committees, give 
expression to its  feelings and its  convictions concerning the variable­
ness in the purchasing power of money. . . ."77 The Farmers' Union 
fu lf i l le d  Huff's desire as i t  enthusiastically endorsed stab ilization  
efforts in the early 1930s.
With the obvious exception of Wallaces' Farmer, the farm press 
fa iled  to convert to stab ilization  until a fte r the Crash of 1929.
75Miniites of the National Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative 
Union of America, Nineteenth Annual Session, Omaha, Nebraska, Novem­
ber 20, 21, 22, 1933, p. 57.
75 j b i d . , Twenty-fourth Annual Session, Denver, Colorado, 
November 20, 21, 22, 1928.
77 i b i d . , Twenty-sixth Annual Session, St. Paul, Minnesota, 
November 18, 19, 20, 21, 1930.
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During the twenties the Rural New Yorker spotlighted the fluctuations 
in the value of the dollar as an unsettling factor in commercial trans­
actions.78 Not until 1930, however, did the magazine ed ito ria lize  
against "a do llar that cheats" and in favor of s tab iliza tio n .79 The 
principal Southern farm journal, the Progressive Farmer, la te r a 
copious supporter of stab ilization  e ffo rts , had but one entry on the 
subject prior to 1931. The 1930 column entitled  "The world’ s News:
A Monthly Review," simply noted the work of Irving Fisher and the Stable 
Money League without offering any endorsement of the stable money pro­
g r a m . T h e  Chicago-based Prairie  Farmer also found stab ilization  good 
copy in 1930. Two lengthy front page artic les  presented stab ilization  
propaganda in August. The artic les  admonished farmers to demand from 
p o litic a l candidates "a pledge in writing" of support for the s ta b il i­
zation c a u s e .81 Along with Wallaces' Farmer these magazines 
anticipated the larger journalis tic  e ffo rt in support of stable money 
that characterized the farm press in the post 1930 era.
78The Rural New Yorker, LXXXI (August 12, 1922), p. 1002;
LXXXVI (March 12, 19271, P- 443; LXXXVIII (July 13, 1929), p. 941; 
LXXXIX (November 15, 1930), p. 1251.
7 9 j b i d . ,  LXXXIX (December 13, 1930), p. 1347.
80progressive Farmer, XLV (December 1, 1930), p. 6.
81 Carl Stover, "The Real Cause of 'Hard Times,"' The Prairie  
Farmer, CII (August 9, 1930), pp. 1, 4, 16; Stover, "How Hard Times Can 
Be Ended," The Prairie Farmer, pp. 1, 15, 16, 17. Another early sup­
porter of stable money was Manufacturers Record, a journal that had 
cooperated with farm c ritic s  of the Federal Reserve during the "Crime 
of 1920" controversy. See "Stabilization of Gold Discussed by Econo­
mists and Financiers," Manufacturers Record, XCIII (February 23, 1928), 
pp. 1-5.
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The affluent 1920s contained a paradox. On either side of 
"Coolidge prosperity" lay depression, especially fo r the nation's 
farmers. In an attempt to escape the ro lle r  coaster business cycle 
theorists produced both reasoned and dubious plans fo r monetary sta­
b i l i ty .  I t  seemed logical but proved optimistic that man could smooth 
the troughs and the speculative heights of his own economy. In the 
1920s, stab ilization  plans were proposed not only for monetary policy 
but for m ilita ry  a ffa irs  (the Washington Armament Conference), diplomacy 
(the Kellogg-Briand Act) and farmers (the Agricultural Marketing Act).
In one sense s tab iliza tio n , including monetary s tab ilization  with its  
ancient quantity theory, was inherently regressive—an expression of 
the Normalcy syndrome. And yet monetary s tab iliza tio n , relying on the 
tools of the New Economics and expressing a commendable humanitarian 
concern, contained modern implications. The theorists, because of the 
greatest depression in American history, were to have the opportunity 
to test the ir hypotheses. Farmers, victims of hard times, would ins is t 
upon i t .
CHAPTER VI
FARMERS AND THE DEMAfO FOR INFLATION 
DURING THE HOOVER ADMINISTRATION 
1929-1932
Farmers looked upon the crash of 1929 with some wry satisfac­
tion . "The farmer had his deflation in 1920," one farm paper noted, 
"nine years la te r he sees the speculators getting theirs." The journal 
predicted "the psychology of our farmers may improve."! As the crash 
of 1929 lengthened into the nation's greatest depression, farmers found 
small comfort in the knowledge that others shared th e ir predicament. 
Instead, rural America, with its  special fa m ilia rity  with hard times, 
began anew the search for a way to end the c ris is . That e ffo rt led 
farmers to monetary panaceas and the nomenclature of the money question 
again accented farm rhetoric. Bimetallism, symmetallism, seigniorage, 
free s ilv e r, gold s te r iliz a tio n , re fla tion  and the honest dollar were 
terms that, fo r many, reflected the pertinent issues of the day.
Thanks to the s ta tis tica l refinements of the New Economics, 
farmers grew acutely aware of the dimensions of the ir distress. Farm 
organizations, journals and politic ians reported the gloomy indices 
which seemed to reinforce the notion that "deflation hits the farmer 
f i r s t  and h a r d e s t . T h e  Prairie Farmer observed, " I f  Congress had
^Progressive Farmer, XLIV (December 7, 1929), p. 5.
2"Deflation Hits the Fanner," P rairie  Farmer, GUI (March 21, 
1931), p. 8.
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passed a law in 1926 requiring every debtor to pay back $1.30 for every 
dollar he had borrowed we would have had a revolution in this country." 
Yet due to deflation "that is just what has been done."^ In November, 
1931, the National Grange reiterated the theme when i t  complained that 
while the average of a ll wholesale prices had dropped 30 per cent dur­
ing the preceding three years, farm prices had fa llen  45 per cent.^ 
During the Hoover years crunching commodity prices more than rivaled  
the stock market crash in producing heartache, bankruptcy and despair.
Deranged economic conditions produced the traditional scramble 
for monetary panaceas that characterized e a rlie r depression eras. 
In fla tio n is t monetary proposals during the Hoover Presidency ranged 
from the "Electric Dollar", which based currency on the consumption of 
kilowatts, to the more customary bimetallic and f ia t  money schemes.5 
As they had in past depressions, farmers demanded an inflationary mone­
tary policy to lessen debt, raise commodity prices and restore 
prosperity.
A favorite recommendation of rural in fla tion is ts  combined work 
r e l ie f  and monetary expansion in public works proposals. In November 
1930, the Rural New Yorker urged creation of a revolving fund of three 
b illio n  dollars "to put people to work building farm to market roads."
3"From the Editor's Haymow," Prairie Farmer, C III (August 8, 
1931), p. 8.
^Proceedings of the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, 
65th Annual Session, Madison, Wisconsin, November 1931, p. 175.
N^ew York Times, 27 December 1932.
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The revolving fund should consist of cred it circulating notes of the 
federal government rather than interest bearing bonds.® The Farmers' 
Union particularly  favored issuance of "non-interest bearing legal 
tender bond currency" to finance work re lie f  projects. The Greenback 
bond currency called for in the Union's plan allowed the government to 
pay for work projects without paying interest to bond holders. A tax 
on gasoline could eventually re tire  the bonds. At its  1930 national 
convention, a Farmers' Union delegate explained "Down in Washington 
there is a National Treasury. They have a printing press . . . and i t  
doesn't cost any more to print $1,000 than i t  does $1."7 In early 1931, 
Jacob S. Coxey resurfaced and with the aid of Senator Heflin of Alabama 
produced a b i l l  that called upon Congress to implement a noninterest 
bearing bond program.®
Farmer in fla tio n is ts  also urged currency expansion during the 
early 1930s. Oklahoma Senator Elmer Thomas, eventual leader of the 
Senate in fla tio n  bloc, presented a typical plea for currency expansion 
in February 1931. Contrasting the in fla tio n  year 1919 with the depres­
sion year 1930, the Senator argued that though prices were high in the 
postwar year, "every man had a job" and "there was no hunger in
®Rural New Yorker, LXXXIX (November 15, 1930), p. 1261.
^Minutes of the Farmers' Educational and Co-operative Union of 
America, 26th National Convention, St. Paul, Minnesota, November 18-21, 
1930), pp. 47-49. See also Ib id . , 27th National Convention, Des Moines, 
Iowa, November 17-18, 1931, p. 40, and John A. Simpson, "To the Member­
ship," Oklahoma Union Farmer, XII (January 15, 1931), pp. 1, 3; and 
John A. Simpson, "To the Membership," Oklahoma Union Farmer, X II 
(July 15, 1931), p. 1.
®U. S ., Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., February 20, 
1931, p. 5597.
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those days. Here in 1930 we had the lowest circulation since 1914," 
and millions were out of work. According to the Oklahoman these figures 
offered "positive proof" of the correlation between commodity prices 
and the amount of money in circulation.^
Increasing the supply of money was a remedy easily understood 
and acceptable to agricu ltura lis ts . Wallaces' Farmer, as did other 
farm papers, advocated an easy money policy including currency expan­
sion.^^ The Farmers' Exchange of Indiana launched a drive for 
expansion of the money supply in early 1931. The Indiana farm paper 
advocated an involved scheme that called for the Federal Farm loan 
Board to issue bonds against farm mortgages and exchange the bonds for 
currency at Federal Reserve banks. In b rie f, the plan proposed to 
refinance farm loans, expand the currency and transform debt into an 
a s s e t . O n e  of the more popular rural stump speakers of the early  
1930s, John A. Simpson, President of the Farmers' Union, charged that 
the depression resulted from the conspiracy of "international bankers 
who began the deflation process in May 1920." Restoration of good
9lb id . , February 13, 1931, pp. 4787-93. See also Ib id . , 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess., January 4, 1932, pp. 1195-96.
10"Contracting the Currency," Wallaces' Farmer, LV (March 15, 
1930), p. 6; "The Money Situation," Ib id . ,  (June 14, 1930), p. 4; 
"Contracting the Currency," Ib id . , (September 20, 1930), p. 4. See 
also U. S ., Congressional Record, S. Res. 367, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 
January 5, 1931, pp. 1361-63.
11"What the Farmer's Exchange Suggests," Farmer's Exchange 
(New Paris, Indiana), V (July 3, 1931), p. 1. See also U. S ., Congres­
sional Record, S. Res. 359, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., December 8, 1930, 
p. 316.
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times awaited only a decision to produce "a big crop of money" and
12reverse the deflation process.
Gold repricing proved a more respectable in flationary device 
than either printing press bonds or f ia t  money. A popular notion 
developed that the depression resulted from an insuffic ient supply of 
gold which in turn forced a decline in price levels. The proponents 
of the gold scarcity theory explained that even though the government 
decreed 23.22 grains of gold equal to $ l,tha  actual purchasing power of 
the dollar depended on the supply and demand for bullion. When gold 
was scarce its  value increased in relation to commodities and prices 
declined. Conversely, when gold was abundant prices rose. C ritics of 
the traditional gold standard complained that during the postwar era 
gold production fa iled  to keep pace with the expansion of business.
The lim ited a v a ila b ility  of gold resulted in a downward readjustment 
of prices and eventually world depression.13
The high priest of the gold repricing movement in the 1930s was 
Cornell's George Frederick Warren, professor of agricultural e c o n o m i c s . 1 4
1^Rochelle News ( I l l in o is ) ,  September 17, 1931, p. 1. See also 
"Nationalize Honey," Oklahoma Union Farmer, X II (October 15, 1931), p. 4. 
Wyoming's Republican Senator Robert D. Carey also urged "a reasonable 
in fla tion  of the currency." See New York Times, 24 July 1931.
13see for example, John R. Commons, "Farm Prices and the Value 
of Gold," The North American Review, CCXXV (February 1928), pp. 195-211; 
Lionel D. Edie, "An International Viewpoint on Commodity Prices--Long 
Decline in Prospect," The Annalist, XXXII (November 16, 1928), pp. 773- 
774. Edie's views were reported in the New York Times, 28 December 1927. 
A popular contemporary expose of the inadequacies of the gold standard 
was James Harvey Rogers, America Weighs Her Gold (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1931), 237 pages.
14warren developed his gold theories with the aid of co-author 
and Cornell colleague Frank A. Pearson. Pearson, a former student of
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A specialist in farm management, Warren grew interested in commodity 
prices as a result of a childhood spent among the Greenbackers, and 
Populists of Nebraska and the price aberrations of 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 0 .During 
the 1920s Warren expressed pessimism about the future of farm prices 
and predicted the industry would experience "a long period of distress. 
A convert to the s tab iliza tio n is t position, Warren held that the only 
hope for farmers was the restoration of an "equitable price leve l” and 
the discovery of "a stable medium of exchange." "The average turnover 
in agriculture is between seven and eight years," he wrote. "No one 
can decide whether to lay a t i le  drain or not until he f i r s t  knows 
something of the probable changes in the general price level for the 
next twenty years.
Familiar with the s tab iliza tio n is t proposals and Fisher's com­
pensated dollar scheme, Warren apparently fa iled  to include gold as a 
significant factor in determining price levels until about 1930.
Henry A. Wallace remembered that "In my f i r s t  talks with Warren [ in  the 
la t te r  1920sl I did not find him enthusiastic about the idea of
Warren's, served happily behind the scenes as his mentor's research and 
s ta tis tic a l associate. See Frank A. Pearson, "This and That," (a typed 
speech, February 24, 1958), 31 pages, Pearson Papers, Cornell University.
l^An a rtic le  length biography of Warren is Frank A. Pearson and 
W. I .  Myers, "The Fact Finder," Farm Economics, Department of Agricul­
tural Economics, New York State College of Agriculture, Ithaca, No. 208 
(February 1957), pp. 5470-516.
T^George F. Warren, "The Agricultural Depression--Its Causes 
and Remedies," mimeographed (May 5, 1924), 5 pages, Pearson Papers, 
Cornell University.
T^Warren to Edwin R. A. Seligman, 5 May 1924, Warren Papers, 
Cornell University.
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increasing the price of gold to keep the price level from going down."^®
Warren f i r s t  endorsed the gold scarcity thesis in a paper he presented
to the International Conference of Agricultural Economists in August, 
1930.19 The in tellectual catalyst that convinced Warren and his asso­
ciate Frank A. Pearson that gold bore a causal relationship to the 
depression was the interim report of the gold delegation of the League 
of Nations published In the summer of 1930. The report gave further 
credence to the gold scarcity thesis suggesting that a serious world 
gold shortage might surface as early as 1934. Of special interest to
the Cornellians was the section written by Joseph Kitchen which pre­
sented a historical and s ta tis tica l analysis of the relationship of 
gold to commodity prices in Great B r i t a i n . 20 "When we saw that we went 
to work," Pearson recalled. "We found out we had too l i t t l e  gold supply 
to support the prices of the twenties."21
Warren prided himself on his personal dictum--"Get the Facts." 
The quantitative methodology he and Pearson used produced a plethora of 
charts, graphs and s ta tis tica l data. Applying sim ilar techniques in
lOwallace believed that i t  was not until New York farmers were 
"really  hurt" about 1930 that his conversations with Warren and Pearson 
regarding gold pricing received support. See Henry A. Wallace, "Further 
Facts on Raising the Price of Gold," Journal of Farm Economics, XL 
(August 1958), p. 711; and compare Wallace to Pearson, 11 April 1957,
22 pages, Pearson Papers, Cornell University.
T^Diary of George Warren, 22 August 1930, Warren Papers,
Cornell University.
20joseph Kitchen, Interim Report of the Gold Delegation of the 
Financial Committee, League of Nations, Document C 375, September 8, 
1930, pp. 79-85.
2^Frank A. Pearson, personal interview with the author,
201 Worth Street, Ithaca, New York, 9 June 1968.
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the e ffo rt to explain the origins of the depression, Warren discovered 
economists had advanced 118 causes for the catastrophe. "Such a babble 
of confusion," he wrote, "merely means that the cause is unknown. . . . 
The present depression is not an act of God for the purification of 
men's souls." Warren also eliminated explanations which credited the 
depression to the business cycle, extravagant liv in g , overproduction, 
too great efficiency, or lack of confidence. The s ta tis tic s , he con­
cluded, demonstrated that the depression "is due to world-wide, violent 
demands for gold following a period of low demand for g o l d . " 2 2
Warren effective ly  evangelized farmers on behalf of gold. He 
frequently contributed artic les  to the agricultural press and his ideas 
often appeared on their editoria l p a g e s . 23 He lectured before schol­
a rly  forums and the state and national meetings of farm groups such as 
the American Farm Bureau, the Grange and the Dairymen's L e a g u e . His 
message a fte r 1930 was substantially the same: After the war one coun­
try  a fte r another attempted to reestablish the gold standard in order 
to restore confidence. This new rush for gold created a "phenomenal 
demand" which resulted in a "gold panic" at a time when production was
22pearson and Myers, "The Fact Finder," pp. 5509-10.
23Between 1930 and his death on May 24, 1933, Warren's bibliog­
raphy lis ted  sixty-six artic les of which the majority pertained to gold 
and prices. See "Writings of G. F. Warren," mimeographed (n .d .) , 11 
pages, Warren Papers, Cornell University.
24por example, Warren spoke to the national convention of the 
American Farm Bureau on monetary matters in 1930, 1931, and 1932. 
Pearson and Myers estimated that in 1932, Warren spoke at f if ty -fo u r  
"one night stands" to over 14,000 listeners. In addition, he spoke 
twice during the year on national radio broadcasts. Pearson and Myers, 
"The Fact Finder," p. 5501.
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actually decreasing. Because gold became re la tive ly  scarce and expen­
sive, commodity prices fe l l  and the world suffered from deflation and 
depression. The remedy lay in raising and stabilizing the price struc­
ture. Toward that end credit expansion, new gold production, and 
economies in the use of gold offered lim ited re lie f . But s ilver remon­
etization and particularly gold devaluation held more promise and 
should be relied  upon as the principal tools to restore prices and 
p r o s p e r i t y . 25 He believed that the alternative to a monetary remedy 
"is the completion of the process of price c o l l a p s e . "26
25warren and Pearson developed a five  factor price equation.
The theory stated that commodity prices were equal to the world supply 
of gold and commodities divided by the world demand for gold and com­
modities and multiplied by the currency price of gold. See Frank A. 
Pearson, W. I .  Myers, and A. R. Gans, "Gold and Prices," Farm Economics, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, New York State College of Agri­
culture, Ithaca, No. 209 (March 1957), pp. 5518-36.
Warren and Pearson pressed th e ir thesis in both popular and 
scholarly forums. A sample of the ir work for the farm press was 
Warren and Pearson, "Price and Gold," Farm Journal, LV (November 1931), 
pp. 7-8; Warren and Pearson, "Money is the Trouble," Farm Journal, LVI 
(.May 1932), p. 7; Warren, "Gold and Its  Effect on Prices," Dairymen's 
League News, XVI (January 24, 1933), p. 1; Warren, "Make Gold Our 
Servant—Not Our Master," Successful Farming, XXXI (March 1933), pp. 16, 
26; Warren, "Demand for Gold Caused the Depression," Successful Farm­
ing, XXXI (April 1933), pp. 10, 16, 37.
A more academic discussion of th e ir price theory is contained 
in Warren and Pearson, Prices (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1933),
386 pages; Warren and Pearson, Gold and Prices (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, In c ., 1935), 755 pages; Warren and Pearson, "The Future of 
the General Price Level," Journal of Farm Economics, XIV (January 1932), 
pp. 23-46; Warren, "Some S tatistics on the Gold Situation," American 
Economic Review Supplement, XXIV (March 1934), pp. 111-129.
Two c r it ic a l reviews of the Warren-Pearson price theory were 
Charles 0. Hardy, Is There Enough Gold? (Washington, D. C ., The Brook­
ings In s titu tio n , 1936), pp. 127-73; and Walter E. Spahr, The Monetary 
Theories of Warren and Pearson (New York: Farrar and Rinehart Press,
1934). See also Paul A. Eke, "The Relation of AAA Reductions to Gold 
Prices and Purchasing Power of Cotton," Journal of Farm Economics,
XVIII (November 1936), pp. 761-65.
26warren and Pearson, "The Future of the General Price Level,"
p . 45.
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New York and New England agricu ltura lis ts  lionized Warren.
A generation of New York Fanners adored the professor, attracted to his 
homespun advice and practical w it.27 Such quips as "most adjustments 
in farming are made by the sh eriff or the undertaker," made him a pop­
u lar speaker at state fa ir  "Farm Day" lectures throughout New England 
and as fa r  west as his native Nebraska. Thanks to his po litica l a b il­
it ie s  and his association with Cornell, Warren served as a prime mover 
in uniting the divergent agricultural organizations of New York into a 
coordinated lobbying force called the Conference Board of Farm Organ­
izations. 28 The Professor also helped Governor Roosevelt create the 
Governor's Agricultural Advisory Commission which counseled the state 
executive in such matters as reforestation, land use, gas taxes, and 
fre igh t rates. Once a month the leaders of the major New York agricul­
tural associations— the Farm Bureau, the Grange, the Dairymen's League 
and the cooperative Grange League Federation—met for breakfast at the 
Ithaca Hotel fo r a discussion with Warren and Pearson of the farmers' 
current economic and p o litic a l problems. Often the conversation drifted  
to monetary matters.^9
27Respect by New York agricu lturalis ts for Warren is under­
scored in two interviews recorded by the Cornell Oral History Program.
See the interview of Fred Sexauer, President of the New York Dairymen's 
League by Gould Coleman, 1963, pp. 114, 144-55, and the interview of 
Edward Foster, Secretary of the New York State Farm Bureau by Gould 
Coleman, 1965, pp. 75-80, 135-36. See also le tte rs  from farmers to 
Warren in the Pearson Papers, Cornell University.
28por example see "Report of the Executive Committee of Confer­
ence Board of Farm Organizations," mimeographed (Ithaca, New York, 
October 26, 1931], 3 pages. Dairymen's League Papers, Cornell University.
29Foster Oral History, pp. 128-31.
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Warren's Empire State residency provided him with the necessary 
connections to influence national opinion. As a New Yorker he became 
acquainted with many of those who would administer the New Deal. Henry 
Morgenthau, J r . ,  studied under him. Henry A. Wallace often lectured 
at Cornell's Agricultural Short Course and Governor Roosevelt consulted 
the Cornell professor regarding farm problems. During a December 1930 
v is it  to the Governor's farm at Warm Springs, Georgia, Warren approached 
Roosevelt about the gold question. As Roosevelt drove his guests 
"between stumps, and over stumps and a ll through the woods," they 
explored the intricacies of gold. The Governor admitted that he had 
"an interest" in gold. "In talking with him," Warren recorded in his 
diary: "I came to the conclusion that he had a much better understand­
ing of i t  than most economists."30
The gold scarcity thesis proved attractive  to farmers as i t  
diverted attention from surplus commodities and freed apologists to 
blame banking authorities, government policy, and fate for th e ir mis­
fortune. In its  f i r s t  ed itoria l a fter the 1929 October stock market 
plunge, Wallaces' Farmer warned, "There is  the most serious danger that 
the gold shortage w ill cause a long, slow decline in prices of a ll 
kinds, which w ill be especially hard on farmers because they owe so 
much money."31 Variations on the theme were repeated in a crescendo
3^Diary of George P. Warren, 7 December 1930, Warren Papers, 
Cornell University. On April 9, 1930, Roosevelt offered Warren an 
appointment on the Public Service Commission for $15,000 a year. 
Warren declined. See Ib id . , April 9, 1930, Warren Papers, Cornell 
University.
31"Gold Shortage and the Farmer," Wallaces' Farmer, LIV 
(November 2, 1929), p. 4.
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of farm ed itoria ls  and resolutions during the Hoover Administration.
In the farm rhetoric of the early 1930s the gold standard rivaled the 
Federal Reserve System as the bogeyman of farm prosperity. The clamor 
against gold contributed to the growing sentiment for stab ilization ists  
schemes, strengthened the position of the bim etallists and prepared 
public opinion for the monetary experiments of the New Deal.^^
The almost monotonous descent of conmodity prices renewed 
farmers' interest in in fla tion  and s tab ilization  proposals. Beginning 
about 1931, the farm e ffo rt to achieve an "honest money" system inten­
s ified . In November 1930, Wallaces' Farmer urged Congressmen from farm 
states to put stabilization "at the head of the lis t"  of leg is la tive  
priori t ie s .33 During November the National Grange and the Farmer's 
Union resolved to support efforts  to s tab ilize  the do llar, and the 
American Farm Bureau Federation at its  national convention in early 
December asked President Hoover to appoint a commission "composed of
32The gold scarcity theme received emphasis in the following 
sample of editoria ls and resolutions: "Prices and Money," P rairie
Farmer, ClI (March 29, 1930), p. 8; "Gold Reserves and Deflation," 
Wallaces' Farmer, LV (July 26, 1930), p. 4; "The World Gold Supply," 
Wallaces' Farmer, LV (September 6, 1930), p. 4; "The Business Depres­
sion," Rural New Yorker, LXXXIX (November 15, 1930), p. 1261; Arthur 
Capper, "Country Needs the 100-Cent Dollar," Capper's Weekly, LVI 
(October 3, 1931), p. 2; "Does Prosperity Depend on Gold?," American 
A gricu ltu ra lis t, XIV (November 14, 1931), p. 1; "S terilization  of Gold," 
Wallaces' Farmer, LVII (February 6, 1932), p. 6; Proceedings of the 
National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, "Resolution on S tab iliza­
tion," 64th Annual Session, Rochester, New York, November 18, 1930, 
p. 21; Ib id . , 65th Annual Session, Madison, Wisconsin, November 31,
1931, pp. 18, 175; and "Gold Devaluation Asked by the American Farm 
Bureau Federation," New York Times, September 10, 1932.
33"Fight for Honest Money," Wallaces' Farmer, LV (November 22,
1930), p. 5.
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farmers, bankers and economists" to study the matter and report to 
Congress on the most useful stabilization p l a n s . 34
Among farm papers Il l in o is ' Prairie Farmer waged the most 
enthusiastic campaign for stabilization during 1931. The journal's  
editor, C lifford  V. Gregory, in February asked President Hoover to call 
a special session of Congress to enact s tab ilization  leg islation . The 
paper frequently quoted Warren's arguments against gold and when actions 
from the Administration seemed unlikely the magazine proposed a "Five- 
Year Plan" for American agriculture. The heart of the plan contained 
an amendment which directed the Federal Reserve Board to in it ia te  
suffic ien t in fla tion  so that "the average wholesale price levels of 
1926" returned. Once 1926 price levels reappeared the Federal Reserve 
was to "adjust the supply of money and credit" so as to insure stable 
price levels. "The people of the country are not radicals," Gregory 
wrote. "All they want is honest money that is worth as much this year 
as la s t, and not more."^^ Meanwhile, during the late  summer and autumn
34proceedinqs of the National Grange of the Patrons of Hus­
bandry, 64th Annual Session, Rochester, New York, November 12-21, 1930, 
p. 154; Minutes of the National Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative 
Union of America, 26th Annual Session, St. Paul, Minnesota, November 18-21, 
1930; Minutes of the American Farm Bureau Federation, 12th Annual Meet­
ing, Boston, Massachusetts, December 5-10, 1930.
33"From the Editor's Haymow," P rairie  Farmer, C III (February 14,
1931), p. 8. The column "From the Editor's Haymow," written by Gregory, 
continued to support in fla tion  and stab ilization  throughout 1931. See 
the following issues: (February 28, 1931), p. 8; (May 30, 1931), p. 8;
(June 13, 1931), p. 8; (August 8, 1931), p. 8; (October 31, 1931), p. 8; 
(November 14, 1931), p. 8. See also C lifford  V. Gregory, "Three-Year 
Plan for Agriculture: How to Bring Back Farm Prosperity," Prairie
Farmer, C III (October 3, 1931), pp. 3, 5, 16, 20; and "Agriculture Needs 
a Five-Year Plan: With Not Enough Money to Go Around, How Are We Going 
to Get Our Share?," Prairie Farmer, C III (November 14, 1931), pp. 3, 16.
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of 1931, more than ten thousand readers replied "yes" to a Wallaces' 
Farmer ballot that asked, "Do You Want an Honest Dollar?" The ballots 
urged Congress to act promptly on in fla tion  and monetary le g is la tio n .36
The American Farm Bureau Federation organized the drive for 
stabilization  in 1931. In early January a group of Farm Bureau exec­
utives met with President Hoover and urged him to appoint a commission 
to investigate stab ilization  proposals. When Hoover proved unresponsive 
officers of Midwestern Farm Bureaus, meeting at Madison, Wisconsin, 
petitioned the National Bureau to create a committee to review monetary 
proposals. Edward A. O'Neal, newly elected President of the American 
Farm Bureau, complied with the Madison request and appointed the Com­
mittee on the S tab ilization of the Unit of Value. The committee 
included three farm journal editors—Henry A. Wallace, C lifford  V. 
Gregory, and C. A. Cobb; professors John R. Commons and George F. Warren; 
Congressman Christian W. Ramseyer of Iowa; Andrew Shearer of Kansas and 
the state farm Bureau Presidents of Kansas, Iowa, New York, California
and I l l in o is .37
The Committee on Stabilization of the Unit of Value met f i r s t  
during September at the Farm Bureau headquarters in Chicago. The con­
ferees agreed that farm prosperity depended on an advance in commodity
36Henry A. Wallace recalled the ballot campaign in testimony 
presented to U. S. Congress, House Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency, S tab ilization of Commodity Prices: Hearings on
H. R. 10517, 72d Congress, 1st Sess., 1932, pp. 51-52.
37w. R. Ogg, comp., "History of Farm Bureau's A ctiv ities  fo r  
Monetary Reform," mimeographed (Chicago; American Farm Bureau Federa­
tion Department of Information, 1934), pp. 1-2; "A. F. B. F. Urges 
Studying of Dollar S tab ilization ," American Farm Bureau Federation 
Weekly News Letter, X (January 13, 1931), p. 2.
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prices and that an increase In price levels awaited monetary reform. 
Among the more popular suggestions fo r providing In fla tion  and s ta b il i­
zation were the Fisher commodity do llar, issuance of f ia t  currency, and 
government purchases of farm mortgages. The September conference, 
though based on some commonly shared conceptions about the need for 
monetary action, proved but a searching and inconclusive beginning for 
the committee.3°
The Farm Bureau stab ilization  committee reconvened a t Chicago 
in October. Professor Fisher, present at the second round of delib­
erations, served In an "advisory capacity" while John R. Commons, a 
committeeman, brought four University of Wisconsin graduate students 
to aid In the proceedings. The academicians and the agrarians agreed 
that farmers faced two alternatives: either "wholesale bankruptcy" or
salvation through in fla tio n  and s tab ilization  of the purchasing power 
of money."39
After further deliberations, including presentation of the ir  
conclusions to the Farm Bureau's board of directors, the stab ilization  
committee published a summary of its  findings in a th irty -fo u r page 
pamphlet en titled  "Honest Money." Every Farm Bureau in the country
38"Dollar S tab ilization Conference Called," American Farm 
Bureau Federation Weekly News Lette r, X (September 15, 1931), p. 1.
See also New York Times, 16 September 1931, 18 September 1931, 25 Sep­
tember 1931, and Ralph Snyder, Chairman of the American Farm Bureau 
Federation Committee on the S tab ilization of the Unit of Value to the 
ed itor, New York Times, 29 September 1931.
390gg, "History of Farm Bureau's A ctiv ities ,"  p. 2; "S tabiliza­
tion Committee Makes Recommendations," American Farm Bureau Federation 
Weekly News Lette r, X (October 13, 1931), pp. 1, 3; "AFBF Committee 
Advances in S tab ilization E fforts ," X (November 3, 1931), p. 3.
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received at least one of the 25,000 printed copies, with a le tte r  from 
national Farm Bureau headquarters urging local study and support of the 
Committee's monetary program. The pamphlet, evenly divided between an 
essay section and a question-and-answer piece reminiscent of the Soc- 
ra tic  method employed in Conn's Financial School, twice in its  foreward 
described the money question as of "fundamental importance" to agricul­
tu re .40
The pamphlet provided a popular synthesis of the Fisher-Commons 
stab ilization  argument and the Warren-Pearson gold scarcity thesis. 
Essentially the argument stated that America had amply demonstrated its  
a b ility  to produce, but had fa iled  to distribute wealth in a rational 
manner. The principal weakness of the d istributive system emanated 
from the fluctuations of the purchasing power of the dollar. The pam­
phlet noted that the average wholesale price of farm commodities 
dropped 58 per cent between 1926 and 1931, while at the same time the 
farmer's burden of debt and taxes rose $1.70. The trac t proclaimed 
that a dollar whose value lurched with each fluctuation in the gold 
supply or vacillated with banker's manipulation of credit policy was 
inherently dishonest.41
To restore the do llar's  in tegrity  the stabilization committee 
offered two recommendations: "Restore the wholesale commodity level
to a point somewhere near that at the beginning of the present deflation"
40"Honest Money: An Explanation of the Relation of Money, 
Prices and Prosperity," (Chicago: American Farm Bureau Federation, 
January 7, 1932), 34 pages. C lifford V. Gregory served as the pam­
phlet's primary author.
411 bid. , p. 7.
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and "Stabilize the price level at that point." In fla tion  of the price 
level could be achieved through a number of devices: open market pur­
chases, lower discount rates, and liberal rediscount e l ig ib i l i ty  rules. 
Other inflationary alternatives included: dollar devaluation, f ia t  
money issue, s ilver remonetization and symmetalism. Regardless of the 
method the committee concluded "Inflationary measures should be applied 
promptly."42
After its  discussion of the i l l s  and cures of deflation,
"Honest Money" called for Congress to stab ilize  the buying power of 
money. The booklet requested an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act 
that would force the Reserve System to use its  monetary and credit 
powers to maintain a stable price level. In addition. Congress was to 
grant the Reserve System new powers including the right to raise or 
lower the price of gold and the option to change the Reserve require­
ment of Federal Reserve Banks. Congress was also asked to direct the 
Federal Reserve to expand credit "steadily at the rate of four per cent 
a year" to provide for stable economic growth and to sponsor an in te r­
national conference to "devise . . . plans to maintain world monetary 
s ta b ility ."  Finally , "Honest Money" urged Congress to adopt the Farm 
Bureau's monetary program without delay.43
The work of the stab ilization  committee influenced the proceed­
ings of the Farm Bureau's national meeting in December 1931. Both 
President O'Neal and Congressman Ramseyer spoke to the convention on 
the need for in fla tio n , monetary reform and stab ilization .
42 lb id ., pp. 12-15. 43 ib id ., pp. 15-16.
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The convention adopted a lengthy resolution en titled  "The Monetary 
Problem," which cataloged the consequences of deflation and claimed 
"The principal cause of the deflation is monetary." The resolution 
closely followed the recommendations of the national committee and
/I/I
urged Congress to pass in flation  and stab ilization  measures.
Three weeks before the Farm Bureau acted upon refla tion  and 
s tab iliza tio n , the Grange held its  Annual Session at Madison, Wisconsin. 
In addressing the Grange convention, National Master Louis J. Taber 
endorsed the gold shortage thesis and concluded that "monetary s ta b il i­
zation . . .  is the most important single issue confronting agriculture 
and the n a t i o n . C l i f f o r d  V. Gregory, editor of the Pra irie  Farmer 
and member of the Farm Bureau's national committee on stab iliza tio n , 
also spoke to the convention on monetary reform and the need for price 
stab ilization . The convention resolved fo r the restoration of 1926 
prices and monetary stab ilization . The "honest money" policy approved 
by the delegates asked for the convening of an international monetary 
conference to stab ilize  s ilver in terms of gold and gold in terms of 
commodities. The grange session indicated its  readiness to cooperate 
with other organizations in the drive for monetary r e f o r m . 46
44m1nutes of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Thirteenth 
Annual Convention, Chicago, I l l in o is ,  December 8, 1931, pp. 145-53; 
"Resolutions Adopted by A.F.B.F. Voting Delegates at Annual Meeting," 
American Farm Bureau Federation Weekly News Lette r, X (December 10,
1931), p. 3; "Quotes From Thirteenth Annual A.F.B.F. Convention," 
American Farm Bureau Federation Weekly News Letter, X (December 15,
1931), p. 3.
45proceedings of the National Grange of the Patrons of Hus­
bandry, 65th Annual Session, November 1931, Madison, Wisconsin, p. 18.
46 ib id . , p. 175. The Farmer's Union convened its  national 
convention in November and resolved that Congress reclaim from the
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During 1931, farm economists, editors, and the "big three" 
agricultural organizations reopened the money question. The New York 
Times fre tted  over the "revival of agrarian projects for easy money," 
and columnist Mark Sullivan presented his readers with an essay entitled  
"Money Question Is Being Fanned Into Flames for Battle of 1932."4? The 
question had been asked before, but by the beginning of 1932, agrarians 
grew confident they possessed the answer to th e ir indebtedness and low 
commodity prices—in fla tion  then stab ilization .
In 1932 and 1933, the "Golden Age" of cooperation began among 
the big three farm organizations: the Grange, the Farmers' Union, and
the American Farm B u r e a u . 48 upon assuming the Presidency of the Farm 
Bureau in May 1931, Edward A. O'Neal, a p o lit ic a lly  shrewd Alabamian, 
instigated the movement to achieve a "unified farm p r o g r a m . " 4 9
"international bankers" the authority to coin and regulate the value 
of money. What was needed, the Union declared, was a vast new "money 
crop" made up of greenbacks to finance public improvements. See Min­
utes of the National Convention Farmers' Educational and Cooperative 
Union of America, Twenty-seventh Annual Session, Des Moines, Iowa, 
November 17, 18, 1931, pp. 14-20; "Resolutions Outline Union Program 
fo r 1932," Oklahoma Union Farmer, X II (December 1, 1931), p. 1. A sum­
mary of the monetary demands of the "big three" farm organizations is 
provided in "Want Honey Money and Co-op Marketing," P ra irie  Farmer,
C III (December 12, 1931), pp. 3, 4.
4?New York Times, 16 September 1931; Mark Sullivan, "Money 
Question Is Being Fanned Into Flames for Battle of 1932," Daily Okla­
homan, 1931.
4&The description, an apt one, is that of Fred Sexauer, Presi­
dent of the Dairymen's League. See Sexauer Oral History, p. 156.
49o'Neal took office April 29, 1931, and called for a ll organ­
ized farm groups to gather in Chicago, May 18, "to develop a close 
working relationship between a ll branches of organized agriculture."
See American Farm Bureau Federation Weekly News Lette r, X (May 5, 1931), 
p. 1; "AFBF Proposes A United Agriculture," Ib id . ,  (May 19, 1931), p. 1 ; 
"Second Agricultural 'Unity' Conference Called," Ib id . , (June 9, 1931), 
pp. 1, 2.
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A variety of Influences, including the depressed economy, worked to aid 
O'Neal in the quest for agricultural brotherhood. But the common denom­
inator for the new alliance was the demand for monetary reform and the 
in it ia l  test of the coalition was the 1932 campaign to achieve Congres- 
sionally mandated in fla tion  and stab iliza tio n .
The national farm conferences held in Washington, D. C ., Jan­
uary 5-9, 1932, demonstrated the importance of teamwork and monetary 
issues to farm thinking. The January meetings were arranged when the 
leadership of the "big three" farm organizations agreed to write a 
common farm program to present to the new session of Congress. The 
four day gathering produced a six-point leg is la tive  package though the 
money question remained the most time-consuming and in ten tly  discussed 
issue before the conference.50 The organizations caucused independently 
on Wednesday, January 6, while on the following day the participants 
joined in group discussions. On Friday, January 8, the authors of pend­
ing stabilization b i l ls .  Congressmen Ramseyer, Strong, Goldsborough, 
and Burtness explained the merits of th e ir proposals and discussed the 
likelihood of monetary leg islation in the coming session. On Saturday, 
the farm delegates caucused with more than one hundred Congressmen 
including Henry B. Steagall, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency 
Committee. At the Saturday session the Congressmen heard Charles R.
SOfhe six-point leg is la tive  package included resolutions on 
the Agricultural Marketing Act, federal taxation, money s tab iliza tio n , 
the t a r i f f ,  Philippine Independence and speculation. See "Resolutions 
of the National Grange, the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union 
of America and the American Farm Bureau Federation Adopted by National 
Officers and Legislative Representatives," pamphlet (Washington, D. C ., 
n .p ., January 6, 7, 8, 1932), 7 pages.
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White, President of the New York State Farm Bureau, explain the farm 
conference's resolution on money. The resolution complained that 
deflation of the price level had gone to "disastrous lengths" and that 
stabilization  legislation was essential because "We cannot exist with 
rubber money and iron debts." During the noon hour the Presidents of 
the three farm organizations appeared on a nationwide unity broadcast 
to explain th e ir new p r o g r a m . 51
The January conferences evinced the irrepressible demand for 
in fla tion  that characterized rural opinion during 1932. In the early 
months of the year a myriad of inflationary proposals t i t i l la te d  the 
imaginations of congressmen, the rural press, and organized farm 
g r o u p s . 52 in spite of the New York Times' ed itoria l bias against mone­
tary tinkering, its  pages illustrated  the clamour for in fla tion  in 
January and February. On January 11, in Washington, Oklahoma's eccen­
tr ic  Governor A lfa lfa  B ill Murray outlined a plan for state banks to 
issue th e ir own currency and thus escape the "clutches of Wall S tree t."^3
5T"Organized Agriculture Unites for Legislation," American Farm 
Bureau Federation Weekly News Letter (December 22, 1931), p. 1; "Eyes 
of Farm Bureau World Center on Washington," Ib id . , (January 5, 1932), 
p. 1; "Farmer Presents United Front on Capitol H il l ,"  Ib id . , (January 12,
1932) , pp. 1-2; "Wanted An Honest Dollar," Ib id . , (February 1 , 1932), 
pp. 4, 5, 7; "United We Stand," Ib id . , (March 1932), pp. 4-7, 20, 21; 
"Team Work At Last," The National Grange Monthly, XXIX (February 1932), 
p. 10; "Sound Monetary Program Demanded by American Agriculture Joint 
Resolutions Tenaciously [ s ic ]  Passed by Three National Farm Groups,"
Press release for morning papers, January 8, 1932 (Washington, American 
Farm Bureau Federation, Department of Information), three pages; Ogg, 
"History of Farm Bureau's A ctivities for Monetary Reform," p. 3.
52gee for example the following b ills  introduced into the 72d 
Congress, 1st session:' HR 20, HR 128, HR 6712, HR 7800, HR 8246, and 
HR 10280.
55n0W York Times, 19 January 1932.
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During the same month Senators David Walsh of Massachusetts and Arthur 
Capper of Kansas and Governor Gifford Pinchot of Pennsylvania proposed 
in flationary currency schemes. Pinchot suggested the government issue 
fiv e  b illio n  in bonds for public works on the grounds that i t  would 
"increase the value of farm products."54 On separate occasions 
William J. Bryan, J r . ,  John A. Simpson of the Farmers' Union, Senator 
Key Pittman of Nevada, the delegates of the Western States S ilver 
Conference, and Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana supported s ilver  
remonetization.55 During the f i r s t  week of February, Wheeler welcomed 
70 representatives of the Farmers' Union from nine Middle Western States 
to hearings on his 16-to-l proposal.56 Meanwhile milder in fla tion ists  
backed the Glass-Steagall banking b ill  while more arduous ones demanded 
the immediate payment of the veterans bonus.67 Discomfited by the 
in flationary m ilieu, the Administration during January announced that 
its  program for recovery excluded easy money schemes and relied upon a 
balanced budget and tax increases.58 Despite such reassurances, in 
February, the Federal Reserve a t the request of the Treasury began 
buying government securities in an e ffo rt to expand the currency supply. 
Authorities admitted that the new policy resulted from Congressional
54mgw York Times, 16 January 1932, 17 January 1932, 29 January
1932.
55new York Times, 19 January 1932, 7 February 1932, 12 February 
1932, 17 February 1932, 26 January 1932.
55ib id . , 5 February 1932.
5^1bid. , 11 February 1932, 10 April 1932.
58 lb id ., 17 January 1932, 28 January 1932.
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pressures for i n f l a t i o n , 5 9  %he farm press, gleeful at the turn of 
events, reported not only that " In fla tion  is on the way," but that 
"Farmers can take credit for forcing action."60
Out of the kaleidoscope of in fla tion  agitation, organized agri­
culture in March focused its  demands on the Goldsborough b i l l .  The 
b i l l ,  the namesake of Representative I .  Allen Goldsborough of Maryland, 
who authored sim ilar leg islation in the early twenties, directed the 
Federal Reserve to raise the price level "as speedily as possible" and 
to s tab ilize  prices once recovery occurred. The measure also granted 
the Reserve System greater f le x ib i l i ty  in the sale of government secur­
it ie s  and conferred the authority to a lte r  the price of g o ld .61 in an 
impressive drive to convert the Administration and Congress to the 
principles of the Goldsborough b i l l ,  organized agriculture hired Wash­
ington lobbyists, interviewed President Hoover, appeared before
69Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History 
of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1963), pp. 384-389.
66"No More Deflation," Wallaces' Farmer, LVII (March 5, 1932), 
p. 1; "The Root of All E v il,"  American A gricu ltu ra lis ts , CXXIX (Jan­
uary 16, 1932); "The Monetary Problem," The I l l in o is  Agricultural 
Association Record, X (March 1932), p. 5; "Should All Prices Go Up or 
Down," American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXIX (April 2, 1932), p. 4; "Prices 
Were Stable Once," Wallaces' Farmer, LVII (April 2, 1932), p. 8; "Fight 
fo r Reflation is Gaining," Wallaces' Farmer, LVII (April 30, 1932), 
p. 1. Both February issues of the American Farm Bureau Federation 
Weekly News Letter and the National Grange Monthly were dedicated to 
the money issue. See also Bernard Ostrolenk, "In fla tion  Trends in Amer­
ica," Current History, XXXV (March 1932), pp. 773-780, who conceded 
"Powerful elements in the United States are agitating for in flation  
. . . "  and predicted the abandonment of the gold standard.
61h .R. 10517 is reprinted in U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Stabilization of Commodity 
Prices, Hearings on H. 10517, 62d Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, p. 1.
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62Congressional committees and broadcast appeals over the radio networks. 
Excepting the e ffo rt to obtain the Agricultural Marketing Act, the 
campaign fo r monetary reform during the spring of 1932 was organized 
agriculture's most aggressive performance during the years of the 
Hoover Administration.
Hearings on the new Goldsborough b i l l  were arranged a fter  
O'Neal and other fam  leaders approached Henry B. Steagall, Chairman of 
the House Committee on Banking and Currency. Steagall appointed a 
Goldsborough chaired subcommittee which held hearings interm ittently  
from March 16 to April 14, 1932. The Goldsborough hearings proved how 
thoroughly organized agriculture had adopted the re fla tion -s tab iliza tion  
program as eight representatives of agricultural organizations and four 
farm Congressmen gave the bulk of the testimony. In addition former 
senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma and economists Wilford I .  King of 
New York University and Irving Fisher of Yale provided lengthy technical 
and s ta tis tica l support fo r the s tab iliza tio n is t cause.63
62"AFBF's 3 Point Program," American Farm Bureau Federation 
Weekly News Lette r, (February 9, 1932), p. 1; "March Radio Program 
Brings Real Results," Ib id . , (March 15, 1932); "O'Neal, Ramseyer and 
Norton on NBC Chain Program," Ib id . , (April 12, 1932), p. 1; and U. S. 
Congress, House, The Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on the Program 
of National Farm Organizations, 72d Congress, 1st Sess., January 12,
1932.
63ogg, "History of Farm Bureau's A ctiv ities  for Monetary Reform," 
p. f . ;  "Congressman Strong Backs Move for Stable Money," American Farm 
Bureau Federation Weekly News Letter (March 1, 1932), p. s .; Hearings 
on^  jl. 10517, 2 parts, March 16, 17, 18, 21 , 22, 28, 29, and April 13, 
14, 1932, 571 pages. Dozens of pages of materials prepared by George 
Warren and Frank Pearson were inserted into the hearings though neither 
man appeared in person before the committee.
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The three presidents of the major farm organizations te s tified  
of the c r it ic a l need for in fla tio n . O'Neal repeated the conclusions of 
the Farm Bureau's Committee on the S tab ilization of the Unit of Value.
As evidence of the popularity of the honest money cause he included in 
his testimony fifteen  pages of names of those who had written approving 
the Farm Bureau's position.64 Louis J. Taber, Master of the National 
Grange recalled the disastrous effects of deflation and the gold scar­
c ity  thesis .65 unpredictable John A. Simpson, President of the 
Farmers' Union, ir r ita te d  the committee, protesting that the Goldsborough
b i l l  did not go fa r enough in its  in flationary impact. He demanded
remonetization of s ilv e r, which i f  adopted "would double the price of 
a ll farm products in 60 days."65 Several of the farm spokesmen admitted 
that th e ir interest in money dated back to 1896. Charles A. Ewing, 
President of the National Live Stock Producers Association, recalled 
that his father had worked in the f i r s t  Bryan campaign. "He wore him­
se lf out in i t ,  came home, voted, and died before the returns were
received." Ewing might have added that many a money crusader had died 
in less propitious circumstances.6?
The subcommittee on April 15, and the fu ll committee on April 21, 
voted favorably to report the Goldsborough b i l l .  The b i l l  that emerged
64nearings on H. R. 10517, pp. 2-51.
65 lb id . ,  pp. 106-17.
55ib id . , pp. 117-22. See also Henry A. Wallace, "For Honest 
Dollar: Farm Organizations Demand Immediate Action to Raise Commodity
Price Level," Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, LVII (April 2, 1932), 
p. 3.
67Hearings on H. 10517, p. 92.
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from committee differed from the March 16 version in that i t  established 
the average wholesale price level of 1921-1926 as the specific goal for 
refla tion  and i t  omitted the controversial gold pricing feature.68 
Instead the b i l l  expected the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the 
Treasury to stab ilize  the price level through credit and currency con­
tro l. The modified and milder version of the Goldsborough b il l  proved 
palatable to the Mouse of Representatives and on May 2, i t  solidly  
approved the proposal 289 to 60.69
Elated at its  success in the House, organized agriculture pre­
pared for a rugged test before the more conservative Senate. During 
May the farm lobby orchestrated a massive campaign to win the Senate 
to s tab iliza tio n .70 Urged to deluge Washington with le tte rs , telegrams 
and petitions, hundreds, perhaps thousands of farmers, wrote their  
Congressmen. The letters  demanded re lie f  and often linked pathetic 
conditions back on the farm with an appeal for the honest d o lla r .7^
68Both Henry A. Wallace and George F. Warren protested the 
omission of the gold pricing feature. See Wallace to Norbeck, 16 May 
1932, H. R. 11499, "Legislative Records," Record Group 46, National 
Archives, Washington, D. C .; Warren to Norbeck, 21 May 1932, Ib id .
69ihe modified b i l l ,  H. R. 11499, is printed in U. S ., Congres­
sional Record, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., May 2, 1932, p. 9410. See also 
"Honest Dollar Approved," American Farm Bureau Federation Weekly News 
Letter (April 26, 1932), p. 3; Guy Bush, "'Reflation ' Comes Nearer," 
Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, LVII (April 30, 1932), p. 6; "House 
Passes Goldsborough 'Honest Dollar' B il l ,"  American Farm Bureau Federa­
tion Weekly News Letter (May 3, 1932), p. 1; New York Times, 4 May 1932.
70"president O'Neal Urges Immediate Action," Anerican Farm 
Bureau Federation Weekly News Letter (May 3, 1932), p. 1; "Farm Leaders 
Elated Over 'D ollar' Victory," Ib id ., (May 10, 1932), pp. 1, 2.
7lGoldsborough acknowledged that congressmen received "hundreds 
of letters" during the House hearings on the Goldsborough b i l l .  See 
Hearings on H. 10517, p. 28. There are a few dozen le tte rs ,
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In addition, the agricultural press sustained an ed itoria l barrage on 
behalf of monetary reform throughout May and June.72
President O'Neal, Senator Elmer Thomas, Congressman Goldsborough 
and the d iligen t Chester Gray, Washington Representative of the American 
Farm Bureau, directed the battle  for the Goldsborough b i l l  in the 
Senate.73 Enlisting the aid of Senator Peter Norbeck, Chairman of the 
Committee on Banking and Currency, the group overcame strong objections 
from conservative Senators and secured hearings before a subcommittee 
of the Committee on Banking and Currency. The hearings, under the 
chairmanship of Smith Wildman Brookhart of Iowa, convened on May 12, 13 
and 18, 1932.74
telegrams and petitions, the majority of them of rural origin in H. R. 
10517, "Legislative Records," Record Group 46, National Archives, 
Washington, D. C. The Elmer Thomas Papers contain hundreds of letters  
discussing every re lie f  plan imaginable including money. See "Agricul­
tural Legislation—April 1932," Thomas Papers, University of Oklahoma.
72$ee Henry A. Wallace, "Dragons that Devour Prosperity," 
Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, LVII (May 14, 1932), p. 1; "Here 
Is the Best Cure for the Depression," American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXIX 
(May 14, 1932), p. 4; The Il l in o is  Agricultural Association Record, X 
(June 1932), p. 10; Clarence Poe, "What's Wrong With the American 
Dollar," The National Grange Monthly (June 1932), pp. 2, 11. See also 
The National Grange, the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of 
America and the American Farm Bureau Federation to Members of the 
Senate, 20 May 1932, H. R. 11499, "Legislative Records," Record Group 45, 
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
73see Thomas to Norbeck, 6 May 1932, Thomas Papers, University 
of Oklahoma; Gray to Julian Blount, Secretary, Banking and Currency 
Committee, 6 May 1932, S 11499, "Legislative Records," Record Group 46, 
National Archives, Washington, D. C .; Gray to Norbeck, 4 May 1932, Ib id .
74u. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Bank­
ing and Currency, Hearings on H. 11499 and S. 4429, 72d Cong., 1st 
Sess., May 12, 13, 18, 1932. See also Ogg, "History of Farm Bureau's 
A ctivities for Monetary Reform," p. 5-6; "President O'Neal in Washing­
ton to Speed Early Approval of Goldsborough 'Honest Dollar' B il l ,"  
American Farm Bureau Federation Weekly News Letter (May 24, 1932, pp. 1, 
3; "AFBF Leaders Speed Action on F arm R elief," Ib id . , (May 31 , 1932), 
pp. 1, 3.
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The inexperience of the Senate in debating monetary s tab iliza ­
tion proved a handicap to the proponents of the Goldsborough b i l l .
While the House had discussed honest money proposals during five  sets 
of hearings spanning the preceding ten years, the Goldsborough b i l l  of 
1932 provided the Senate with its  f i r s t  opportunity to confront the 
proposition. Norbeck, for example, confessed total ignorance of the 
Fisher compensated dollar scheme.75 Education of the solons was under­
taken when many of the witnesses who had appeared at the House hearings 
repeated the ir testimony before the Brookhart committee.76 Warren, one 
of the few witnesses who had not te s tifie d  e a r lie r , recorded his impres­
sion of the Senate proceedings: "There seemd F s ic l to be no great
interest in the b i l l  in the Senate before the hearing, but the hearings 
changed the point of view of a number of men." He added, "The general 
point of view seems to be one of utter discouragement and bewilder­
ment. "77 The hearings did add to the ranks of the stab ilization is ts  
Banking Committee Chairman Norbeck.78
75Norbeck to Wallace, 19 May 1932, H. R. 11499, "Legislative 
Records," Record Group 46, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
76An eye witness summary of the hearings is provided in "Honest 
Dollar in the Senate," Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, LVII (May 28,
1932), p. 1, 5. See also Irving Fisher, assisted by Hans R. L. Cohrssen, 
Stabilized Money: A History of the Movement (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1935), pp. 186-205.
77oiary of George F. Warren, May 12, 13, 1932, Warren Papers, 
Cornell University.
7&Norbeck to Wallace, 19 May 1932, H. R. 11499, "Legislative 
Records," Record Group 46, National Archives, Washington, D. C .; and 
Norbeck to George B. Kennard, Executive Secretary, South Dakota Farm 
Bureau Federation, 23 May 1932, Ib id.
187
Secretary of the Treasury Ogden L. M ills  found the House pas­
sage of the Goldsborough b i l l  "disturbing" and marshalled both the 
Administration and the leadership of the Federal Reserve into a more 
determined stance against the b ill .7 9  %he opposition armed with threats 
of a Presidential veto overcame the farm lobby when on June 1, the 
Senate Banking and Currency committee agreed to replace the Goldsborough 
b i l l  with a Glass-authored substitute measure.®- Senator Carter Glass 
of V irg inia, "the arch-enemy of the honest d o llar,"  admitted the sole 
motive behind his move was to defeat the Goldsborough proposition.®^
The Glass proposal called for modest in fla tio n  of the currency, but 
dropped a ll references to s ta b ility  as a goal of national monetary 
policy.82 On June 4, President O'Neal, in a national radio broadcast, 
scored the Senate and Glass in particu lar, characterizing the committee's 
action as "makeshift" and the Senator as a tool of the "gigantic bank­
ing fra te rn ity ."83 Wallaces' Farmer, in its  own version of the loser's 
"wait-until-next-year" re fra in , promised "You have not seen the last
790gden M ills  to Norbeck, 31 May 1932, Ib id .
®®New York Times, 25 May 1932.
81"Senate Blocks Honest Dollar," Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa 
Homestead, LVII (June 11, 1932), p. 4.
82The Glass substitute extended the circulation privilege to 
a ll United States bonds earning less than 3-3/8 per cent interest for a 
period of three years. I t  was estimated the measure could provide a 
mild one b illio n  dollar expansion of the currency. Attached to the Home 
Loan Bank Act i t  became law July 22, 1932. See "What Congress Did for 
the Farmers," National Grange Monthly, (September 1932), p. 7; New York 
Times, 2 June 1932. See also "Senate Has Streak of Repentance," 
Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, LVII (July 23, 1932), p. 4.
83"0'Neal Scores Parties in Chain Radio Talk," American Farm 
Bureau Federation Weekly News Letter (June 1932), pp. 1, 3.
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of us. This sop thrown to us by Senator Glass may delay the cause 
momentarily, but you w ill hear from us again and again. . .
The 1932 presidential election year provided farmers the oppor­
tunity for a hearing. The dismal farm record of the Hoover 
Administration, its  role in defeating the Goldsborough b i l l  and the con­
tinuing depression generated abundant issues for the upcoming contest.85
After the defeat of oragnized agriculture's program in the 
spring of 1932, O'Neal determined to maintain the united front concept 
fo r the fa l l  elections.86 He appointed a seven member committee to 
d raft a common program to submit to the Republican and Democratic con­
ventions. The committee recommended to both conventions a six-point 
plan which emphasized the honest d o lla r .87 The politic ians greeted 
the farm delegation with less than fu ll enthusiasm. Mildred Simpson, 
daughter of the Farmers' Union President, wrote, "The Democrats are not 
paying much attention to agriculture. Mr. O'Neal, Mr. Taber and Dad 
had a hard time getting a hearing before the Resolutions Committee.
84"Senate Blocks Honest Dollar," Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa 
Homestead, LVII (June 11, 1932), p. 4.
85xhough i t  omits a discussion of in fla tion  demands, a summary 
of the farm problem, Roosevelt and th e ir  relationship to the election 
of 1932, is Amy Gertrude S lich ter, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Farm 
Problem, 1929-1932," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, LX III (Sep­
tember 1956), pp. 238-58.
B^The unity of the big three v/as l i t t l e  more than an agreement 
to disagree as exemplified in the "Three-way b i l l ."  See William R. 
Johnson, "National Farm Organizations and the Reshaping of Agricultural 
Policy in 1932," Agricultural History, XXXVII (January 1963), pp. 35-42. 
Johnson fa iled  to discuss i t ,  but the one solid common denominator 
among organized agriculture was the demand for monetary in fla tion  and 
the honest do llar.
87[dward A. O'Neal, "Congress and Conventions," American Farm 
Bureau Weekly News Letter (August 1932), pp. 4, 5, 6, 7.
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They fin a lly  got a few m i n u t e s . S i m i l a r  complaints of summary trea t­
ment were directed at the Republicans.
On July 4, O'Neal keynoted the Farm Bureau's own campaign for
the fa l l  elections. Speaking to over 20,000 listeners at Ottuma, Iowa,
the Farm Bureau President charged that "Congress and the two po litica l 
conventions have shown a calloused and even defiant indifference to 
the welfare of agriculture." O'Neal admitted that both party platforms 
adopted portions of the program of organized agriculture though "the 
Democratic platform is a b it more d e fin ite ."  S t i l l  he flayed the 
politicians for the "shameful and disgraceful" way they dealt with the 
demands of farmers. Recalling the fig h t for the honest dollar he 
asked, "Are we going to allow our nation to pursue a policy which 
enriches the creditor class at the expense of the debtor class?" O'Neal 
urged farmers to en lis t in a "war of ballots" to support the "true 
friends of agriculture" in the coming elections.89
Throughout the remaining months of the campaign the Farm Bureau 
zealously pushed its  program for agriculture including demand for in fla ­
tion and stab ilization . Using the forum of the Bureau's national radio 
hour, O'Neal, in July, reported that yet another attempt for Congres­
sional approval of the Goldsborough b il l  would be made. On the same 
program Vice President Charles Hearst of Iowa devoted almost a ll of his 
radio comment to a discussion of the Bureau's fight for the
8% ildred Simpson to Gray, 30 June 1932, John A. Simpson Papers, 
University of Oklahoma.
89"President O'Neal Makes S tirring  Independence Day Address," 
American Farm Bureau Weekly News Letter (July 5, 1932), p. 3.
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90honest do llar. On Labor Day, September 5, 1932, the Bureau organized 
a nationwide "Muster Day" campaign to ra lly  farmers behind the program
qi
of organized agriculture. At Harlan, Iowa, O'Neal blamed the "Elder 
Statesmen" for the continuing depression and particu larly  for the Senate 
defeat of the Goldsborough b i l l . 9% W. R. Ogg, a Washington lobbyist 
fo r the Bureau, recalled that during the months of the campaign, "Farm 
Bureau leaders in the various states in th e ir  addresses to farmers 
almost invariably stressed the importance of monetary reform in urging 
support of the Farm Bureau program." Ogg added that the voting records 
of Congressmen on the Goldsborough issue were compiled and sent to the 
state farm b u r e a u s . 93 Loyalty to the honest dollar was a major test in 
identifying the "true friends of Agriculture."
Each month of 1932 marked a further deterioration in the eco­
nomic status of farmers. During the second week of September, prodded 
by the tensions and violence associated with the Farmers' Holiday Asso­
ciation, representatives of nine Midwestern States met a t Sioux City, 
Iowa, to discuss proposals for agricultural r e l i e f . 9 4  i t  was to this 
forum that O'Neal f i r s t  presented the Farm Bureau's demand for gold 
devaluation. In a 400-word telegram sent to the Sioux City Governor's 
Conference, O'Neal, on behalf of the Farm Bureau's board of directors, 
requested that the State Executives consider urging an immediate session
p. 7.
90ogg, "History of Farm Bureau's A ctiv ities  for Monetary Reform,"
9 T l b i d . ,  p .  7-8. 9 2 j b i d . ,  p .  8.
9 3 l b i d . ,  p .  7.
94wew York Times, 10 September 192 and 12 September 1932.
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of Congress to deal with the restoration of farm prices and a proposed 
moratorium on foreclosures. The heart of the Farm Bureau telegram pro­
claimed "the situation has become so acute as to make necessary the 
reduction of the gold value of the do llar. . . ." Devaluation would 
enable debtors "to meet th e ir obligations in a measure of dollars 
approximating the value of the dollar at the time that the debts were 
incurred." Reducing the do llar's  gold content also provided the only 
"practical method" that would ease the burden of debt and s t i l l  allow 
the government to maintain the gold standard.95 The dispatch demon­
strated that the farmer disciples of Fisher, Commons and Warren had 
learned th e ir lessons well.
During the Presidential campaign of 1932, the Farm Bureau 
o ff ic ia lly  maintained a nonpartisan stance. Yet the Bureau's campaign 
to en lis t farmers in a "war of ballots" on behalf of the friends of 
agriculture undoubtedly stimulated rural voter turnout. The correla­
tion between the size of the farm vote and Democratic victory was 
important in 1932. Iowa, fo r example, voted Democratic for the f i r s t  
time since the Civil War and the majority of the nation's farmers, for 
a potpourri of reasons, supported Roosevelt. The emphasis the Bureau 
placed on the honest dollar also put the Republicans in bad lig h t as 
Hoover's emphatic rejection of stab ilization  received wide publicity  
in the farm press.
John A. Simpson, President of the Farmers' Union, v/as a farm 
leader who seldom concealed his partisanship. A man of strong emotional
95o'Neal to Governors Dan Turner of Iowa, and Warren E. Green, 
of South Dakota, 8 September 1932, Rumely Papers, Indiana University.
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views, Simpson, combined a genuine concern for agriculture's distress 
with an a b ility  to communicate the discontent and bitterness that pre­
vailed in many rural regions of the country. His national radio 
speeches, abrasive to authority, prophetic in decrying injustice and 
unsophisticated in searching out remedies, earned him tens of thousands 
of le tters  of support, censure from network executives and national 
notoriety.9°
On economic matters Simpson liked being called a "radical," 
claiming that a radical "is one who fights for a worthy project" while 
a conservative "is one who worships a t the feet of dead r a d i c a l s . "97 
Simpson's radicalism, however, was of la te  19th Century vintage as his 
views had crystallized during the Populist campaigns of the 1890s.98 
On monetary issues he was an in fla tio n is t and though he favored almost 
any means of cheapening the do llar he much preferred s ilver remonetiza­
tion. He believed that Wall Street and the international bankers had 
imposed deflation and the depression on the country fo r the ir own 
selfish ends. As a consequence he viewed the money issue as "the most
96simpson's 1932 radio addresses were inserted into the Congres­
sional Record by Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma. See also John A. 
Simpson, The M ilitan t Voice of Agriculture (Oklahoma City: Mrs. John A.
Simpson Co., 1934), 206 pages. For network critic ism  of his more par­
tisan comments see Frank M. Russell, Vice President of National 
Broadcasting Company to Simpson, 30 April 1932, John A. Simpson papers, 
University of Oklahoma. Simpson reported his f i r s t  four radio addresses 
of 1932 produced over 30,000 le tters  from listeners. See Simpson to 
Russell, 30 April 1932, Ib id .
97Rochelle ( I l l in o is )  News, September 17, 1931, p. 1.
98Qilbert C. F ite , "John A. Simpson: The Southwest's M ilitan t 
Farm Leader," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXV (March 1949), 
pp. 563-84.
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important of a ll questions facing the people." Simpson reminded his 
followers that 1932 celebrated the centennial of President Jackson's 
war on the money monopoly. The Farmers' Union o ff ic ia l called upon 
farmers to im itate the example of th e ir Greatgrandfathers and overthrow 
the banker e li te  of 1932. I f  only, he wished, one of the parties might 
surimon the courage to nominate a new Andrew Jackson.99
Simpson thought he discovered a new "Hickory Jackson" on the 
banks of the Hudson River in the person of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt in itia te d  contact between the two when on March 7, 1932, he 
wrote Simpson, " I wish much that I  could meet you personally and talk  
with you about many matters on which I need information and advice at 
f i r s t  hand." The Governor concluded the fla tte rin g  le tte r  with an 
inv ita tion  to Simpson to be his house guest at A l b a n y . ^^0 Farmers' 
Union o ffic ia l arranged a meeting with Roosevelt at Hyde Park on 
April 3.^0^ During the Chicago convention Simpson, dissatisfied with 
the money plank adopted by the Democratic convention, phoned the 
Governor in Albany. "I remember you told me," he la te r reminded 
Roosevelt, "that you would interpret i t  [th e  money plank] lib e ra lly  
and by lib e ra lly  you said you meant we must have a dollar with less
99john A. Simpson, "Farmers Must Organize," Oklahoma Union 
Farmer, X III  (June 1, 1932), pp. 2, 3, 4.
TOORoosevelt to Simpson, 7 March 1932, Simpson papers. Univer­
s ity  of Oklahoma.
Simpson to Roosevelt, 10 March 1932, Ib id .
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purchasing p o w e r . S a t i s f i e d ,  Simpson on July 1, "Had the honor of 
announcing Oklahoma's 22 [votesJ for Roosevelt."^03
Roosevelt's reassurances, whatever the ir context, were s u ffi­
cient as Simpson enthusiastically stumped a dozen midwestern states for 
Roosevelt and in fla tio n . Crowds of five  to fifteen  thousand often 
gathered at great farmer picnics to hear the fie ry  Oklahoman describe 
Roosevelt as more progressive than the Democratic platform. Simpson's 
campaign hustings pleased and were encouraged by Roosevelt and his 
a d v i s o r s . T04 The Governor's cultivation of Simpson and the Farmers' 
Union resulted in that organization rejecting its  traditional nonpar­
tisan stance and o ff ic ia lly  endorsing the Democrat's c a n d i d a c y . ^05
During the campaign Simpson frequently offered Roosevelt advice 
on the money issue. After conferring with the candidate at Columbus, 
Ohio on August 20, Simpson wrote Roosevelt and complained "the money 
plank of the National Democratic Platform is the most embarrassing one 
I meet." The in fla tio n is t encouraged Roosevelt to openly state that 
"you believe we must have a cheaper d o lla r ."106 Even Simpson realized
102simpson to Roosevelt, 3 April 1933, Ib id .
lO^Diapy of John A. Simpson, 1 July 1932, Ib id .
104$ee Roosevelt to Simpson, 28 July 1932; Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr. to Simpson, 4 August 1932; Roosevelt to Simpson, 9 August 1932; 
Roosevelt to Simpson, 5 October 1932; Adolph A. Berle to Simpson,
4 October 1932 and 24 October 1932; Roosevelt to Simpson, 19 November 
1932, John A. Simpson papers. University of Oklahoma.
165$ee memorandum "Conference of Farmers' Union O ffic ia ls  with 
Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt," Sioux C ity , Iowa, September 29, 1932, 
Simpson papers; Simpson to Roosevelt, 7 October 1932, Ib id .
T06simpson to Roosevelt, 27 August 1932, Ib id .
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the sensitive nature of the money issue, however, for he added, "I want 
you to say just enough on this money question to ju s tify  you in doing 
what should be done a fter you are elected. I do not want you to say 
enough to drive votes from you. I  think you understand."TO?
Roosevelt probably understood the treacheries of controversial 
issues like  the money question better than Simpson imagined. The 
chameleon nature of Roosevelt’ s attitude toward the issue was reflected 
in the Democratic money plank which an tith e tica lly  called for "a sound 
currency to be preserved at a ll hazards" and for an international con­
ference "to consider the rehabilitation of s ilver and related questions." 
Rexford Tugwell, a member of Roosevelt's brains trus t, puzzled "How 
would this be regarded in the old populist country i f  the f i r s t  was 
meant and what would businessmen say i f  the second was really  
intended?"^®® Roosevelt, the p o litic ian , was perhaps more aware than 
Tugwell of the practical wisdom of a candidate's ambiguity on such 
issues.
During the election of 1932, Roosevelt finessed the money issue. 
His ambivalent posture on the question in part reflected the nominee's 
obligation to provide conciliation and leadership to the party. He 
embraced and gained support of both in fla tio n is ts  and sound moneyites. 
The majority of the Democratic House delegation had endorsed the honest 
dollar and two lieutenants in his 1932 campaign. Senators Burton K. 
Wheeler and George Norris, were repeatedly identified with the
'07lbid.
TOGRexford G. Tugwell, The Brains Trust (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1958), p. 378.
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in fla tion  mo v e me n t Amo n g  his closest advisors Roosevelt's liaison  
with organized agriculture Henry Morgenthau, J r . ,  publisher of American 
A g ricu ltu ra lis t, continually pressed the Warren-Pearson gold theories 
upon the candidate.^10 Inflationary schemes also held a certain fas­
cination for the Governor who frequently quizzed his aids about the 
p ractica lity  and p o litica l appeal of the newest monetary plan. On such 
occasions Tugwell recalled he "shuddered" but d u tifu lly  researched the 
various monetary devices as requested.
During the campaign Roosevelt ad ro itly  refused association with 
any monetary scheme. I f  in fla tio n is ts  supported him so did the conser­
vatives like  the New York Times, Bernard Baruch, Joseph P. Kennedy and 
Carter Glass. On August 13, Morgenthau introduced Henry A. Wallace to 
Roosevelt at a luncheon at Hyde Park. Wallace had been brought to New 
York at least in part to appraise the candidate of the honest dollar 
sentiment in the Midwest. The Iowa ed ito r, who had often attacked 
Hoover for his a n ti-in fla tio n  stand, reported to his readers "the gov­
ernor is quite skeptical about in fla tio n  as the cure for our troubles." 
Wallace, impressed with Roosevelt's personality and concern for agri­
culture, blamed the Governor's attitude on the influence of "certain
T09see New York Times, 22 October 1932 and 1 December 1932. 
Another who urged Roosevelt to accept in fla tio n  and the Goldsborough 
b i l l  was former Senator Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma, co-sponsor of the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913. See Owen to Roosevelt, 6 October 1932, 
Owen papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
TTOjohn Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau D iaries: Years of
C ris is , 1928-1938 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 20.
TTTfugwell, The Brains Trust, pp. 98, 292. Roosevelt had also 
shown interest in the Stable Money League. See Daniel R. Fusfeld,
The Economic Thought of Frank!in Roosevelt and the Origins of the 
New Deal (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 190-99.
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Columbia University professors," undoubtedly Raymond Moley and 
T u g w e l l T h e  explanation for Roosevelt's lack of commitment on the 
money question may have been that he had not made up his own mind on 
the issue and wished to preserve his options. In a private conversa­
tion with Tugwell the Governor asserted that Bryan's demand for cheap
113money may have been premature, "but hadn't he been essentially right?" 
Roosevelt's front runner status probably obviated the necessity for an 
immediate answer.
The in fla tio n is ts  of 1932 simply had l i t t l e  choice but to sup­
port Roosevelt's candidacy. For i f  Roosevelt offered in fla tion is ts  
equivocation. Hoover presented them depressing certainty. In a major 
address on farm issues at Des Moines, the President eulogized the gold 
standard and reiterated his opposition to a "rubber dollar" as provided, 
he alleged, in the Goldsborough b i l l .  Wallaces' Farmer concluded, "A 
vote for Hoover is a vote for the veto of the Honest Dollar b i l l . "1^4 
Consequently the in fla tion is ts  of 1932 suffered l i t t l e  from a dilemma 
complex.
When the American people voted to support the New Deal on 
November 8, more than one in fla tio n is t concurred with Simpson's verdict.
TT^Henry A. Wallace, "Sizing up Eastern Attitudes," Wallaces' 
Farmer and Iowa Homestead, LVII (September 3, 1932), pp. 3, 18; see 
also Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa: 
The Agrarian Years, 1910-1940 (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University
Press, 1968), pp. 152-59.
TlSïugwell, The Brains Trust, p. 56.
114"ciosing the Door of Hope," Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Home­
stead, LVII (September 3, 1932), pp. 3, 18.
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"The results are almost p e r f e c t . Y e t  farmer in fla tion is ts  conceded 
that the contest to determine New Deal monetary policy remained unre­
solved. Before the polls closed on election day, former senator Owen 
of Oklahoma congratulated Roosevelt on his impending victory, urged 
the Governor to support the Goldsborough b i l l  and in fla tio n , and warned 
the President-elect that he would be "subjected to the supreme s k ill  
of the d e f l a t i o n i s t s . "TTG Would-be monetary reformers viewed the 
Democratic victory of 1932 with optimism, but they perceived the open- 
ended nature of th e ir commitment. As of the winter of 1932, the battle  
fo r in fla tio n  and stab ilization  continued.
^^^Simpson to A. W. Ricker, 9 November 1932, Simpson papers. 
University of Oklahoma.
TlGowen to Roosevelt, 8 November 1932, Owen papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
CHAPTER V I I
FROM NEW ERA TO NEW DEAL: FARMERS AND THE DRIVE FOR
INFLATION DURING THE WINTER 1932-1933
"We think better on an empty stomach than a fu ll one" explained 
Senator Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota as he accounted for the Roose­
ve lt victory of November 1932.  ^ Most farm spokesmen expressed 
satisfaction at the New Yorker's victory viewing i t  as an opportunity 
to change national economic policy.2 Yet farm leaders would have agreed 
with Henry A. Wallace's assessment of Roosevelt that "An awful lo t w ill 
depend . . .  on just which particular group of people he takes for 
advice."3 During the interregnum farm leadership demanded and received 
a hearing from the President-elect. Concurrently with the e ffo rt to 
educate the incoming Administration the farm lobby maintained what 
pressures i t  could on the expiring Congress and Administration.
Resurgence of organizational ac tiv ity  began a month before the 
elections when President O'Neal of the Farm Bureau hosted the leaders
Tprairie  Farmer, CIV (November 26, 1932), p. 7.
2see Louis J. Taber to Roosevelt, 11 September 1932 and Taber 
to Josephus Daniels, 29 November 1932, Taber papers, Cornell University; 
Earl C. Smith, President of Illin o is  Agricultural Association, to 
Rainey, 11 November 1932, Rainey papers. Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D. C.
^Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of 
Iowa: The Agrarian Years, 1910-1940 (Ames: The Iowa State University
Press, 1968), p. 154.
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of farm organizations, the farm press and the marketing associations 
in a unity conference at Chicago on October 11. Appointing several 
committees, the Chicago conference named Henry A. Wallace chairman of 
the Committee on Stabilization of the Unit of Value. The committees 
were to report recommendations at the reconvening of the group on 
December 12. That date allowed discussants the time to re fle c t on the 
results of the approaching national elections and the opportunity to 
attend the national conventions of the "big three" farm organizations 
scheduled for mid-November and early December.^
The Farmers' Union at Omaha, Nebraska and the National Grange 
at Winston-Salem, North Carolina met in mid-November 1932. Both con­
ventions heard major addresses on the money question and both ra tif ie d  
resolutions demanding in fla tio n . The delegates of the Farmers' Union 
championed bimetallism while those attending the Grange sessions 
believed in preserving the gold standard though they wished to make i t  
more flex ib le  through implementing credit and currency management 
designed to produce an honest d o l la r .^
^Henry T. Rainey, with FDR's blessing, played an important role 
in organizing unity conferences of the interregnum. See Earl C. Smith 
to Rainey, 11 November 1932; O'Neal to C. 0. Moser, 28 November 1932; 
Rainey to O'Neal, 30 November 1932; Smith to Rainey, 5 December 1932, 
Rainey papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D. C.
^Minutes of the National Convention Farmers' Educational and 
Cooperative Union of America, 28th Annual Session, Omaha, Nebraska, 
November 1932, pp. 5, 5; New York Times, November 15 and 17, 1932; 
Proceedings of the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry, 66th 
Annual Session, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, November 16-25, pp. 32, 
101, 165-66; "A Great Grange Gathering at Winston-Salem," The National 
Grange Monthly, XXIX (December 1932), p. 1.
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The money issue also received fu ll scrutiny at the Farm Bureau 
national convention which assembled at Chicago, December 5-7. Bureau 
delegates heard President O'Neal demand "world wide price in fla tio n ,"  
s ilve r remonetization, and gold devaluation.® The convention also 
listened as Professor George F. Warren lectured on the "Stabilization  
of the Measure of V a l u e . T h e  delegates enthusiastically translated 
the Warren message into a two-page resolution premised on the gold 
scarcity thesis. The proposal called for an increase in the price of 
gold to $30 dollars per ounce, the cessation of gold coinage, the te r­
mination of the circulation privilege for gold coins, and in fla tion  of 
commodity prices. To fa c il ita te  the program the resolution asked that 
the Treasury create a "stab ilization  bureau" to administer the Fisher 
commodity dollar scheme. The new agency "free from bank or any other 
influences" was to s tab ilize  the purchasing power of the do llar "as 
near as humanly possible" to the average price level that existed 
between 1920 and 1929.®
On December 12, O'Neal's unity conference, calling its e lf  the 
National Farm Conference Group, met with Roosevelt's agricultural 
advisors including Henry Morgenthau, J r .,  at Washington, D. C. During 
the three-day session, Wallace's Committee on the Stabilization of the
^"Organized Agriculture Speaks at A.F.B.F. Convention," Amer­
ican Farm Bureau Federation O ffic ia l News Letter (December 12, 1932),
p. 1.
^Warren, "Stabilization of the Measure of Value," mimeographed, 
December 6, 1932, 13 pages, Warren papers, Cornell University.
8"Extracts from Resolutions Adopted at Indicated Annual Meet­
ings of the American Farm Bureau Federation on: Monetary, Banking,
Financial and Fiscal Policies," American Farm Bureau F iles, Chicago, 
I l l in o is .
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Unit of Value recommended measures, including an increase in the price 
of gold to $30 per ounce, that v ir tu a lly  repeated the language of the 
Farm Bureau money re s o lu tio n .  ^ Though monetary reform was but one of 
the measures suggested at the conference, i t  managed to receive a major 
emphasis. Fred Sexauer, President of the Dairymen's League and confi­
dant of George Warren, wrote the Cornell professor, "almost to a man" 
farm leaders agreed that "the only solution of the problem was the one 
which you have been suggesting." Sexauer concluded, " I came away from 
Washington very much encouraged that something might be done."TO
The December conferences resulted in a renaissance of the Con­
gressional farm bloc. On December 20, more than 150 congressmen agreed 
to push for the program of organized agriculture. The program empha­
sized gold devaluation, currency expansion, the domestic allotment plan 
and credit and mortgage re lie f .  To fa c il ita te  its  leg is la tive  efforts  
the bloc divided into four committees with Mississippian Thomas Jeffer­
son Busby, an in fla tio n is t, chairman of the one on currency reform.
Two days a fte r the House group organized, 15 senators lunched with rep­
resentatives of agriculture's "big three" and agreed to promote the 
program in the upper House. With a reorganized congressional lobby, a 
congenial incoming administration, and a plan of action, organized
^"Minutes of a Conference of Agricultural Leaders Held at the 
Harrington Hotel," Washington, D. C ., December 12, 13, 14, 1932, 
pp. 12-13, mimeographed, John Simpson papers. University of Oklahoma, 
New York Times, 13 December 1932.
lOSexauer to Warren, 14 December 1932, Dairymen’s League papers, 
Cornell University.
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agriculture at the end of 1932 stood ready to help shape national 
economic policy.
During the interregnum other interest groups joined in agricul­
ture's drive to discover solutions to the economic riddles of the Great 
Depression. Though the economic performance of agriculture e lic ited  
some concern from businessmen during the 1920s, the crash of 1929 
startled  businessmen into a genuine, i f  self-in terested search for ways 
to cope with the farm problem.1% The National Industrial Conference 
Board examined the gloomy prospects for agriculture as early as 1926.^^ 
The United States Chamber of Commerce endorsed the Agricultural Market­
ing Act of 1929 and in November of 1932 the chamber appointed a major 
committee to investigate ways to restore farm purchasing p o w e r . ^ 4  
Beginning about 1933 the Committee for the Nation provided an important
T^Arthur Capper of Kansas, Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma, and 
Ellison D. Smith of South Carolina comprised the Senate farm bloc steer­
ing committee. "Farm Leaders Agree on Domestic Allotment Plan,
American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXIX (December 24, 1932), p. 4; "Time for 
Action,^ Bureau Farmer (December 1932), p. 7; "National Grange Master 
Outlines R elief Program," Il l in o is  Agricultural Association Record, X 
(December 1932), p. 7; "Farm Relief May Squeeze Thru Yet," Capper's 
Weekly, LVII (December 31, 1932), pp. 1, 2; "The Parade of the Week," 
P rairie  Farmer, CIV (December 24, 1932), p. 4; New York Times, Decem­
ber 21, 1932.
T^See John P. Gleason, "The Attitude of the Business Community 
Toward Agriculture During the McNary-Haugen Period," Agricultural His­
to ry , XXXII (April 1958), pp. 127-38.
T^ The Agricultural Problem in the United States (New York: 
National Industrial Conference Board, 1926]!
^4"President Smith Serves on National Committee," Il l in o is  
Agricultural Association Record, X (December 1932), p. 4.
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example of farm-business c o o p e r a t io n B y  1933, the interdependency 
of rural and urban prosperity forced businessmen to admit the need for 
higher farm prices. Some businessmen went further as they joined in 
the demand for monetary in fla tion  and the adoption of a managed cur­
rency system.
Edward A. Rumely from La Porte, Indiana originated and promoted 
the concepts which evolved into the Committee for the Nation, the best 
organized and financed of the organizations lobbying for in fla tion  in 
the 1930s. Rumely, whose exuberant personality recalled that of his 
p o litic a l idol and friend, Theodore Roosevelt, enjoyed a peripatetic  
career. Matriculating a t Notre Dame, Oxford and Heidelburg, Rumely 
received an M.D. and a degree in economics from the University of 
Freiburg in 1906. The Indianan never practiced medicine. Instead he 
founded the experimental Interlaken School which emphasized vocational 
education 1906-1914, invented the Rumely Oil Pull Tractor eventually 
sold to Allis-Chalmers, edited and became part-owner of the New York 
City Evening Mail in 1915, established a vitamin company and in the 
1920s created the Agricultural Bond and Credit company. The la tte r  
venture lent $35,000,000 to wheat farmers between 1926 and 1930. As 
the Great Depression intensified the company's 76 agents emphasized
T^Herbert M. Bratter, "The Committee for the Nation: A Case
History in Monetary Propaganda," Journal of P o litica l Economy, XLIX 
(August 1941), pp. 531-52. The Bratter a rtic le  was based solely on 
publications of the Committee and news stories from the New York Times. 
Bratter did not have access to the pertinent manuscript collections 
now available to researchers. The essay summarized the various tech­
niques useful to the Committee in disseminating its  propaganda but 
v irtu a lly  ignored the important role of agriculture in the Committee's 
history.
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collections rather than loans but towards the end of 1932 the company 
prepared to follow its  fanner-borrowers into bankruptcy J®
Undoubtedly Rumely's conversion to in fla tion  as the cure for 
the depression resulted from financial reverses of the Agricultural 
Bond and Credit company and the hope that rising commodity prices would 
enable fanners to repay th e ir in d eb ted n essR u m ely 's  "road to 
Damascus" on the in fla tion  issue included more obtuse motives as w ell. 
His correspondence revealed a sensitive i f  inveterate do-gooder, a 
Catholic social gospeler who expressed distress a t the suffering of 
farmers and feared for the future of the free-enterprise system. In 
addition, during the winter of 1931, Professor Gehart von Schulze- 
Gaevernitz, an old friend and Rumely's former economics teacher, toured
TGpor Rumely's post Committee for the Nation career see Richard 
Polenberg, "The National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government 
1937-1941," Journal of American History, L II (December 1965), p. 582. 
Much of the foregoing a rtic le  is repeated in Richard Polenberg, Reor­
ganizing Roosevelt's Government: 1936-1939, Harvard University Press,
1966). For Rumely's l i f e  to 1914, see Philip Morehouse McGarr, ed itor, 
"The Autobiography of Dr. Edward A. Rumely: The Formative Years, 1882-
1900," Indiana Magazine of History, LXVI (March 1970), pp. 1-39; Philip  
Morehouse McGarr, ed itor, "The Autobiography of Dr. Edward A. Rumely: 
Student Days Abroad, 1900-1906," Indiana Magazine of History, LXVI 
(September 1970), pp. 198-237; Philip Morehouse McGarr, ed itor, "The 
Autobiography of Dr. Edward A. Rumely: The La Porte Years, 1906-1914,"
Indiana Magazine of History, LXVII (March 1971), pp. 1-44. The author 
has also relied on Fanny Scott Rumely to Dear Family, 29 February 1952, 
which traced the highlights of Rumely's l i f e  on the occasion of his 
70th birthday, and Rumely, "Committee for the Nation," typed autobiog­
raphy, Part I ,  March 5, 1950, 21 pages; and Rumely, "Committee for the 
Nation," typed autobiography. Part I I ,  March 13, 1950, 25 pages, Rumely 
papers, Indiana University.
T^See A. H. Barger to the Members of the Board of Directors of 
the Agricultural Bond and Credit Corporation, 21 June 1932, Rumely 
papers; Rumely to Col. E. H. House, 25 November 1932, Rumely papers, 
and "Statement of Income and Expenses--Edward A. Rumely--1932,"
December 1932, Rumely papers, Indiana University.
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America and convinced the Indianan that the depression emanated p ri­
marily from monetary phenomenon.
During the June 1932 Republican Convention Rumely, upset at 
the weakening position of Chicago banks, wired automotive tycoon Henry 
Ford and Vincent Bendix, President of Bendix Aviation Corp., encour­
aging them to assert leadership to avert a worsening of the c ris is . 
Within two days Bendix arranged to discuss the situation with Rumely.
As he was escorted into the executive's Chicago suite, Rumely recalled 
that Bendix was enjoying breakfast "in a bed that had four posts and 
s ilk  curtains—most luxurious sheets and covering, and looked very much 
lik e  a Turkish Shah." Overcoming the incongruity of the setting and 
the topic for discussion, the conversation centered on ways to end the 
depression and especially the need for an inflationary monetary policy.
Bendix and Rumely agreed that an in flationary monetary policy 
might be achieved i f  i t  were pushed by a national committee of leading 
businessmen and farm representatives. Bendix allowed that he was not 
interested in creating a majority of a ll the people but in a majority 
of "the effectives" whom he defined as those "who w ill make the deci­
sions u ltim ate ly ."20
During the course of the breakfast conversation the main out­
lines of a national in fla tion  lobby were sketched. Chicago, New York
lORumely, "Committee for the Nation," Part I ,  pp. 1-2.
lORumely, "Committee for the Nation," Part I ,  pp. 7-8; Rumely,
"Memorandum File In fla tio n ,"  15 June 1932; and Rumely to Dr. Edmund
Stines, 25 June 1932, Rumely papers, Indiana University.
Z O i b i d .
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or both ought to provide the headquarters of the committee and "a good
address would be helpful." The Committee should possess a short and
descriptive name, reflective of the purpose of the new organization. 
Bendix and Rumely agreed that the major statements of the organization 
must rely on "unimpeachable data" prefereably confirmed through the 
fa c il it ie s  of a professional research organization. The men also saw 
the necessity of securing the cooperation of agriculture. Agricultural
cooperatives and the farm implement industry could provide financial
support and because of heavy advertising budgets might induce the farm 
journals to cooperate as w ell. Other potential supporters of an in fla ­
tion committee included home owners confronting mortgage payments and 
professional economists, although Bendix preferred the endorsement of 
businessmen rather than " id ea lis tic  thinkers." Finally the men reviewed 
the lik e ly  individual supporters of such a movement.21
Returning to his o ffice from the Bendix interview, Rumely com­
piled a memorandum concerning his role in the proposed national 
in fla tion  committee. Rumely suggested that he could operate "as an 
editor" in the stimulation, organization and production of in fla tion  
propaganda. In return for organizing the national in fla tio n  drive, 
Rumely asked Bendix for $1,500 a month out of which he would pay his 
traveling and personal expenses. Bendix placed $2,000 a t Rumely's
21"Committee to Promote Restoration of Normal Commodity Prices: 
Suggestions of Vincent Bendix as recorded by Edward A. Rumely," 25 June 
1932, Rumely papers, Indiana University. They named Henry Ford,
William Randolph Hearst, Frank 0. Lowden and Alexander Legge as men 
who might be interested in the project.
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disposal. The Indianan's assignment was to see what interest others 
might have in the idea.^^
In the six months following the June 25th breakfast session 
with Bendix, Rumely surveyed two major sources of support fo r the pro­
posed in fla tio n  organization. He interviewed many of the top echelon 
of business leaders in both Chicago and New York, often finding them 
receptive to the need for in fla t io n .23 He also courted the agricul­
tural industry. Interviewing Senators Borah and Norbeck he found both 
anxious to cooperate on behalf of the in fla tion  remedy. During August 
Rumely drove through Iowa and South Dakota to survey farming conditions 
and report his impressions to Bendix. Approaching Sioux City, Iowa, 
he witnessed the overalled farm holiday strikers halting the tra ff ic  
of farm products to the c ity . With the aid of Allis-Chalmers dealers, 
many of whom he had been associated with in the implement industry, he 
composed his report. Rumely informed Bendix that farmers believed 
they were the victims of a great in justice and were at the point of 
despair due to the burden of debt and taxes and the low levels of com­
modity prices. Rumely exclaimed, "The very body of men who should be 
the most tenacious force in support of capitalism and private in it ia -  
t iv e --th e  six m illion farm owners--are being alienated so seriously
ZZRumely to Bendix, 25 June 1932, Rumely papers, Indiana Uni­
versity .
23Rumely's efforts may be traced in his profuse correspondence. 
See Rumely to Bendix, 30 June 1932, 3 July 1932, 6 July 1932, 26 Sep­
tember 1932, 28 September 1932, and Bendix to Rumely September 30, 1932. 
Letters to businessmen from Rumely include: Rumely to General Robert
Wood, 22 September 1932; Rumely to Vanderlip, 10 November 1932; Rumely 
to John S. Cullinan, 6 August 1932. See also a two-page mailing l is t  
of names of farm and business leaders canvassed by Rumely dated 30 Sep­
tember 1932; Rumely papers, Indiana University.
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that they cannot be counted upon to remain in the ranks of conservative
voters."24
Convinced that farmers had more to gain from in fla tion  than 
almost any group, Rumely in itia ted  contact with agricultural leaders. 
Receptive to his ideas were such midwestern agricultural figures as 
Herbert F. Perkins of International Harvester, former I l l in o is  Governor 
Frank 0. Lowden, Edward A. O'Neal, President of the Farm Bureau, and 
C lifford  Gregory, editor of Prairie Farmer. Rumely reported to Bendix, 
"Mr. Gregory . . . te lls  me that the more in te llig en t leaders of the 
farm organizations see the question clearly and would . . . support 
financia lly  and otherwise a movement to c la r ify  i t  as an issue for 
general public discussion."^5
At O'Neal's urging Rumely arranged for Henry A. Wallace to meet 
Bendix at the in d u stria lis t's  executive offices in Chicago. Wallace 
liked the in fla tio n  committee notion but disliked Bendix, confiding to 
Rumely, "That man Bendix talks very se lfish ly ." After meeting two 
other Rumely converts to in fla tio n . General Robert Wood and Lessing J. 
Rosenwald, chief executive officers of Sears Roebuck and Co., Wallace, 
impressed, agreed to serve on the executive board of the proposed in fla ­
tion committee. Wallace, however, qualified his commitment to the 
neophyte committee: should he receive the post of Secretary of
Agriculture, "you must immediately remove my name from the stationary"
24Rumely to Bendix, 19 August 1932, Ib id . 
ZSRumely to Bendix, 26 October 1932, Ibid.
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and from any public endorsement of the committee's objectives.^®
By the middle of January 1933, Rumely secured a name, an execu­
tive  board and a research organization for the proposed in fla tion  
organization. Rumely t it le d  the new organization the Committee for the 
Nation for Rebuilding Purchasing Power and P rices .2? Lessing J. Rosen­
wald, Chairman of the Board of Sears Roebuck, J. H. Rand, J r . ,
President of Remington Rand Corporation, Frank A. Vanderlip, retired  
and respected New York City banker, joined Henry A. Wallace and Vincent 
Bendix on the Committee's Executive Board. For an in it ia l  $10,000 fee 
the committee hired the prestigious i f  nearly indigent National Indus­
t r ia l  Conference Board, Inc. to research the nature and effects of 
monetary contraction and to assemble and analyze the various proposals 
fo r raising prices and restoring purchasing power through monetary
O O
means. ®
Rumely also increased his efforts to bring organized agricul­
ture into the ranks of the Committee for the Nation. Recognizing the 
influence of George F. Warren on the monetary thinking of farm organi­
zations, Rumely lunched with Fred H. Sexauer, President of the Dairymen's
2®In addition, Wallace requested that the in tegrity  of the 
in fla tion  committee be assured through a prohibition on members spec­
ulating in the gold market. See Rumely to Wallace, 3 November 1932; 
Wallace to Rumely, 8 November 1932; Rumely, "The Committee for the 
Nation," Part I ,  p. 14; Rumely to Bendix, 9 January 1933, Rumely 
papers, Indiana University.
Z^The name v/as f i r s t  used in Rumely to Bendix, 23 December 1932, 
Rumely papers, Indiana University.
28j. H. Rand, Jr. to National Industrial Conference Board, In c ., 
Attention Mr. V irg il Jordan, 13 January 1933; Jordan to Rand, 16 Jan­
uary 1933, Rumely papers, Indiana University.
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League and an ardent Warren disciple. With Sexauer's cooperation 
Rumely planned a January 26 conference a t New York City on the topic 
"The Farm Relief Problem and the Price Level." The meeting held under 
the aegis of the National Industrial Conference Board provided Rumely 
and Sexauer the opportunity to gage the potential for cooperation among 
farm and business leaders. Sexauer believed that the Committee for 
the Nation format offered the "possib ility  of our developing a rather 
close contact between agriculture and industry" and enthusiastically 
secured the participation of the Grange, the Cooperative Council, the 
Farmers' Union, the Farm Bureau and the National Cooperative Milk Pro­
ducer's Federation in the January 26 a f f a i r . ^9 At the conclusion of 
the day-long conference Rumely and Sexauer hosted a private dinner for 
those who had expressed an interest in joining the Committee fo r the 
Nation. Most of those in attendance agreed that a jo in t study of the 
depression might prove informative to both farm and business in terests .30 
George F. Warren, "The Committee for the Nation's staunchest 
aide and ablest supporter," according to Rumely, also participated in 
the incipient stages of the committee's formation. As preparations
29sexauer to Harry Hartke, President of National Cooperative 
Milk Producer's Federation, 17 January 1933; Alanson B. Houghton to 
Sexauer, 17 January 1933; Sexauer to Rumely, 17 January 1933, Hartke 
to Sexauer, 19 January 1933, Dairymen's League papers, Cornell Univer­
s ity ; C. 0. Moser to Rumely, 21 January 1933; L. J. Taber to Committee 
fo r the Nation, 21 January 1933; Hartke to Rumely, 21 January 1933; 
Rumely to Mary, 23 January 1933, illu s tra tes  Rumely's awareness of 
Warren's influence among farm organizations. Rumely papers, Indiana 
University.
30Could Coleman, Oral Interview of Fred H. Sexauer at Auburn, 
New York, January 28, April 2, May 17, June 21, 1963 and December 12, 
1966, the Cornell Program in Oral History, pp. 149-50; and U. Benton 
Blalock to Sexauer, 30 January 1933 and Sexauer to Blalock, 2 February 
1933, Dairymen's League papers, Cornell University.
31Rumely, "The Committee for the Nation," Part I I ,  pp. 21-22.
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fo r the January 26 conference proceeded, Warren traveled to Chicago and 
visited Bendix and General Robert Wood. The two financial angels of 
the Committee for the Nation proved "very much interested" in Warren's 
gold theories.32 Warren expanded his contact with in fla tio n is t busi­
nessmen when he delivered the major address at the Rumely-Sexauer 
conference of January 26. His paper en titled  "Causes of the Depression 
and the Remedies for It"  emphasized the need for re fla tion  and monetary 
s ta b iliza tio n .33 Warren's audience which included Henry I .  Harriman, 
President of the National Chamber of Commerce, and V irg il Jordan, Pres­
ident of the National Industrial Conference Board, proved so receptive 
that a sim ilar session was held at Chicago on February 4.34
Another early supporter of the Committee for the Nation,
Henry A. Wallace continued his active support of in fla tio n  during the 
interregnum. The editor spoke before several farm conventions during 
December and January asking that agricu ltura lis ts  support an increase 
in the price of gold from $20.67 to $30 per ounce, an international 
conference on bimetallism, and adoption of the Fisher-Warren s tab iliza ­
tion program.35 One such address delivered to the Nebraska legislature  
the day before he agreed to serve as Roosevelt's Secretary of
32warren Diary, January 20, 1933, Warren papers, Cornell.
33"Causes of the Depression and the Remedies for I t , "  mimeo­
graphed, January 26, 1933, 19 pages, Warren papers, Cornell University.
34warren Diary, January 26, 1933, Warren papers, Cornell; Rand 
to Borg, 3 February 1933, Rumely papers, Indiana University.
35"The Money Question," The Il l in o is  Agricultural Association 
Record, Vol. I I  (February 1933), pp. 17-18; " Illin o is  Farmers Have Just 
Begun to Fight," Prairie Farmer, Vol. CV (February 4, 1933), p. 3.
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Agriculture specifically  lauded the Warren concepts and created furor 
in the eastern press. Afraid that he had embarrassed his new employer, 
Wallace wrote the President-elect that in the future he intended to be 
a "team" player following "the instructions of the Captain." Wallace 
insisted, however, that in fla tion  whether voluntarily undertaken by 
bankers and the Federal Reserve or imposed by the government was an 
urgent necessity. " I f  I were a real radical I would not ask anything 
better than a continuation of the deflation. But as I  contemplate the 
extraordinary misery among our unemployed and among our farm folks . . . 
I am moved to write to you as I h a v e ."36 Upon accepting Roosevelt's 
invitation to become Secretary of Agriculture, Wallace withdrew from 
the Committee for the Nation but recommended Fred H. Sexauer as his 
replacement. Rumely, whose amicable relations with the dairy leader 
had been established in preparation for the New York and Chicago con­
ferences, accepted Wallace's c h o ic e .37
Sexauer, with the exception of Rumely, proved the most inde­
fatigable and loyal member of the Committee. As a young man Sexauer, 
in search of cheap land, moved eastward from De Kalb County, Ill in o is  
to Auburn, New York where he bought 240 acres for a minimal downpayment. 
Without formal agricultural training the transplanted midwesterner 
frequented the Geneva Experiment Station and the Agricultural College 
at Cornell in an attempt to learn the la test sc ien tific  management and
36wallace to Roosevelt, 19 February 1933, RPF, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. See also "Campaign for In fla ­
tion Gaining," Wallaces' Farmer, LV III (January 21, 1933), pp. 4, 24.
37Rumely, "The Committee fo r the Nation," Part I I ,  p. 13; 
Sexauer, Oral History, p. 149, Cornell.
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farming techniques. Sexauer also valued membership in agricultural 
organizations, eventually becoming president of the Dairymen's League 
Cooperative Association, In c ., the cooperative that served the New York 
City milk shed. By the end of the 1920s, the Dairymen's League under 
Sexauer's leadership represented approximately 65,000 farmers in New 
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the western fringes of New England.38 
Sexauer f i r s t  came into contact with Warren when the young 
farmer served as Secretary of the Cayuga County Farm Bureau during 
World War I .  Sexauer noted he became "quite an admirer" of Warren's 
and recalled that "I always went to him fo r advice."39 During the hard 
times of the 1930s, Sexauer, though his Republican and free enterprise 
s p ir it  recoiled at the idea, understood the demands of farmers for 
government intervention and regulation of the economy. He believed 
that during eras of distress most would exchange freedom for security. 
"Those of us in farm circles who believe that farmers would be happier, 
that business would be better and democracy better served by free in s ti­
tutions, recognize that we cannot stem the tide of regulation without 
the reestablishment of an adequate income for agriculture." Reiter­
ating Warren's views, Sexauer argued that monetary management including 
gold repricing offered the exclusive alternative to economic regimenta­
tion. To Sexauer the se lf-in te res t of the business community dictated  
that they jo in  farm demands for a restoration of price levels.
38Sexauer, Oral History, pp. 2-7; "The Dairymen's League Coop­
erative Association, In c ., and How I t  Benefits the Dairy Farmer: What 
the League Is ,"  mimeographed pamphlet, nd. Dairymen's League papers. 
Cornel 1.
39Sexauer, Oral History, pp. 144-45; 200-05.
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The inescapable alternative to a managed monetary policy was the coming 
of the regulatory s ta te .40
After the in it ia l  farm business conferences and the resignation 
of Henry A. Wallace from the Executive Board of the Committee for the 
Nation, farm representatives wished to more precisely define agricul­
ture's role in the Rumely committee. Louis J. Taber, Master of the 
National Grange, Edward A. O'Neal, President of the Farm Bureau,
Charles Holman, Secretary of the National Cooperative Milk Producers' 
Federation, and Sexauer discussed the matter at Washington on Febru­
ary 16. The men agreed that farm organizations should present a 
unified front on the major issues that might come before the committee 
"in order to guide" the thinking of its  business members. The group 
chose Sexauer as its  "Contact Man" with the Committee. Sexauer insisted 
upon the designation "Contact Man" rather than representative, fo r he 
recognized the f u t i l i t y  of committing the farm groups to any proposi­
tion without f i r s t  obtaining th e ir specific prior approval. In 
accepting the appointment he received agreement from the farm leadership 
that they would meet at his call from time to time to review agricul­
ture's association with the Rumely committee. As for his association 
with the business members of the Committee, Sexauer notified them that 
he was anxious to cooperate with them provided they recognized the 
"ind iv idualis tic  character of farmers and farm organizations."
40%he views of Sexauer may be found in his voluminous corres­
pondence. Three le tters  are especially pertinent: Sexauer to Murray
Lincoln, Secretary, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, 31 December 1931; 
Sexauer to William Hard, Secretary, Republican Program Committee,
23 August 1938; Sexauer to Rumely, nd, but probably December 1938.
See also the Sexauer Oral History, 300 pages.
216
He advised the Committee leadership to proceed "cautiously" i f  farm 
support were to be retained because of agriculture's "past experience 
with business." Thus Sexauer, with the support of the major farm 
organizations, succeeded Wallace in mid-February as the farmer member 
on the Committee's Executive B o a rd .41
During January and February, the Rumely group launched its  
investigation of the American economy. The Committee subsidized twelve 
National Industrial Conference Board studies which surveyed the more 
troublesome areas of the American economy. Scholarly and s ta tis tica l 
in approach, each report was numbered and stamped "Confidential—Not 
fo r Publication." The memoranda dealt with such topics as total 
indebtedness in the United States, the status of commercial banking and 
the economic reconstruction program of the Hoover Administration. 
Altogether the reports bluntly illu s tra ted  the magnitude of the defla­
tion process, the precarious position of commercial banks and the 
ineptitude of the government's response to the c r is is .42
41$ee "Summary of Meeting of Committee for the Nation on F ri­
day, February 10, 1933," typewritten, 2 pages. Dairymen's League papers, 
Cornell; "Report of Conference with Mr. Taber and Mr. O'Neal," Washing­
ton, D. C ., February 16, 1933, 4 pages. Dairymen's League papers, 
Cornell; and Robert J. Andersen to F. A. Vanderlip, 8 February 1933, 
Gannet papers, Cornell.
During Sexauer's f i r s t  year on the Executive Board, more than 
f i f t y  farm organizations became "endorser-members" of the Committee for 
the Nation. A l is t  of "endorser-members" is contained in "Resolution 
Inviting Cooperation of Business Leaders with Organized Agriculture," 
National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation, nd, but probably 
December 1933, Warren papers, Cornell.
4^The National Industrial Conference Board studies completed 
fo r the Committee for the Nation during the interregnum were: "An
Estimate of Interest-Bearing Debt in the United States, 1922-1929," 
Report No. 1, February 11, 1923, 3 pages; "The Present Position of Com­
mercial Banking," Report No. 2, January 30, 1933, 5 pages; "The 
Financial Reconstruction Program of the United States Government to
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On March 3, the Committee telegramed members of Congress its  
prescription fo r economic recovery. The Committee release stated that 
deflation must stop and announced that the principal means to restore 
prices lay in altering the monetary system. Specifically the Committee 
suggested five  remedies: the guarantee of bank deposits, the suspen­
sion of specie payments and an embargo on gold exports, the devaluation 
of gold to an unspecified level, the implementation of the compensated 
dollar scheme, and the segregation of commercial from investment bank­
ing. Issued the day before Roosevelt's inauguration, the Committee's 
proposals almost perfectly anticipated the early New Deal monetary
program.43
The resemblance of New Deal monetary decisions to the platform 
of the Committee for the Nation resulted from more than coincidence. 
During the interregnum Rumely, Warren and other in fla tio n is ts  pressed
January 1933," Report No. 3, February 3, 1933, 6 pages; "The Decline of 
Purchasing Power of Industrial Workers, 1929-1933," Report No. 4, 
February 8, 1933, 3 pages; "The Urban Real Estate Mortgage Situation," 
Report No. 5, February 8, 1933, 8 pages; "Accomplishments and Limita­
tions of the Financial Reconstruction Program of the Federal Government: 
The Federal Land Banks," Report No. 6, February 14, 1933, 8 pages; "The 
General Price Situation," Report No. 7, February 17, 1933, 8 pages; 
"Accomplishments and Limitations of the Financial Reconstruction Pro­
gram of the Federal Government: The Glass-Steagall Act," Report No. 8,
February 21, 1933, 5 pages; "Estimates of National Income," Report 
No. 9, February 24, 1933, 3 pages; "Purchasing Power Made Unavailable 
by Bank Closings and Hoarding," Report No. 10, March 1, 1933, 2 pages; 
"Accomplishments and Limitations of the Financial Reconstruction Program 
of the Federal Government: Enlargement of Federal Reserve Discount
Powers; Extension of National Bank Note Circulation Priv ilege," Report 
No. 11, March 2, 1933, 7 pages; "Congressional Proposals fo r Raising 
Prices by Means of an Enlarged Monetary Circulation," Report No. 12, 
March 2, 1933, 11 pages. The reports are contained in the Dairymen's 
League papers, Cornell.
4^"Introduction to Interim Report of the Committee for the 
Nation," February 26, 1933, 20 pages. Dairymen's League papers, Cornell.
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on Roosevelt and his advisors inflationary monetary views. Rex Tugwell 
rebuffed Rumely's f i r s t  e ffo rt to contact Roosevelt but on January 9, 
the irrepressible in fla tio n is t used a past Parent-Teacher Association 
a f f il ia t io n  with Mrs. Roosevelt to request that she pass to the Presi­
dent-elect certain propaganda materials. The soon-to-be f i r s t  lady 
gave the Information to Louis Howe, who not only met with Rumely but 
presented the documents to Roosevelt. Howe, Secretary to the President, 
stayed in contact with Rumely during the next few years and remained 
sympathetic to the Committee for the Nation viewpoint.^4
During the interregnum Warren also gained access to the leader­
ship of the incoming Administration. On several occasions he managed 
to discuss his in fla tion  proposals with Eleanor Roosevelt. After one 
l iv e ly  bout with her Warren recorded in his diary, "Mrs. R has a real 
understanding of a ll the work that Pearson and I have done and is quite 
able to put an economist on the rack i f  he disagrees with her."4  ^ On 
January 12, Warren admitting that he was "taking part in the favorite  
indoor sport of America," that of offering advice to Roosevelt, wrote 
the President-elect that his Administration would confront four main 
problems: the t a r i f f  and war debts issue, the money question, unemploy­
ment and the farm p r o b l e m . 46 Roosevelt thanked the professor for his
Rumely to Mrs. Roosevelt, 9 January 1933, and Rumely, "Com­
mittee for the Nation," Part I I ,  page 1, Rumely papers, Indiana 
University.
45warren Diary, 16 February 1933, Warren papers, Cornell.
46warren to President-elect, 12 January 1933, and Warren to 
Henry Morgenthau, J r . ,  4 March 1933, Warren papers, Cornell.
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counsel and asked him to confer with Raymond Moley concerning the 
"monetary s ituation ."4?
In February, Warren and the Executive Board of the Committee 
fo r the Nation met with the President-elect and reviewed the pessimistic 
conclusions of the National Industrial Conference Board studies. 
Roosevelt asked the group to share its  information with Treasury Secre­
tary designate William Woodin. The in fla tion is ts  conferred with Woodin 
in New York City on February 28, but reported that the president of the 
American Car and Foundry Company seemed distraught at the suggestion 
that the solution to deflation and the bank panic lay in raising the 
value of assets through gold devaluation. Woodin did agree, however, 
that i t  might be necessary to suspend specie payments.48
Though the most sophisticated of the genre, the Committee for 
the Nation was but one of several in fla tion  groups organized during the 
interregnum. The Crusaders for Economic Liberty of Chattanooga, 
Tennessee contributed both impassioned rhetoric and the motto, "The 
Golden Rule instead of the rule of gold," to the campaign for monetary 
s ta b iliza tio n .49 Other in fla tion  committees were appointed in Iowa
47Roosevelt to Warren, 3 February 1933, Warren papers, Cornell.
48sexauer, Oral History, pp. 154-55; Sexauer papers, Cornell; 
Warren Diary, 28 February 1933, Warren papers, Cornell; Rumely to W. I .  
Myers, 28 October 1957, Pearson papers, Cornell
49The Crusaders for Economic Liberty sponsored H. R. 11898,
72d Congress, 2d Session. See also George W. Christians, President of 
Crusaders for Economic Liberty to Secretary of Agriculture, c. January 
1933, Record Group 16, National Archives, Washington, 0. C.
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and I l l i n o i s . 50 The most d istinctive of the regional organizations 
was probably the Sound and Honest Money Association, Inc. of Syracuse, 
New York. Organized February 24, 1933, the Association received the 
support of the New York State Grange, the State Horticultural Society, 
the Dairymen's League and the Farm Bureau. Charles R. White, President 
of the New York Farm Bureau, led the Association. The Syracuse group, 
philosophical disciples of George Warren, favored gold devaluation, 
the compensated dollar and an international conference to deal with 
s ilver rem onetization.5  ^ A prominent New York agricultural leader. 
White on several occasions discussed monetary issues with Roosevelt. 
White reported that on the in fla tion  issue the President-elect "assured 
us that we were righ t." White added that he "had fa ith" that Roosevelt 
"would be a ll right when the time came."52 in the meantime the Sound 
and Honest Money Association sponsored a number of propaganda dinners 
and printed materials promoting the in fla tio n is t viewpoint.
While in fla tio n is ts  organized to push the New Deal away from 
orthodoxy, they maintained what leverage they could on the lame
SO lllino is  Agricultural Association Record, I I  (February 1933), 
p. 10; and E. A. Ellison, Milford H. Beehgly, L. Mighell, W. Mighell 
and Oscar Heline to Wallace, 4 March 1933, Record Group 16, National 
Archives, Washington, D. C.
5^The (Syracuse) Post-Standard, February 25, 1933, p. 1; and 
C. R. White to Dear S ir, 21 February 1933, Warren papers, Cornell; 
"Purposes For Which the Organization Has Been Formed," mimeographed, 
February 24, 1933, Dairymen's League papers, Cornell.
52white to Henry A. Wallace, 3 March 1933, Record Group 16, 
National Archives, Washington, D. C. Another example of a Roosevelt 
"off the record" endorsement of in fla tion  is recorded in Frank Freidel, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston: L i t t le ,  Brown & Co.,
1956), p. 351.
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duck Congress. The second session of the Seventy-second Congress con­
vened on December 5, 1932 and adjourned 11:24 a.m., March 4, 1933, 
only minutes before Roosevelt received the presidential oath. The 
transition from New Era to New Deal was tremulant and partisan.S3 A 
leg is la tive  cripple, the interregnum Congress proved the wisdom of 
eliminating lame duck sessions a l t o g e t h e r . observers reported 
that "procrastination" and "obstruction" prevailed. Senator Arthur 
Capper of Kansas accurately predicted that the interregnum Congress 
would be but a "John the Baptist" that could do l i t t l e  more than "pre­
pare the groundwork" fo r the incoming Administration.^5
Though the lame duck session proved generally unproductive, 
i t  provided further evidence as to the growing demands for in fla tio n . 
The crescendo of in fla tion  proposals that marked the f i r s t  session of 
the Seventy-second Congress intensified during the short interregnum 
s e s s io n .56 The National Industrial Conference Board reported to the
53jordan A. Schwarz, The Interregnum of Despair: Hoover, 
Congress, and the Depression (Urbana: University of I l l in o is  Press,
1970), pp. 202-25. Hoover's view of the interregnum is presented in 
Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership, 1937-1945 (Philadel­
phia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1955), pp. 81-103. Roosevelt's resentment
of Hoover is portrayed in Grace Tu lly , £.C[.jR. : My Boss (Chicago: 
People's Book Club, 1949), pp. 57-68.
54pendleton E. Herring, "Second Session of the Seventy-second 
Congress," American P o litica l Science Review, XXVII (June 1933), 
pp. 404-22; and Arthur Capper, '"P o litic s ' Balls Up the Short Session," 
Capper's Weekly, LV III (February 4, 1933), p. 2.
S^Arthur Capper, "The Short Session Won't Do Much," Capper's 
Weekly, LVII (December 31, 1932), p. 2.
66$ee "Campaign for In fla tion  Gaining," Wallaces' Farmer,
L V III (January 21, 1933), p. 4; and C liffo rd  Gregory, " In fla tion  Needed 
to Raise Prices," Prairie Farmer, CV (January 21, 1933), p. 8; Arthur 
Capper, "The Dollar, The Debtor and Congress," Capper's Weekly, LV III
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Committee fo r the Nation that the two sessions of the 72d Congress 
witnessed the introduction of 19 b ills  calling for extraordinary cur­
rency issue, five  b i l l  proposing the devaluation and s tab ilization  of 
the gold do llar, 17 b ills  providing in fla tio n  through legislation  
favorable to s ilv e r, and more than 100 b ills  requiring cred it expansion 
through one of the various government lending institu tions. An analysis 
of the authorship of the b ills  illu s tra ted  that the strongest support 
for in fla tio n  legislation emanated from western and southern states.
The study observed that in flationary measures commanded "a considerable 
congressional minority" though the volume and variety of b ills  indi­
cated a lack of unanimity on behalf of any particular in fla tio n  rem edy.57 
During the lame duck session the most active Senate in fla tio n ­
ists included s ilverites  Burton K. Wheeler of Montana and William Borah 
of Idaho, the devaluationist Tom Connally of Texas and the determined 
i f  indiscriminate in fla tio n is t Elmer Thomas of O klahom a.58 Early in
^January 14, 1932), p. 2; "The Farm Bureau a t Washington," Il l in o is  
Agricultural Association Record, I I  (March 1933), p. t .  Conservatives 
also were aware of the strength of the demands for in fla tio n . See the
statement of alarm by Republican National Committee chairman. Senator
Simeon Da Fess of Ohio in U. S ., Congressional Record, 72d Congress,
2d Sess., February 21, 1933, pp. 4571-73.
57National Industrial Conference Board, "Congressional Propos­
als for Raising Prices by Means of an Enlarged Monetary Circulation," 
Report No. 12 for the Committee for the Nation, March 2, 1933, 11 pages.
58por biographical background see LeRoy Ashley, The Spearless 
Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920s
(Urbana: University of Il l in o is  Press, 1972), 325 pp; and Claudius 0.
Johnson, Borah of Idaho (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936),
Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, My Name is Tom Connally (New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1954); Frank H. Smyrl, "Tom Connally and the
New Deal" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 1968) 
242 pages; Burton K. Wheeler with Paul F. Healy, Yankee from the West 
(Garden C ity, New York: Doubleday and Company, In c ., 1962); Eric Man-
heimer, "The Public Career of Elmer Thomas," (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 1952).
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the session about two dozen representatives including Wright Patman of 
Texas and Thomas Jefferson Busby of Mississippi formed a "currency- 
reform group" that periodically met to review in fla tion  proposals.59 
Throughout the session new converts announced the ir fa ith  in in flation  
including Majority Floor Leader and f ir s t  New Deal House Speaker 
Henry T. Rainey of I l l in o is .60
Though most observons agreed that Congressional sentiment 
favoring in flation  had reached formidable proportions the only vote on 
the issue in the lame duck session came on a s ilver remonetization pro­
posal. From 1926 to 1932 the price of s ilver dropped from 73 cents to 
just under 25 cents an ounce, an a ll time low. Senators from mining 
states urgently requested that the federal government "do something 
fo r s ilv e r ."61 With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, in fla ­
tio n is ts , as they had in the past, turned to s ilver as a base for 
currency issues. S ilver po litic ians, anxious to broaden support for 
the rehabilitation of s ilv e r, often solicited and welcomed the s ilver- 
in fla tio n is t demands of debtor g r o u p s . 6 2
' 69u. s . ,  Congressional Record, 72d Congress, 2d Sess., Decem­
ber 30, 1932, p. 1135.
60"The Parade of the Week," Prairie Farmer, CV (February 4, 
1933), p. 4.
61a historical sketch of the s ilver issue from Hayes to Hoover 
is provided in Jeannette P. Nichols, "Silver Diplomacy," P olitical 
Science Quarterly, XLVIII (December 1933), pp. 565-88. The work of 
silverites  from 1929-1933 is traced in Herbert Bratter, "The S ilver 
Episode," Journal of P olitical Economy, XLVI (1938), pp. 609-21. A 
reinterpretation of a leading s ilv e rite  is Arthur F. Sewall, "Key 
Pittman and the Quest for the China Market, 1933-1940," Pacific Histor­
ical Review, XLIV (August 1975), pp. 351-71.
62Generalizations about the s ilver bloc are frequently subject 
to qualification. Some s ilver politicians like  Borah opposed
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Agriculturalists viewed the monetary use of s ilver as combining 
a p lentifu l currency supply with the safety of a m etallic base. In 
addition, bimetallism enjoyed the authenticity of a trad ition , for "the 
people's money" was touted as the currency of Washington, Jefferson, 
Jackson and Bryan. I t  was apparent that farm prices must be raised and 
s ilv e r remonetizationists promised to cheapen the dollar and lighten 
the debtor's burden. Thomas E. Howard, Chairman of the Board of Direc­
tors of the National Farmers' Union, cataloged the farm hopes for 
remonetization in a national radio address entitled  "Bi-Metallism or 
Communism." According to Howard, remonetization would broaden the 
monetary base and "open up another great reservoir from which the 
fie lds of commerce and business might be adequately irrigated ." Further, 
i t  would provide the s ilver states with a prosperous industry; "free 
the nation from the international money racketeers" who control the 
banking and credit institutions; unleash the frozen assets of the 
nation; allow America to co llect the war debts; restore world trade and 
the purchasing power of the people. In connection with the las t claim.
bimetallism for they feared the prejudice associated with the word 
would prevent easterners from supporting a subsidy for the mining indus­
try . Key Pittman's biographer stated that "Silver Key" was not an 
in fla tio n is t "and he probably cared l i t t l e  about agricultural prices."
See Fred L. Is rae l, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 87-88. Yet Pittman's principal s ilver pro­
posal in the f i r s t  session of the Seventy-second Congress, S 3606 was
reintroduced into the House (H.R. 12598) by Thomas D. McKeown, an agri­
cultural representative from Oklahoma.
The nuances of the s ilver bloc from the crash of 1929 to March 4,
1933, are examined in John A. Brennan, S ilver and the F irst New Deal
(Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1969), pp. 1-63. Yet as one
reviewer concluded, Brennan fa iled  to give much emphasis to agricul­
ture 's role in bringing about the s ilver legislation of the 1930s.
See John L. Shover, Review of S ilver and the F irst New Deal, by Bren­
nan, Agricultural History Review, XLV (April 1971), p. 133.
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Howard predicted that remonetization would raise the price of commod­
it ie s  to the farmer enabling him to secure more dollars for less 
product, and allowing him to pay his just debts.63 The argument, though 
flawed in economic fa c t, provided a simple and attractive e l ix ir  that 
gained the support of many agricultural spokesmen in the 1930s. 
Morgenthau recalled that demands for increased u tiliza tio n  of s ilver  
often punctuated the farm conferences of early 1933.^^ The preoccupa­
tion of the rural mind with the s ilver myth often resulted in 
agricultural spokesmen appearing more dogmatic on the issue than those 
within the mining industry. In the interregnum Congress, six of the 
eight principal silver b ills  were the work of congressmen from agri­
cultural states.G6
Senators Burton K. Wheeler of Montana and William Borah of 
Idaho especially represented the marriage of farmer and miner, of in f la ­
tio n is t and s ilv e r ite . In addition to the trad itional in fla tio n is t  
arguments fo r s ilver based on the quantity theory of money, s ilverites  
claimed that remonetization would result in the restoration of the 
American agricultural export market. American farmers, the argument 
contended, competed at a disadvantage with producers who lived in cheap
63Thomas E. Howard, "Bi-Mettalism or Communism: Money Racke­
teers Now in Control," pamphlet (Chicago: National Farmers' Union,
August 27, 1932), 27 pages.
64john Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau D iaries: Years of
C ris is , 1928-1938 (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1959), p. 1843.
65see H. R. 14300, January 18, 1933, by Shallenberger of 
Nebraska; H. R. 13931, December 28, 1932, by Cross of Texas; S. 5444, 
January 10, 1933, by Bankhead of Alabama; S. 5342, January 6, 1933, by 
D ill of Washington; H. R. 14281, January 17, 1933, by Steagall of 
Alabama, and H. R. 14374, January 23, 1933, by Dies of Texas.
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currency countries. Wheeler explained that because Argentine currency 
had depreciated 40 per cent, the Argentine farmer received 40 per cent 
more currency for his product. Thus the Argentine farmer could re tire  
more fixed costs than his American counterpart who suffered from an 
appreciated currency. S ilver apologists also claimed remonetization 
would result in higher world commodity prices. Wheeler believed that 
restoring s ilver would "double the primary money of the world" and 
"increase the purchasing power of over 60 per cent of the peoples of 
the world." The rehabilitation of s ilver and the enhanced purchasing 
power of the s ilver currency nations would result in revived export 
markets, stimulated industry, and restored prosperity.
During the winter of 1932-1933, William Borah reiterated his 
b e lie f that the money question "lies at the base of a ll our troubles, 
especially the f a r m e r 's ."67 Though he did not favor independent 
bimetallism, the "Lion of Idaho" believed "there must be a reflation"  
of the c u rre n c y .68 His program for agriculture included the refinancing 
of farm debt and the securing of an international agreement on s ilver. 
Should the attempt to s tab ilize  world s ilver prices f a i l ,  the only 
alternative was gold devaluation and a "reasonable expansion of the 
currency" based in part on Treasury s ilver purchases. Throughout
66a major Wheeler speech on the subject is recorded in U. S ., 
Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., January 24, 1933, pp. 2349- 
2359; Pittman's view of the thesis is reviewed in Sewall, "Key Pitman," 
pp. 355-56.
67Borah to E. J. Cantonwine, 20 January 1933, Borah papers. 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
68Borah to H. C. Austin, 23 January 1933, Borah papers. Manu­
scrip t Division, Library of Congress.
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Borah's correspondence he emphasized the theme that a healthy agricul­
ture depended upon revived export markets and that in turn awaited the 
restoration of the world price of s ilv e r .69
The in fla tion  controversy caught the attention of the Senate 
on January 23, 1933. A New York Times reporter observed, "The whole 
question of currency in fla tio n , which has been stalking the Capitol 
fo r weeks and so fa r  has been held behind cloak-room doors, boiled out- 
on the floor of the Senate today and precipitated the most serious 
debate which has held the attention of that body in a long t im e ."70 
Senator Wheeler had provided the catalyst fo r the in fla tion  debate when 
he moved to attach a 15-to-l s ilve r remonetization amendment to the 
Glass branch banking b i l l . 71 During the ensuing two-day debate farm 
state Senators Thomas of Oklahoma, Long of Louisiana, Sheppard of Texas 
and Brookhart of Iowa joined Wheeler in praising the advantages of 
free s ilver. Thomas, an eclectic in f la t io n is t , demanded expansion of 
the currency through any means, "I care not what k in d --s ilv e r, copper, 
brass, gold or paper."7% Senator Sheppard of Texas represented many
69Borah's attitude toward farmers, in fla tio n  and s ilve r may be 
ascertained in the following le tte rs : Borah to W. Scott H a ll, 28 Decem­
ber 1932; Borah to Stroebel, 28 December 1932; Borah to Jos. Cannon,
10 January 1933; Borah to Jos. J. Turner, 12 January 1933; Borah to 
Richard L. Jones, 18 January 1933; Borah to H. C. Austin, 23 January 
1933; Borah to Edmund P la tt, 26 January 1933; Borah to Dr. G. W. States, 
6 February 1933; Borah to M. E. Hay, 13 February 1933, and Borah to 
Mrs. Joseph Childres, 18 February 1933, Borah papers. Manuscript D ivi­
sion, Library of Congress. See also "Dollar Our Big Problem: Borah
Believes Country Has Dishonest Money," Oklahoma Union Farmer, XXI 
(November 1, 1932), p. 2.
70New York Times, 25 January 1933.
7Tu. S ., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., January 23, 
1933, p. 2293.
72 ib id . , January 24 , 1933, p . 2362.
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agrarians who discovered s ilver during the Battle of the Standards in 
the 1890s. Boasting that as a young orator he had authored the slogan, 
"And God said, le t  there be lig h t, and there was Bryan," the Texan 
argued "we have a situation now practically parallel with the condi­
tions of 1896."73 Unfortunately for the remonetizationists, the Senate, 
at Senator Glass' insistence, voted 56 to 18 to table the Wheeler pro­
posal.74
The vote on the Wheeler amendment, though a temporary setback 
fo r the cause of in fla tio n , proved instructive. Agricultural senators 
cast 14 of the 18 votes against tabling the s ilver proposal. The 
majority of mining senators refused to support the Wheeler amendment 
because they either thought the remonetization program premature or 
because they backed an alternative s ilver program .75 Yet the lesson 
of the Wheeler vote seemed clear. Once mining senators agreed on a 
common s ilver program the support of in fla tio n is t farm politicians  
might be secured and the farm-mine coalition of 1896 renewed.
Since the stalemated nature of the interregnum Congress offered 
l i t t l e  opportunity for leg islative accomplishment, in fla tion is ts  used 
the session to define and propagandize the monetary controversy. 
Representative Wright Patman continued the campaign to have the govern­
ment pay more than two b illio n  in United States notes to the veterans 
of World War I .  Presented not only as a humanitarian measure but as a
73ib id ., p. 2352. 74 ib id ., p. 2393.
75gorah to Nels Larson, 30 January 1933, Borah papers, Manu­
script Division, Library of Congress; and Brennen, S ilver and the F irst 
New Deal, pp. 59-60.
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means to provide in fla tion  through currency expansion, the Texan coined 
the motto, "You cannot fatten the herd by feeding the bu ll; Money must 
reach the people in some w a y ."76 Patman's Texas colleague. Senator 
Tom Connally, became an exponent of gold devaluation during the debate 
over the Wheeler amendment. Connally, concerned at the low prices and 
heavy indebtedness which confronted Texas farmers, argued that devalua­
tion offered the most practical and d irect method of raising farm 
prices and easing the financial burdens of the depression. The Connally 
campaign for a reduction in the gold content of the dollar was the 
forerunner of a more successful e ffo rt in the succeeding c o n g re s s .77
Oklahoman Elmer Thomas u tilized  the interregnum to prepare for 
his eventual role as leader of the Senate in fla tion  bloc. During the 
winter of 1932-1933, the Oklahoman engaged in extensive correspondence 
with such in fla tion is ts  as the radio priest Father Charles Coughlin, 
the Committee for the Nation, and the Cornell economists Warren and 
P earso n .78 in  early February Thomas published the results of a survey 
taken among leading American economists which demonstrated that
76patman to Thomas, 15 January 1933, Thomas papers. University 
of Oklahoma.
77u. S ., Congressional Record, 72d Congress, 2d Sess., Janu­
ary 24, 1933, pp. 2363-2372. Connally presented his views in the 
following le tters : Connally to Major S. B. Moore, 28 January 1933;
Connally to W. P. Allen, 18 January 1933; Connally to W. M. Covey,
30 January 1933; Connally to Hon W. 0. Huggins, 6 February 1933;
Connally to W. B. B izze ll, 6 February 1933; and Connally to Judge W. C. 
Morrow, 6 February 1933, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
78a sample of the pertinent correspondence is Coughlin to 
Thomas, 15 February 1933; Thomas to Coughlin, 16 February 1933; Thomas 
to Coughlin, 17 February 1933; Coughlin to Thomas, 28 February 1933; 
Committee for the Nation to Thomas, 21 January 1933; Thomas to Committee, 
25 January 1933; Pearson to Thomas, 14 February 1933; Warren to Thomas,
1 February 1933; and Thomas to Bush, 9 February 1933, Thomas papers, 
University of Oklahoma.
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in fla tio n  sentiment had invaded academe as well.^^ On February 15, 
the publicity conscious Senator wrote to the dozen most in fluentia l 
leaders of Wall S treet, "we are forced to appeal from an impotent Con­
gress and a short-sighted Administration to you, a higher power . . 
fo r support fo r the in fla tion  cause.^0 I f  Thomas found few converts 
on the street, his ac tiv itie s  at least notorized the demands of rural 
constituents for cheap money.
Agricultural congressmen joined others in the e ffo rt to direct 
the incoming Administration toward an in fla tio n is t course. In late  
November 1932, Wheeler visited the President-elect concerning the 
16-to -l remonetization proposal. Upon leaving the session with Roose­
v e lt, Wheeler refused to reveal Roosevelt's attitude to reporters 
though they sensed that the Montanan seemed encouraged on the issue.
The refusal of Senator Carter Glass of Virginia to serve the 
New Deal as Secretary of the Treasury may have been the most pregnant 
interregnum decision to effect Roosevelt's future monetary policies. 
Glass, the coauthor of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, because of 
deserved prestige on economic matters and long service to the Democratic 
Party, received Roosevelt's invitation to jo in  the cabinet as head of
79u. S ., Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., February 4, 
1933, pp. 3372-3376; the originals are in the Thomas papers. University 
of Oklahoma.
80New York Times, 15 February 1933.
BTlbid., 1 December 1932.
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the Treasury on January 19, 1933.82 Agricultural in fla tio n is ts  were 
ind ifferent to the appointment recalling that the sharp-tongued Virgin­
ian had opposed them during the "Crime of 1920" skirmish, the 
Goldsborough and Strong hearings, and in the Wheeler amendment debates. 
Fortunately, from the in fla tio n is ts ' viewpoint, Roosevelt shared the 
concern that Glass might prove too in flex ib le  on monetary issues. 
Raymond Moley, leader of the New Deal Brain Trust, recalled that on 
January 28, 1933, while negotiating with Glass concerning the Treasury 
appointment, Roosevelt sent him the following instructions: "So far
as in fla tion  goes, you can say that we're not going to throw ideas out 
of the window simply because they're labeled in fla tio n . I f  you feel 
the old boy [G lassl doesn't want to go along, don't press him." The 
President may have been as relieved as agricu lturalis ts when Glass 
declined the Treasury post on February 7.^3
Even as Glass contemplated the Treasury appointment. Senator 
Thomas of Oklahoma inserted a Fraser Edwards column into the Congres­
sional Record that asserted Glass hesitated to jo in the New Deal 
cabinet because he feared Roosevelt's position on in fla tio n . Edwards 
quoted "one of the men close to Roosevelt" as confiding, "Mr. Roosevelt 
said he was prepared to experiment with the currency situation. He 
wants a sound currency, as we a ll do, but he w ill sign a b i l l  that w ill 
enable people to pay th e ir debts." Edwards reported that insiders
82a firsthand account of the Glass negotiations is provided in 
Raymond Moley, with the assistance of E llio t  A. Rosen, The F irst New 
Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, In c ., 1965), pp. 80-86.
83Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1939), p. 119.
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believed that Roosevelt would choose "the mildest form of in fla tio n ,"  
one that might easily be dropped i f  i t  fa iled  to promote refla tion  or 
terminated should the prices rise to satisfactory leve ls .84 Prairie  
Farmer also counted the Glass decision a victory for in fla tio n . Prais­
ing Roosevelt fo r the appointment of Wallace, "a valiant ba ttle r for 
farm re lie f  and for in flation" as Secretary of Agriculture, the maga­
zine continued, "the refusal of the conservative Carter Glass to accept 
appointment as Secretary of the Treasury, w ill be an indication that 
Mr. Roosevelt is not afraid  of sensible in f la t io n ."85
As a result of the events of the interregnum, in fla tion is ts  
optim istically anticipated the coming of the New Deal. During the 
winter of 1932-1933, Roosevelt listened to the Committee for the Nation, 
read Warren and Pearson's gold a rtic le s , discussed the rehabilitation  
of s ilver with Wheeler and other s ilv e r ite s , reviewed the galley proofs 
of Irving Fisher's new book, Booms and Depressions, and confided p ri­
vately to agricultural in fla tio n is ts  that he sympathized with their  
views. In addition, the negative response of Senator Glass to the 
Treasury post and the appointment of known in fla tio n is ts  such as Wallace 
and Morgenthau to New Deal positions gave further credence to the view 
that Roosevelt might begin in flationary p ro g ram s.86
84jhe column appeared in the Washington Herald, January 30, 
1933. See U. S ., Congressional Record, 72d Congress, 2d Sess., Jan­
uary 30, 1933, pp. 2864-2865.
85"The Parade of the Week," P ra irie  Farmer, CV (March 4, 1933),
p. 4.
85jhe examples cited here that are not mentioned ea rlie r in the 
chapter may be found in Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of 
Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the New DealTNew York:
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Roosevelt's inaugural address, a progressive manifesto, r e i t ­
erated at least three ideological notions common to in fla tio n is t  
oratory. F irs t, the President described the acute effects of deflation. 
"Values have shrunken to fantastic levels," he said. Then in words 
reminiscent of a Heflin or a Father Coughlin, the speech castigated the 
"stubborness" and "incompetence" of the "unscrupulous money changers." 
Deprecating the banking fra te rn ity  had long been a favorite pastime of 
in fla tio n is ts . The President also affirmed the positive use of the 
state in raising farm prices and restoring the economy. "Definite 
efforts" were to be undertaken "to raise the value of agricultural 
products." Roosevelt also requested "s tr ic t supervision of a ll banking 
and credits and investments" and proclaimed, "there must be provision 
for an adequate but sound c u rre n c y ."^ ?  The las t statement caused some 
confusion among Roosevelt's listeners. One Congressman complained, 
"Where does he stand? His speech cuts both ways . . . sound currency, 
but a t the same time lots of i t . "  In the ir interpretations of the 
address, conservatives seized upon the adjective "sound" while in f la ­
tionists stressed the word " a d e q u a t e . T h e  placing of the "adequate 
but sound currency" clause in the same sentence that demanded supervised
Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 192-195. Roosevelt was an eco­
nomics major his senior year at Harvard with a special interest in 
money and banking. He had been taught the va lid ity  of the quantity 
theory of money. Ib id . , pp. 30-34.
G^Though i t  omits an explanation of the "adequate but sound" 
phrase, the best exegesis of the address is Moley, The F irst New Deal, 
pp. 96-124.
survey of Congressional and Newspaper opinion re la tive  to 
the address is printed in the New York Times, 5 March 1933.
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banking and credit strengthened the argument that the Roosevelt money 
phrase implied the adoption of a managed currency system.
F inally , the diary of Professor Warren of Cornell provided a 
glimpse into the President's monetary thinking at the end of the in te r­
regnum. On March 5, Warren travelled to Washington aboard an 
"aeroplane." Warren dined with his former student, Henry Morgenthau, 
J r . ,  head of the Farm Credit Administration. In the course of review­
ing the President's attitude on the money question, Morgenthau informed 
the professor that Roosevelt had exclaimed, "Warren is absolutely 
right" on the necessity of restoring price levels. At 10:30 p.m., 
Warren, Moley, Woodin, Hull and Governor Lehman of New York met with 
Roosevelt to review the bank holiday proclamation and discuss monetary 
issues. Later Warren recorded in his diary, "Roosevelt showed me the 
debt and wealth comparisons for 1909 [ s ic ]  and had the relationships 
straight. He recognized that deflation cannot be gone through with."
In good sp irits  Roosevelt read the bank proclamation and then returned 
to a discussion of in fla tio n . "He [Roosevelt] indicated his interest 
in revaluation and hoped that the index number idea could be worked 
out." Then according to an outline en titled  "Notes Used in Conference 
with Roosevelt," attached to the diary for March 5, Warren lectured 
the group on the need for "raising prices" through gold devaluation.
B^The ambivalent nature of the expression could re flec t Roose­
ve lt's  desire to keep his options open. Moley believed that "Roosevelt 
wasn't sold on the idea of in fla tion  before or immediately a fter his 
inauguration." See: Moley, After Seven Years, p. 156. Yet Moley
admits knowing that Roosevelt "had certain unorthodox views" regarding 
monetary policy during the Glass negotiations. See: Moley, The F irst
New Deal, p. 81.
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He concluded that obtaining the commodity do llar "would be a great 
achievement."90
Thus the Ivy League professor depicted the President on his 
f i r s t  day in office as a searcher for a monetary policy that might l i f t  
prices from th e ir depressed levels. Agricultural in fla tio n is ts , them­
selves veterans of the monetary wars, looked to the Roosevelt 
Administration to transform the common dream into national policy.
OOwarren Diary, March 5, 1933, Warren papers, Cornell University.
CHAPTER V I I I
INFLATION'S NEW DEAL: FARMERS, ROOSEVELT AND REFLATION
MARCH 4-JULY 27, 1933
The stock market crash, the bank runs and Roosevelt's inaugural 
address accentuated a loss of fa ith  in economic orthodoxy. Capital­
ism's lost poise encouraged the rise of competitive economic doctrines. 
In fla tio n , comfortably fam iliar and yet modernized through the vocab­
ulary of the new economics, enjoyed the broadest support of the 
would-be e lix irs  of 1933.
In fla tion is ts  claimed they offered the moderate and sc ien tific  
remedy for the economic chaos of 1933. Those favoring in flationary  
proposals admitted that wild and unrestrained in fla tion  would prove as 
disastrous as severe deflation. Many favoring monetary expansion 
disliked the appellation " in fla tio n is t"  and instead labeled themselves 
"re fla tio n is ts ,"  "rational in fla tio n is ts ,"  "s tab iliza tion is ts ,"  or 
"controlled in fla tio n is ts ."  The Progressive Farmer proclaimed "v/hat 
American farmers want is not unsteady and uncertain money in fla tion  
but a genuine s tab iliza tio n , fa ir  to debtor and creditor alike."^  
Reflation theorists promised to restore prices to predepression levels 
through managed currency techniques. Relying on the monetary theses
^Elmer Thomas to George E. Black, 20 April 1933, Thomas papers. 
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma (hereafter cited as Thomas 
papers). The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII (March 1933), p. 30.
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of Fisher, Coirmons and Warren, in fla tio n is ts  assumed that the new 
economics provided the tools to s tab ilize  prices at any desirable leve l. 
The idea of a sc ien tific  currency added an aura of respectability and 
moderation to the in fla tio n  argument.%
The demands for in flationary monetary action during the winter 
of 1932-1933 gained a relentless momentum a fte r Roosevelt's inauguration. 
In fla tio n is ts  believed Roosevelt more congenial to th e ir cause than his 
doctrinaire predecessor. The New Deal's f i r s t  measures, the bank hol­
iday proclamation, the embargo on gold and s ilve r exports, and the 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, dramatically focused
3
attention on monetary issues. Furthermore, the great deflation respon­
sible for the inclusion of the word "emergency" in the t it le s  of so 
many leg is la tive  proposals, s t i l l  plagued the nation. Between 1929 
and 1932 gross farm income shrank 57 per cent while the Gross National
Zfhe concept of controlled in fla tio n  is reiterated in the fo l­
lowing: Senator Duncan Fletcher, Chairman, Senate Banking Committee,
New York Times, 20 April 1933; Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi,
U. S. Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., April 25, 1933, 
p. 2322; Senator William Borah of Idaho, Ib id . , April 17, 1933, p. 1831; 
"Reflation is Coming," American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXX (April 29, 1933), 
p. 4.
^Monetary histories of the New Deal include: Helen M. Burns,
The American Banking Community and New Deal Banking Reforms, 1933-1935 
(Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974), 203 pages; Arthur Whipple 
Crawford, Monetary Management Under the New Deal : The Evolution of £
Managed Currency Systein-- Its  Problems and Results (Washington, D. C .: 
American Council on Public A ffa irs , 1940), 354 pages; Milton Friedman 
and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 
1857-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 420 f f ;
James Daniel Paris, Monetary Policies of the United States, 1932-1938 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 198 pages. A Memoir
recalling the monetary events of 1933 is James P. Warburg, The Money 
Muddle (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934), 272 pages. See also Elmus R.
Wicker, "Roosevelt's 1933 Monetary Experiment," The Journal of American 
History, LVII (March 1971), pp. 864-879.
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product declined from 104.4 b illio n  in 1929 to 46.0 b illio n  in 1933. 
Using 1926 standards the mortgage-ridden farmer had to raise $2.75 
worth of commodities to re tire  $1.00 of debt in 1933.  ^ " I t 's  like  I 'd  
borrow a team from you, and when I brought the team back, you'd say I 
should have brought back four horses instead of two. That's what the 
gold dollar has been doing to the man who borrowed," explained a w riter 
for Wallaces' Farmer.^
Farm organizations renewed the campaign for in fla tion  on 
March 7 when representatives of the National Grange, the National Live­
stock Association, leading dairy, cotton and wool and poultry 
cooperatives met at Washington, D. C. to discuss a common agricultural 
program. The next day, the group sent a statement to Roosevelt warning 
that an "appalling number" of farmers faced bankruptcy unless the 
government exercised its  monetary powers "to de fin ite ly  raise price 
l e v e l s . " G  Meanwhile national Grange leaders adopted an in fla tion  or 
bust slogan, "Reflate or Repudiate.
^U. S ., Bureau of the Census, Historical S tatistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C ., 1960), p. 351;
New York Times, 30 April 1933.
^Wallaces' Farmer, LV III (December 9, 1933), p. 612.
^Taber, et çQ_., to the President, 8 March 1933, Louis J. Taber 
papers, Cornell University (hereafter cited as Taber papers). See also 
Sexauer to C. 0. Moser, 9 March 1933, Dairymen's League papers, Cornell 
University (hereafter cited as DLP); and C. 0. Moser, "Agriculture Asks 
Hand in New Deal," The Cattleman, XIX (April 1933), pp. 10-18.
^National Grange Monthly (May 1933), pp. 8, 10. Other farm
groups endorsing in fla tion  during the early weeks of the New Deal were: 
American Farm Economic League to Elmer Thomas, 1 April 1933, and Okla­
homa Agricultural Cooperative Council, 28 March 1933 to Thomas, Thomas 
papers; Milking Shorthorn Society (Missouri) to Henry A. Wallace,
27 March 1933, Secretary of Agriculture, "Currency," Record Group 16, 
National Archives, Washington, D. C.
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In early March, the Board of Directors of the American Farm 
Bureau a t Chicago prepared leg islative suggestions for the pending 
special session of Congress. The Bureau decided upon a four-point 
recovery program that emphasized government guarantees of bank deposits, 
parity prices for farm commodities, mortgage re lie f ,  and "immediate 
action" on the "recommendations of Dr. George W. [ s ic ]  Warren regarding 
monetary reform." Throughout the spring of 1933. President Edward 
O'Neal featured the Bureau's monetary program on the federation's 
national radio hour. On March 11, listeners heard O'Neal describe the 
monetary program as "more far-reaching and more fundamental" than other 
proposed remedial measures. O'Neal's speeches reiterated the gold 
scarcity thesis, urged devaluation to raise commodity prices and pressed 
for congressional enactment of the "honest dollar" monetary s tab iliza ­
tion scheme.8 The Bureau Farmer, the federation's national magazine, 
also participated in the campaign f i l l in g  its  pages with honest dollar
g
propaganda.
^O fficial News Letter (March 9, 1933), p. 1; Ib id . , (April 18, 
1933), p. 3. See also Christiana McFadyen Campbell, The Farm Bureau 
and the New Deal : A Study of the Making of National Farm Policy, 1933- 
1940 (Urbana: University of Il l in o is  Press, 1962), pp. 53-54, and
Theodore Saloutos, "The American Farm Bureau Federation and Farm Policy: 
1933-1945," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXVIII (March 1948), 
pp. 332-333; and Saloutos, "Edward A. O'Neal; The Farm Bureau and the 
New Deal," Current History, XXVIII (June 1955), pp. 358-359.
^"Commodity Dollar Appears Likely," Bureau Farmer (NY ed), V II I  
(August 1933), pp. 8-9; "Dr. George F. Warren explains Currency Change," 
Ib id . , (April 1933), p. 8; "Two Ways Out, Says Dr. Warren," Ib id . , (NY 
ed., March 1933), pp. 8, 9; M. Raffetto, "Give the Farmer an Honest 
Dollar," Ib id . , (Nev. ed., July 1933), pp. 7-8; H. B. Test, "Our Mone­
tary System," Ib id . , (SD ed., February 1933), p.b, and the following 
artic les  by George h  Warren: "America Needs Honest Dollars," Ib id . ,
(Minn, ed., February 1933), pp. a-b; "Gold and the Price Situation," 
Ib id . , (111. ed., January 1933), p. 9; and "Stabilization of the Mea­
sure of Value," Ib id . , (Vt. ed., February 1933), pp. a - f .
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The self-confessed "m ilitant voice of agriculture," John A. 
Simpson, President of the Farmer's Union, wrote Roosevelt the day before 
the inaugural that "All other measures w ill fa i l  until such time as our 
monetary system has been in te llig e n tly  revised."10 Simpson, the lead­
ing agitator for the small, poorer farmer, equated in te llig en t monetary 
reform with 16-to-l bimetallism and generous issues of f ia t  currency.
The farm leader informed Congress that i f  i t  would remonetize s ilver i t  
could adjourn confident that i t  had "not only saved the Nation but the 
W o r l d . T h e  Farmer's Union and its  direct-action arm, the Farmers 
Holiday Association, also backed a greenback scheme which the 20th 
Century populists labeled "prosperity notes" or "Liberty Notes."
Simpson explained the government could s tab ilize  the price level through 
controlled expansion or contraction of the amount of " liberty  notes"
in c ircu la tion .12
An irascible c r it ic  of much of the New Deal agricultural pro-
13gram, Simpson pressed on Roosevelt the farmer's need for real in fla tio n .
lOsimpson to FDR, 3 March 1933, John A. Simpson papers, Univer­
s ity  of Oklahoma, Norman (hereafter referred to as the Simpson papers).
11u. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., March 28, 
1933, p. 909. See Simpson's testimony before U. S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings on H. R^. 3835, An Act 
to Relieve the Existing National Emergency by Increasing Agricultural 
Purchasing Power, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, pp. 171, 465; see also 
"Billings Montana Radio Speech," typed copy, c. November 1933, 42 pages, 
Simpson papers.
I^See S. 788, U. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st 
Sess., March 23, 1933, pp. 785-6, by Thomas of Oklahoma, March 13, 1933, 
and "Economic Problems," radio address by Simpson, March 25, 1933, 14 
pages, Simpson papers; Tom W. Cheek, "The Money Changers Are Fleeing 
From the Temple," Oklahoma Union Farmer, XIV (March 15, 1933), p. 1.
I^Simpson to FDR, 14 September 1933, Simpson papers.
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Unhappy with Roosevelt's mild in flationary program, Simpson in the fa l l  
of 1933 proclaimed that while he had "Faith in Roosevelt," he had l i t t l e  
in the President's p r o g r a m . ^4 The Oklahoman blamed the Chief Executive's 
weakness on inept ad v is o rs .S im p s o n  argued the President could 
restore prosperity "in twenty-four hours" i f  he would remonetize s ilve r, 
cut in half the gold content of the do llar, and pay public debts with 
" fu ll legal tender non-interest-bearing currency." The morning a fter  
Roosevelt adopted such a program wheat would sell fo r three dollars a 
bushel and cotton for fo rty  cents a pound.S im pson and his farmer 
followers represented a strident populist voice that though often dis­
sonant, received a patient hearing from the New Deal.!?
Often as financia lly  troubled as th e ir  subscribers, farm 
journals joined agricultural organizations in the in fla tion  campaign 
of 1933. As a minimal demand the pro-in flation  journals asked that the 
government provide re fla tion  of commodity prices through either gold 
devaluation or lim ited s ilve r remonetization. Farm papers often 
admitted an inexpertise on monetary issues but seemed in a mood to sup­
port any action which promised re lie f .  "Well," wryly confessed one
14"Faith in Roosevelt, Not in Program: Open Letter to FOR,"
Oklahoma Union Farmer, XVII (September 15, 1933), p. 1.
lOsimpson to FDR, 14 September and 24 October 1933, Simpson
papers.
T^simpson-Roosevelt correspondence regarding monetary policy 
includes: Simpson to FDR, 3 April 1933, and 30 April 1933, 6 May 1933,
5 June 1933, 16 August 1933, 24 October 1933, and 28 October 1933. See 
also Roosevelt to Simpson, 6 April 1933, 20 May 1933, 24 October 1933, 
and 15 November 1933, Simpson papers.
17john L. Shover, "Populists in the Nineteen-Thirties: The
Battle fo r the AAA," Agricultural History, XXXIX (January 1965),
pp. 17-18.
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e d ito r ia l, "the woods are fu ll of them T re fla tio n is ts l and Breeder's 
Gazette is in the woods, too."^^ At least four in fluentia l farm peri­
odicals maintained a sturdy interest in the in fla tion  cause. The 
quartet: Prairie Farmer, Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead, American
A g ricu ltu ra lis t, and Progressive Farmer and Southern Rural 1st, presented
19readers with lite ra te  and exhaustive amounts of pro-inflation copy.
Chicago's P ra irie  Farmer and its  editor C lifford  Gregory, 
principal author of the Farm Bureau's 1932 pamphlet "Honest Money," con­
tinued th e ir ed ito ria l campaign fo r in fla tio n  during 1933. A llied  with 
the I l l in o is  Agricultural Association and the Farm Bureau, the magazine 
lauded the Warren gold formula in its  feature cartoons, in its  news 
summary "Parade of the Week," and in Gregory's personal column "From 
the Editor's Haymow." The journal supported the domestic allotment
^breeder's Gazette, XCVIII (April 1933), p. 4. See also "Ask 
Monetary Revision," American Creamery, LXXV (April 12, 1933), p. 834, 
and Fred H. Sexauer, "Depreciated Currencies," Ib id . , (December 1932), 
p. 258; "How Much Are We To Be Inflated?," Producer, XIV (May 1933), 
pp. 12-13; "Higher Commodity Prices," Milk Dealer, XXII (April 1933), 
pp. 38-39; " In fla tio n ,"  Hoards Dairymen, LXXVIII (May 25, 1933), p. 1; 
"In Order to Pay Our Debts," New Agriculture Review, I (August 1932), 
p. 3; W. C. Jones, "Changing Our Monetary Basis," National Wool Grower, 
XXII (June 1932), pp. 30-31; "Nation Needs a Lower-Priced Dollar," 
Capper's Weekly, LV III (March 18, 1933), p. 2, and "The Money Crisis is 
Nothing New," Ib id . , (March 11, 1933), p. 1; "Hail and Hello, Henry 
Wallace," Pacific Rural Press, (March 18, 1933), p. 4. Gilbert Fite 
discovered that while farm journals tended to avoid other issues, they 
provided copious support for in fla tio n . See "Farmer Opinion and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XVIII (March 1962), pp. 671-672.
T^These four periodicals and The Farmer (St. Paul), edited by 
Dan Wallace, are cited as contributing most to the farm organization's 
drive for honest money in W. R. Ogg, "History of Farm Bureau's A ctiv i­
ties  for Monetary Reform," mimeographed (1934), 14 pages, especially 
pp. 13-14, American Farm Bureau Federation F iles, Chicago, I l l in o is .
243
features of the AAA but emphasized that refla tion  and stab ilization  
were essential fo r the restoration of farm prosperity.
Henry A. Wallace's appointment as Secretary of Agriculture 
brought increased prestige to Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa Homestead but 
no lessening of the magazine's campaign fo r monetary reform. Donald R. 
Murphy, Wallace's successor as editor of the Iowa paper, continued to 
push the Fisher-commodity dollar plan and perceived the slightest 
Administration inflationary move as proof that the honest money cause 
approached victory. The magazine frequently described the "Roosevelt- 
Wallace" farm program as providing a "two horse team"--"controlled 
in flation" and "controlled production" and asserted that both were
PI
necessary to pull farmers out of the economic mire.
New York's American A gricu lturalist also contributed an o f f i ­
c ia l to the inner c irc le  of the New Deal. Henry Morgenthau, J r . ,  
publisher of the biweekly farm journal and a long-time friend of Roose­
v e lt 's , received appointment as Governor of the Farm Credit Administration 
in March 1933. Morgenthau, a proponent of "honest money" doctrines, 
channeled the ideas of his former Cornell professor, George F. Warren,
ZOSee the following 1933 issues: P rairie  Farmer, CV (March 4 ),
pp. 4, 8; (April 15), p. 4; (April 29), pp. 1, 4; (May 27), pp. 4, 6; 
(July 8 ), p. 4; (August 5 ), pp. 15-17; (September 2 ), p. 4; (Septem­
ber 30), p. 4; (October 14), p. 4; (November 25), p. 4; (December 9 ), 
pp. 1, 5. See also James F. Evans, Prairie Farmer and WLS: The 
Burridge D. Butler Years (Urbana: University of I l l in o is ,  1969). See
also C. V. Gregory, "Money Question," Bureau Farmer (Iowa e d .), V II 
(March 1932), pp. 13, 14.
ZlSee the following 1933 issues: Wallaces' Farmer and Iowa 
Homestead, LV III (March 18), p. 120; (April 29), pp. 1, 8, 18; (May 13), 
p. 208; (May 27), p. 237; (July 22), p. 320; (September 16), p. 412; 
(October 14), p. 481; (October 28), p. 1, 10; (November 11), p. 548; 
(November 25), p. 588; (December 9 ), p. 612.
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to both the subscribers of American A gricu lturalist and Roosevelt.
In June 1932, Morgenthau, busy with the a ffa irs  of Roosevelt's 
candidacy, accepted as an "assistant publisher" Howard Edward Babcock, 
president of Ithaca's powerful Cooperative Grange League Federation 
Holding Company and former professor of marketing in Warren's depart­
ment at Cornell.23 The new Morgenthau associate, a fervent in fla tio n is t, 
helped establish the Sound and Honest Money Association in early 1933 
and gathered agricultural support fo r the Committee for the Nation.
In collaboration with Fred Sexauer, Babcock successfully promoted the 
candidacy of in fla tio n is t Judge John D. M ille r  to the presidency of the 
prestigious National Cooperative Council. Through M ille r the New York 
in fla tion is ts  gained access to and support from the great majority of 
the nation's agricultural cooperatives.^^
Babcock gained great notoriety for the honest money crusade in 
his popular, i f  controversial American A gricu ltura lis t column, "Kernels, 
Screenings and Chaff." Babcock believed farmers suffered not from over­
production of commodities but from underproduction of gold. In May,
22$ee the Warren Diary, March 5, July 7, August 14, November 17, 
1933, Warren papers, Cornell University (hereafter cited as Warren 
Diary), and the Henry Morgenthau, J r . ,  "Farm Credit Diary," May 8,
July 3, September 25, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York. Also Warren to Morgenthau, 4 March 1933, 15 March 1933, 7 July 
1933, 16 October 1933, Warren Papers. Details of Babcock and the GLF 
are found in Thomas E. Milliman and Frances E. Sage, The GLF Story, 
1920-1964: A History of the Cooperative Grange League Federation, Inc. 
(Ithaca, New York: Wilcox Press, In c ., 1964), 465 pages, especially 
pp. 83-85.
23American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXIX (June 1932), p. 1.
Z^Babcock to Sexauer, 14 February 1933 and Sexauer to Babcock,
18 February 1933, DLP. See also Gould Coleman, Oral History of Fred H. 
Sexauer, Auburn, New York, 1963, pp. 68-69, 151, Sexauer Papers, Cornell 
University (hereafter cited as Sexauer papers).
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Babcock began publishing a review of the daily prices of gold, and 
claimed the quotations of gold prices were more fundamental to farm 
prosperity than the indices of the various commodity markets. "Gen­
e ra lly  speaking, rising gold prices in terms of dollars means cheaper 
dollars and therefore higher commodity p r ic e s ."^5 Babcock's decade- 
long promotion of the Warren gold program helped create a tenacious 
commodity do llar following among Northeastern f a r m e r s .
The South's largest farm journal. The Progressive Farmer and 
Southern R uralist, traced its  heritage to Colonel Leonidas L. Polk, a 
leader in the Alliance and Populist movements of the late Nineteenth 
Century. Continuing the Populist stance of the magazine, Clarence Poe, 
President-editor of the journal, revived the money issue as early as 
1930.27 Confronted with the Great Depression and the farm paper's near 
bankruptcy, Poe f i l le d  issue a fte r issue with pro-inflation copy. 
Leaning not only on Populist ideology, but on Fisher and the Stable 
Money Association and la te r Warren and the Committee for the Nation,
Poe concluded that re fla tio n , gold s tab iliza tio n , and s ilver
25$ee the following 1932 Babcock columns: American Agricul­
tu ra lis t , CXXIX (November 26, 1932), p. 14; (December 10, 1932), p. 14; 
(December 24), p. 18; and the following 1933 columns: American Agri­
c u ltu ra lis t, CXXX (January 7 ), p. 18; (March 4 ), p. 18; (March 18)7" 
p. 18; (May 13), p. 18; (July 8 ), p. 18; (September 2 ) , p. 14; (Novem­
ber 11), p. 14; (December 23), p. 14.
2^Ed Foster Oral History Project, Cornell University, pp. 82, 
86. In early 1934, Morgenthau sold American A gricu lturalist to a syn­
dicate including Babcock and newspaper publisher Frank Gannett. See 
American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI (January 20, 1934).
27ciarence Poe, My First 80 Years (Chapel H il l:  The University 
of North Carolina Press), pp. 87-106, 223, 231.
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remonetization were essential i f  southern farmers were to repay debts
O Q
and regain prosperity. °
A believer in the positive uses of government, Poe accepted 
most of the New Deal programs, but ranked as f i r s t  in p rio rity  the need 
fo r money reform. In February 1933, Poe published an open le t te r  to 
Roosevelt in which he asserted that the year would be remembered as 
either "The Year of Liquidation or—the Year of Reflation." To insure 
the la tte r  Poe recommended the immediate inactment of the honest dollar 
program.29 Poe continued his pro-inflation campaign in his personal 
column, "The World's News; A Monthly Review," reminding readers as 
la te  as 1936 of the need for gold management.30 In May of 1933 and 
continuing fo r five  months. The Progressive Farmer featured a major 
series entitled  "Iron Debts and Rubber Money." The essays, complete 
with tabular evidence, demonstrated to farmers the evils of a fluc­
tuating dollar and the necessity of re fla tio n .31 Throughout the
28?he Progressive Farmer and Southern Ruralist: XLV (July 7,
1930), p. 561; XLV (December 1, 1930), p. 1010; LXVI (May 1, 1931),
p. 330; XLVI (October 1, 1931), p. 576; XLVII (January 1, 1932), p. 6;
LXVII (February 1, 1932), p. 6; XLVII (May 1, 1932), p. 6; XLVII 
(June 1, 1932), p. 4; XLVII (August 1932), p. 4.
29jhe Progressive Farmer, XLVIII (February 1933), p. 30.
30see the following Poe columns: The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII
(March 1933), p. 30; XLVIII (April 1933), p. 26; XLVIII (May 1933), 
p. 26; XLVIII (June 1933), p. 22; XLVIII (August 1933), p. 22; XLVIII 
(October 1933), p. 48; XLVIII (December 1933), p. 261; XLIX (March 1934), 
p. 46; L (May 1935), p. 50; LI (October 1936), p. 58.
31 Eugene Butler, "Iron Debts and Rubber Dollars," The Progres­
sive Farmer, XLVIII (Hay 1933), pp. 4, 24; Ib id . , (June 1933), p. 6; 
Butler, "Six A nti-In fla tion  Arguments Answered," The Progressive Farmer, 
XLVIII (July 1933), p. 5; Butler, "America Abandons Its  'Cross of Gold,"' 
The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII (August 1933), p. 7; Butler, "What About
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monetary wars of the 1930s, Poe, representing a journal read in more 
than one m illion farm homes, actively encouraged in fla tion ists  and 
endorsed th e ir cause.3%
Though the campaign for honest money relied on the farm organ­
izations fo r p o litica l strength and the farm journals for ed itoria l 
vigor, the Committee for the Nation functioned as the nerve center of 
the 1933-1934 monetary reform crusade. Under the leadership of 
Edward A. Rumely and a five member Directing Committee, the organiza­
tion established headquarters at 205 East 42nd Street, New York City 
and proceeded to en lis t farmer and businessman into a powerful national 
in fla tio n  lobby. By May 1, the Committee boasted a membership of "one 
thousand industrial leaders" and eighty-nine per cent of the heads of
oo
American farm organizations.
S ilver Money?," The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII (September 1933), pp. 14, 
33. See also "Only In fla tion  Can Help Cotton Prices," The Progressive 
Farmer, XLVIII (October 1933), p. 3; " In fla tion  the Quick Remedy," The 
Progressive Farmer, XLVIII (November 1933), p. 3; "Taking Another Plank 
From the Populist Platform," The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII (December 
1933), p. 3; "Honest Dollar Upheld," The Progressive Farmer, L (April 
1935), p. 5; "Production Control vx Dollar Devaluation," The Progres­
sive Farmer, L (August 1935), pp. 3, 33; " S til l Worship the Gold 
Standard," The Progressive Farmer, LI (October 1935), p. 5.
^^Borah to Poe, 6 December 1932, Borah papers. Manuscript Div­
ision of the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C .; Poe to Thomas,
7 February 1933, Thomas papers; Poe to Wheeler, Wheeler papers. Manu­
script Division, Library of Congress; "Soliciting Your Help In To [ s ic l  
Great Movements," memorandum from The Progressive Farmer and Southern 
R uralis t, October 28, 1933, DLP; Clarence Poe to Wm. Chenery, Editor, 
C o llie r's  Weekly, 20 October 1933, DLP. See also Poe, "Money That's 
Neither Honest Nor Stable," Pacific Rural Press, CXXV (March 25, 1933), 
p. 216, and Poe, "Yard always three fee t, but a d o lla r--,"  Wallaces' 
Farmer, LVI (October 17, 1931), p. 1119.
33committee stationary offered to send the names of the one 
thousand business leaders upon request. The eighty-nine per cent f ig ­
ure is in Rumely to Otto H. Falk, 1 May 1933, Rumely papers, Indiana
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Rumely, an unabashed public relations promoter, ran the organ­
ization through frequent, often da ily , mimeographed le tte rs  to the 
Directing Committee and the National Advisory and Auxiliary Committees 
of the organization. The Rumely le tte rs , often marked "confidential" 
fo r no apparent reason other than dramatic e ffec t, related Washington 
and Wall Street gossip, in fla tion  campaign strategy, and the latest 
In fla tion  apologetics. Frequently Rumely also included appeals for 
donations to the Committee's treasury.34
Rumely's requests for contributions met success. From its  
formal organization in January 1933 to July 1, 1934, the Committee 
spent $154,949.80. Durings its  f i r s t  eighteen months the Committee 
disbursed $38,586.82 for salaries and o ffice expenses and $24,570.84 
in research fees paid for the most part to the National Industrial 
Conference Board. The remaining Committee expenditures financed a 
heroic in fla tion  propaganda campaign. By July 1934, Rumely reported 
that in addition to 26 monographs on monetary issues the Committee had 
published 4,951,387 pieces of printed matter. During 1933, the Com­
mittee also sponsored five National Broadcasting Company network 
broadcasts and managed to a ir  1006 fifteen-minute e lectrical transcrip­
tions over 381 radio stations. Rumely believed in conversion through
saturation.35
University (hereafter cited as Rumely papers). In a le tte r  to the 
President, May 12, 1933, the Committee claimed to represent "over 85 per 
cent" of organized agriculture and 750 presidents of business concerns.
34jhe Rumely le tters  regarding Committee ac tiv ities  are about 
equally divided among the Rumely papers at Indiana University and the 
Dairymen's League papers at Cornell.
35The statis tics  are from "Financial Statement: January 1- 
July 1, 1934 and Program for Next Six Months of Committee for the
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The Committee's efforts  to Influence businessman, po litic ian  
and farmer were not limited to the impersonal media of radio and pam­
phlet. The Committee hosted propaganda dinners at Chicago's Union 
League Club fo r midwestern agricultural and business executives. On 
more exotic occasions Committee guests cruised Lake Michigan aboard 
the Mizpah, the yacht of Commander E. F. McDonald, J r . ,  President of 
Zenith Radio Corporation, In New York the Committee sponsored several 
parties at the Frank Vanderlip mansion on the Hudson where the rich  
Westchester County crowd gathered to imbibe cocktails and Warren's 
gold theories. Debt proved the common denominator between yachting 
in fla tio n is t and agrarian currency expansionist. Frank A. Pearson, 
Warren's Cornell colleague, characterized most of the Committee's 
dinner guests as "businessmen and speculators who couldn't pay their 
debts." Urban in fla tion is ts  appeared as eager as the farmer to see 
higher price levels, Pearson recalled, "they poured a lo t of money into 
the Committee for the Nation.
The Committee also hosted several Washington dinners and sem­
inars for Congressmen and government o ff ic ia ls . Administration leaders 
including Morgenthau and Cabinet members H ull, Roper, Wallace and Woodin
Nation," pamphlet (July 15, 1934), 16 pages and "Progress in 1933 
Toward Realization of Program Proposed by Committee for the Nation and 
Statement of Expenses for 1933," nd, 3 pages, both in Rumely papers.
The Rumely papers and the DLP contain quarterly and often monthly finan­
cial data of the Committee.
^^Interview with Pearson, June 9, 1968, 201 Worth Street,
Ithaca, New York. See also "Guests at Committee Dinner," October 23, 
1933; W. W. Gasser to Rumely, 24 October 1933 and Rumely to Directing 
Committee, 26 October 1933, in DLP. Correspondence regarding the 
February 3, 1933 Committee dinner is in the Rumely papers.
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met with Committee representatives to analyze monetary i s su es .  
Occasionally up to 60 congressmen assembled to hear Warren present the 
Committee's viewpoint at the Mayflower Hotel or the House Office Build­
ing. By November 1933, Rumely reported that 150 solons had specifically  
requested a complete f i l e  of Committee l ite ra tu r e .M e a n w h ile  the 
Committee received several dozen le tters  of support from leading pol­
itic ians.^^
While the Committee made flir ta tio u s  advances toward urban 
in fla tio n is ts  i t  soberly sought a working partnership with organized 
agriculture. Rumely's desire for an agricultural alliance sprang from 
both practical and romantic notions. He reminded business colleagues 
that farm organizations had developed great interest in monetary issues 
and that they could quickly exert influence in most of the nation's 
congressional d is tr ic ts .40
Interest in a farm-business coalition also emerged in part from 
a desire to preserve free-enterprise capitalism. Currency tinkering 
called for no fundamental revisions of America's mythical la issez-fa ire  
trad ition  and attracted many fearful of more radical alternatives.
O^Warren Diary, April 6-12, March 4-6, May 24, July 10-12, 1933.
30Rumely to Directing Committee, 4 November 1933, and 13 Sep­
tember 1933, DLP. Senator Connally of Texas remarks favorably on a 
Committee dinner in Connally to 0. B. Burtness, 8 April 1933, Tom Con­
nally Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
^%ee 0. B. Burtness to Rand, 30 March 1933, Connally papers;
S. B. P e ttin g ill to Rand, 20 September 1933, and Wright Patman to Rand, 
2 May 1933, DLP. Also Patman to Committee, 10 February 1934, Daniel C. 
Roper to Rand, 20 March 1933 and M o s  Pinchot to Rumely, 13 September 
1933, Rumely papers.
40Rumely to Directing Committee, 17 October 1933, DLP.
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A Committee pamphlet asked businessmen to "Remember that the Kulaks 
(independent farmers) resisted Russian communism long a fte r c ity  opposi­
tion had been suppressed."41 Business s e lf-in te res t dictated that 
something be done to a llev ia te  farm distress for an unhappy agricul­
tural industry would remain "an unsettling p o litica l influence" 
demanding greater government regimentation that would but damage indus­
tr ia l  recovery.42
Although subordinate to the in fla tio n  campaign the business 
leadership of the Committee also hoped to convert farmers to the view 
that they had as much to fear from organized labor as management.
In the fa ll  of 1933, J. H. Rand, J r . ,  writing as Chairman of the Com­
m ittee's directors, asked Roosevelt to proclaim a six months moratorium 
on strikes and Rumely fre tted  that "an alliance between farmers and 
labor may take place against a ll cap ita l. . .
The Committee's in fla tionary , free enterprise and anti-labor 
program well suited its  Contact Man with Agriculture, Fred H. Sexauer, 
President of New York's Dairymen's League. Sexauer worked closely on 
the Committee's monetary proposals with such agricultural leaders as 
L. J. Taber, Master of the National Grange, John D. M ille r , President 
of the National Cooperative Council, Edward A. O'Neal, President of the 
Farm Bureau, M. Benton Blalock, President of the American Cotton
DLP.
41"Program for the Next Six Months," 16 July 1934, pp. 3, 4,
^^Rumely to Directing Committee, 19 October 1933, DLP.
43w. W. Gasser to Rumely, 24 October 1933, DLP.
44Rumely to Directing Committee, 31 October 1933, DLP.
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Cooperative Association and even John A. Simpson, President of the 
Farmer's Union, who cooperated with the Committee though he thought 
its  in fla tio n  program mild and its  method genteel. "Out here in the 
west," he wrote Rand, "we are fu lly  convinced that the only way to get 
those in power in Washington to apply real remedies is to scare them."45 
The agricultural members of the Committee did more than lend 
th e ir  names to the organization. They distributed Committee lite ra tu re  
to th e ir memberships, recruited in fla tion  speakers for state and 
national meetings and petitioned Congress and the President on behalf 
of the Committee p r o g r a m . 46 jhe farm press also furthered Committee 
goals as i t  ed ito ria lly  supported the Committee and often relinquished 
its  columns to Rumely press releases.47
George F. Warren provided the most direct link the Committee 
maintained with the White House. Warren stayed in Washington during 
inauguration week to discuss monetary problems with the President,
45$impson to Rand, 2 November 1933, DLP.
46a review of Committee-farm organization cooperation is pro­
vided in Sexauer to E. A. O'Neal, 17 July 1933, 9 pages, DLP. See also 
Utah State Farm Bureau to Committee, 22 November 1933, DLP.
47£xamples are "Dr. George F. Warren Explains Currency Change," 
Bureau Farmer, V III  (April 15, 1933), p. 18; "Parade of the Week,"
P ra irie  Farmer, CV (April 15, 1933), p. 4; "Businessmen Advocate 75 Per 
Cent In fla tio n ,"  Il l in o is  Agricultural Association Record, I I  (May 1933), 
p. 15; "The Honest Dollar," National Grange Monthly, (May 1933), p. 8; 
"Gold Dollar is Unstable Says Committee for Nation," Tennessee Farm 
Bureau News, XI (June 1, 1933), p. 2. O'Neal praised the Committee in 
his radio address reprinted in O ffic ia l News Letter (April 18, 1933), 
p. 3. See also G. Thorpe, General Manager, California Walnut Growers 
Association to the President, 24 May 1933, Southwestern M iller to Com­
m ittee, 9 November 1933, and L. J. Taber to Rand, 21 October 1933, DLP.
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Morgenthau, Moley, Tugwell and leading Congressional figures.48 On 
March 15, Warren grew alarmed that the Administration seemed intent on 
maintaining the strength of the dollar in foreign exchanges. Explain­
ing that closing the banks and the economy b i l l  were "violently  
deflationary," Warren warned Morgenthau that " i f  the deflationists are 
to be allowed to have the ir way, tinkering with booze and domestic 
allotments is worse than fiddling while Rome burned." Impressed with 
the professor's alarm, the farm credit ch ief, in a procedure repeated 
frequently during the coming year, presented a Warren gold devaluation 
manifesto to the President.49
Toward the end of March 1933, the Committee published the "Five 
Next Steps" necessary to restore the economy. Step One called for the 
Administration to quickly reopen sound banks and guarantee their  
deposits. The program suggested that the United States continue its  
gold embargo and suspension of specie payments until domestic prices 
rebounded to a desirable level. Next the Committee advised Roosevelt 
to allow the dollar to depreciate in foreign exchange transactions in 
order to stimulate international debt repayment and foreign demand for 
American exports. The program also endorsed "at a future date" gold 
revaluation from $20.67 per ounce to $36.17, a cheapening of the dollar 
thought suffic ient to restore 1926 commodity price levels. The final 
step urged the creation of a federal board to administer the Fisher
48warren Diary, March 5-7, 1933.
49see Warren to Morgenthau, 15 March 1933; Warren to FDR,
15 March 1933, and "There Are Only Tv/o Ways Out of the Depression," 
memorandum by Warren, 25 March 1933, Warren papers.
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commodity dollar:scheme.50 In sum, the Committee for the Nation program 
encouraged a mildly in flationary policy that with the exception of the 
fifth'recommendation eventually found favor within the heirarchy of 
the New Deal
The Committee immediately undertook an extensive campaign to 
bring; the "Five Next Steps" to the attention of the Administration. 
Sexauer asked the farm organization to deluge Washington with mail and 
Warren recommended the program to Wallace who, in turn, presented i t  
to Roosevelt.
From April 5 to 18 Warren, at Committee expense, stayed in 
Washington attempting to draft a monetary b i l l  embodying re fla tio n is t 
thinking. On April 6, Warren, Rand, Fisher, Congressman Goldsborough, 
and former Oklahoma Senator Robert L. Owen, a founder and now b itte r  
opponent of the Federal Reserve, met with farm representatives includ­
ing O'Neal, Taber and Simpson to discuss the proposed leg islation.
Though Simpson and about half of the conferees wanted to provide for 
the issuance of paper money, the proposal so s p lit  the discussants 
that Committee leaders decided to lim it the b i l l  to gold revaluation 
and s tab iliza tio n .52
50pand to Fanny Scott Rumely, 30 March 1933, Rumely papers; 
and New York Times, 6 April 1933. An explanation of Warren's role in 
the preparation of "Five Next Steps" is found in Sexauer to Taber,
1 April 1933, DLP.
51Sexauer to All Cooperatives, 4 April 1933, DLP; Warren to 
Wallace, 4 April 1933, and Wallace to the President, 6 April 1933, 
Secretary of Agriculture, "Farm Relief 1933," Record Group 16, National 
Archives, Washington, D. C.
52warren Diary, April 5-16; Rumely provides a detailed descrip­
tion of these conferences in Rumely to Rand, 9 April 1933, Rumely papers.
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The Committee paid $3,000 to Washington lawyer and lobbyist
Frederick P. Lee to draft the technical language of the b i l l .  On
April 20, Congressman Goldsborough, a member of the House Banking and
Currency Committee, introduced the Committee's program in the form of
two b i l ls .  The new Goldsborough proposals quickly received the public
endorsement of the Committee, the National Grange and the American Farm
Bureau Federation. The Goldsborough b i l l  made mandatory the immediate
devaluation of the gold dollar to a point calculated to restore the
1926 price level and called for the creation of a National Monetary
53Board charged with implementing the Fisher compensated do llar.
Committee and farm in fla tion is ts  met with the President on at
least three occasions during the second week of A pril. At the f i r s t
meeting Roosevelt assured the delegates that he believed in the Warren
gold plan. At a second conference on April 12, a Committee delegation
including Rand, Sexauer and Warren found the President in a receptive
mood. He asked the specific number of gold grains that Warren favored
in a revalued do llar. A fter jo tting  down the Warren figures the Presi-
54dent encouraged the Committee to continue its  work. Two days la te r  
a delegation of farm leaders including Louis Taber of the National
A typed draft of the proposed b i l l  is in the Warren papers. See also 
Sexauer to Simpson, 20 April 1933, DLP, and Robert L. Owen to the 
President, 24 April 1933, and 3 May 1933, OF 229, Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York (hereafter cited as Roosevelt Library).
S^See H. R. 5073 and H. R. 5160, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.; Warren
Diary, April 16-18; and Sexauer to Lee, 20 April 1933, DLP.
54warren Diary, April 12, 1933.
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Grange informed Roosevelt that refla tion  and farm re lie f  were insep­
arable.^5
The Goldsborough gold program was but one of many monetary 
schemes presented to the new Administration. The New Deal scrutinized 
the Kent Plan, the Rorty Plan, scrip money, and stamp money, in addition 
to trad itional monetary panaceas. Pamphlets and le tters  suggesting 
economic remedies inundated Washington.56 One le a fle t asked, "When Will 
Franklin Delano Drop Mustard Plasters and Hot Water Bottles, Go Direct 
to the Sore Spot, and Give the World an Honest Dollar?," while a te le ­
gram informed Roosevelt, "Your photo on the face of a ll new currency 
w ill give the public confidence."^7 Memory of such advice prompted 
Secretary of Treasury Woodin in his le tte r  of resignation due to i l l  
health to write Roosevelt, "This old boy Staphylococcus is one of the 
meanest ever, and hangs on even worse than the man with 147 pages of 
closely written manuscript elucidating a plan to save the country.
By April 18, the New York Times counted 57 in fla tion  proposals
S N^ew York Times, 15 Apri1 1933.
^bim etallism  received the support of two Texas Congressmen.
See U. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., March 15, 1933, 
pp. 477-78 and 483-488. Interest free bonds are praised by Patman in 
Ib id . , April 6, 1933, pp. 1368-70. A Connally gold proposal is examined 
in New York Times, 4 April 1933. Representative P ettin g ill of Indiana 
supported stamp money in P etting ill to Wallace, 3, 7, 11 of April 1933, 
Secretary of Agriculture, "Currency," Record Group 16, National Archives, 
Washington, D. C.
S^A. W. Lafferty , "'Ghost' of the Gold Standard," pamphlet 
(March 24, 1933), 4 pages. Secretary of Agriculture, "Currency," Record 
Group 16, National Archives, Washington, D. C ., and James J. G illogly  
Association to President, 14 May 1933, OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
SBwoodin to FDR, 5 July 1933, PPF 258, Roosevelt Library.
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in C o n g re s s .G e n e ra lly , in fla tion  demands fe l l  into three categories: 
those that urged "doing something for s ilve r,"  those that provided for 
currency expansion through government issue of greenbacks or non-interest 
bearing bonds, and those that advocated some form of gold management 
including devaluation and the commodity dollar.
The f i r s t  Congressional test of in fla tion  strength came appro­
pria te ly  during Senate debate on the Administration's farm re lie f  b i l l .  
Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana with the aid of Louisiana's Huey 
Long and other farm state senators attempted to attach a 16-to-l s ilver  
remonetization amendment to the farm b i l l  on April 17.60 in fla tio n is t 
senators did not particu larly oppose the domestic allotment idea, but 
they believed the proposal largely useless unless i t  included provisions 
fo r in fla tio n . They argued that without in fla tion  commodity prices 
would remain depressed and farm debts would grow a ll the more in to ler­
able.
After Senators Long and Wheeler reviewed the traditional silver  
lita n y . Senate Majority Leader Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas informed
59New York Times, 18 April 1933.
60u. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., April 17, 
1933, pp. 1817-1842. See T. Harry Williams, Huey Long (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 631.
61The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in reporting 
favorably the farm b il l  also included a resolution that stated that no 
permanent re lie f  could be expected until "the money question is consid­
ered adjusted." See U. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
April 17, 1933, p. 1844. The same view is repeated in le tters  from 
Senators to constituents. See Borah to David Travis, 21 March 1933, 
Borah papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Thomas to H il l ,  
24 March 1933, Thomas papers; Norris to C. J. Purer, 19 April 1933, 
Norris papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
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his colleagues that the President opposed adoption of the Wheeler amend­
ment. Several s ilver senators including William Borah of Idaho bowed
62to the wishes of the President and the proposition fa iled  43 to 33.
The vote on the Wheeler measure proved instructive. F irst the 
vote displayed a graphic picture of economic geography, fo r with the 
exception of James Couzens of Michigan, no one from any state north of 
North Carolina and Kentucky or east of Wisconsin voted for the s ilver  
amendment. The 33 votes for the Bryanic formula also illu stra ted  the 
growth of in fla tion  sentiment in the Senate since January when a simi­
la r  proposition received but 18 affirm ative v o t e s .63 Presidential 
advisor Raymond Moley acknowledged that a t least 10 in fla tio n is ts  sen­
ators had either voted "no" or had fa iled  to answer the ro ll due to 
White House p r e s s u r e . O n l y  insistent instructions from the President 
prevented a Senate in fla tion  majority on April 17.
Defeat of the Wheeler Amendment proved but a temporary setback 
fo r Congressional in fla tio n is ts . Immediately a fter the vote on the 
s ilve r measure, Oklahoman Elmer Thomas introduced an amendment to the 
farm b i l l  combining the major in fla tion  suggestions into one omnibus 
proposal. The Thomas Amendment provided greater lib e ra lity  in Federal 
Reserve open market operations, issuance of paper money, gold
62u. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., April 17, 
1933, p. 1842.
63jeanette Nichols, "Silver In flation  and the Senate in 1933," 
Social Studies, XXV (1934), pp. 12-18.
64Raymond Holey, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and Bros.,
1939), pp. 157-158; and Moley with the assistance of E llio t  A. Rosen,
The F irst New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, In c ., 1966), 
p. 300.
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devaluation and acceptance of s ilver in payment of the war debt. To 
add to the f le x ib il i ty  of the measure, Thomas proposed that the Presi­
dent be granted permissive powers to use none, one or any combination 
of the in fla tion  techniques.^5 Thomas recalled that he purposefully 
chose the eclectic approach to in fla tion  legislation "in order to 
secure the maximum s u p p o r t . T h e  Administration quickly saw the 
potency of the Thomas in fla tion  package. Moley shuddered, "Here were 
a ll three of the dreaded proposals for in fla tion  bound up together in 
a way deliberately calculated to en lis t a ll the in fla tio n is t support in 
Congress."G7
On the morning of April 18, Senators Robert J. Bulkley of Ohio 
and James Byrnes of South Carolina informed Roosevelt that the Thomas 
Amendment would pass Congress. The President asked Byrnes to approach 
Thomas with an offer of Administration support i f  the Oklahoman would 
agree to certain revisions of the amendment.68 a few hours la te r , 
Thomas met with Roosevelt and the tv/o men agreed to cooperate.
66An Amendment by Thomas of Oklahoma to H. R. 3835, 73rd Cong., 
1st Sess., April 17, 1933, p. 1844.
66Elmer Thomas, "40 Years a Legislator," July 8, 1954. An 
unrevised and uncorrected copy of a manuscript. University of Oklahoma, 
Norman, Oklahoma.
67Holey, After Seven Years, p. 157. See also David Webb, "The 
Thomas Amendment: A Rural Response to the Great Depression," in 
Donald E. Green, (Ed.), Rural Oklahoma (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Histor­
ical Society, 1977), pp. 101-112.
68pirst person accounts of the Thomas Amendment negotiations 
are Moley, F irs t New Deal, pp. 300-305; James P. Byrnes, All in One 
Lifetime (New York: Harper, 1958), p .77; Herbert Peis, 1933 Characters
in Crisis (Boston: L itt le  Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 124-131; Warburg,
Money Muddle, pp. 95-106.
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Roosevelt, Thomas remembered, especially liked the idea that in fla tion  
would result in higher prices and that the Amendment freed the Presi­
dent on monetary matters from further Congressional interference.
Thomas also impressed upon the President that armed with the powers of 
the amendment, Roosevelt could gain the in it ia t iv e  a t the upcoming 
London World Economic Conference.69
That evening at a meeting called to discuss the pending v is it  
of Ramsay MacDonald, British Prime M inister, Roosevelt announced to his 
advisors that he intended to accept the Thomas Amendment. Moley 
observed that when those in the room heard the news, "All hell broke 
loose." The decision led to Budget Director Lew Douglas' classic dooms­
day prediction, "Well, this is the end of Western C i v i l i z a t i o n .
While Roosevelt's capitulation to Senate in fla tio n is ts  provoked 
immediate controversy, many of his supporters pictured the President 
as only reluctantly accepting the Thomas Amendment in order to preclude 
more drastic Congressional action.71 The weakness of the scenario is 
that Roosevelt accepted both the necessity for managed currency and
69Thomas, "40 Years a Legislator," p. 230.
70Moley, After Seven Years, p. 157-159; Moley, F irs t New Deal, 
p. 302; Peis, Characters in C ris is , p. 126 corrects Moley's account as 
to the excitement caused by the Roosevelt in fla tio n  decision.
71see Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1933), p. 117; Moley, After Seven Years, p. 157; The 
New York Times, a Roosevelt supporter explained "While in effect the 
President has surrendered to the insistency of the westerners and 
southerners . . .  he had i t  on his own terms." See 20 April 1933. A 
balanced account is provided in Frank Freidel, FDR: Launching the New
Deal [Boston: L i t t le ,  Brown and Company, 1973), p. 321. See also
Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and P olitical
Ideas of Franklin 0. Roosevelt (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State
University Press, 1958), pp. 57-58.
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monetary in fla tion  well before his alleged surrender to Thomas. At his 
f i r s t  press conference on March 8, Roosevelt in o ff the record remarks, 
informed reporters that "managed currency" must be "part of the perman­
ent system so we don't run into this thing [severe d e fla tio n ] a g a i n . "72 
On April 5, just before the series of conferences with the Committee 
fo r the Nation and farm in fla tio n is ts , Roosevelt wrote Colonel House 
in words reminiscent of Warren: "While things look superfic ia lly  rosy,
I realize well that thus far we have actually given more of deflation  
than of in fla tio n . . . .  I t  is simply inevitable that we must in fla te  
and though my banker friends may be horrified , I  s t i l l  am seeking an 
in fla tion  which w ill not wholly be based on additional government 
debts."73 Two days la te r when a reporter asked about in fla tio n , Roose­
v e lt responded that he would not resort to "the printing presses," but
he obviously thought monetary management necessary in order to speed 
74recovery.
In addition to accepting the necessity of currency adjustments, 
Roosevelt agreed that the general price level was much too low and an 
unfair burden to debtors.75 On April 15, three days before the con­
cession to Thomas, Roosevelt finished the process of going o ff the gold
72March 8, 1933, Transcripts of the Press Conferences of Presi­
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt fo r the Years 1933-1945 (Hyde Park, New York: 
F. D. Roosevelt Library, 1956-1957), I ,  p. 13.
73Roosevelt to House, 5 April 1933, reprinted in E ll io t t  Roose­
ve lt (E d .), £. £ . £ . ,  His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (New York: Duel!,
Sloan and Pearce, 1950), I , 342.
74Roosevelt Press Conferences, I ,  April 7, 1933, pp. 135-138.
75Roosevelt to Simpson, 6 April 1933, Simpson papers.
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standard when he ordered the Secretary of Treasury to prohibit new 
exports of gold. At his April 19 press conference, Roosebelt explained 
the gold move: "The whole problem before us is to raise commodity
prices. For the las t year, the dollar has been shooting up and we 
decided to quit competition."76 when asked what other reflationary  
steps the Administration contemplated, Roosevelt proved himself an 
em piricist and a sports fan. The President, he explained, is lik e  a 
quarterback on a football team who cannot te ll  what play w ill be called 
until the current play has run its  course. " I f  the play makes ten 
yards, the succeeding play w ill be d ifferen t from what i t  would have 
been i f  they had been thrown for a loss." He intended to score a 
"touchdown" on commodity prices and his game plan included "a de fin ite ly  
controlled in fla t io n ."77 Two days la te r Roosevelt included the Thomas 
Amendment as a "very, very essential" member of his team, but in a 
mood to keep opponents guessing, cautioned reporters that as to the 
new in fla tion  powers, "I do not have to use any of them."78
Roosevelt explained his program to the nation on May 7. In his 
second major radio address since the inauguration the President acknowl­
edged that when he took o ffice , "the country was dying by inches," due 
to extreme deflation. He stated that even before coming President he 
had concluded that the deflationary spiral must end. As for monetary 
policy, "The Administration has the defin ite objective of raising
76Roosevelt Press Conferences, I ,  April 19, 1933, p. 152. 
77lb id ., p. 156-157.
78ib id . ,  pp. 167-170.
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comnodity prices to such an extent that those who have borrowed money 
win on the average, be able to repay that money in the same kind of 
dollar which they borrowed."79 No doctrinaire honest moneyite could 
have more clearly stated the Fisher-Commons-Warren thesis. The next 
morning Morgenthau observed that Roosevelt seemed pleased with his 
speech, interested in a two-page Warren memorandum, and remarked, "As 
soon as I get the authority from Congress to regulate gold, I can use 
i t  when and i f  necessary."80
The revised Thomas Amendment granted the President regulatory 
authority over gold and wide latitude in other areas of monetary policy. 
The Amendment stated that whenever the President desired currency 
expansion he f i r s t  must authorize the open market committee of the 
Federal Reserve to purchase up to three b illio n  dollars of federal ob­
ligations with Federal Reserve notes. Should open market operations 
prove insuffic ient the President held several options: He might have 
the Treasury issue up to three b illio n  in greenbacks, reduce the gold 
content of the dollar as much as 50 per cent, or accept in payment of 
debts owed the United States one b illio n  dollars in s ilver at a price
not to exceed 50 cents per ounce. S ilver received in payment would
81serve as a base for the issue of s ilver ce rtifica tes .
79"The Second Fireside Chat," is reprinted in Samuel I .  Rosen- 
man (Comp. ) ,  The Publ 1c Papers and Addresses of Franklin Di• Roosevelt: 
With A Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roose­
ve lt TNew York: Random House, 1938), I I , pp. 160-158.
80[vjorgenthau, "Farm Credit Diary," May 8, 1933.
81u. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., April 20, 
1933, pp. 2004-2005; Ib id . ,  April 22, 1933, pp. 2170-2171.
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Senator Thomas opened debate on his amendment a few minutes 
past noon on April 24. The t a l l ,  white haired, deliberate speaker con­
sumed the next three hours on what he considered "the most important 
proposition (save the world war) that has evern come before any parlia ­
mentary body of any nation of the world." He promised that adoption 
of the proposition would transfer 200 b illio n  from one class to another. 
He explained that he had reference to the value that had accrued to
creditors because of the rising value of the d o l la r .
The Thomas Amendment passed the Senate on April 28, but the 64 
to 21 vote emerged only a fte r s ilverites  secured Administration approval 
of two amendments to the in fla tio n  measure. S ilver interests success­
fu lly  included among the President's discretionary powers the right to
remonetize s ilver at whatever ratio  to gold he chose, and they raised 
from one to two b illio n  the amount of s ilver acceptable in payment of 
the war debts. Attached to the Agricultural Adjustment Act as T it le  
I I I ,  the omnibus in fla tion  package received the signature of the Presi­
dent on May 12.
The Administration's new monetary program received both approv­
ing and ambivalent responses from rural spokesmen. Pacific Rural Press 
welcomed the contemplated in fla tion  but warned its  readers to "pray 
that President Roosevelt have gimp enough and common sense enough to
82u. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., April 24, 
1933, p. 2217.
83lb id . , pp. 2410, 2250, the vote is pp. 2551-52; New York 
Times, 8 May 1933.
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throw us in reverse In time to prevent d i s a s t e r . T h e  big three 
agricultural organizations proudly claimed sponsorship of the b i l l  and 
praised the Administration for accepting the measure. Yet the Grange 
and the Farm Bureau believed the Thomas Amendment incomplete and urged 
Roosevelt to incorporate the Goldsborough compensated dollar scheme 
into the p r o p o s a l . 85 Fred Sexauer probably summarized the attitudes of 
most rural in fla tio n is ts  when he wrote on the day the Thomas Amendment 
received Senate approval, that the program would be "entirely satis­
factory" i f  i t  would but include "the policy of obtaining and maintaining 
the 1926 price l e v e l . " ^ 5
The Committee for the Nation's f i f t h  step, the commodity do llar, 
remained an elusive goal throughout the spring of 1933. On May 1, farm 
in fla tio n is ts  made a last e ffo rt to have stable dollar leg islation  
incorporated into the farm b i l l .  O'Neal and the Committee fo r the 
Nation attempted to insert the compensated dollar scheme into the farm 
b i l l  as i t  lay in Conference Committee. Though Congressman Goldsborough 
served on the committee, the move f a i l e d . 87 By May 20, Goldsborough
84pacific Rural Press, CXXV (April 29, 1933), p. 6; Simpson's 
claim of responsibility for the Amendment is in "Radio Address by 
John A. Simpson," May 27, 1933, Simpson papers. See also "The Record 
of Achievement," O ffic ia l News Letter (May 29, 1933), p. 3.
85a. s. Goss, Chairman, Executive Committee, National Grange 
and O'Neal to President, 26 April 1933, Secretary of Agriculture, 
"Currency," Record Group 16, National Archives, Washington, D. C. See 
also "Radio Address by John A. Simpson," May 27, 1933, Simpson papers, 
and "The Record of Achievement," O ffic ia l News Letter (May 29, 1933), 
p. 3.
B^Sexauer to Moser, 28 April 1933, DLP. See also Governor 
Miriam A. Ferguson (Texas) to Roosevelt, 29 May 1933, Roosevelt Library.
87Rumely t o  S exauer, 1 May 1933, DLP.
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proclaimed the e ffo rt to secure honest do llar leg islation fu t i le .
"Right a t th is time, with the President's tremendous popularity, noth­
ing can be done without his cooperation."88 Efforts to complete the 
f i f t h  step would await a new Congress.
During May, June and July, in fla tio n is ts  centered th e ir  atten­
tion on the London Economic Conference which met from June 12 to 
July 27. Aside from s ilver interests who held hopes for an international 
agreement restoring the price of th e ir metal, in fla tio n is ts  feared the 
gathering at London more than they welcomed i t .  They worried that 
B rita in , France and the gold bloc countries might conspire with the 
"die-hard deflationists" within the Federal Reserve and the State Depart­
ment to s tab ilize  the dollar at an a r t i f ic ia l ly  high leve l. Exchange 
rate s tab ilization  unfavorable to the dollar might n u llify  much of the 
in fla tio n  potential of the Thomas Amendment. Warren warned on May 10 
that America must avoid foreign agreements that prevented su ffic ien t 
gold devaluation or those that might forbid periodic changes in the 
price of gold necessary to implement the compensated d o lla r .89 In late  
May, Louis J. Taber, concerned with the Administration's timorous use 
of the Thomas Amendment, wrote Rumely of "our supposed in fla tion  vic­
tory" and expressed hope that i t  was not "turning out to be a flop."^^
88Quoted in Rumely to Directing Committee, 20 May 1933, DLP. 
See also O'Neal Outlines 'New Deal' Progress in NBC Speech," O ffic ia l 
News Letter [May 16, 1933), p. 3.
89warren Memorandum, 10 May 1933, DLP.
^^Taber to Rumely, 22 May 1933, DLP.
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The Committee asked Roosevelt to appoint Warren and V irg il 
Jordan, President of the National Industrial Conference Board, delegates 
to the London C o n fe re n c e .T h e y  viewed as unfortunate the choice of 
Cordell Hull Secretary of State, as head of the American delegation. 
Rumely complained that the Secretary's "thinking stopped with 1812 and 
that unless one can enter his mind by the route of quoting Thomas Jef­
ferson, i t  is d if f ic u lt  to get any new conception a c r o s s . "92 Overcoming 
disappointment regarding the selection of the American delegation,
Rumely placed a complete f i le  of Committee lite ra tu re  with each of the 
25 delegates as they boarded ship for London. Included in the Committee 
parcel were two of Warren and Pearson's books: Prices and Prices and
Production. Appropriately each book had the delegates name lettered  
in goldl93
Committee lite ra tu re  prior to the London Economic Conference 
explained that in fla tion  and recovery could best be achieved through a 
nationalistic  monetary policy. "The United States," read one Committee 
statement, "should not allow its e lf  to get into a position where its  
domestic price level is fixed or influenced by decisions arrived at in 
international c o n f e r e n c e s . "94 Committee pamphlets argued that each 
country ought to be free to establish the domestic price level suited
91 Committee to Roosevelt, 22 May 1933, DLP; Howe to Taber, 
18 May 1933, Taber papers.
92Rumely to Directing Committee, 1 June 1933, DLP.
93ib id . ,  26 May 1933.
94committee to National Advisory and Auxiliary Committees, 
17 May 1933, Rumely papers.
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to its  needs. I f  each nation adopted the commodity do llar, both domes­
t ic  price levels and foreign exchange rates would s tab ilize . Parroting 
Warren, the Committee stated that regardless of others the United States 
must be free to a lte r  the price of its  gold to assure stable price 
lev e ls .95
During May and June, the Committee continued its  dialogue with 
the President. Wallace, Morgenthau and Howe delivered and recommended 
Committee le tters  and studies to the President and Warren, at the Secre­
tary 's  request, spent May 24 in conversations with W o o d i n .96
By Mid-June, the Committee developed and urged upon Roosevelt 
a new three-point in fla tion  program. The Committee asked Roosevelt to 
create a free gold market in the United States. By granting Americans 
the right to trade in gold the Committee hoped to remove London's dom­
inant influence on the world price of the metal. Furthermore, the 
Committee believed that competition between the American and British  
markets might result in higher gold prices. Rand wrote Roosevelt, "We 
predict that any rise in the New York price of gold would be followed 
by a rise  in London and by a rise in the world level of general com­
modity prices."97 The las t two steps in the new program asked that the 
United States reprice gold from $20.67 to $36.17 per ounce, equivalent
95ib1d. , and Rumely to Direct Committee, 12 May 1933, DLP.
96wallace to the President, 22 May 1933, and Wood to Presidents 
17 June 1933, and Wood to Wallace with attached note, "Thanks for 
le ttin g  me see th is . FDR," nd. Secretary of Agriculture, "Currency," 
Record Group 16, National Archives, Washington, D. C .; Howe to Rumely, 
27 May 1933, OF 229, Roosevelt Library; Warren Diary, 24 March 1933.
97Rand to President, 18 May 1933, Secretary of Agriculture, 
"Currency," Record Group 16, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
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to a 42.8 per cent cut in the gold content of the dollar and enact the 
Goldsborough stab ilization  b il l  to ensure future s ta b il ity .98
Alerted that "forces struggling fo r deflation" were seeking a 
currency stabilization agreement at London, the Committee for the Nation 
and its  agricultural a llie s  engaged in a comprehensive propaganda e ffo rt  
during the las t ten days of June. A $5,000 donation from automotive 
executive E. L. Cord financed the new e ffo rt. By Rumely's count, the 
Committee sent its  anti-London propaganda to the nation's 1440 daily  
newspapers, a ll financial editors, 200 directors of Federal Reserve 
Banks, 300 Washington correspondents, 800 farm and magazine editors,
960 exporters, 1100 Committee members and to Congress and significant 
Administration o f f i c i a l s . 99 The Committee also asked its  membership 
to write Roosevelt protesting any London stab ilization  agreement and 
urging instead its  new three-step in fla tio n  program.
On June 30, the Committee and Farm Bureau President O'Neal sent 
separate telegrams to a vacationing Roosevelt a t Campobello. The mone­
ta ris ts  warned against European interference in American monetary 
a ffa irs  and urged the President "for the sake of the farmers" to imme­
diately adopt a domestic re fla tio n -s tab iliza tio n  p r o g r a m . ^^0
The afternoon of June 30, Roosevelt informed reporters with 
some vehemence that he believed currency stab ilization  i l l  advised at
98committee for the Nation to Roosevelt, 13 June 1933, Thomas
papers.
99Rumely to Directing Committee, 22 June 1933, DLP. See also 
Shipp to Rumely, 19 May 1933, and Committee to Sexauer, 19 May 1933, 
DLP.
TOOcommittee to Roosevelt, 30 June 1933; Rumely to Rand, 30 June 
1933, DLP, and O'Neal to Roosevelt, 30 June 1933, OF 5707, Roosevelt 
Library.
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the present time That evening Morgenthau reviewed the Warren gold 
theory with the President. Later that night the President wrote the 
American delegation at London that attempts at stabilization "at this  
time" were "particularly u n w i s e . " 1 0 2  Two days la te r on July 2 ,  Roose­
v e lt, s t i l l  unhappy with events in London, composed his "bombshell" 
message aboard the cruiser Indianapolis. In the new message Roosevelt 
declared he would consider i t  a "catastrophe" should the London con­
ference "allow its e lf  to be diverted by the proposal of a purely 
a r t i f ic ia l  and temporary experiment affecting the monetary exchange of 
a few nations only." The President, in words suggestively sim ilar to 
those of the Committee for the Nation, asserted: "The sound internal
economic system of a nation is a greater factor in its  well being than 
the price of its  currency in changing terms of the currencies of other 
nations." Roosevelt then reiterated the honest do llar position. He 
sought a do llar "which a generation hence w ill have the same purchasing
and debt paying power as the dollar we hope to attain  in the near
future."T03
The President's words effective ly  orphaned the conference which 
adjourned a fte r a face saving delay on July 27. Roosebelt's rebuke to
London amounted to a monetary declaration of independence and freed him
lO lpreidel, Launching the New Deal, pp. 479-81.
I^^Edgar B. Nixon, ed ., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign 
A ffairs (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
19 5 9 )V l, pp. 264-66.
^^^Ib id . , pp. 268-70. See Poe's reaction to the "bombshell" 
in The Progressive Farmer, XVIII (August 1933), p. 22.
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to pursue a nationalistic  policy. A week a fter the "bombshell" message
Roosevelt asked Morgenthau to bring Warren to Washington for discus- 
104
sions. During a July 10 session with the President, Wallace in 
Warren's presence reported that Tugwell and the Cornell professor 
differed on monetary policy. "Well," Roosevelt retorted, "you see I 
have come much closer to Warren than to Tugwell." The President then 
turned to Warren and confided, "Wei 1. I have gone a. lo t further than 
you thought I would in M a r c h . "105
Since the onset of the New Deal, Warren could have cataloged 
three major re fla tion  victories. The administration had taken the 
country o ff gold, accepted the Thomas Amendment, and had frustrated  
the internationalists at London. Yet during the summer of 1933 commod­
ity  prices fe l l  to distressing lows. The new slump illu s tra ted  the 
inverse relationship between in fla tio n  sentiment and the price leve l.
By late summer an in fla tio n is t chorus demanded that Roosevelt use the 
monetary freedoms preserved at London to implement the powers of the 
Thomas Amendment to achieve a true in flationary policy. The ancient 
interrogative, the money question, would remain a fundamental issue in 
New Deal p o litics .
TO^Morgenthau, "Farm Credit Diary," July 3, 1933. 
TOSwarren Diary, July 10, 1933.
CHAPTER IX
INFLATION MIRAGE: FARMERS AND NEW DEAL MONETARY
POLICY, JULY 1933 TO JUNE 1934
The New Deal's resolve to raise prices from the disaster levels
of 1932 appeared s e lf - fu lf i l l in g  as stock and commodity markets ra llie d
into the third week of July 1933. Between March 4 and July 19, wheat
prices advanced 84 per cent, cotton 71 per cent, and corn rose from
38.5 to 82.5 cents a bushel.^ Other farm commodities joined the improv-
2
ing price picture i f  in less spectacular fashion. The outlook allowed 
seats on the Commodity Exchange to command a 50 per cent higher price 
than they had a few weeks e a rlie r , and on April 19 the New York Times 
hinted that soaring domestic prices might impel dealers to import 
w h e a t T h e  newspaper's suggestion proved premature for on July 19, 20, 
and 21 commodity prices fe ll  precipitously. Wheat declined 34 cents a 
bushel, cotton dropped three cents a pound, and stocks in general lost 
about half of the accumulated gain since the inauguration of the New 
Deal.^ The midsummer plunge dampened commodity prices well into winter. 
Confronted with lower prices for farm commodities and faced with higher
1New York Times, 18 and 19 July 1933.
^U. S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1934 
(Washington, D. C ., 1935), p. 707.
N^ew York Times, 19 July 1933.
^ Ib id ., 23 July 1933.
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prices for non-farm goods, attributable partly to the success of the 
NRA, farmers between July and October suffered a 14 per cent loss of 
purchasing power.^
The July commodity smash led to vigorous rural demands that 
Roosevelt exercise the inflationary provisions of the Thomas Amendment. 
The farm campaign for a cheaper dollar began with the July commodity 
avalanche s t i l l  underway. On July 20, the Senate’s leading cotton 
spokesman, John H. Bankhead of Alabama, telegraphed Roosevelt urging 
immediate gold devaluation.^ During the following three months the 
administration received inflationary advice from farm state politicians, 
many of whom held important posts in the Democratic congressional 
leadership.7 Experiencing some disillusionment with the AAA, farm 
organizations renewed th e ir demands for in flationary action. During 
October farm organizations from the 400 delegates of the Kansas Live 
Stock Association to the 400,000 member National Cooperative Milk
^See Van L. Perkins, "The AAA and the Politics of Agriculture: 
Agricultural Policy Formation in the Fall of 1933," Agricultural His­
to ry , XXXIX (October 1965), p. 221. See also F. A. Pearson, W. I .
Rogers and A. R. Gans, "Warren as Presidential Advisor," Farm Economics, 
CCII (December 1957), pp. 5636-37.
^Bankhead to FDR, 20 July 1933, PPF 1362.
^Examples of congressional in fla tion  demands are: Rep. Clar­
ence Cannon of Missouri to FDR, 23 August 1933, Thomas papers; Rep.
W. L. Fiesinger, Ohio, to FDR, 30 August 1933; and Rep. Donald C.
Dobbins of I l l in o is  to FDR, 14 September 1933 and Rep. Joseph W. Byrns, 
majority leader to FDR, 14 September 1933, in OF 229, FDR Library; 
Senator George Norris to FDR, 18 October. 1933, Norris papers. Manu­
scrip t Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C .; House Speaker 
Henry T. Rainey favored devaluation. See I_.A.A. Record, XI (September 
1933), p. 9. See also the remarks of Senator Pat Harrison, Chairman 
of the Senate Finance Committee in O ffic ia l News Letter, XAI (Septem­
ber 19, 1933), pp. 1, 2.
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Producers Federation resolved in favor of immediate in fla tion  and the 
money question again rivaled discussions of the weather as a favorite
Q
pastime of rural Americans.
The July min i-crash produced strong in fla tio n is t agitation  
throughout the South. On September 12, angered a t declining cotton 
prices, 2000 farmers gathered at Columbia, South Carolina, petitioned 
Roosevelt to in fla te  the currency immediately and establish the minimum 
price of cotton at 15 cents a pound.^ The Columbia ra lly  sparked imi­
ta tive meetings in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma and Texas and numerous telegrams from southern 
congressmen demanding i n f l a t i o n . O n  September 18, more than 200 dele­
gates representing cotton state governors stormed Washington in an 
unsuccessful attempt to confer with the P r e s i d e n t . S o u t h  Carolina
®See The Producer, XV (October 1933), p. 9; Sexauer to FDR,
4 October 1933 and Rumely to Directing Committee, 17 October 1933,
Dairymen's League Papers, Cornell University (hereafter cited as DLP); 
"Resolution Inviting Cooperation of Business Leaders with Agriculture," 
by National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation, October 1933, Rumely 
papers, Indiana University (hereafter cited as Rumely papers).
^From its  mid-July high of 12 cents a pound, cotton dropped
to an average of 9.24 cents in August, 9.19 in September and 9.15 in
October, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1934, p. 466; Governor I .  C. Black­
wood to Wallace, 13 September 1933, Secretary of Agriculture, "Currency," 
Record Group 16, National Archives.
TOsee Smith to President, 18 September 1933; Rep. Sam Rayburn 
of Texas to FDR, 14 September 1933, Senator Hugo Black of Alabama to 
FDR, 14 September 1933; Senator Tom Connally to FDR, 17 September 1933; 
Rep. John E. Rankin of Mississippi to Morris Sheppard, 13 September 
1933, Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee to FDR, 15 September 1933, 
and Rep. 0. H. Cross of Texas to FDR, 23 September 1933, a ll in OF 229, 
FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agricul­
ture and Forestry, and Oklahoma Senator Elmer Thomas headed a committee 
of the cotton group which le f t  a pro-inflation manifesto at the White 
House. The resolution praised the greenback program of the 1860s and 
urged that the government ease the present cris is  through a fresh Issue 
of paper currency. One cotton spokesman threatened that unless the 
administration agreed to undertake in fla tio n , "farmers are going to 
change the gover nment . Sept ember ' s  cotton rebellion was but one of 
a series of incidents that reflected the rising temper of the agricul­
tural regions.
Falling commodity prices also prompted John A. Simpson and the 
Farmers' Union to reenter the fray on behalf of in fla tio n . In August 
Simpson urged his "brothers" to write Roosevelt of rural conditions 
and plead for in fla tio n . 3^ Simpson telegraphed the President that 
unless the government remonetized s ilver and rapidly expanded the cur­
rency, "There w ill be more farmers objects of charity this winter than 
ever before. . . By his count, Simpson held 92 meetings with farm
groups during the summer and early fa l l  of 1933, often speaking to
T lprairie  Farmer, CV (September 30, 1933), p. 4; New York Times, 
18 September 1933.
T^Smith, e t to Roosevelt, 19 September 1933, FDR Library;
New York Times, 19 September 1933; Forrest Davis, "33 Cotton Revolt for 
In fla tion  Bared Rural Temper," New York World Telegram, February 1934; 
"Only In fla tion  Can Help Cotton Prices," Progressive Farmer, XVIIIL  
(October 1933), p. 3.
T^simpson to Dear Brothers, 17 August 1933, Simpson to Schmahl, 
30 September 1933, and Simpson to Mrs. Florence Preston, 29 September 
1933, John A. Simpson papers. University of Oklahoma (hereafter cited 
Simpson papers).
T^simpson to  FDR, 16 A ugust 1933, Simpson pape rs .
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crowds of over 10,000 on the theme, "There is no medium of exchange
with which the people can do b u s i n e s s . I n  addition, the farm leader
remained in contact with a number of in fla tio n is t organizations includ­
ing the Liberty Party whose 1932 presidential candidate, William H.
"Coin" Harvey, hosted Simpson at his Monte Ne, Arkansas home during
the las t week of September.
On October 7- a delegation of Farmers' Union and Farm Holiday 
leaders met with Roosevelt and asked for a moratorium on mortgage fore­
closures, in fla tion  of the currency and a guaranteed cost of production 
scheme fo r farm commodities. National Farmers' Union Secretary 
Edward E. Kennedy reported, "The President did not commit himself on 
the subject of in fla tion  of the currency, but he seemed impressed by 
our presentation."17
Agriculture's campaign for in fla tio n  during the fa l l  of 1933 
sprang not only from the midsummer commodity slump but from the increas­
ing cost of doing business. Farmers complained they suffered a cost 
price squeeze and b itte r ly  c ritic ized  the NRA as adding to th e ir over­
head. The r i f t  between farmers and the NRA led many to boycott stores 
displaying the blue-eagle and revita lized  interest in in fla tion  as a
ISsimpson to FDR, 14 September 1933, Ib id .
l^Simpson also corresponded with the National Monetary Reform 
Association of Spokane, Washington and the National Remonetization 
League of Denver, Colorado. The la tte r  group was a ff ilia te d  with 
Senator Burton K. Wheeler. See also Rep. Walter M. Pierce of Oregon 
to Simpson, 26 September 1933; and Senator Gerald P. Nye of North 
Dakota to Simpson, 25 September 1933, the Simpson papers.
E. Kennedy, et to FDR, Secretary of Agriculture, "Cost 
of Production," Record Group 16, National Archives; Oklahoma Union 
Farmer, XIV [October 15, 1933), p. 1.
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remedy that promised to diminish the price disparity of farm to non- 
farm goods.TG
In early September, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace 
warned Roosevelt, "the NRA w ill soon make i t  necessary either to adopt 
price fixing in agriculture or else s tart in fla tion  in the very near 
future." Improved prices because of the allotment program could not 
be expected until a fte r mid-January, Until then. "I am expecting the 
situation to become exceedingly t e n s e . T h e  Wallace prediction 
proved accurate. In October, Senator Elmer Thomas threatened to lead 
1,000,000 destitute farmers in an honest dollar march on Washington 
and newspapers reported incidents of farmers forcibly halting fore­
closure proceedings. On October 16, Governor William Langer 
proclaimed an embargo on North Dakota wheat until prices improved and 
six days la te r the Farm Holiday Association began a strike that 
threatened to spread throughout the corn belt.^O
The American Farm Bureau Federation, a principal supporter of 
the allotment scheme, reemphasized the need for immediate in fla tion .
On September 9, its  President Edward A. O'Neal featured the "cost- 
price squeeze" argument for in flation  in a nationwide radio address. 
The farm leader credited "practically a ll"  of the economic improvement
TBprederick E. Murphy to Wallace, 11 October 1933, OF 1, FDR 
Library; Perkins, "The AAA and the Politics of Agriculture," Agricul­
tural History, p. 222; Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Twentieth 
Century Populism: Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-
1939 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1951), pp. 480-482.
T^Wallace to FDR, 11 September 1933, OF 1, FDR Library; see 
also New York Times, 10 September 1933.
ZOsaloutos and Hicks, Twentieth Century Populism, pp. 482-84.
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since March to the New Deal's in flationary monetary program.21 Before 
his radio appearance O'Neal visited Roosevelt to urge the immediate
Op
use of the Thomas Amendment powers to revalue the dollar. During 
the last week of September he returned to the White House with a dele­
gation of Grange and cooperative representatives and agricultural 
editors Clarence Poe and Dan Wallace. The group informed Roosevelt 
that organized agriculture found i t  increasingly d if f ic u lt  to support 
the AAA and the NRA programs. They complained that while the NRA 
helped labor, the AAA had as yet done l i t t l e  for farmers. The spokes­
men reminded Roosevelt that in fla tion  and the commodity dollar offered 
the farmer his only hope for immediate economic improvement and urged
the President to quickly enact the monetary program of organized agri- 
23culture.
Rising demands for in fla tion  placed Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace in an uncomfortable position. A conspicuous veteran 
of the honest money campaign of the 1920's, he had converted to the 
efficacy of agricultural production controls during June of 1932, due 
to the arguments of Rex Tugwell. The Secretary recalled, " I t  was thus 
that I became heterodox so far as Warren was concerned. I s t i l l
21"The Need for Action," radio address by O'Neal, 9 September 
1933, 5 pages, Thomas papers; "A.F.B.F. President Urges Immediate 
In fla tio n ,"  O ffic ia l News Letter, X II (September 19, 1933), pp. 1, 5.
22o'Neal to FDR, 12 September 1933, OF 1350, FDR Library; 
O'Neal to Rumely, 15 September 1933, DLP.
^^"Agriculture Calls on President to Speed R elief," O ffic ia l 
News Letter, X II (October 3, 1933), pp. 1, 3, Rumely to Direction Com­
m ittee, 27 September 1933, DLP; and "Farm Leaders Warn of Impending 
Revolt in Plea to President," The Journal of Commerce (New York),
26 September 1933, p. 1.
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thought the price of gold should be raised but I did not look on that 
as a magic c u r e - a l l . W a l l a c e  acknowledged in early April that his 
advisors divided between Tugwell's production planning and Warren's 
monetary planning approaches.25 The Secretary informed Roosevelt that 
both views had merit and that unless one were teamed with the other 
neither might succeed.26
As a New Deal administrator Wallace continued an interest in 
monetary and banking issues developed during his days in farm journal­
ism. Prior to the inauguration he canvassed his future colleagues as 
to their views regarding gold devaluation. Reactions to his honest 
money ideas varied. He discovered Roosevelt "sympathetic and open 
minded," but Secretary of the Treasury William Woodin only "polite,"  
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull "cold and distant." But Attorney 
General Homer Cummings, an old Bryan man, and Secretary of Commerce 
Daniel Roper, expressed open sympathy for the monetary reform cause.2?
24wallace to Dear Frank (Pearson), 11 April 1957, P. A. Pearson 
papers, Cornell University. A good account of Wallace's monetary views 
on the eve of his joining the New Deal is William 6. Shepherd, "Why the 
Farmer Doesn't Like Our Dollar: Interview with Henry A. Wallace,"
C o lliers , XIC (April 1, 1933), pp. 8, 9, 48, 49.
26The differences between Tugwell and Warren were almost, i f  
not quite irreconcilable. Tugwell believed in the Fisher commodity 
dollar but thought that the cris is  of the 1930's presented an inoppor­
tune time "to make such a drastic change." See Tugwell, The Brains 
Trust (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), p. 98. As for Warren he
characterized the NRA and the AAA as "about 10% useful, 15% po litica l 
expediency, 25% hot a ir ,  and 50% measures that w ill result in violent 
reaction. . . . "  See Warren to Morgenthau, 16 October 1933, Warren 
papers.
26wallace to FDR, 6 April 1933, Secretary of Agriculture, "Farm 
R elief, 1933," Record Group 16, National Archives.
27Wallace's recollections about his role in the formation of 
New Deal monetary policy are contained in Wallace to Dear Frank
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The agricultural secretary also scrutinized the personnel and policies  
of the Federal Reserve System. Generally Wallace believed that the 
Reserve had made in e ffic ien t use of the open market committee. Its  
decentralized organization and its  myopic concern for banker's profits  
prevented the system from exerting positive monetary leadership.28
During the f i r s t  few months of the New Deal Wallace recalled,
" I was as strong as Warren for increasing the price of gold."29 He 
shared Committee for the Nation materials with the President and in 
July recommended a study to Roosevelt which dated recovery from the 
gold embargo of April 19. The work of Carl Snyder, S tatis tic ian  of the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank, the study proved to Wallace's satisfac­
tion a causal relationship between the depreciating dollar and the 
revival of trade.
(Pearson), 11 April 1957, 2 pages and Wallace to F. A. Pearson, 4 Jan­
uary 1958, 22 pages, F. A. Pearson papers, Cornell University. The 
la t te r  is an extemporanious and angry reply to the c r it ic a l interpre­
tation of Wallace found in F. A. Pearson, W. I .  Myers and A. R. Gans, 
"Warren as Presidential Adviser," Farm Economics, No. 211 (December
1957), pp. 5598-5676. Wallace's more composed response to the Farm 
Economics a rtic le  was published in Henry A. Wallace, "Further Facts on 
Raising the Price of Gold," Journal of Farm Economics, XL (August 1958), 
pp. 709-18.
ZBWallace's monetary and banking opinions may be traced in the 
following: Wallace to FDR, 31 March 1933, Secretary of Agriculture,
"Banks," Record Group 16, National Archives; Wallace to FDR, 6 April 
1933, OF 1, FDR Library; Wallace to FDR, 19 April 1933, OF 90, FDR 
Library; Wallace to FDR, 20 May 1933, Secretary of Agriculture, "Cur­
rency," Record Group 16, National Archives; Wallace to Howe, 22 July 
1933, OF 1, FDR Library; Wallace to FDR, 26 July 1933, Secretary of 
Agriculture, "Currency," Record Group 16, National Archives.
29wallace, "Further Facts on Raising the Price of Gold," Jour­
nal of Fam Economics, p. 715.
30Wallace to FDR, 26 July 1933, OF 1, FDR Library. Attached to 
the foregoing was Snyder, "The Recovery of Trade and the Depreciation 
of the Dollar," 11 July 1933, 6 pages.
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Following the July slump in conmodity prices, Wallace changed 
emphasis. The secretary feared that an overemphasis on the in fla tion  
remedy would prove detrimental to the total New Deal agricultural pro­
g r a m . T h e  secretary believed that sudden commodity price increases 
might retard the department's campaign to get farmers to sign acreage
Op
reduction contracts. In la te  August, Wallace asked Roosevelt's per­
mission "to make a l i t t l e  statement on what in fla tion  w ill and w ill not
do for agriculture." Upon receiving approval, Wallace released his
33views to the press. The secretary credited in fla tion  with easing
the debtors burden, creating short-term advantages for American exports, 
and increasing the purchasing power of consumers. But the statement 
clearly  expressed Wallace's "heterodox" view that both monetary and 
non-monetary ingredients must play a role in agricultural recovery. 
Wallace noted that in fla tion  offered only temporary advantages. Foreign 
nations tended to adjust currencies so that benefits achieved through 
devaluation soon evaporated. In fla tio n  also fa iled  to adjust supply 
and demand in the domestic market; alone, i t  could not save agricul­
ture.^^
Wall ace to FDR, 21 August 1933 and Wallace to FDR, 7 Septem­
ber 1933, OF 1, FDR Library.
3^See Morgenthau, Farm Credit Diary, 1 October 1933; Warren 
Diary, 5 October 1933, and New York Times, 25 September 1933.
33wallace to FDR, 29 August 1933. FDR's wire read "Private, 
en tire ly  approve your suggested statement." FDR to Wallace, 30 August 
1933, Secretary of Agriculture, " In fla tio n ,"  Record Group 16, National 
Archives.
34"inflation and Agriculture," by Wallace, OF 1, FDR Library; 
"Wallace Discusses In fla tio n ,"  Wallaces' Farmer, LV III (September 16, 
1933), p. 412.
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The Wallace statement led to charges that the Secretary had 
abandoned his commitment to in flation  and the honest do llar. Surprised, 
Iowa Senator R. Louis Murphy telegraphed his friend, " I would suggest 
i t  to my brother you need a v a c a t i o n . L e s s  charitably, the Iowa 
Farmers' Union demanded Wallace's resignation.36 Many in fla tion is ts  
viewed the Wallace statement as betrayal and never quite forgave him 
fo r his seeming tepid support. Rumely of the Committee for the Nation 
summarized, "Whenever Secretary Wallace speaks on money, i t  is the. 
voice of Jacob and the hand of E sau ."37
During September and October, Wallace patiently explained that 
his interest in honest money remained u n d i m i n i s h e d . 33 On September 20, 
before the Grain Dealers Association in Chicago, the Secretary r e i t ­
erated a be lie f in controlled in flation  and stabilization of the 
purchasing power at 1926 le v e ls .39 While in Chicago he assured 
Robert E. Wood, President of Sears Roebuck and Company, that he had not
35Richard Louis Murphy to Wallace, 1 September 1933. See also 
Wallace to Murphy, 2 September 1933, Secretary of Agriculture, " In fla ­
tion," Record Group 16, National Archives.
36oklahoma Union Farmer, XVIII (October 1, 1933), p. 3.
37Memorandum by Rumely, 15 December 1933, DLP; Professor F. A. 
Pearson was quite c r itic a l of Wallace during an interview with the 
author. See also Pearson, Myers and Gans, "Warren as Presidential 
Adviser," Farm Economics, p. 5635.
33see for example, Wallace to Justice Richard F. M itchell,
18 September 1933 and Paul Appleby to Bertram Holst, 23 September 1933, 
Secretary of Agriculture, " In fla tion ," Record Group 16, National 
Archives; Wallace to Sexauer, 29 September 1933, Secretary of Agricul­
ture, "Currency," Record Group 16, National Archives.
39a copy of the Wallace Chicago speech of September 20, 1933 
is in the DLP; New York Times, 21 September 1933.
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altered his monetary views.40 In late September, a fter discussing the
problem during a party at Secretary Woodin's home, Wallace summarized
the monetary issue for Roosevelt:
F irs t, there are millions of people who are worried sick for 
fear there w ill be no in fla tion .
Second, there is a smaller, but wealthier, group which is 
thoroughly scared for fear there w ill be uncontrolled 
in fla tio n .
Third, there is a rather large group of earnest students who 
are afraid that there w ill be premature stab ilization .
Wallace recommended that the President publicly reaffirm  the New Deal's
commitment to an "honest, just price level." Such a statement would
reassure both in fla tion ists  and a n ti-in fla tio n is ts , s tab ilize  markets
and speed business recovery.41
Before relations soured between Wallace and in fla tio n is ts , the
agricultural secretary brought professors George F. Warren and James
42Harvey Rogers to Washington for consultations with the President. 
Wallace believed that Roosevelt's "bombshell" message to London cleared 
the way for the administration to seriously research a gold repricing 
program. Rogers, a Yale University economist, had written an expose of 
the classical gold standard and, as a former student of Irving Fisher,
40wood to Rumely, 22 September 1933, DLP.
41Wall ace to FDR, 29 September 1933, Secretary of Agriculture,
" In fla tion ,"  Record Group 16, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
4^Both Warren and Wallace agree that Wallace in itia ted  the July
conferences. See Warren Diary, July 10, 1933, and Wallace to Pearson,
4 January 1958, F. A. Pearson papers.
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shared much of the Warren viewpoint.43 on July 10 the two professors. 
Secretaries Wallace and Roper and the President conferred on the mone­
tary situation. Wallace recalled, "What we actually went in to ta lk  
to the President about was adopting a precise program for gradually 
determining the value of gold."44 The President assigned "the gold 
dust twins," as the press dubbed the economists. Room 7512 in Roper's 
Commerce building where i t  was hoped they might work in obscurity.45 
During the month following the July 10 conference, Warren and 
Rogers met with Roosevelt and other New Deal advisors, prepared memo­
randa and researched a t least ten procedures to cheapen the d o lla r .4®
At Hyde Park on August 8, Warren summarized the research for Roosevelt: 
The Government must boost commodity prices through a 35 to 45 per cent 
drop in the price of the gold do llar and must establish a permanent 
gold stabilization program.4? S t i l l  uncertain as to Roosevelt's actions, 
Warren, on August 9, cruised for Europe. The vacation-bound Cornell 
professor breezily wrote Rogers, " I leave the world in your care--also 
the GT."48
43Microfilm of the Rogers-Warren correspondence was researched 
at Cornell University. The James H. Rogers papers are at Yale University.
44wallace to Pearson, 4 January 1958, F. A. Pearson papers.
45ihe Sun (New York), 11 July 1933, and Washington Evening S tar,
11 July 1933, and the Warren Diary, 10, 11, 12 July 1933.
45jhe month's ac tiv ities  may be traced in the Warren Diary and
in the le tters  and memorandums in the Warren papers, Cornell University.
47warren Diary, 8 August 1933, and a memo by Warren, "Reflation
Necessary," 8 August 1933, to which is attached, "Left with FDR on 
August 8, also prices of gold, 4 charts." Warren papers.
48warren to Rogers, 8 August 1933, Rogers-Warren Correspondence,
Yalp Ilniuprsi'tv.
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The next two months proved less carefree than Warren wished.
He spent part of the vacation gathering European opinion regarding 
America's slide from the gold standard. He reported that Europeans 
s t i l l  on gold would abandon that standard soon in an e ffo rt to l i f t  
prices. He quipped, there would be "a rise in prices or a rise in dic­
ta to rs ."49 Returning to the United States, Warren lunched with 
Roosevelt on September 20. The President expressed interest in Warren's 
European observations and confided that though Secretary Woodin 
objected he had developed three plans to cheapen the dollar: buy s i l ­
ver, issue greenbacks, or buy gold.^O For almost a month a fte r the 
luncheon v is it  with Roosevelt, Warren commuted between Ithaca and Wash­
ington, increasingly frustrated at the administration's monetary 
inaction. "Things do not look good to me," he wrote Morgenthau on 
September 29 and warned, "the longer the delay, the more the dollar 
must be cut."^^ On October 16, a concerned Warren again appealed for 
action and notified  R o o s e v e l t . T w o  days la te r  Roosevelt invited him 
to the most exciting weekend in Warren's life .^ ^  The professor's 
theories were about to emerge from chrysalis to currency. Roosevelt 
would buy gold.
49warren to Roper, 14 September 1933, and Warren to FDR,
18 August 1933, Warren papers.
SOWarren Diary, 20 September 1933.
91 Warren to Morgenthau, 29 September 1933, Warren papers, and 
Warren Diary, 5 October 1933.
S^Warren to FDR, 16 October 1933. See also Warren to Morgen­
thau, 16 October 1933, Warren papers.
S^FDR to  W arren, 18 O ctober 1933, W arren p ap e rs .
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The Roosevelt decision to adopt the Warren program climaxed 
months of speculation as to the additional monetary steps the New Deal 
might take. Henry Wallace recalled Roosevelt "had to move a step at a 
time and i t  was obvious he wanted to keep the boys g u e s s in g ."54 During 
the summer, whenever reporters asked when the New Deal might implement 
provisions of the Thomas Amendment, Roosevelt's favorite reply was,
"When, as and if"  which he explained meant "when, as and i f  action is 
taken there w ill be an announcement to that e f fe c t ."^5 The President 
also remained evasive regarding the work of professors Warren and Rogers, 
responding less than candidly to one reporter's query about the pair,
" I haven't heard a w o rd ."55 Yet Roosevelt frequently discussed with 
the press his hopes to raise and stab ilize  both the dollar and commod­
ity  prices. And he confidentially informed at least one pro -in fla tion is t 
publisher that he "need not worry about our going back to the gold 
standard fo r a long, long time."^?
Undoubtedly the combination of fa llin g  commodity prices and 
rising farm unrest influenced Roosevelt's decision to buy gold in Octo­
ber 1933. James P. Warburg, the bright and youthful scion of a 
powerful Wall Street banking family and riva l claimant to Warren as a 
New Deal monetary advisor, recalled that the desire to l i f t  farm prices
54wallace, "Further Facts on Raising the Price of Gold,"
Journal of Farm Economics, p. 712.
55yhe Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 12 May 1933, 
p. 251 and 16 May 1933, p. 278.
55%bid. ,  26 July 1933, p. 90.
57 lb id . , 14 July 1933, pp. 157-160; 25 August 1933, pp. 209-212; 
Roosevelt to J. David Stern, 22 August 1933, OF 229, FDR Library.
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determined New Deal monetary action "far more than purely monetary 
consideration."58 Warburg believed Roosevelt's decision to act upon 
the Warren theory resulted not so much from conviction as from the 
p o lit ic a lly  expedient desire to prevent "marching farmers."59 The New 
York banker recalled that he made his las t plea against the Warren plan 
on September 20. He urged an orderly rebuilding process rather than 
the uncertainty of further dollar depreciation. "The President l i s ­
tened patiently to what I had to say," Warburg wrote, "but when I was 
a ll through he smiled and told me that a ll that was very pretty , but 
meantime how were we going to keep prices advancing? How were we 
going to relieve the debt burden? What were we going to do about the 
farmers?"50 On October 19, Roosevelt confided to Secretary of In terio r  
Harold Ickes "that there was an agrarian revolt on in the country and 
this was our chief concern just now." The President informed Ickes 
of the pending gold purchase program and afterward the Secretary 
recorded, " i t  seems clear to me that i f  th is fa ils  there w ill be frank 
in fla t io n ."51
Warren and Morgenthau anxiously arrived three minutes early for 
th e ir 9 o'clock appointment with the President on Friday, October 20. 
Warren noted that "Roosevelt was having breakfast in bed; traces on
58james P. Warburg, The Money Muddle (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1934), p. 141.
59ib id ., p. 133. GOibid., p. 147.
5lHarold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The
F irst Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953),
p. 110. See also Herbert Feis, 1933: Characters in Crisis (Boston: 
L it t le ,  Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 284-285.
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the table. His health and cheer were good." After perusing yet 
another Warren memorandum, the President dictated a statement explain­
ing the administration's new gold policy. Morgenthau urged that the 
gold program be announced over national radio and when presidential 
secretary Stephen Early assured Roosevelt that "the President of the 
United States can have the a ir  at any time," arrangements were made fo r  
the fourth "fireside chat."62
The President explained the new monetary program over network 
radio, Sunday evening, October 22. The speech reviewed the principal 
New Deal accomplishments to date: four m illion new jobs and a 33 per
cent increase in the price of basic farm commodities. S t i l l  Roosevelt 
acknowledged that agricultural prices remained distressingly low. The 
President reiterated his wish to re fla te  the dollar and stab ilize  its  
"purchasing and debt-paying power during the succeeding generation."
To recover commodity prices, America must insulate the value of the 
dollar from foreign influences and "take firm ly in its  own hands" con­
tro l over its  gold value. Roosevelt announced that the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation would buy newly mined domestic and occasionally 
world gold, not at the old standard of $20.67 an ounce, but at prices 
determined a fte r consultation between the President and the Secretary 
of the Treasury. Warren's simple equation that higher priced gold 
meant higher priced commodities offered the unstated rationale for the 
new program. Roosevelt did inform listeners that the gold buying 
policy was but another step toward "managed currency" and that
62warren Diary, 20 October 1933.
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undoubtedly "prophets of evil" would c r it ic iz e  i t .  The President con­
cluded that the new monetary policy would allow the maintenance of 
government cred it, preserve sound currency and restore commodity prices 
to prosperous l e v e l s . 63
Even a fte r Roosevelt's October 20 decision to adopt the Warren 
plan, members of the administration opposed to gold repricing voiced 
pained outcry a t the proposal. The "Antis," as Warren and Pearson 
labeled th e ir opposition, included nearly everyone connected with the 
Treasury, the State Department and the Federal Reserve. Dean Acheson, 
the Undersecretary of the Treasury, described as "nearly hysterical," 
f e l t  so deeply on the subject he la te r resigned. From his sick bed 
Secretary Woodin called Roosevelt and asked, "Why do you do this i l l e ­
gal thing?" Meanwhile a group of "Antis" in the Treasury Department 
fra n tic a lly  attempted to produce an alternative policy. After a week 
of haggling Roosevelt, whose "prophets of ev il"  seemed embarrassingly 
applicable to many within his own administration, had had enough. On 
October 29, the President summoned Treasury and Federal Reserve o f f i ­
cia ls to the White House for an afternoon briefing. The President was 
angry at contentious subordinates and feared a serious farm uprising 
unless some inflationary step was undertaken. Warren recorded:
President stated that the country was in agrarian revolution; 
that Iowa was out of the hands of the reserves; that we are a ll 
in one boat; that the administration has adopted the policy of 
raising the price of gold; that i f  we do not like  the boat, leave 
i t ;  i f  we stay, follow the skipper; that i f  we must growl, do i t  
in the closet. "There has been too much growling in public. I t  
has to stop."
63samuel I .  Rosenman (comp.). The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938), I I ,  pp. 420-
A 9Q
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Roosevelt then explained the rationale for the gold policy. The nation 
must choose between deflation or re fla tio n . P o lit ic a lly , deflation was 
suicidal. "We may lose bonds and liv e . We cannot lose . . . homes and 
farms and liv e ."  The entire issue centered not on exchange ratios or 
gold reserves but on the "human impossibility of deflation ." The Pres­
ident hoped the gold program would avert an agrarian revolution, but 
warned, " i f  i t  does not work wo w ill try  something e l s e . "64
Roosevelt's gold experiment began on October 25, 1933. Warren 
recorded that he, Morgenthau and Jesse Jones, head of the RFC, gathered 
about Roosevelt's bedside as the President ate breakfast. The discus­
sion quickly centered on the gold purchase program. Roosevelt 
suggested that the RFC set its  price 25 cents above the day's world 
market price, Morgenthau proposed 26 cents and Warren, in order to pre­
vent the new price from ending in 5, held out for 27 cents. In good 
sp irits  everyone agreed with the Warren figure and the RFC bought gold 
during the day for $31.36.65 The breakfast-gold pricing sessions were 
repeated almost daily for the next month and then less frequently until 
the program ended in J a n u a r y . 66 As a result the price of gold rose 
steadily from October 25, peaking on November 15 a t $34.91 before 
softening to $31.77 on December 13. The following month the price
64warren Diary, 29 October 1933. Compare John M. Blum, From 
the Morgenthau D iaries: Years of C ris is , 1928-1938 (Boston: Houghton
M ifflin  Company, 1959), p. 72; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr . ,  The Age of 
Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Com­
pany, 1959), p. 242.
65warren Diary, 25 October 1933; the pre-March price was $20.67.
G6warren Diary, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 October 1933.
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again climbed, reaching $32.99 on January 15, when the gold ac tiv ities  
of the RFC were transferred to the Treasury. Finally Roosevelt sta­
b ilized  the price of gold at $35 an ounce under provisions of the Gold 
Standard Act, January 30, 1934.^7
Farm groups associated with Professor Warren viewed Roosevelt's 
new gold program with immense g ra tifica tio n . Fred Sexauer praised the 
new policy as "the greatest voluntary step toward the economic rehabil­
ita tio n  of th is country that has been taken during the past century."68 
Charles White, President of the New York Farm Bureau, expressed the 
self-congratulatory mood of many when he proclaimed the new policy "the 
child of agricu lture ."69 During the three month l i f e  of the gold pur­
chase program, agricultural organizations endorsed and defended the 
President's monetary experiment and the farm press enlightened its  
readership with such supportive artic les  as "Ghost Stories in the 
Graveyard: Golden Calf Boys are Scaring Themselves to Death."76
670etails of the gold purchase program are examined in Arthur 
Whipple Crawford, Monetary Management Under the New Deal : The Evolu­
tion of ^  Managed Currency System-- Its  Problems and Results (Washington, 
D. C. : American Council on Public A ffa irs , 1940), pp. 70-75, 336-340; 
James Daniel Paris, Monetary Policies of the United States, 1932-1938 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), pp. 21-29. See also
F. A. Pearson, W. I .  Myers, and A. R. Gans, "Warren as Presidential 
Adviser," Farm Economics, CCXI (December 1957), pp. 5638-5657.
^%exauer to Morgenthau, 25 October 1933, DLP. Morgenthau read 
Sexauer's le t te r  to FDR while the la tte r  shaved.
69charles R. White, "Agriculture and the Gold Standard," New 
York State Farm Bureau Federation News (December 1933), p. 10.
76prairie Farmer, CV (December 9, 1933), p. 1. See also "Backs 
Wallace's Honest Dollar," Wallaces' Farmer, LV III (October 29, 1933), 
p. 1; "Parade of the Week," Prairie Farmer, CV (October 28, 1933), p. 4; 
Successful Farming, XXXI (December 1933), p. 10; "Roosevelt Okays 
A.F.B.F. Honest Money Plan," O ffic ia l News Letter, No. 22 (November 
1933), p. 1; Minutes of the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the New York
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Regardless of such endorsements, the New Deal's gold machina­
tions fa iled  to satisfy rural in fla tio n is ts . Many thought that gold 
devaluation would not restore price levels and must be coupled with 
new issues of paper and s ilver c u r r e n c y . Se n s i n g  a "tendency toward 
radicalism" among farm groups, Edward A. Rumely wrote Warren the day 
the gold purchase program began that the a b ility  of "responsible and 
conservative groups" to maintain the allegiance of farmers depended 
upon the experiment achieving success "within the next 45 days."7%
The gold program did not fa i l  for want of a cheerleader.
Edward A. Rumely and the Committee for the Nation viewed Roosevelt's 
adoption of the Warren plan as a great victory and resourcefully 
gathered support for the program. During the f i r s t  week of the gold 
experiment about 700 Committee members wired approval to R o o s e v e l t .  
During the course of the experiment the Committee blitzed the admin­
is tra tio n , Congress, the press and agricultural organizations with
State Farm Bureau Federation, Syracuse, New York, November 9, 10, 1933; 
Howard E. Babcock, "Kernels, Screenings and Chaff," American Agricul­
tu ra lis t , CXXX (November 11, 1933), p. 22; Capper's Weekly, LVIII 
(November 11, 1933), p. 2; "Leagued Against the Farmer," Wallaces' 
Farmer, LV III (November 11, 1933), p. 548; and "Line Up Behind the 
President," Ib id ., (November 25, 1933), p. 588; "Taking Another Plank 
From the Populist Platform," Progressive Farmer, XVIIIL (December 1933), 
p. 3.
^^See Norris to J. W. Jones, 23 October 1933, Norris papers. 
Library of Congress; Sixty-seventh Annual Session of the Patrons of 
Husbandry, Boise, Idaho, November 15-24, 1933, pp. 16-17; O ffic ia l 
Minutes of the 29th Annual Convention of the Farmers Educational and 
Co-Operative Union of America, Omaha, Nebraska, November 21-22, 1933, 
pp. 33-34; "Senator Norris, Bryan and Others Plead for Treasury Note 
Money," Oklahoma Union Farmer, XIV (November 1, 1933), p. 1; New York 
Times, October 25, 1933.
72Rumely to Warren, 25 October 1933, DLP.
73Rumely to  D ire c t in g  C om m ittee, 27 O ctobe r 1933, DLP.
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mailings that sometimes included 20,000 addressees. The mailings were 
reinforced with a vigorous radio e ffo rt that resulted in the broadcast 
of more than 1,000 15-minute e lectrical transcriptions.7* Cognizant of 
the Committee's work, Roosevelt wrote Rand on November 21, "I am glad 
that you are at work on national broadcasts to counteract the somewhat 
unpatriotic propaganda we are facing."75
Ever sensitive to the ac tiv ities  of the "antis," the Committee 
attempted to counter every conservative complaint with propaganda of 
its  own. The Committee's campaign benefited from the disarray of the 
sound moneyites and from the unwillingness of the scandal-marred bank­
ing fra te rn ity  to engage in new con fron ta t ions .7  ^ Two weeks a fter the 
inauguration of gold purchases, Rumely scornfully reported "the other 
side" was limited to "talking Grover Cleveland and German in fla tio n , 
with no fresh data applicable to the present c r i s i s . "77 when the New 
York Chamber of Commerce adopted an "anti" resolution, the Committee 
mailed its  own viewpoint to every Chamber in the nation. Meanwhile, the 
Committee forced the "antis" to withdraw a sim ilar resolution from the
74yhe work of the Committee may be followed in Rumely to Direct­
ing Committee, 30 October 1933, 31 October 1933, 1 November 1933,
2 November 1933, 4 November 1933, 13 November 1933, 14 November 1933,
17 November 1933, 23 November 1933, 28 November 1933, 4 December 1933,
7 December 1933, 29 December 1933; and Earl Harding to Directing Com­
m ittee, 3 November 1933, DLP.
75Roosevelt to Rand, 21 November 1933, OF 229, FDR Library.
75a droll i f  interpretive review of the gold experiment from 
the viewpoint of Wall Street is John Brooks, "Annals of Finance: Gold
Standard on the Booze," The New Yorker, XVL (September 13, 1959), 
pp. 107-126.
77Rumely to  D ire c t in g  C om m ittee, 6 November 1933, DLP.
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agenda of a meeting of the New York Board of Trade and even its  c ritic s  
acknowledged the Committee's power to influence public opinion.78
The most publicized confrontation between the Committee and its  
opponents occurred on the night of November 27 in New York C ity. En­
couraged at Alfred E. Smith's attack on the New Deal's "baloney dollar" 
a group of "antis" calling themselves The Crusaders hired Carnegie 
Hall fo r a mass meeting to protest the administration's monetary pol­
ic y .79 Sound moneyite speakers appeared before a crowd of 2,000, seven 
hundred of whom were Remington-Rand employees sent to cheer every 
mention of Roosevelt's name! A few blocks away the Committee for the 
Nation arranged for Father Charles E. Coughlin and Senator Elmer Thomas
o n
to appear before a successful pro-in flation  ra lly  at the Hippodrome.
One reporter referred to the rival meetings as the "Waterloo" of the 
money war and the press generally interpreted the outcome as a victory
78Rumely to Directing Committee, 13 November and 17 November
1933, DLP; and James McMullan, "News Behind the News: the National 
W hirligig, Herald-Tribune (New York), 22 December 1933. See also Rand 
to FDR, 11 November 1933, and Resolutions of a conference "representing 
the Committee for the Nation, the Monetary Reform League, Farm Organ­
izations, and Members of Congress," Washington, D. C ., 17 November 1933, 
OF 229, FDR Library.
7%mith's "baloney" remarks were contained in a le t te r  to the 
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, 24 November 1933, and is 
reprinted in New Outlook, CLXII (December 1933), pp. 9-11. See also 
Oscar Handlin, A1 Smith and His America (Boston: L itt le  Brown and Co.,
1958), p. 175. A le tte r  from The Crusaders, Inc. to Rumely, 7 June
1934, lis ts  the "beliefs" of the organization, DLP.
80j. H. Rand, J r .,  to FDR, 27 November 1933, DLP. Another f i r s t  
person account of the proceedings is Rumely to Colonel Louis McHenry 
Howe, 28 November 1933, DLP; a friendly answer is Howe to Rumely,
11 December 1933, DLP. See also Forrest Davis, "Inside Story of Fight 
fo r Reflation Shows Four Led the Attack," World Telegram (New York),
23 February 1934, p. 1, and Charles J. T u ll, Father Coughlin and the 
New Deal (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), pp. 42-49.
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fo r Roosevelt and an embarrassment to the forces of A1 Smith and sound
Q1
money. ‘
The Committee for the Nation believed that the rout of the hard 
money crowd In New York City provided Roosevelt the opportunity to 
so lid ify  re fla tion  gains. Heeding Warren's advice, the Committee urged 
the President to devalue the dollar a fu ll 50 per cent to $41.34, a cut 
thought su ffic ien t to restore prices to th e ir 1926 averages- While 
business. Industry and finance might survive a lesser devaluation, 
stabilization  at any figure less than $41.34 would "freeze agriculture  
Into a monetary straight jacket." Adeptly mustering Its  publicity  
resources during December and January, the Committee worked closely 
with In fla tion  Senators Borah and Thomas to push Roosevelt toward the 
"50 cent" d o l l a r . 82 But another turn In New Deal monetary policy 
thwarted the new year In fla tio n  d r i v e . 83 The 1933 battle for In fla tion  
led to a truce that granted refla tlon ls ts  but partia l victory.
Roosevelt viewed the Warren program as a contingency that 
might l i f t  prices and as an expedient that retained for the administra­
tion the In it ia t iv e  In the battle over monetary policy. Roosevelt frankly
8^New York Times, 28 November 1933; James McHullan, "News 
Behind the News: the National W hirligig," Herald-Tribune (New York),
5 December 1933. See also Senator Elmer Thomas to Coughlin, 5 December 
1933, Thomas papers. University of Oklahoma.
82comm1ttee ac tiv itie s  may be followed In Rumely to Directing 
Committee, 4 December 1933; 7 December 1933; 15 December 1933; 29 Decem­
ber 1933; and Rumely to Wood and Rosenwald, 8 December 1933; Wood to 
Rand, 1 December 1933; Committee for the Nation to Administration Ad­
visers, Members of Senate and House, 29 December 1933; a ll In DLP; and 
Rand to Warren, 12 December 1933, 6FW papers.
83Rumely to F. A. Vanderlip, 12 January 1934. See also Rumely 
to J. D. M ille r , 25 January 1934, DLP.
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acknowledged that numerous imponderables surrounded the Warren theory. 
Two days a fte r Implementing gold purchases Roosevelt wrote his banker- 
uncle Frederick A. Delano, "The gold purchase method seemed to me the 
only rea lly  sound experiment to try , even though i t  s t i l l  is an experi­
ment."84 Three weeks la te r at Savannah, Georgia, the President defended 
the empirical nature of the New Deal and labeled c ritic s  of such experi­
mentation "modern Tories," who like  the Loyalists of the 1770s opposed 
reform.85 The century-old Jackson-Biddle feud furnished Roosevelt an 
even more apt historical p ara lle l. He wrote Colonel Edward House on 
November 21, "The real truth is . . . that a financial element in the 
larger centers has owned the Government ever since the days of Andrew 
Jackson—and I am not wholly excepting the Administration of W. W.
The country is going through a repetition of Jackson's figh t with the 
Bank of the United States—only on a fa r bigger and broader b a s i s . " 8 6  
Beyond Its  price tinkering potential the Warren program meshed with 
the overall Jackson-Roosevelt goal of transferring the direction of 
monetary policy from Wall Street to Pennsylvania A v e n u e . 8? Attempts to 
tame the money power were, a fter a l l ,  commonplace in the history of 
American progressivism.
84pDR to Frederick A. Delano, Deputy Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond, 27 October 1933, OF 327, FDR Library.
85samuel I .  Rosenman, (comp.). The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, I I ,  p. 490.
86pDR to House, 21 November 1933, PPF 222, Roosevelt Library. 
See also O'Neal to FDR, 25 November 1933, Roosevelt Library.
87see Elmus Wicker, "Roosevelt's 1933 Monetary Experiment,"
The Journal of American History, LVII (March 1971), pp. 864-879; 
Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, pp. 247-248.
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Through the end of November Roosevelt professed satisfaction
OQ
with the results of the gold program. During December i t  became 
apparent that the relationship between the price of gold and other com­
modities was more obtuse than Warren imagined. Wholesale commodity 
prices declined during the la tte r  half of November and into the new 
year.B^ Under pressure from leaders of the Federal Reserve and the 
business community, the President had Warren and James H. Rogers review 
the gold program and prepare data for a more permanent revaluation of 
the d o l l a r . O n  January 15, Roosevelt asked Congress for new legis­
lation contained in the hastily passed Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 
1934. The new monetary legislation fixed the upper lim it of dollar 
devaluation at 60 per cent of the old weight and transferred t i t l e  of 
a ll Federal Reserve gold to the government. The act also established
a fund out o f  the "profit" of any subsequent devaluation to be used
91t o  S t a b i l i z e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s .
B^The Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 24, 
1933, p. 495.
B^Historians have tended to view Roosevelt's adoption of the 
Warren gold program with greater toleration than economists. Empha­
sizing the p o litic a lly  expedient nature of the experiment are John M. 
Blum, From the Morgenthau D iaries, pp. 74-76; and Schlesinger, The 
Coming of the New Deal, pp. 246-248. Economists who view gold buying 
with varying degrees of disdain are Crawford, Monetary Management Under 
the New Deal, pp. 70-75; Paris, Monetary Policies of the United States, 
pp. 21-29; C. 0. Hardy, Is There Enough Gold? (Washington, D. C .: 
Brookings In stitu tio n , 1935), 212 pages. A review of the gold program 
and its  effect on specific commodity prices is contained in Murray R. 
Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950 (New York:
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), pp. 295-299.
SOwarren Diary, December 15, 19, 20, 29, 30, 1933, and January 2.. 
3, 4, 7, 11, 1934.
Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin £. 
Roosevelt, I I I ,  pp. 40-45. See H, R. 6976, 73rd Cong., 2d Session, 
January 23, 1934.
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Roosevelt explained the new monetary strategy in a press con­
ference on January 15. He reviewed the speculative rise in prices that 
greeted his f i r s t  hundred days in o ffice , the crash of mid-July and the 
subsequent decline in commodity prices. The President claimed that 
gold stabilization was "in prospect" from the outset of the Warren pro­
gram. He credited the experiment with cheapening the dollar in 
international exchange rates and enhancing America's a b ility  "to get 
rid  of a great many of our export surpluses." He reminded reporters 
that Great Britain and France were as yet unwilling to f ix  exchange 
ratios and observed that "Great Britain has been pursuing what you call 
the Professor Warren theory for perhaps two years." But Roosevelt 
acknowledged that future devaluations associated with the new gold 
legislation would probably have "very l i t t le "  effect on domestic 
prices.92
During the two weeks following Roosevelt's monetary message to 
Congress, Warren, Morgenthau, George L. Harrison, Governor of the Fed­
eral Reserve Bank of New York, and other New Deal advisers discussed 
tbe next steps in administration monetary strategy. Consensus emerged 
that revaluation ought to quickly follow passage of the new legislation  
pending in Congress, but controversy remained regarding the size of any 
cut in the gold dollar. On January 31, the day a fte r passage of the 
Gold Reserve Act, the President convened a post-luncheon meeting of his 
s ta ff to settle  the matter. Iro n ica lly , the conservative Harrison 
advocated raising gold to $41.34 an ounce, the maximum allowed under law.
92jhe Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 15, 
1934, pp. 55-77.
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The Reserve o ff ic ia l hoped the move would give an aura of " fin a lity "  to 
gold buying. For th e ir  part, Warren and Morgenthau advised a lesser 
cut to give the President room for maneuver should future devaluations 
become necessary. Roosevelt accepted the Warren-Morgenthau position 
stating that "he did not want the appearance of f in a lity ."  At 3:10 p.m., 
Roosevelt issued a proclamation fix ing the weight of the gold dollar at 
15-5/21 grains of gold, nine-tenths fin e , or $35 per ounce.^3 Warren, 
Roosevelt and Morgenthau viewed the standard that would las t for a gen­
eration as but a temporary expedient, to be adjusted according to the
94future dictates of international monetary po litics .
With the exception of the more ardent disciples of Warren, who 
feared that $35 gold would prove insuffic ient to support a return of 
1926 prices, the majority of farm spokesmen seemed pleased with Roose­
v e lt's  January gold d e c i s i o n s . j^io days before the President's 
January 15 message to Congress, the National Agricultural Conference 
a t Washington lis ted  as the f i r s t  of seven resolutions "Approval of 
the President's monetary policy." The conference composed of repre­
sentatives from the major farm organizations urged the President to
93warren Diary, January 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 1934. 
For more on the role of Harrison see Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary 
History of the United States, pp. 224-225, and Brooks, "Annals of 
Finance," pp. 107-126. Roosevelt discussed the rationale for the $35 
figure in The Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 31, 
1934, p. 122.
94on February 2, Warren wrote Herman Oliphant that the Treasury 
should make i t  clear "that we w ill change the price within the legal 
lim its whenever i t  is in our in terest. I  do not think that the $35 
price has any material chance of being high enough." Warren papers, 
Cornell University.
95on January 25, Rumely estimated that i t  would take a gold 
price of $45 to restore 1926 prices. See Rumely to J. D. M ille r , DLP.
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continue working for a stabilized d o l l a r . "^6 Senator Elmer Thomas of 
Oklahoma endorsed the President's monetary message of January 15, in te r­
preting the move as meaning "we w ill have many new dollars in 
circulation" and Farm Bureau President O'Neal wired Roosevelt regard­
ing the Gold Reserve Act: "You have won another great victory for the
97fo lks." The farm press also praised the nationalization of gold and 
interpreted the new devaluation as another victory in agriculture's  
drive for the honest d o lla r .98
Agricultural in fla tio n is ts  generally approved the President's 
treatment of gold, but disliked his fa ilu re  to do something for s ilv e r. 
The autumn decline in farm prices and the announcement of the gold pur­
chase plan in October rekindled an interest in s ilver that had lain  
dormant since the passage of the Thomas amendment in A pril. After the 
administration began the gold purchase program, Key Pittman, leader of 
the Senate s ilver bloc, reminded New Deal o ffic ia ls  that s ilver
98"Minutes of the National Agricultural Conference," Washington, 
D. C ., January 12, 13, 1934, DLP; "Th- National Agricultural Confer­
ence," National Grange Monthly, XXXI (February 1934), p. 3; "National 
Farm Conference," Bureau Farmer (February 1934), p. 4.
97o'Neal to FDR, 29 January 1934, OF 1350, Roosevelt Library; 
"Statement by Elmer Thomas, United States Senator, Oklahoma," January 15, 
1934, 3 pages, Thomas papers. University of Oklahoma.
98See "Roosevelt Moves to Raise Price Levels," Wallaces' Farmer, 
LIX (January 20, 1934), p. 20; "Our Monetary Policy," Prairie Farmer,
CVI (January 20, 1934), p. 6; Arthur Capper, "What the Money Program 
Will Do," Capper's Weekly, LIX (February 3, 1934), p. 2; "Gold Valua­
tion and Reflation Win," American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI (February 3, 
1934), p. 4; "'Honest Dollar' Speeds Prosperity; What President's New 
Money Policy Means," Prairie Farmer, CVI (February 3, 1934), p. 23; 
Successful Farming, XXXII (February 1934), p. 10.
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awaited r e l ie f .99 Pittman's many letters to Roosevelt memorializing 
s ilve r were but a precursor to a larger campaign as dozens of congress­
men endorsed sim ilar legislation during November and D e c e m b e r . in 
mid-December, Henry T. Rainey, Speaker of the House, added his own 
remonetization proposal to the many already before Congress and on 
December 29, a third of the Senate signed a resolution favoring "the 
free and unlimited coinage of both gold and s ilver at a ratio  to be 
established by law."^^^
On October 28, three days into the Warren gold purchase program, 
ten congressmen, mostly from farm d is tric ts  and at the instigation of 
Martin Dies of Texas, jo in tly  wired the President regarding monetary 
policy. The Dies telegram typified the fusion of s ilver and agricul­
tural interests that underscored much of the campaign to rehabilitate  
s ilver. The memorial urged that foreign nations be allowed to buy 
American farm products with s ilver whose value would be a r t i f ic ia l ly  
established three cents above its  world price. The wire observed "The 
Government is now purchasing gold above the world market price. We 
urge the same thing be done for s ilver."  To further their cause the 
congressmen lis ted  three arguments frequently used to interest agrarian 
groups in the cause of the white metal. An adequate use of s ilver  
would expand the money supply and thus increase the purchasing power
99pittman to FDR, 15, 19, 23, 28 October 1933, Pittman papers. 
Library of Congress.
TO^ Many such le tters  are contained in OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
^9^For Rainey's bimetallism proposal see The Washington Post, 
December 21, 1933. Details regarding the Senate resolution are contained 
in Elmer Thomas to W. S. Thomas, 29 December 1933, Thomas papers.
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of farmers= The restoration of s ilver would stimulate the disposal of 
farm surpluses to s ilver nations like  India and China who would be 
better able to afford our exports. And conversely, as American currency 
depreciated in relation to the s ilver backed currencies, the United
States would cease becoming the dumping ground for cheap foreign
^  102 imports.
Among the big three farm organizations the Farmers Union had 
o ff ic ia lly  supported s ilver remonetization since 1931. Its  President 
John A. Simpson crusaded for s ilver during the early th irt ie s  in the 
apocalyptic style fam iliar to old line Populists. During the November 
1933 national convention at Omaha, Nebraska, Simpson castigated "the 
workers of in iqu ity ," the bankers of England and America who perpe­
trated the "Crime of 1873" and the panics of 1920 and 1929. The 
convention enthusiastically endorsed the Wheeler remonetization b il l  
a fter Simpson exhorted, "Your wheat surplus, your meat surplus, your 
cotton surplus, and much of the surplus of our factories w ill vanish" 
with passage of the s ilver bill.^^S
Monetary themes also loomed important at the 1933 conventions 
of the Grange and the Farm Bureau. The Patrons of Husbandry met in 
November at Boise, Idaho and a fter hearing Senator William Borah and
lOZwartin Dies, et ^ . , to FDR, 28 October 1933, GFW papers.
103see "Report of John A. Simpson, President, National Farmers' 
Union," November 21, 1933, 6 pages, Simpson papers. University of Okla­
homa ; O ffic ia l Minutes of the 29th Annual Convention of the Farmers 
Educational and Co-Operative Union of America, Omaha, Nebraska, Novem­
ber 21, 22, 1933, pp. 33-34. The Wheeler b ill  referred to was S. 70, 
73rd Cong., 2d Sess. The Union also endorsed a proposal of Elmer 
Thomas' for the issuance of " fu ll legal-tender non-interest bearing 
currency."
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National Master Louis J. Taber speak on the money question, the conven­
tion endorsed "the greater monetary use of silver" as a means of 
providing reflation and stab ilization  of p r i c e s . 1^4 parm Bureau dele­
gates convened at Chicago on December 13, commended Roosevelt "for his 
far-reaching and sound policies in regard to revaluation of the dollar" 
and urged the immediate adoption of the commodity do llar. The Bureau 
also wished "to call attention . . .  to the desirab ility  of remonetiz­
ing s ilve r."  In words sim ilar to the Dies telegram, the Bureau's 
resolution claimed a bimetallic base would expand credit and currency 
at home and exports a b r o a d . 1^5
The National Agricultural Conference held in Washington, D.C., 
January 12, 13, 1934, also endorsed remonetization of s ilver. The con­
ference not only approved the administration's gold policy but urged a 
"larger monetary use of s ilv e r, as in the judgment of the President 
w ill best carry out this policy." The signatory organizations to the 
Conference report included not only the Grange and the Farm Bureau but 
the National Cooperative Council, the Farmers National Grain Associa­
tion and the American Agricultural Editors Association. By January, 
1934, organized agriculture had reentered the s ilver controversy.^®^
l®4proceedings of the National Grange, 67th Annual Session,
Boise, Idaho, November 15-24, 1933, pp. 17. The Grange convention also 
urged the issuance of not more than three b illio n  dollars of non-interest 
bearing bonds to pay for public works. See Ib id . , pp. 16-17, 159;
National Grange Monthly, XXX (December 1933), p. 1.
^®^Minutes of the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, Chicago, I l l in o is ,  December 13, 1933; Bureau 
Fanner TJanuary 1934), p. 7.
TOG"Minutes of the National Agricultural Conference," Washington, 
D. C ., January 12, 13, 1934, DLP; O ffic ia l News Letter (January 23, 1934), 
pp. 1, 2.
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The in fla tion  "brains trus t,"  the Committee for the Nation, 
also recognized agriculture's fresh interest in s ilve r. In mid-Septem­
ber, during a conversation with Committee chairman James H. Rand., J r .,  
Roosevelt asked the Committee to investigate "the problem of s i l v e r . " ^ 0 7  
On October 4, the Committee submitted its  "Report on Silver" to the 
President. The memorandum held that gold devaluation offered the 
"simplest and most effective" means for restoring prices. As for s ilve r, 
"The preponderant opinion on the Committee is that i t  is technically 
superfluous for the purpose of reducing the abnomal purchasing power 
of the do llar." The report denounced bimetallism though i t  approved 
Treasury purchases of s ilver as encouraging American exports to the 
Orient. The Committee endorsed the proposal of Warren that the admin­
istration  experiment with a symmetallic do llar representing a fixed 
ra tio  of gold and s ilve r. The union of gold and s ilver in the dollar
"might suggest recognition of the growing interdependence of the world
10fteconomy that is in process of building."
Never enthusiastic for s ilv e r , the resurfacing of the issue put 
the Committee in a quandary. I t  feared that emphasis on s ilver might 
divert support from Warren's gold program and the commodity do llar.
At the same time the Committee recognized the necessity of obtaining 
s ilver bloc support for reform monetary leg is la tion . Toward the end 
of October, Rumely, secretary to the Committee, cautioned against
107see Rand to FDR, 1 September 1933, and FDR to "Mac" Qlarvin 
M eIntire], 11 September 1933, OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
108"Report on S ilver," Committee for the Nation, 4 October 1933, 
6 pages, DLP.
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releasing the presidential "Report on. -Silver" to the public. "Nobody." 
Rumely predicted, "can foresee what combinations and blocs w ill have to 
be met with in leg is la tive  halls when the question of a commodity 
dollar comes up." Rumely contended the Committee ought to appease the 
"tig h tly  organized" s ilver bloc i f  only s ilver advocates would keep 
the conmodity d o lla r .^^9
Roosevelt also respected the power of the resurgent s ilver  
movement. On September 20, 1933, he asked Secretary Woodin to "give 
serious consideration to some method of raising the price of s ilver to 
sixty cents an ounce, and ta lk  with me about i t  as soon as I get back."^^^ 
The same day, Warren recorded that the President considered s ilver pur­
chase a viable monetary option.^^^ About a week a fte r the beginning 
of Warren's gold program, Roosevelt expressed the hope that i t  would 
resu lt in higher s ilver p r i c e s . T h e  next day he wrote Morgenthau,
"The point that Key Pittman makes is that we should do something to 
purchase s ilve r as well as gold, and the point is fa ir ly  well taken."1^3 
In November, Roosevelt sent Morgenthau, the newly appointed Acting 
Secretary of Treasury, a confidential f i l e  on the s ilver issue that
lO^Rumely to Directing Committee, 28 October 1933, DLP.
TTOpoosevelt to Secretary of Treasury, 20 September 1933,
OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
ITTWarren Diary, 20 September 1933.
TT^ib id . , 30 October 1933, see the chart en titled  "Price of Gold 
and S ilver," and a notation, "Went over this sheet with Roosevelt. He 
had asked question i f  gold goes to $41.34 does not s ilver go to 50( .^"
n^Memo from the President for Henry Morgenthau, J r . ,  31 Octo­
ber 1933, OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
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included material gathered from Pittman and a note that instructed,
" I t  might be good ball fo r you to ask Pittman to lunch with you some 
day."T14 During the fa l l  months of 1933, Roosevelt provided silver  
interests a sympathetic hearing. S t i l l  the question remained as to 
how fa r he would go to f u l f i l l  the 1932 Democratic National Platform 
which pledged "the rehabilitation of s ilve r."
On December 21, 1933, Roosevelt acted to appease s ilver in ter­
ests. He announced American acceptance of the S ilver Agreement 
negotiated during the July London Economic Conference. Primarily the 
work of Utah Senator Key Pittman, who had served as a delegate to the 
conference, Roosevelt explained the London agreement looked "to the 
elimination of an unnatural oversupply of s ilver on the markets of the 
world." Specifically , the President ordered the Treasury to purchase 
and coin the total s ilver production of American mines for the subse­
quent four year period. A seigniorage charge of one-half the statutory 
price of $1.29 per ounce would be assessed making the effective price 
of s ilver sixty-four and one-half cents per ounce.^^^ Though monetar­
i ly  insignificant, the President's December s ilver proclamation
TT^ FDR to Acting Secretary of Treasury, 21 November 1933, Ib id .
TTSyhe Pittman agreements also lim ited the amount of silver 
the signatory powers could sell on the international market. See 
Pittman to Morgenthau, 11 December 1933, Pittman papers, Library of 
Congress. The President's proclamation and a note of explanation are 
contained in Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, I I ,  pp. 534-539. See also The Press Conferences of Frank­
lin  D. Roosevelt, December 22, 1933, pp. 564-567.
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provided the mining industry with a welcomed, i f  moderate, subsidy.
The December 21 Presidential proclamation fa iled  to satisfy  
bim etallists. The seigniorage charge rankled the free -s ilveri tes and 
the lim ited purchase program offended in fla tio n is ts . Senator William 
Borah of Idaho, who favored both in fla tion  and remonetization, informed 
constituents that the President's s ilver proclamation would not "in 
any way interfere with the real fig h t for the remonitization [js ic j of 
s i l v e r . Y e t  bim etallists recognized the crucial importance of 
Roosevelt's support. Early in the new year Elmer Thomas admitted:
" I f  the President of the United States concludes to say s ilver shall 
be restored, i t  w ill be restored. I f  he opposes i t ,  i t  w ill be prac­
t ic a lly  impossible . . .  to do anything for s ilver.
Remonetizationists tested Roosevelt's attitude toward s ilver 
during the debates that preceded passage of the Gold Reserve Act. On 
January 26, Senator Wheeler, in conjunction with Senator William H.
King of Utah, offered a s ilver rider to the President's gold b i l l .
The Wheeler-King amendment required the Treasury to purchase at least 
50 m illion ounces of s ilver per month until monetary reserves included 
an additional b illio n  ounces or until 371 grains of s ilver equaled 23.22
The average price of s ilver during the 1920's was approxi­
mately fifty -n in e  cents per ounce. See Brennan, S ilver and the First 
New Deal, p. 86. The proclamation resulted in but a one per cent 
increase in the nation's monetary stock. See Allen Seymour Everest, 
Morgenthau, the New Deal and S ilv e r: A Story of Pressure Politics
(New York: King's Crown Press, 1950), p. 31.
^^^Borah to L. F. Parsons and Charles P. Reiniger, 22 December 
1933, and Borah to W. Mont Ferry, 30 December 1933, Borah papers. 
Library of Congress.
ll^Thom as to  Edwin F ra n tz , 6 January  1934, Thomas papers .
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grains of gold in terms of purchasing p o w e r W h e e l e r  appealed for 
support, arguing that the proposal would "find markets for our surplus 
farm products, for our surplus cotton, our surplus wheat, and our sur­
plus manufactured a r t ic le s ."^20
Roosevelt strongly opposed the Wheeler rider because of its
1mandatory purchase feature. He informed Joseph T. Robinson, Senate 
Majority Leader, "This is not the time to order the purchase of s ilver. 
Let us wait a l i t t l e  while to see how the Pittman agreement works out." 
He observed that the Thomas Amendment already granted the administra­
tion the authority to buy s ilver "from time to time at such prices
that seem reasonable."^^2
The President's intervention defeated the Wheeler Amendment
43 to 45.123 Senator Borah reported that at least three Senators favor-
124able to the b i l l  bowed to administration pressure. Among those 
voting for i t  were 14 senators from the s ilver p'"tiucing states, six 
Republicans who opposed the measure but hoped to embarrass Roosevelt,
11^1). S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2d Sess., 
January 26, 1934, pp. 1415-1416.
I^^Wheeler's two-day defense of the amendment contained a 
strong appeal to agricultural Interests. See Ib id . ,  January 27, 1934, 
pp. 1445-1462.
121See Robinson's remarks to the Senate, Ib id . , p. 1463.
1^^"Private and Confidential Memorandum from FDR to Senator 
Robinson," 25 January 1934, OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
123g. s . , Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2d Sess., 
January 27, 1934, pp. 1464-1465.
12^Borah to John H. Wourms, 29 January 1934, Borah papers. 
Library of Congress.
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and 25 Senators with important agricultural c o n s t i tu e n c ie s F o u r  
days a fte r the vote, Borah predicted that the s ilver issue would resur­
face before the current session of Congress adjourned. He added, "I 
do not think the administration can defeat i t  a g a i n .
The defeat of the Wheeler amendment, as Borah expected, stim­
ulated s ilv e r!tes to greater agitation. The spring of 1934 seemed a 
s ilve r replica of 1896 and farmers as they had in the Populist era sig­
n ifican tly  contributed to the demands for bimetallism. In February, 
Rumely, whose Committee for the Nation had been reluctant to push 
s ilv e r , wrote his Directing Committee that organized agriculture
favored remonetization. He added that s ilver purchase "seems to be
1 ?7presenting i ts e lf  more d irectly  than at anytime in the past."
Within weeks the Committee sponsored s ilver purchase dinners for Con­
gressmen and farm lobbyists in Washington.128 The s ilver bloc also 
proved sensitive to the importance of farm support fo r the white metal. 
Representative James G. Scrugham of Nevada, leader of a hundred pro-
s ilve r congressmen, worked to overcome the notion that s ilver
129legislation would benefit only the eleven mining states.
125%he six Republicans are lis ted  in Brennan, S ilver and the 
F irs t New Deal, p. 113.
126gorah to James F. McCarthy, 31 January 1934, Borah papers.
IZ^Rumely to Directing Committee, 9 February 1934, DLP.
12%early 200 congressmen attended a Committee dinner on behalf 
of the Dies b i l l  on April 23. See New York Times, 24 April 1933.
^^%crugham to E. H. Walker, 7 March 1934. Scrugham worked 
with Father Charles Coughlin and the Committee for the Nation in seek­
ing s ilver leg islation. See "Memorandum" by W. C. L. to Pittman,
21 March 1934, Pittman papers. Library of Congress.
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Of the more than fo rty  s ilv e r proposals before Congress, the 
Dies b i l l ,  which fused the interests of agriculture and s ilv e r, served 
as the catalyst fo r additional New Deal s ilve r leg is la tion . Within a 
week of the Wheeler vote. Representative Martin L. Dies of Texas in tro ­
duced a new silver-agricu ltura l r e l ie f  b ill.^^®  The b i l l  proposed to 
create an Agricultural Surplus and Exchange Board comprised of the 
President and the Secretaries of Commerce, In te rio r, Agriculture and 
Treasury. The Board would sell American agricultural exports to foreign 
buyers in exchange for s ilver accepted a t a valuation of up to 125 per 
cent of the world market price. A fter completing the sale the Board 
would deposit the s ilver with the Secretary of Treasury who would issue 
s ilve r ce rtifica tes  against the metal. In turn, the Board would use 
s ilv e r certifica tes  to reimburse American farmers for the commodities 
sold abroad. Dies' proposal offered farmers advantages in both overseas 
and domestic markets. Advocates reasoned that the exchange of commod­
it ie s  for depreciated s ilver provided American farm products a 
competitive advantage in international markets while the issuance of 
s ilv e r certifica tes  to the farmer provided agriculture a fu ll domestic 
price. Agriculturalists believed the b i l l  would reduce surpluses, 
increase currency supplies and have an ameliorative effect on commodity 
prices.T3T
s , , Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2d Sess., Feb­
ruary 2, 1934, p. 1895; New York Times, 4 February 1934.
T3T$ee H. R. 7581, 73rd Congress, 2d Sess. Dies explained the 
major features of his b il l  in U. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 
2d Sess., March 19, 1934, pp. 4845-4849.
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The measure drew strong support from agricultural interests.
John A. Simpson endorsed i t ,  commenting on its  s ilver ce rtifica te  fea-
132tures: "That puts out some real money." During committee hearings
on the b il l  Warren, J. H. Rand, J r . ,  and Simpson tes tified  for the b il l
and agricultural representatives dominated the House debates on the 
133measure. Representative Jed Johnson of Oklahoma expressed a common 
notion when he exclaimed, "1 am firm ly convinced that the s ilver b il l  
is real farm re lie f;  i t  is mortgage re l ie f ,  i t  is tax r e l i e f . "1^4 Even 
after the administration through Morgenthau opposed the b i l l ,  the Dies 
proposal impressively passed the House on March 19, 258 to 112.^35 
The ayes included Speaker Rainey, 20 Republicans, a ll five Farmer-Labor 
members and the bulk of the D e m o c r a t s . ^^ 6
In fla tio n is t leader Elmer Thomas sponsored the Dies proposal 
in the Senate. Thomas had the b i l l  assigned to the Agricultural and 
Forestry Committee where a subcommittee that included Thomas, Wheeler, 
Capper and Shipstead added the major ingredients of the Wheeler s ilver
T^ N^ew York Times, 4 March 1934 and 4 February 1934.
T33ib id . , 11 March 1934 and 4 March 1934.
s . .  Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 2d Sess., 
March 19, 1934, p. 4862. See also comments by Representative Somers 
of New York, Ib id . , p. 4863 and by Dies, Ib id . , p. 4846.
135lb id . ,  p. 4863.
T^ Gwew York Times, 20 March 1934. Of the 38 Democrats who 
voted against the measure, 29 came from the Northeast or Virginia.
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purchase proposal defeated in January to the Dies m e a s u r e T h e  new 
omnibus provided cohesion to the agricu ltural, s ilver and in flation  
blocs in the Senate. Pittman and Wallace both thought the b il l  would 
p a s s . T 3 8
Roosevelt hoped demands for s ilver legislation would diminish 
following the defeat of the Wheeler amendment in January.^39 in March, 
Secretary Morgenthau announced the government opposed further s ilver  
leg islation. The Treasurer explained that the London Agreements pro­
vided s ilver interests with adequate protection and he expressed the 
opinion that Congress ought to avoid new monetary legislation in order 
to allow time to evaluate the experimental monetary policy already 
e n a c te d .R e g a rd le s s  of its  attempts to discourage additional s ilver  
leg is la tion , the New Deal maintained a continuing dialogue with silver  
interests and Morgenthau and his aids at the Treasury investigated a
S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., March 20, 
1934, p. 4878; U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry, Report, Encourage Sale of American Agricultural Surplus Prod­
ucts Abroad; To Provide Payment Therefor in S ilv e r, and to Provide for 
Purchase of S ilv e r, Report No. 697, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., April 10, 1934.
T3Bpittman held strong reservations regarding the Dies b i l l .
S t i l l  he thought that without Presidential interference i t  would pass 
Congress. See Pittman to Mr. President, 25 April 1934, and Pittman to 
Morgenthau, 13 April 1934, Pittman papers. Library of Congress; Wallace 
to The President, 28 April 1934, Record Group 16, "Currency," Secretary 
of Agriculture, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
139Roosevelt as la te  as mid-April told a delegation of repre­
sentatives, "I am absolutely opposed to any s ilver legislation at this 
session." See "The President's Conference with Members of the House 
of Representatives at 8:30 P.M., Sunday Evening, April 15, 1934," 419, 
Roosevelt Library.
T4PNew York Times, 2 March and 16 March 1934; Blum, From the 
Morgenthau D iaries, pp. 185-6.
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variety of issues associated with the monetary use of the white metal 
during the early spring of 1934.141
Roosevelt explained his attitude towards the Dies-Thomas b i l l  
and s ilver legislation in general in a conference with 16 Senators and 
the Vice President on the afternoon of April 14. Roosevelt especially 
expressed indignation at any mandatory purchase requirements in the 
s ilve r b i l l  and asserted, “Things are going damn well at this particu­
la r  tim e--don't forget i t . "  He also asked to be given a free hand to 
negotiate international agreements on s ilver purchase. " I f  we f a i l , "  
he promised, "then maybe we w ill try  to ta lk  about our a b ility  to do 
i t  a ll by ourselves. I am in favor of a bi-m etallic b a s e . "^42
By the end of April the major contention between Roosevelt and 
s ilverites  centered on the issue of permissive versus mandatory legis­
la tion . In the words of Borah, permissive legislation meant that "we 
bury our leg is la tive  power in the bosom of the President, where i t  w ill 
rest for ever m o r e . "^43 in fla tion is ts  believed that the discretionary 
features of the Thomas amendment had allowed the administration to side­
step a more vigorous monetary program. They did not want to repeat 
the error.
T4T$ee Warren Diary, February 21, April 11 and April 25, 1934; 
Oliphant to Pittman 27 February 1934, Pittman papers. Library of Con­
gress; Morgenthau Diary, I ,  p. 48, Roosevelt Library.
^42"jhe President's conference with the Senators Saturday a fte r­
noon, April 14, 1934," PSF, "Senate," FDR Library. Compare also, "The 
President's conference with the Members of the House of Representatives 
at 8:30 P.M., Sunday evening, April 15, 1934," FDR Library, 419; and 
The Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roooevelt, April 20, 1934, p .293-94.
143Borah to McCarthy, 20 April 1934, Borah papers. Library of 
Congress. Rumely reported that 17 Senators had indicated their opposi­
tion to permissive leg islation , see Rumely to Directing Committee,
April 23, 1934, DLP.
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On April 27, the cabinet advised Roosevelt to compromise with 
the s ilve r bloc. Morgenthau recorded that the cabinet " fe lt  that for 
the President to veto another important measure would be most embar­
rassing for the congressmen at election time."144 During the following
three weeks Roosevelt, in a series of conferences, sought accommodation
145with the s ilver senators. These efforts produced the agreement 
embodied in yet another Presidential s ilver message to Congress on 
May 22.
The May 22 message asked for authorization for the government 
to buy s ilver "with the ultimate objective" of accumulating s ilver  
reserves until they comprised one-fourth of the nation's monetary stock 
or until s ilver reached $1.29 per ounce. S ilver was to be purchased 
at not more than 50 cents per ounce and a controversial tax of 50 per 
cent was to be imposed on profits accruing from s ilver transactions.
The message also requested that the President be granted the permissive 
power to nationalize s ilver as had already been done with gold.^^G
The s ilver compromise fa iled  to please agrarian in fla tio n is ts . 
The compromise reflected Roosevelt's capitulation to those demanding 
s ilve r subsidies, not those clamoring for an expanded currency.
144f^orqenthau Diary, I ,  p. 49, Roosevelt Library. Pittman gave 
Roosevelt much the same advice. See Pittman to FDR, 25 April 1934, 
Pittman papers, Library of Congress.
^^^These conferences are accounted for in Brennan, S ilver and 
the F irs t New Deal, pp. 122-130.
^^^Rosenman, (comp.). The Public Papers and Addresses of Frank­
lin  D. Roosevelt, pp. 253-255.
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Like its  December 21 precursor, the June s ilver purchase agreement con­
tributed but a t r i f l e  to the future growth of the nation's monetary 
s t o c k . E l m e r  Thomas doubted that the b i l l  would expand the Nation's
currency "a single copper," and Huey Long characterized the measure as
1 / 1 0
"an a ll day sucker; something to play with." Nevertheless, Thomas, 
Long, Wheeler, Borah and other in fla tio n is ts , resigned that the b i l l  
was the only one possible a t the current session, joined the majority 
in passing the measure 55 to 25 on June 11.^49 Congressman Dies guided 
the b i l l  through the House and the S ilver Purchase Act received the 
President's signature on June 19.^^®
The S ilver Purchase Act climaxed a year and a quarter of New 
Deal monetary management. Unhappily the restorative powers of Roose­
ve lt's  monetary program had proved disappointing. Reviewing the gold 
policy for reporters in April 1934, the President admitted that the 
Warren experiment had fa iled  to restore prices "as much as we expected. 
Statis tics  showed that though the gold content of the dollar had been 
reduced 41 per cent, the wholesale price index during the f i r s t
T47$ee Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United 
States, pp. 488-89; Blum, From the Morgenthau D iaries, pp. 188-89; 
Schlesinger, The Corning of the New Deal, pp. 251-52.
T^^U. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., May 22,
1934, p. 9218. See also Thomas to Robinson, 2 June 1934, Thomas papers.
149u. S ., Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., June 11,
1934, p. 11060. Borah explains his vote in Borah to Fiesinger, 28 May
1934, Borah papers. Library of Congress.
^^ N^ew York Times, 20 June 1934.
T^^The Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 20, 
1934, p. 293.
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13 months of the New Deal climbed but 21.5 per cent.^^Z The much 
touted 1926 level of prices would await recovery until 1942!^^^ In fla ­
tionists believed the sluggish price level proved that genuine currency 
expansion had yet to m aterialize. Within weeks of the S ilver Purchase 
Act, farm organizations, in fla tio n is ts , congressmen and the Committee 
fo r the Nation resumed demands for a cheaper do llar. They remained 
unconvinced that in flation  was more mirage than miracle worker.
T These statis tics are taken from Everst, Morgenthau, the New 
Deal and S ilver, p. 44. Influences such as drought, the AAA and in ter­
nat! onaT conditions also contributed to higher commodity prices in the 
th irt ie s . See Frederick C. M ills , Prices in Recession and Recovery:
A Survey of Recent Changes (New York: The National Bureau of Economic
Research, In c ., 1936), pp. 268-84.
153u. S ., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor S tatis tics ,
Bulletin 1376, Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes, 1960 (Washington, D. C ., 
1963), p. 29.
CHAPTER X
INFLATIONISTS DEFLATED: FARMERS AND NEW DEAL
MONETARY POLICY, 1934 AND 1935
The passage of the S ilver Purchase Act in June 1934 proved a 
las t hurrah for any re a lis tic  expectation that the New Deal might pro­
vide energetic and inflationary monetary leadership. During the 
following year the administration pursued other interests while admin­
istering a passive monetary policy that frustrated and disappointed 
those anticipating further in flationary action. The experience divided 
in fla tion ists  and separated the more embittered from the ranks of the 
New Deal.
Alienation between in fla tion ists  and the New Deal began as the 
administration suspended its  most daring monetary experiment—the 
Warren gold purchase program. By December 1933, agricultural in fla tio n ­
is ts , s ilverites and the Committee for the Nation commonly expressed 
discouragement and doubt as to Roosevelt's next monetary move.  ^ While 
many farm spokesmen seemed temporarily satisfied with the gold devalua­
tion proclamation of January 31, 1934, plain-spoken John A. Simpson, 
President of the Farmers' Union, believed the cut in the gold dollar
Vhe Rumely memos during December and January re flec t disappoint­
ment at Roosevelt's commitment to in fla tio n . Rumely quoted Senators 
Elmer Thomas and William Borah as sharing doubts about the future direc­
tion of American monetary policy. See Rumely to Directing Committee,
7 December 1933, DLP.
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"of l i t t l e  value" and groused "the whole program here is worse than
p
crazy." Within three months the major farm organizations revived 
demands for s t i l l  more in fla tion .^
The administration viewed in fla tio n is ts  with a new sense of 
impatience during the spring of 1934. On April 24, as sentiment for 
s ilver legislation neared majority status in Congress, Secretary of 
the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, J r . ,  with the blessing of Roosevelt, 
released the names of large holders of s ilver stocks. Administration 
leaders hoped the l is t  of s ilver speculators might embarrass many who 
supported "doing something for s ilve r."  Morgenthau's l i s t  included 
Amy Collins, Father Coughlin's secretary, and the Committee fo r the 
Nation's Frank Vanderlip. Coughlin never forgave the administration 
fo r the "double-cross" and "Roosevelt and Ruin" replaced "Roosevelt or 
Ruin" in the priest's  passionate rhetoric.^ The s ilver l is t  episode 
created h o s tility  among s ilv e rite s , but fa iled  to lessen the demands 
which forced Roosevelt to acquiesce in the S ilver Purchase Act of June 
1934.
The Committee for the Nation, though never openly breaking with 
Roosevelt, also grew increasingly uncomfortable with the New Deal
Simpson to Rand, 31 January 1934, DLP; and Simpson to Roose­
v e lt, 4 February 1934, Record Group 16, Secretary of Agriculture, "Farm 
R elief," National Archives. Simpson died in Washington, March 14, 1934.
^"Resolutions of the National Agricultural Conference,"
April 14, 1934, DLP.
4$ee Sheldon Marcus, Father Coughlin: The Tumultuous Life of
the Priest of the L itt le  Flower (Boston: L i t t le ,  Brown, 1973), pp. 68-70;
and Charles J. T u ll, Father Coughlin and the New Deal (Syracuse: Syra­
cuse University Press, 1965), pp. 55-56.
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during 1934. The f i r s t  strains on the relationship between the Com­
mittee and Roosevelt appeared during the gold-buying venture of late  
1933. When i t  became clear that the gold program fa iled  s ign ificantly  
to raise prices, the Committee refused to fa u lt the Warren thesis, but 
rather blamed the disappointing results on the NRA, deflationists prop­
aganda, and "feeble administration" of policy. Committee memoranda 
explained that the expected price increases fa iled  to materialize  
because the NRA depressed business recovery "through regulation, dom­
ination, and red tape," while deflationists "frightened investors and 
others with stories of runaway in fla tio n . The program also had fa llen  
victim to its  administrators—the personnel of the Treasury, Department 
of Agriculture and Federal Reserve who sabatoged the very policy they
5
were supposed to execute. Warren apologists charged the widening gap 
between London gold prices and RFC gold prices during December and 
January proved the tim id ity of the administration in raiding its  own 
do llar abrosd.G in late May, Warren confidentially appraised the gold 
experiment for Rumely: "Of course, no one expected that the gold value
of the do llar could be fu lly  controlled by using the small sums and the 
awkward procedures that were used las t f a l l .  There seemed to be no
^Rumely to Directing Committee, 21 October and 30 October 1933, 
1, 13, 17, 28 November 1933, 7, 12, 15 December 1933; and Committee for 
the Nation to Members of the National Advisory and Auxiliary Committees, 
1 November 1933, DIP. Frank A. Pearson's defense of the Warren gold 
policy is in Pearson, W. I .  Myers, and A. R. Gans, "Warren as Presiden­
t ia l  Adviser," Farm Economics, No. 211 (December 1957), pp. 5637-55.
Gpumely to Directing Committee, 1 May 1934; Rand to National 
Advisory and Auxiliary Committees, 8 May 1934; Rand to B. C. Forbes,
23 May 1934 and Earl Harding to Democrats, 26 May 1934, DIP.
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other legal procedure possible except a 'once for a l l '  devaluation and 
the public was then probably not ready fo r an adequate increase in 
price." Warren boasted that even within the lim itations imposed on the 
program, the experiment had halted the deflationary cycle and resulted 
in a more buoyant and stable price level.^
The New Deal's disdain for la issez-fa ire  government added to 
the r i f t  between the Committee and the Roosevelt regime. The Republi­
can free enterprise Board of Directors of the Committee disliked the 
administration's emphasis on government planning. Rumely confided,
"the deepest meaning in Professor Warren's thought always has been the 
implied b e lie f that i f  the price level is preserved . . . there w ill be 
an opportunity for the free plan of individual in it ia t iv e  and the fu r­
ther development of our cap ita lis tic  e c o n o m y .T h e  Committee secretary 
believed that "socialism" should be lim ited to government control of 
money and banking, but that other economic a c tiv ity  ought to be freed
Q
from the "dead hand" of government regulation.
During 1934 the Committee's private enterprise emphasis led i t  
to promote several campaigns which chastized the administration for 
abandoning monetary measures in favor of alleged soc ia lis tic  alterna­
tives. In January the Committee sponsored Professor Douglas Copland 
of the University of Melbourne in a series of lectures directed at
^Quoted in Rumely to Directing Committee, 26 May 1934, DLP.
^Rumely to Directing Committee, 7 December 1933, DLP.
^Rumely to  D ir e c t in g  C om m ittee, 1 F ebrua ry  1934, DLP; a ls o
P ro fe s s o r  D avid  N o v ick  to  C om m ittee, 6 A p r i l  1934, DLP.
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farm audiences. Copland critic ized  the NRA and the AAA and argued that 
Australia and New Zealand, though revaluing gold 25 per cent above the 
British pound, had restored prosperity and avoided socia lis tic  in ter­
ventionist schemes. The Committee furnished Copland's monograph, 
Australia and the World C ris is , to more than fo rty  agricultural organ­
izations.
In February the Committee began an e ffo rt to defeat the 
Fletcher-Rayburn B ill which, as the Security Exchange Act, received the 
President's signature on June 6, 1934. While admitting the existence 
of security abuses, the Committee viewed the licensing and regulatory 
features of the proposed b il l  as a dangerous grant of power over private 
property to the federal government. In addition, the b il l  seemed an 
attempt to displace the monetary remedy with a "restric tive  regimenta­
tion program.
On March 23, 1934, James H. Rand, J r . ,  Chairman of the Committee, 
te s tified  against the Fletcher-Rayburn B ill before the House Committee 
on Interstate Commerce. Rand described the b il l  as the product of 
"theoretical young men" vjho hoped to guide the country to the le f t ,  
perhaps even to Communism. S t i l l ,  Rand depicted Roosevelt as the "hope
TOpumely to Directing Committee, 6 January 1934 and 25 January 
1934, and Rumely to M ille r , 25 January 1934, DLP.
TlSee Rand to Wood, 12 February 1934; Rumely to Directing Com­
mittee, 20 February 1934, and to Rand, 9 March 1934; Rand to Sexauer,
21 March 1934; F. Spencer Baldwin to Rumely, 1 March 1934, and "Special 
Research Memorandum Dealing with the Proposed Fletcher-Rayburn B i l l - -  
National Securities Exchange Act of 1934," No. 4, Prepared for the 
Committee by the National Industrial Conference Board, March 19, 1934,
7 pages. The foregoing are in DLP.
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of the country," i f  only the President would restrain his advisers and 
exercise proper monetary leadership
Rand appended to his remarks before the House Committee a state­
ment of Dr. William A. W irt, Superintendent of the Gary, Indiana School 
System. The Gary o ffic ia l claimed that while in Washington during the 
summer of 1933, a group of "brain trusters" confided to him th e ir plot 
to replace the traditional "social order" with the regimented state. 
Over cocktails, ta lkative junior government employees informed the 
credulous pedagogue that they intended to thwart recovery until the 
people demanded fundamental reform including the nationalization of 
business and industry. W irt quoted one conspirator as warning, "Mr. 
Roosevelt is only the Kerensky of th is revolution.
W irt, a frequent correspondent with fellow Indianian Edward 
Rumely, supported the Committee fo r the Nation and the Warren monetary 
p a n a c e a . Perhaps frustration at the administration's monetary inac­
tion prompted Wirt to unveil his bizarre story. A Congressional 
investigation into the allegations of Communist intrigue proved the 
story without merit. Nevertheless, Wirt and indirectly  the Committee 
for the Nation, the publisher of the Hoosier's charges, were among
12"Fu11 Text of Statement by James H. Rand, J r . ,  on Regimenting 
Aspects of the Fletcher-Rayburn B il l ,"  to House Committee on Interstate  
Commerce, March 23, 1934, 8 pages. Warren papers, Cornell University.
l% i r t ,  "The Road to Destiny Charted for Americans by Some of 
the Brain Trusters," published by the Committee for the Nation and 
attached to the Rand statement immediately above.
l^Numerous letters between Rumely and Wirt are located in the 
Rumely Papers, Indiana University.
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the f i r s t  to discredit the New Deal with the specter of the Red
Menace.15
By the end of the New Deal's f i r s t  year, the Committee's an ti- 
regimentation campaign led i t  into open co n flic t with the Department of 
Agriculture and Secretary Henry A. Wallace. When the Secretary called 
fo r international cooperation and economic planning in the pamphlet, 
"America Must Choose," the Committee published a William Wirt authored 
response, "America Must Lose."'^ The essay predicted that government 
imposed regimentation such as the AAA and the NRA could lead to the 
loss of private property rights and Communism and asked for a raise in 
the price of gold as a means of insuring lib e rty  and prosperity. During 
the controversy, Wallace, a former committee board member, confiden­
t ia l ly  wrote Rand denying that his "planned middle course" led to 
regimentation or the le f t .  He agreed that increasing the price of gold 
had provided "a much needed breathing sp e ll,"  and that further increases 
in the price of gold might become necessary. But, "Whatever is done 
about money the choice between the courses I outlined w ill have to be
TSgelect House Committee, To Investigate Charges Made by Dr. 
William A. W irt: Hearings, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., April 10, 1934. See
also Prairie Farmer, CVI (April 28, 1934), p. 6; Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
J r . ,  The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Hough­
ton M ifflin  Co., 1959), pp. 457-60.
TGwallace, "America Must Choose: The Advantages and Disadvan­
tages of Nationalism, of World Trade and of a Planned Middle Course" 
(Boston: Foreign Policy Association and World Peace Foundation, 1934),
33 pages; W irt, "America Must Lose--By a Planned Economy and the Step­
ping Stone to a Regimented State" (New York: The Committee for the
Nation, 1934), DLP.
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made, soon or la te . The money policy does not provide an alternative."^^  
The monetarists of the Committee and the secretary no longer shared a 
common premise.
The conflic t between the Committee and the Agriculture Depart-
18ment increasingly polarized. One gleeful conservative expressed 
surprise at the development and chided Rand, "I thought the Committee 
fo r the Nation had gone to bed with R o o s e v e l t . T h e  Committee found 
i ts e lf  further estranged when the Agriculture Department sponsored the 
Bankhead B ill providing fo r compulsory cotton acreage reduction.
Rumely described the Bankhead proposal as one of "crop restriction  
versus monetary action" and Committee members shared Washington gossip 
that insiders in the Agriculture Department viewed the b i l l  as but the 
in it ia l  step in a broad and permanent program of mandatory controls.
The agitated Committee heard reports that agricultural o ffic ia ls  
admitted the effectiveness of the gold program in raising the price of 
cotton, but now opposed such a move in order to create greater demand
^^Wallace to Rand, 9 March 1934, and Rand to Wallace, 1 March 
1934, Record Group 16, Secretary of Agriculture, "Currency," National 
Archives. Another Wallace assessment of the gold policy is in Wallace, 
"Report of the Department of Agriculture to the Executive Council: 
Probable Effect of Gold Policy on Agricultural Exports," February 17, 
1934, Ibid.
T^Wallace, New Frontiers (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1934)
314 pages, scathingly reviewed the work of the Committee. The book 
characterized the Wirt incident as "comical" and accused the Committee 
of promoting a higher price level through monetary means so that i t  
might satiate its  Wall Street nurtured appetite fo r speculation.
Wallace concluded, "They were interested in changing the rules of the 
game with respect to money but not with respect to anything else."
See Ib id . , pp. 60-61 and 91-100.
Rumely's private reaction to the Wallace charges is , "He should 
have known better." See Rumely to Directing Committee, 5 October 1934, 
DLP; also Rumely to Wallace, 16 June 1934, DLP.
l^ L .  Horn to  Rand, 28 March 1934, DLP.
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fo r the allotment approach.20 George Warren, s t i l l  an active advisor 
to Morgenthau, met with Committee leaders in New York during the second 
week of March and noted th e ir  h o s tility  toward the AAA and NRA programs. 
His diary observed that the professor attempted to "tone down th e ir  
conversations to a constructive basis."21
The Committee's anti-AAA stance threatened to disrupt the har­
mony with which organized agriculture had supported the honest dollar 
campaign. When Committee for the Nation propaganda blasted the Bankhead 
Cotton Control B i l l ,  Edward O'Neal, President of the Farm Bureau,
strongly protested. The Alabaman believed that both monetary and pro-
22duction control benefited the cotton industry. Arthur H. Packard, 
President of the Vermont Farm Bureau, echoed O'Neal's sentiments when 
he wrote the Committee, "You are doing a valuable job on gold, do not
spoil i t  by c ritic iz in g  AAA. . . . Stick to your job."^^ Fred H.
Sexauer, agriculture's contact man on the Committee, wrote Rumely con­
cerning the Packard complaint, "This situation is bound to occur a t any
time the Committee goes outside of the particular f ie ld  in which i t
brought the farm organizations together fo r action." Sexauer recom­
mended confining the committee's work to monetary matters and implied
2®Committee to Members of Congress, et ^ . , 15 March 1934, 
George F. Warren papers, Cornell University. See also Bankhead's angry 
response to the above: Bankhead to Committee, 16 March 1934 and Rumely
to Directing Committee, 19 March 1934, DLP.
21 Warren Diary, March 11, 12, 1934.
22o'Neal to Sexauer, 8 March 1934, DLP.
23packard to  C om m ittee , 15 Septem ber 1934, DLP.
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that should the Committee again pursue matters extraneous to the money 
issue i t  might lose the support of organized a g r i c u l t u r e . ^4
While O'Neal and a majority of farmers supported the New Deal, 
many agricu ltura lis ts , particularly in the Northeast, agreed with the 
Committee's view of the AM. The depression came belatedly and with 
less vengeance to Northeastern farmers. Yankee poultry and dairy 
interests saw l i t t l e  need for government controls that increased the 
price of feed grains and they complained that the benefits of allotment 
accrued primarily to Southern and mid-Western agriculture. The farmers 
of New England and New York also believed in the George Warren commod­
ity  dollar panacea with its  corollary that more radical programs were 
unnecessary and probably threatening to free enterprise agriculture.
The disaffection of the Committee for the Nation for the New Deal par­
t ia l ly  reflected and encouraged Northeastern agriculture's indifference 
to the Wallace-Tugwell program.
Howard E. Babcock, columnist and part-owner of New York's 
American A gricu ltu ra lis t, became the most outspoken proponent of the 
commodity dollar and the harshest c r it ic  of AM production controls in 
the Northeast. A Warren disciple and a participant in the delibera­
tions of the Committee for the Nation, Babcock opposed the AM for 
putting government into farming which he thought violated the "Yankee 
principles" of " th r if t ,  self-reliance and rugged individual character." 
The columnist observed that Southerners and Midwesterners dominated 
New Deal agricultural agencies and he charged they cared l i t t l e  for
24$exauer to  Rumely, 21 September 1934, DLP.
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the problems confronting Northeastern farmers. Babcock complained that 
the "tremendous bally-hoo" associated with the AAA diverted farmers 
from such fundamental issues as the honest dollar campaign.^5 The pop­
ular journalist created consternation within organized agriculture when 
in March 1934 he called for "the states east of Ohio and North of the 
Carolinas" to secede from the American Farm Bureau Federation because 
of its  role in the formation of the AAA.-- The New Yorker's challenge 
drew an immediate response from such midwestern leaders as C lifford  
Gregory, but for awhile threatened the unity of the Nation's largest 
and most powerful farm organization.^7
More than an occasional intemperate Babcock essay bothered 
Northeastern agricultural leaders. The New York delegation to the 
December 1934 Chicago Annual Farm Bureau convention vainly attempted to
25pertinent Babcock columns are "Kernels, Screenings, and 
Chaff," American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXI (March 3, 1934), pp. 30; (March 31, 
1934), p. 26; (May 26, 1934), p. 26; (June 23, 1934), p. 26; (Decem­
ber 22, 1934), p. 30; (April 28, 1934), p. 26. Related are Frank E. 
Gannett, "Americans Dare to Live," American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI 
(February 2, 1934), pp. 1, 19; E. R. Eastman, "We V is it with Secretary 
Wallace," American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI (March 3, 1934), p. 5; Rumely 
to Directing Committee, March 20, 1934, DLP; Gannett, Eastman, Babcock, 
"Farmers Suggest a Permanent Administration Program for Agriculture," 
American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI (April 28, 1934), p. 4; "Right Attitude 
Toward AAA," American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI (May 12, 1934), p. 4;
Gannett, Eastman, and Babcock, "Who Says I t  Doesn't Work!," American 
A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI (May 26, 1934), p. 1; Rumely to Eastman,
October 3, 1934, and Eastman to Rumely, 4 October 1934, DLP.
26Babcock, "Kernels, Screenings and Chaff," American Agricul­
tu ra lis t , CXXXI (March 17, 1934), p. 30.
27"Dividing Forces in Agriculture," Wallaces' Farmer, LIX 
(March 31, 1934), p. 201; "Stirring Up Sectional Jealousies," Wallaces' 
Farmer, LIX, p. 413; "Sectional Prejudice," Prairie Farmer, CVI (April 14, 
1934), p. 8. "Parade of the Week," Prairie Farmer, CVI (May 12, 1934), 
p. 6; "Thoughts on the New Deal," The Ill in o is  Agricultural Association 
Record, XII (June 1934), p. 1 , 4 ;  "Farmers Should Stand Together,"
Prairie Farmer, CVI (June 9, 1934), p. 8.
328
po
replace O'Neal as president of the organization. During 1934, activ­
ists within New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts seriously
p Q
contemplated Babcock's call to secede from the American Farm Bureau. 
Edward S. Foster, General Secretary of the New York State Farm Bureau 
Federation, blamed the discontent on discord over the production con­
tro l program of the AAA and discrepancies in the p rio rity  the two sides 
gave the Warren monetary e l ix ir .  For his part, Foster admitted studying 
the works of Warren and Pearson "like the Bible" and recalled, "I'm  
sure i t 's  true that there was no state in the country that had the 
exposure to what makes prices and the monetary system that the farmers 
in New York State had had. . . . That accounts for a lo t of the 
difference in the point of view."30 In a le t te r  written in May 1934, 
Foster acknowledged that one of the charges made in New York against 
the American Farm Bureau had been that i t  "has not taken aggressive 
leadership in regard to the monetary program."31
The American Farm Bureau preserved its  unity through simple 
agreement to tolerate its  membership's schizoid response to national
28poster to Board of Directors, New York State Farm Bureau 
Federation, 15 December 1933, Gannett papers, Cornell University.
29See Christiana McFadyen Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the 
New Deal : A Study of the Making of National Farm Policy, 1933-1940
(Urbana: University of I l l in o is  Press, 1962), pp. 80-84.
30Ed Foster, Oral History Project, Cornell University, pp. 76,
82.
31 Foster to Board of Directors, N.Y.S.F.B.F., May 1934, Gannett 
papers. More on the confrontation between New York and the A.F.B.F. 
may be gleaned from Foster to Board of Directors, N .Y .S .F.B .F., 2 April 
1934, 30 June 1934, and 2 October 1934, a ll in the Gannett papers, 
Cornell University.
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farm i s s u e s . ^2 Northeastern farmers continued to rank monetary policy
f i r s t  in p rio rity  while Midwestern and Southern agricu ltu ra lis ts , though
sympathetic toward the Warren viewpoint, were increasingly indebted to
the AAA. In July 1934, Rumely visited the Chicago headquarters of the
Farm Bureau and reported that while Midwestern farm leaders liked the
AAA, "they would cooperate on a purely monetary program.
Through the remainder of the decade the national leadership of
American Farm Bureau, including O'Neal and Gregory, routinely endorsed
the monetary remedy. At its  December 1934 national convention, the
Bureau featured Warren as principal speaker, devoted an entire session
to monetary issues and adopted flo r id  resolutions favoring further
revaluation and the commodity d o l l a r . ^4 Yet Ed Foster detected in a ll
of this a certain affectation. "Every year in the annual meeting," he
recalled, "New York and Vermont applied pressures for the American Farm
Bureau Federation to really  pick this one up jjnonetary po licy l and do
a job of i t . "  But Foster observed, though the convention granted
"courteous approval" of the monetary resolutions, "They d idn 't work hard
35in implementing i t . "  By July 1934, Rumely complained that agricul­
tural leaders fa iled  to see monetary action as a "do or die m atter."^6
32campbell, The Farm Bureau and the New Deal, pp. 81-82; Foster's 
reasons for staying in the National Bureau are lis ted  in Foster to 
Directors of N.Y.S.F.B.F., 19 December 1935, Gannett papers, Cornell.
^^Rumely to Directing Committee, 26 July 1934, DLP.
S^ Minutes of the Sixteenth Annual Convention of the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, Nashville, Tennessee, December 10-12, 1934; 
O'Neal, "The Three Horsemen of National Recovery," Bureau Farmer, (June 
1934), pp. 7, 8, 9.
^^Foster, Oral History, pp. 77, 82.
^^Rumely to  S exauer, 28 J u ly  1934, DLP.
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After 1933, production controls proved the Bureau's f i r s t  love, but on 
occasion the organization offered f lir ta tio u s  gestures toward the 
Warrenites reminescent of the honest do llar passions of 1932-1933.
The Committee fo r the Nation accomplished more in 1934 than 
s te r ile  carping at New Deal reform. Convinced that the Warren e lix ir  
s t i l l  possessed restorative powers, the Committee, during the summer 
and fa l l  of 1934, engaged in a vigorous "Gold Has Worked" campaign.
The new endeavor defended the devaluations of 1933 and demanded that 
the price of gold be raised from $35 to $41.34, the ceiling fixed under 
the Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934. Once again the Committee 
ra llie d  the American Farm Bureau, the Grange, the cooperatives, and 
the agricultural journals into a strident in fla tion  lobby. Committee 
sympathizers interviewed administration leaders, including Secretary 
Wallace and Roosevelt; "educated" congressmen at propaganda dinners 
"on how well the gold policy worked"; published an estimated one m illion  
le tte rs  and pieces of lite ra tu re  including a series en titled , "The 
Library of Monetary Understanding"; and inundated the airwaves with 
in fla tio n is t r h e t o r i c . T o  finance its  1934 a c tiv itie s , the Committee
S^The Committee's 1934 ac tiv itie s  may be traced in the several 
dozen le tte rs  contained in the Sexauer and Dairymen League Papers at 
Cornell and the Rumely papers at Indiana University. A 10-page summary 
is Rumely to Directing Committee, 2 October 1934, DLP. See also "The 
Next Steps," Bureau Farmer, X (June 1934), p. 6; Gannett, Eastman and 
Babcock, "Who Says I t  Doesn't Work," American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI 
(May 25, 1934), p. 1; "Gold Price Should Be Raised to Help Farmers Now," 
American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXI (July 7, 1934), p. 4; "Strikes: I f
the Dutch Riot, Anything Can Happen--Anywhere!", Committee for the 
Nation pamphlet containing the 1934 monetary resolutions of the Grange, 
New York State Farm Bureau, American Farm Bureau, National Cooperative 
Council, and National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation, Sexauer 
papers, Cornell.
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received $65,808.20 from firms and individuals; $23,500 from members 
of the Directing Committee; and $1,815.38 from the sale of books.
S t i l l  its  $91,123.58 income fa iled  to meet the Committee's to ta l 1934 
expenditure of $98,923.33.38
Concurrent with the defense of the Warren e l ix ir ,  the Committee 
and its  in fla tio n is t a llie s  revived the commodity dollar campaign. The 
concepts underlying the stabilization b i l l  of 1932 remained alive during 
1933 as Maryland Congressman Thomas Alan Goldsborough, with encourage­
ment from the Committee and endorsement of organized agriculture, 
introduced stabilization legislation into the Seventy-Third C o n g r e s s . 39 
The new Goldsborough b i l l  lay dormant under the shadow of the Presi­
dent's dramatic 1933 monetary moves until January 1934, when i t  became 
apparent the gold buying experiment would be abandoned. Seeking per­
manency for the monetary reform cause, s tab ilization is ts  made 
institu tionalizing  the commodity dollar the paramount leg is la tive  goal 
of the m id-th irties.
While Goldsborough directed its  leg is la tive  fa te , Frank A. 
Vanderlip provided the in tellectual punch that served as the basis for 
the commodity dollar battle of 1934 and 1935. Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury under McKinley, long-time President of New York's National
38Rumely insisted that Committee funds undergo quarterly auditing. 
See "Committee for the Nation Contributions--1934," and "Committee for 
the Nation Expenses—1934," attached to Rumely to Directing Committee,
4 February 1935. An annotated l is t  of contributors is contained in 
Rumely to Directing Committee, 13 March 1935, DLP.
3%ee H.R. 5160 and H.R. 5073, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., American 
Farm Bureau O ffic ia l News Letter (May 16, 1933), p. 3; and Rumely to 
Directing Committee, 7 August 1933 and Goldsborough to Rumely, 12 Octo­
ber 1933, DLP.
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City Bank and former President of the New York Clearing House Associa­
tio n , Vanderlip had cooperated with the Committee for the Nation from 
its  inception in 1932. The banker authored the Committee's Five Next 
Steps, the monetary exegesis that seemed to forecast the New Deal's 1933 
monetary program. One of the rare banker defenders of Roosevelt's gold 
program, Vanderlip believed the commodity dollar an untried theory 
whose impact on the stabilization of prices could best be calculated as 
".hopefully probable." But the commodity do llar experiment ought to be 
undertaken because of the mayhem associated with the classical gold 
standard, because the experiment avoided "irretraceable steps" and 
could be abandoned i f  found untenable, and because of the tremendous 
pressures on government for the harsher alternative of printing press
in fla tio n .
In January 1934, a fte r  discussions with Roosevelt and the Com­
mittee, Vanderlip asked that a ll the various manipulative forces 
effecting the price level be combined within a single new agency. The 
Vanderlip plan created a seven member presidentially appointed board 
comprised of one at-large member and two representatives each from 
industry, banking and agriculture. The board, designated the Federal 
Monetary Authority, included among its  duties establishing rediscount 
rates, conducting open market operations in government securities and 
bankers' acceptances, dealing in foreign exchange, purchasing gold and 
s ilver bullion and assuming the legal tender note issuing functions of 
the Federal Reserve. Vanderlip, an opponent of the Federal Reserve
4^Vanderlip, "President Roosevelt's Monetary Policy," radio 
address over NBC Blue Network, November 9, 1933, Warren papers, Cornell.
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in 1913, now suggested reducing that system to a mere clearing house.
The plan made i t  the "policy" of the United States to restore and sta­
b iliz e  wholesale prices at 1926 levels. The Federal Monetary Authority 
would establish a commodity dollar tied to the wholesale index, but 
eliminated the awkward procedure of varying the gold content of the 
dollar with each gyration in prices. Instead, the authority would seek 
stab ilization  through broad power over the nation's credit and currency 
resources. Though more sophisticated than its  predecessors, the 
Vanderlip stab ilization  plan drew on the antagonism of managed currency- 
ites toward the Federal Reserve and the stab ilization  trad ition  that 
dated to the f i r s t  Goldsborough B ill of 1922.41
Vanderlip's proposal appeared within days of the administration's 
decision to qu it the Warren experiment and received enthusiastic endorse­
ment from those s t i l l  seeking cred it and currency in fla tio n . The 
Committee fo r the Nation, agricultural groups, and Congressman Golds­
borough quickly adopted the New York banker's plan. On January 20, 
Goldsborough introduced the Vanderlip scheme in the form of a b i l l  
e n titled , "The Currency Control Act of 1934."4^
During the spring, a House Banking and Currency subcommittee 
conducted hearings on the Goldsborough-Vanderlip proposal. Goldsborough 
cooperated with the Committee for the Nation so that a number of
41Vanderlip to the President, 19 January 1934; Rumely to Direct­
ing Committee, 11 January 1934 and Rumely to Vanderlip, 12 January 1934, 
DLP.
^^See H. R. 7157, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., January 20, 1934; O'Neal 
to Rumely, 1 February 1934 and Pearson to Rumely, 7 February 1934, DLP.
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commodity dollar advocates te s tif ie d  in favor of the b ill .4 3  The major
question before the Committee, however, concerned the administration's
attitude toward the b i l l .  On February 27, Goldsborough telegraphed
Rumely that Secretary Morgenthau would provide the administration's
answer in an appearnce before the Committee on March 1. Goldsborough
44cautioned, " I t  sounds like  bad news."
Appearing before the Committee, Morgenthau read a prepared 
statement cleared e a rlie r  with the President. The Secretary described 
the Goldsborough B ill as "worthwhile and important," but observed "The 
country has just come through one of the most d if f ic u lt  banking crises 
i t  has ever had, and we are just beginning to see daylight a l i t t l e . "
The cabinet o ffic ia l asked the committee to delay new currency leg is la ­
tion until January 1935 in order to give the administration time to 
evaluate the results of the New Deal's f i r s t  year of monetary experi­
mentation.45
Morgenthau's w ait-until-next-year ploy fa iled  to deter s ta b il i­
zationists from seeking immediate enactment of the Goldsborough B il l .  
Attempting to broaden support fo r the Federal Monetary Authority, 
Goldsborough and the Committee fo r the Nation accepted a s ilver amend­
ment negotiated among Representative James Scrugham of Nevada and Father 
Coughlin and Vanderlip. The Scrugham amendment directed the Federal
43$ee Rand to Wood, 12 February 1934; Rumely to Vanderlip,
15 February 1934; Rumely to Directing Committee, 19 March 1934, DLP 
and "Memorandum," 12 March 1934, Warren papers.
44Goldsborough to Rumely, 27 February 1934, DLP.
4 5wew York T im es, 2 and 4 March 1934; Rumely to  D ir e c t in g  Com­
m it te e ,  3 March 1934, DLP.
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Monetary Authority to purchase one b illio n  ounces of s ilver a t the rate 
of not less than 50,000,000 ounces per month until 371-% grains of 
s ilv e r equaled "in purchasing power" 23.22 grains of gold. The amend­
ment authorized the Monetary Authority to issue legal tender s ilver  
certifica tes  against the cost of the s ilver i t  purchased.46 Acceptance 
of the s ilve r amendment promised to add 100 s ilver representatives to 
the s tab iliza tio n is t cause. Goldsborough reported to Rumely that the 
merger of s ilv e rite  and s tab iliza tio n is t assured the matter being 
brought to the floor of the House where, he predicted, i t  w ill succeed 
"by an overwhelming m ajority ."47
In spite of Goldsborough's optimism, the b il l  remained mired 
in the House Banking and Currency Committee during 1934. Roosevelt's 
decision to appease the s ilver block with the S ilver Purchase Act of 
June 1934 lessened the enthusiasms of that lobby for the stab ilization­
is t  cause. But of overriding importance, commodity dollar advocates 
fa ile d  to convert Roosevelt to the Vanderlip plan. In early January, 
when the plan f i r s t  made news, a reporter asked Roosevelt i f  the 
administration were about to establish a central bank. "I think i t  is 
a rotten guess," Roosevelt responded, adding that Andrew Jackson had 
already abolished i t . 4% By mid-April nothing happened to a lte r  the
46a copy of the Scrugham amendment with an attached memo dated 
21 March 1934 is in the Pittman papers. Library of Congress. See also 
Rand to Thomas, 25 April 1934 and Committee for the Nation to Ellison D. 
Smith, et a j[., April 23, 1934, Thomas papers. University of Oklahoma.
47Rumely to Directing Committee, 17 March 1934, DLP. See also 
Kenneth G. Crawford, "S ilvérités Throw Support Behind Central Bank B il l ,"  
New York Post, 26 April 1934.
4^Roosevelt Press Conferences, January  12, 1934, I I I ,  p . 61.
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President's mind. The notes of a conference held on April 14 between 
Roosevelt and key senators to review pending legislation indicated that 
when the Monetary Authority B ill appeared on the agenda, the President 
dismissed the issue with a curt "thumbs down."49 The next day during 
a sim ilar session, when House leaders voiced "strong support" for the 
b i l l ,  Roosevelt explained he shared the desire to achieve stabilization  
and added that some such plan would evolve eventually. But, he con­
cluded, "I think you are a l i t t l e  ahead of time." The opposition of 
Roosevelt to the b i l l  proved decisive. The Vanderlip-Goldsborough 
scheme would await a new Congress.50
As the Morgenthau testimony regarding the Vanderlip-Goldsborough 
scheme suggested, following a year of drama. New Deal monetary policy 
entered an era of quiescence. Though publicly embracing the triumvirate 
re fla tio n , remonetization, and s tab iliza tio n , administration monetary 
policy in the post-Silver Purchase Act period was passive and a m b i g u o u s . 51 
During the New Deal's second winter, Roosevelt generally evaded ques­
tions regarding monetary issues. When a reporter inquired in October 
1934 i f  a recent v is it  with Warren indicated a change in the gold
49"The President's conference with the Senators, Saturday After­
noon, April 14, 1934," PSF, Roosevelt Library.
50"The President's conference with Members of the House of 
Representatives at 8:30 P.M., Sunday evening, April 15, 1934," 419, 
Roosevelt Library.
51 Roosevelt stressed refla tion  in FDR Press Conferences, V,
March 6, 1935, pp. 144-145, and "steadiness of prices and value," in 
an address to bankers. See Samuel I .  Rosenman, (comp.). The Public 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, I I I  (New York: Random
House, 1938), p. 439. A summary of administration monetary goals is 
Morgenthau, "The American Dollar," Morgenthau Diary, Book V, delivered 
over the radio May 13, 1935, 22 pages.
337
policy, Roosevelt joined in the general laughter when he responded,
"I am neither a prestid ig itator nor an astrologist. Let i t  go at 
th a t."52 A few weeks la te r when asked about reports concerning the 
establishment of a central banking system the President mockingly 
responded, "Who raised the ghost? . . .  I only know what I have read 
in the papers." Though he confessed, "That is a mean answer," Roosevelt 
continued to meet reporters' monetary questions with tac itu rn ity  during 
the spring of 1935.53
Intellectual uncertainty may have explained the administration's 
new passive monetary posture. Roosevelt acknowledged to reporters in 
April 1934 that devaluation had fa iled  to influence prices "as much as 
we expected," and la te r informed Morgenthau, who disagreed that the 
Warren program "had not worked."54 in spite of much accomplishment, 
the New Deal ship of state seemed a d rift during the winter of 1934-1935.56 
Morgenthau confessed to a group of advisors in September that "at this 
moment nobody from the President down has a way out," and he asked for 
suggestions that "would give me a new deal for the administration."56 
In April 1935, Roosevelt aboard the President's special train  en route 
from Jacksonville, Florida to Washington, passed the time in informal
SZpoosevelt Press Conferences, IV , October 12, 1934, pp. 130-31. 
63lb id . , October 24, 1934, p. 144.
54Roosevelt Press Conferences, I I I ,  April 20, 1934, p. 293; 
Morgenthau, Diary, Book I I I ,  January 3, 1935, p. 23.
55Arthur M. Schlesinger, J r .,  The Age of Roosevelt: The Poli­
tics  of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1950), pp. 1-11.
56Morgenthau, D ia ry , Book I I ,  September 12, 1934, p. 70.
338
conversation with reporters. Observing that he had read "a lo t of 
financial lite ra tu re  on the tr ip ,"  Roosevelt confided that of the f i f ­
teen English and American economists he had analyzed, "Two things stand 
out: the f i r s t  is that no two of them agree and the other thing is that
they are so foggy in what they say i t  is almost impossible to figure 
out what they mean. I t  is jargon, absolute j a r g o n . The New Deal's 
search for a new deal subsequently produced the great leg is la tive  
package of 1935. Yet monetary issues remained d if f ic u lt  and the Banking 
Act of August 23, 1935 was the las t of the great reform measures to 
receive approval.
During the post-Silver Purchase Act era. New Deal po litica l 
problems contributed to the ambivalent nature of administration monetary 
policy. While Roosevelt disdained economic jargon, he appreciated that 
an.occasional juggling of monetary policy might serve useful p o litica l 
ends. The gold purchases of October 1933 and the s ilver program 
originated p a rtia lly  from the administration's desire to calm farmers 
and curry the favor of the s ilver bloc. In January 1935, Roosevelt 
again attempted to manipulate monetary a ffa irs  for p o litica l purposes.
He instructed Morgenthau to keep the bond and foreign exchange markets 
in an unsettled condition until the Supreme Court handed down its  deci­
sion on the gold clause cases. The President reasoned, "the only way 
that the man in a taxicab can become interested in the Gold case is i f  
we kept the story on the front page." With the markets in turmoil, 
should the Supreme Court verdict prove disappointing, "the man on the
S^Roosevelt Press Conferences, V, April 18, 1935, pp. 184-85.
339
street w ill say for God's sake, Mr. President, do something about i t . "58 
Though in this instance Morgenthau refused to acquiesce and the Presi­
dent retracted the instruction, i t  appeared that Roosevelt understood 
the possib ilities of a p o lit ic a lly  inspired monetary p o l i c y . D u r i n g  
1935, Roosevelt considered Long, Coughlin, and Townsend, a ll in fla tio n ­
is ts , greater p o litica l threats than Hoover and his gold standard 
f o l l o w e r s . 88 Confronted with "the po litics  of upheavel," administration 
monetary policy occasionally retreated into equivocation.
Roosevelt probably welcomed in fla tio n is ts  for interviews during 
1934 and 1935 as both a truth seeker and a p o litic ian . Among others, 
he met and corresponded with representatives of the Committee for the 
Nation, agricultural leaders, former Senator Robert L. Owen, President 
of the Sound Money League, and Irving F i s h e r . 81 Fisher, the veteran
88Morgenthau, Diary, Book I I I ,  January 14, 1935, p. 98.
89lb id . , January 15, 1935, p. 101.
GORoosevelt to Gannett, 1 March 1935, OF 229; see also Roose­
v e lt to Ray Stannard Baker, reprinted in Donald Day, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's Own Story: Told in His Own Words From His Private and 
Public Papers (Boston: L itt le  Brown and Co., 1951), p. 239; and James A. 
Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Co., In c .) , 1948, p. 52.
81see Rumely to Roosevelt, 7 September 1934, Rand to Roosevelt, 
12 September 1934, Bendix to Roosevelt, 12 August 1934; Committee to 
Roosevelt, 11 December 1934, O'Neal to President, 13 October 1934;
Roper to Rand, 5 November 1934, a ll in DLP; and McIntyre to Owen,
25 October 1934 and Roosevelt to Owen, 6 November 1935, Owen papers. 
Library of Congress, Washington; and Wood to President, 11 and 24 Octo­
ber 1934, OF 229, FDR Library, Hyde Park. References for 1935 include: 
The National Agricultural Conference to President, 14 January 1935; 
Rumely to McIntyre, 27 April and 6 May, 1935, OF 229, FDR Library,
Hyde Park: Rand to Roosevelt, 16 February 1935, 4 March 1935, 9 April
1935, 15 April 1935, 16 May 1935, 26 July 1935; Rumely to Directing 
Committee, 15 March 1935 te lls  of Rand's interview with Roosevelt, a ll 
in DLP; Broughm to Owen, 12 and 15 July 1935, te lls  of a Fisher in te r­
view with the President, Owen papers. Library of Congress; and Wood to 
FDR, 8 August 1935, PPF 1365, FDR Library, Hyde Park.
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s ta b iliza tio n is t, understood that a struggle for the President's mone­
tary mind continued. He complained to Marvin McIntyre, Roosevelt's 
appointments secretary, that several "who regard my influence with the 
President as 'dangerous' have sought to prevent that influence being 
given fu ll opportunity."®^ Yet Roosevelt periodically met with the 
Yale professor and granted Fisher permission to dedicate his 1934 mon­
ograph, Stabilized Money; A History of the Movement, to the President. 
The book praised New Deal monetary policy as representing "the goal at 
which the stable money movement has aimed.
George F. Warren's peripatetic association with the New Deal 
during 1934 and 1935 epitomized the administration's amphibolic mone­
tary posture. The Cornell professor fa iled  to see the President between 
the January decision to abandon the gold experiment and August 1934. 
During that interim Warren remained a part-time advisor to Morgenthau, 
whom he counseled on such issues as gold purchases, bond sales, exchange 
ratios and stab ilization  fund procedures.®^ Warren repeatedly urged
GZpisher to McIntyre, 24 December 1934; also see "Memo for Mac" 
from FDR, 28 December 1934 and a Fisher "Memo," 6 September 1934, in 
OF 229, FDR Library, Hyde Park. Rumely to Directing Committee, 3 Octo­
ber 1934, DLP, describes a Fisher-Roosevelt conference.
®3lrving Fisher, assisted by Hans R. L. Cohrssen, Stabilized 
Money : A History of the Movement (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.
August 1934), p. v. See also Rumely to Directing Committee, 19 Septem­
ber 1934, DLP. During the summer and fa l l  of 1935, Roosevelt consulted 
Fisher regarding appointments to the Federal Reserve's newly created 
Board of Governors.
®4warren's 1934-1935 ac tiv ities  may be followed in the Warren 
Diary, and in Warren correspondence with Oliphant, Morgenthau and 
James H. Rogers, Warren papers, Cornell. See also F. A. Pearson,
W. I .  Myers and A. R. Gans, "Warren as Presidential Adviser," Farm 
Economics (New York State College of Agriculture, Cornell University, 
December 1957), pp. 5562-5576.
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further devaluations e lic itin g  from Morgenthau the complaint that the 
professor wanted to "buy a ll the gold in the w o r l d . Y e t  the Secre­
tary valued the economist's advice. Warren frequently stayed in 
Washington as Morgenthau's guest and the Secretary often funneled the 
Cornellian's views d irectly  to the President.
On August 14, two days before Warren le f t  to attend a conference 
of agricultural economists at Bad Eilsen, Germany, he and Morgenthau 
stopped a t the White House for a 50-minute chat with the President. 
Morgenthau provided Warren le tters  of introduction and asked the pro­
fessor to gather European reaction to American s ilver policy. Roosevelt 
and Warren discussed the re la tive  merits of devaluation and the AAA in 
raising farm prices. Roosevelt credited the AAA for most of the price 
increases. Warren objected and noted, "I ir r ita te d  him fo r the f i r s t  
time in my experience." S t i l l  Roosevelt expressed interest in the 
in flationary impact of manipulating gold, asked Warren for some price 
data to use at the press conference the next day, and concurred with 
Warren that the administration should have raised the price of gold 
higher than i t  did in January 1934. At the conclusion of the session, 
Warren asked Roosevelt to "leave Q h e j door open" regarding future gold 
devaluation. Roosevelt agreed and asked Warren to "come in" when he 
returned from Europe. S ign ificantly, as Warren le f t ,  Governor George L. 
Harrison of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and Eugene R. Black of
GSwarren Diary, February 21, 1934.
G^Morgenthau, Diary, Book I ,  August 20, 1934, p. 23. Warren 
Diary, April 25, 1934.
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the Federal Reserve Board, both nemeses to the Warren viewpoint, entered 
fo r a two-hour session with the President. 7^
During the winter and spring of 1934 and 1935, Warren continued 
to divide his energies between Ithaca and Washington. On October 11, 
Warren discussed the results of his European tr ip  with the President.
At the luncheon meeting Roosevelt principally inquired about the feas­
ib i l i t y  of stimulating recovery through public works, though he asked 
i f  Warren s t i l l  thought i t  necessary to raise gold to $41.34,®^ In 
mid-January Morgenthau again summoned Warren to Washington to work on 
a speech for the Secretary, celebrating the anniversary of gold deval­
uation. While in Washington Warren saw Frank Gannett, Rochester, New 
York publisher and supporter of the Committee for the Nation who reported 
that the "President told him Warren was 'dead righ t' and has been right 
a ll along." The publisher quoted the President as confiding, "Warren 
is working on a plan for me."69
Warren and Herman Oliphant, General Counsel to Morgenthau, had 
been assigned to work on a law and a Constitutional amendment, should 
the Supreme Court invalidate the government's suspension of the gold 
clause in private and public contracts. The administration anxiously 
awaited the pending court decision and deliberated alternatives, should
67warren Diary, August 14, 1934; Frank Waltman, J r .,  "Money 
Plan, Pondered at White House," Washington Post, August 15, 1934.
G^Warren Diary, October 11, 1934. Attached to the foregoing is 
a "Memorandum on Prices," which Warren presented to the President dur­
ing the ir conference. See also Warren to Morgenthau, 12 September 1934, 
Warren papers, Cornell University.
69warren D ia ry ,  January 15, 1935.
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the opinion uphold the sanctity of the gold clause. In response to an 
adverse decision, Warren suggested pegging the dollar to the pound at 
a 5 to 1 ra tio , further gold devaluation and symetallism. Warren 
recorded that Roosevelt was " fu lly  sold" on the la tte r . During one of 
the pre-verdict worry sessions, Morgenthau informed advisors that "the 
gold policy was the major one of the administration affecting recovery 
and that the President never said i t  fa iled ."  The group then discussed 
managed currency and Warren advocated its  immediate adoption, should 
the court produce an unfavorable ru lin g .^0
The court announced its  emotion-laden and historic gold clause 
cases decision on February 18, 1935. The justices found the suspension 
of the gold clause in government contracts both unconstitutional and 
unconscionable, but on a 5-4 vote ruled that bondholders could not sue 
fo r damages. Labeling the New Deal action ille g a l and immoral, the 
court nonetheless allowed the administration to have its  way.^l The 
decision contained another irony. While conservatives damned i t  and 
reformers lik e  the Committee fo r the Nation welcomed i t ,  the verdict 
alleviated the urgency for a genuinely radical monetary program. The 
decision, in e ffec t, freed the New Deal to follow moderate monetary 
instincts.
70Warren Diary, January 15, 16, 17, 1935; Harold L. Ickes,
The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, The F irst Thousand Days, 1933-1936 
TNiw York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), p. 294.
7lwill1am E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 144. Roosevelt's
hostile reaction to the court's decision is in Rosenman, The Public 
Papers of F.D.R. , IV, pp. 7-8.
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Warren's Washington influence subsided with the passing of the 
gold clause c ris is . In mid-March, Morgenthau assembled Warren and a 
dozen Treasury and Federal Reserve experts for a discussion of the mone­
tary situation. The Secretary informed the group that Roosevelt desired 
a higher price level and asked Warren to lead the discussion how such a 
goal might be achieved. I f  Morgenthau hoped for a consensus from the 
group, he was disappointed. Warren reported that Harrison and T. Jef­
ferson Coolidge "would do nothing"; Williams would "cut wages and 
deflate"; Jacob Viner would "call an international conference"; and 
Henry Wallace would postpone monetary action ' " t i l l  new crop when prices 
are low."?2 On March 16 Warren met with Roosevelt in a genial but 
unproductive session in which they decided i t  would be inadvisable for  
the President to address the nation on monetary matters.73 Between the 
March meeting and Warren's death in May 1938, the Cornellian rarely saw 
the President, though he continued to counsel Morgenthau on a variety  
of monetary issues. Relegated to the status of an in-house e x ile , a 
frustrated Warren encouraged Morgenthau to rekindle the President's 
interest in gold and p r i c e s . 74
Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma also contributed sign ifican tly  
to the nuances that comprised the in fla tio n is ts  campaign of 1934 and 1935. 
The Oklahoman's tenacious pursuit of a cheaper dollar earned him the 
sobriquet "The Undoubting Thomas" from the eastern press and the
72warren Diary, March 13 and 15, 1935.
73 lb id ., March 16, 1935.
74 ib id . , June 24, 1936. See the Warren-Morgenthau correspon­
dence and the Warren-Rogers correspondence, Warren papers, Cornell
University
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leadership of Congressional in fla tion ists .^^ Unhappy with the Trea­
sury's cautious execution of the S ilver Purchase Act of June 1934,
Thomas pushed the administration into greater s ilver purchases and on 
August 9, nationalization of the white metal. But neither s ilver pur­
chase nor nationalization resulted in substantive currency e x p a n s i o n . 7 6  
Disappointed, Thomas acted the role of in fla tio n is t gadfly, ever anxious 
to remind the administration of its  monetary responsibilities.
Thomas' reputation as the farm state senator most publicly 
identified  with the in flation  cause forced the Committee for the Nation 
to work with the Oklahoman. Almost from its  inception, Rumely sent 
Committee propaganda to the Senator and on one occasion the former 
medical student mailed Thomas 72 globules containing a J. P. Morgan 
prize tonic of cod liv e r  o i l ,  yeast and vitamins, because "your person­
a l i ty  and influence are of such v ita l importance."77 Whether or not 
the banker's e l ix i r  bore responsibility, the in fla tio n is t proved an 
energetic co-worker for the Committee. In June 1934, the Oklahoman 
proposed that the Federal Reserve be replaced with a "Supreme Court of 
Money" whose outlines resembled the Vanderlip Plan.78 In July, the 
Senator, with the endorsement of the Committee, blasted the rumored 
exchange-rate stabilization negotiations between Reserve and European
76wew York Times, 3 August 1934.
76john A. Brennan, S ilver and the F irst New Deal (Reno: Univer­
s ity  of Nevada Press, 1969), pp. 137-138; New York Times, 2 August 1934.
77Rumely to Thomas, 1 March 1935, Rumely papers, Indiana Univer­
s ity .
78see S. 3798, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., June 6, 1934, and Thomas to 
Lewis, 4 June 1934 and Thomas to LeBlanc, 20 June 1934, Thomas papers.
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banking o ffic ia ls  at Basel, Switzerland. The resulting outcry forced 
the bankers to disavow any stabilization move.79 During August the 
Committee arranged for Thomas to deliver the principal address on Farm 
Organization's Day at the Chicago World's Fair. The nationally broad­
cast speech, written with the aid of Rumely, demanded a further rise  
in the price of gold and explained "How creditor classes can save them­
selves by conceding the Honest Dollar." The Committee distributed  
30,000 reprints of the preoration and Irving Fisher delivered a petition  
from farm leaders praising the speech to Hyde Park.^O
During the fin a l quarter of 1934, Thomas worked with the Com­
mittee, Father Coughlin and si 1vérités preparing for the next Congress. 
On December 5, he published an open le t te r  to congressmen and public 
o ffic ia ls  lis tin g  twenty-two proofs that the dollar remained overvalued. 
Thomas concluded that regardless of administration policy, the incoming 
Congress must re fla te  the dollar to 1926 l e v e l s . I n  late December 
the Oklahoman invited sixteen organizations including the Committee for
79See Ewing to Thomas, 17 July 1934, Thomas papers; Bendix to 
Roosevelt, 12 August 1934, DIP; New York Times, 10 and 11 July 1934.
B^ New York Times, 14 August 1934; Rumely to Sexauer, 15 August 
1934; Rumely to Directing Committee, 16 August 1934; Thomas to Harding,
16 August 1934; Thomas to Rand, 21 August 1934; Rumely to Directing 
Committee, 25 September 1934, a ll in DIP. See also Rumely to Thomas,
28 September 1934, Thomas papers, and Thomas, "Money," Bureau Farmer,
X (September 1934), pp. 1, 4. The Fisher episode is recorded in 
New York Times, 8 September 1934.
BlThomas to Senators, Congressmen, et £]_., 5 December 1934, 
Thomas papers. See congratulatory le tters  of O'Neal to Thomas, 29 Decem­
ber 1934, also those of Senator Peter Norbeck of South Dakota and 
Representatives Alfred F. Belter of New York, Fred C. G ilchrist of Iowa, 
Clarence E. Cannon of Missouri, Rush D. Hall of West Virginia and Will 
Rogers of Oklahoma, Thomas papers.
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the Nation and the major farm groups to participate in a National Mone­
tary Conference at Washington, D. C ., scheduled for mid-January.
Thomas hoped the disparate in flation  forces might "try and agree upon 
a defin ite  program" to present to the new C o n g r e s s .
The National Monetary Conference convened under Thomas' chair­
manship on January 16, 1935, in the Senate Office Building meeting room 
of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Delegates included 
senators, congressmen and representatives from such esoteric groups as 
the Peoples Power League, National Depositors Committee, Social Credit
Association and the American Society of Martians, proud of its  two
83publications, Message from Mars and Gold Standard. The morning 
session granted a dozen monetary enthusiasts ten minutes each to speak 
on behalf of a favorite monetary e l ix ir .  The multifarious proposals 
ranged from the suggestion that the government award every family on 
r e l ie f  five  hundred dollars, to the fa m ilia r, i f  no less emphatic 
in fla tio n  rhetoric of Irving Fisher, Father Coughlin, and Edward Ken­
nedy, Secretary of the Farmers' U n i o n . 84
BZyhomas to Sexauer, 5 January 1935. See also Everson to Thomas, 
24 December 1934; Rumely to Thomas, 26 December 1934, Thomas papers, and 
New York Times, 24 December 1934.
^^Represented at the conference were Robert L. Owen's Sound 
Money League; The Veterans of Foreign Wars; The National Depositors' 
Committee; The American Society of Martians; The National Association 
fo r Social Justice; The American Monetary Association; World Monetary 
Reform League; The People's Power League; National Soldier's Bonus 
League; the Social Credit Organization of the United States; The Organ­
ization for the Abolition of Poverty; The Five Hundred Dollar Club;
Irving Fisher; and Robert H. Hemphill, Columnist for the Hearst publi­
cations.
^^Proceedings of National Monetary Conference, mimeographed, 
Washington, D. C ., January 16, 1935, 92 pages. See also "List of Names 
Taken from Cards Received at Door, Monetary Conference," January 16,
1935, Thomas papers.
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The afternoon session of the conference adopted a series of 
monetary resolutions. The conference agreed that the Federal Reserve 
must be replaced with a government owned central bank that would serve 
as the "sole bank of issue" for American currency. Other resolutions 
urged detachment of the dollar from a fixed relationship to gold and 
remonetization of s ilv e r, payment of the soldiers bonus "in fu l l ,"  
management of the domestic price level through "currency and credit 
controls," and replacement of government "tax-exempt, interest-bearing 
bonds" with "non-interest bearing legal tender notes" issued through 
the new central bank. Curiously reversing the psychology of numerous 
government bond drives, the conference also resolved that Congress 
investigate the "identity" of the creditors of the United States "with 
the object of determining and disclosing potential enemies of the
nation."85
Thomas' attempt to fashion an in fla tio n is t consensus fa iled  to 
m aterialize. Three days a fte r the conference adjourned, the Oklahoman 
described the "central purpose" of the in fla tion  meeting as an endorse­
ment of a central governmentally owned bank and currency expansion.
The Senator dismissed the balance of the resolutions as "more or less 
local in nature."86 Yet fear of those "local" resolutions prevented 
the Committee for the Nation and probably the Farm Bureau and the Grange 
from attending the Washington money session. Rumely pointed to the 
resolutions on s ilver remonetization and f ia t  currency as supporting
GSlbid., pp. 75-78.
86Thomas to George Malone, 19 January 1935, Thomas papers.
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"the wisdom of our refraining from participation in the money confer­
ence." He also complained that the resolution urging "nationalization" 
of the Federal Reserve differed from the Vanderlip plan which called 
fo r the Reserve to remain a "banker's institution" subservient to a 
central monetary authority. Though c r it ic a l of the Thomas conference, 
Rumely hoped the radicalism of the Washington Conference might frighten  
"standpatters" into supporting the comparatively moderate program of 
the Committee for the Nation.
In the wake of the National Monetary Conference, in fla tio n is ts  
looked to the new Congress for additional monetary leg is la tion . The 
f i r s t  session of the Seventy-fourth Congress convened on January 3 and 
lasted until August 26, 1935. The exhaustive session voted on three 
issues dear to in fla tio n is ts , but fragmented and suffering from dimin­
ished popular support and administration opposition, the currency 
expansionists met defeat. Yet the session proved productive as i t  
passed major monetary and banking reform leg is la tion .
Elmer Thomas continued to press the administration for a more 
generous s ilver policy during 1935. In March, Thomas attempted to 
attach a s ilver amendment to the administration's $4.88 b illio n  Public 
Works B i l l .  Thomas explained to members of the Senate s ilver bloc that 
the amendment would expand the currency through a "rational and conser-
O O
vative increase in the use of s ilve r."  The la test Thomas amendment
Rumely to Directing Committee, 18 January 1935, OLP. See also 
O'Neal to Thomas, 16 January 1935; Warren to Thomas, 8 January 1935;
Wood to Thomas, 8 January 1935, a ll of whom declined to attend the con­
ference, Thomas papers.
B^ Thomas to Hon. Henry P. Ashurst, et , 22 February 1935, 
and Thomas to Ernest D. Krecht, 19 January 1935, Thomas papers.
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compelled the Treasury to issue s ilver certificates based on the mone­
tary rather than the lessor bullion value of its  s ilver holdings. The 
measure also included a mandatory s ilver purchase feature which directed 
the Treasury to buy at least f i f t y  m illion ounces per month, either 
until s ilver comprised one-fourth of the value of a ll monetary stock, 
or until i t  reached $1.29 per ounce. Thomas projected that the amend­
ment would add one and a half b illio n  to the currency supply within 22 
months.90
Thomas' proposal received a mixed response from s ilver senators. 
Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota and Gerald P. Nye of South Dakota
pledged support, but the leader of the Senate s ilver bloc, Nevada's Key
Pittman, warned that without the endorsement of the President, "I do
91not believe we can get a majority vote in the Senate on your amendment."
Thomas sought the President's support in a le t te r  addressed to
the Chief Executive on March 8. The Oklahoman stressed that s ilver 
offered a conservative basis for a controlled expansion of the currency, 
in contrast to the soldiers' bonus and a Wheeler greenback plan then 
under consideration in Congress. Thomas concluded that i f  his program 
were adopted, prices could recover their 1925 levels and "we would have
B^Text of the amendment is printed in U. S ., Congressional Rec­
ord, 1st Sess., 74th Cong., March 22, 1935, p. 4239. The amendment 
also provided that the s ilver certifica tes be reissued and kept in con­
stant circulation and granted the Secretary of the Treasury discretionary 
powers to exchange gold for s ilver or to accept s ilver in payment of 
debts owed the government.
9 N^ew York Times, 23 March 1936, p. 1.
^Iprazier to Thomas, 25 February 1935; Pittman to Thomas, 28 Feb­
ruary 1935; Nye to Thomas, 4 March 1935, Thomas papers.
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no further serious controversy over the money question."9% The argu­
ments may have impressed the President who arranged to meet with Thomas, 
Morgenthau, and Herman Oliphant in mid-March to discuss the Senator's 
suggestions.93 s t i l l  the President fa iled  to endorse the Thomas 
measure.
A fter nearly seven weeks and th ir ty  amendments. Senate leader­
ship grew increasingly impatient to pass the Public Works B il l .  On 
March 23, the Senate voted to table the Thomas Amendment 40 to 33, for 
the works b i l l  meant aid to the unemployed and patronage and several 
lik e  George Norris, who normally supported s ilver leg is la tion , voted 
against Thomas. Undeterred, the Oklahoman, a skilled  parliamentarian, 
immediately reintroduced the s ilver amendment with but minor revisions. 
Faced with a Thomas filib u s te r . Senate Majority Leader Robinson 
threatened cloture. Instead, confronted with the tactics of Thomas and 
a grandiose announcement from the traveling Huey P. Long that he 
intended to jo in the s ilver debate on Monday, Senate leadership capit­
ulated. On Saturday, March 23, the Public Works B ill with the Thomas 
s ilve r amendment attached received Senate approval, 68 to 16.94
Senator Glass, the architect of the Senate compromise, seemed 
confident the House would reject the Senate amendments to the works 
b i l l . 95 The strategy worked. Despite an emotional appeal from
9^Thomas to Roosevelt, 8 March 1935, Thomas papers.
93"Memo for Mac," March 9, 1935, OF 229, FDR Library
94u, S ., Congressional Record, 1st Sess., 74th Cong., March 22, 
1935, pp. 4272-4305, and Ib id . ,  March 23, 1935, pp. 4349, 4362; New 
York Times, 23 March and 24 March 1935.
9 5 ib id . , 23 March 1935, p. 4353.
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Representatives John Rankin of Mississippi and Martin Dies of Texas for 
the Thomas s ilver feature, the lower body voted to send the Public Works 
B ill to conference committee stripped of the Senate amendments. The 263 
to 108 defeat of the Rankin-Dies positi n saw 80 Democrats, 19 Republi­
cans, 7 Progressives and 3 Farmer-Laborites vote with the minority.
On March 27 the Conference Committee approved the works b i l l ,  but 
deleted the Thomas s ilver p ro v is io n .
The New York Times reported the Thomas defeat illu s tra ted  the 
waning sentiment fo r in fla tion  in Congress. Columnist Turner Catledge 
detected a new Presidential attitude towards monetary issues, conclud­
ing "there is a d istinct impression in Washington that he is unalterably 
opposed to any further tampering with the medium of exchange.
Catledge might have been even more impressed with the enigma of Roose­
v e lt's  monetary mind had he read a memorandum from the President to 
Morgenthau written about three weeks a fte r the defeat of the Thomas 
amendment. Concerned with financing the work re lie f  program, Roosevelt 
quizzed the Secretary, "Is there anything to prevent us from taking a ll 
of the seigniorage we have received on s ilver purchase and coin i t  into 
f i f t y  cent pieces and dollars and use i t  to pay part, i f  only a small 
part, of the work re lie f  costs? This sounds like  Senator Thomas, but 
I would like  to know what authority the law gives us."98
9Grhe house debate is in Ib id . , March 26, 1935, pp. 4465-4476. 
See also New York Times, 28 March 1935.
97%urner Catledge, "In fla tion  Sentiment Wanes in Congress," 
New York Times, 31 March 1935, IV, 10:7, and Ib id . , 27 March 1935, 
p. 1:3.
98R ooseve lt to  M orgenthau, 16 A p r i l  1935, OF 229 , R o o seve lt
Library.
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The President also suffered Irresolution regarding the next 
currency expansion proposal to come before Congress—the veterans' 
bonus. From 1932 to 1936 the immediate cash payment of the veterans' 
adjusted compensation certifica tes  proved a re s ilie n t measure. Hoover 
routed the issue and its  proponents in 1932 and Roosevelt successfully 
opposed the proposition in 1933 and 1934.99 Texas Representative 
Wright Patman's II. R. 1 reintroduced the matter in January 1935. The 
Texan's la test e ffo rt combined immediate payment of the bonus with 
currency expansion. The b i l l  required that the veterans be paid with 
2.2 b illio n  legal tender non-interest bearing notes. The measure also 
contained a currency control feature. Should the Secretary of the 
Treasury discover the commodity prices exceeded the ir 1921-1929 aver­
ages, the b i l l  authorized him to withdraw from circulation an appropriate 
amount of Federal Reserve and National Bank n o t e s . O n  March 22, the 
date before the Senate accepted the Thomas s ilver amendment, the House 
passed the Patman bonus-honest dollar measure, 319 to 90.
Elmer Thomas, with the support of the Farmers Union, the Com­
mittee for the Nation and other ag ric u ltu ra l-in fla tio n is ts , directed
99The bonus issue is traced from its  origin during the Wilson 
Administration to its  payment in 1936 in the m istitled  Roger Daniels,
The Bonus March: An Episode in the Great Depression (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1971),360 pages.
S ., Congressional Record, 1st Sess., 74th Cong., March 19,
1935, p. 3989.
TOTlb id . ,  March 22, 1935, p. 4314.
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10?the Patman b i l l  through the Senate. During debate in the upper 
chamber, Thomas emphasized the monetary features of the b i l l  explain­
ing "we propose to finance the payment of the adjusted-service 
certifica tes  . . . exactly as the administration financed the C ivil 
^ap,"103 Evidently the money of Lincoln s t i l l  held its  attractions as
the Senate approved the measure 55 to 33 on May 7.^04
A fter in i t ia l ly  expressing strong opposition to the Patman b i l l ,
the President wavered. Among others. Vice President Garner argued that
payment of the bonus was inevitable and that a veto might produce unfor­
tunate p o litic a l repercussions. On May 20 Roosevelt told a Patman led 
delegation that though he opposed the current b i l l ,  he had "an.open 
mind" regarding possible alternative bonus leg is la tion . That afternoon 
Roosevelt recalled the Patman conversation to a chagrined and dedicated 
opponent of the bonus, Henry Morgenthau. Roosevelt explained his equiv­
ocation on the issue as "never le t  your le f t  hand know what your right 
hand is doing." Unconsoled, Morgenthau quizzed, "Which hand am I ,  Mr. 
President?" The reply came quickly, "My right hand. But I keep my 
le f t  hand under the table." Later Morgenthau observed, "This is the 
most frank expression of the real F.D.R. that I  ever listened to and 
that is the real way that he w o r k s . "105
102see Arthur Capper, "Congress Strongly for Bonus," Capper's 
Weekly, LX (January 19, 1935), p. 2; and letters  to Thomas reprinted in 
U. S ., Congressional Record, 1st Sess., 74th Cong., May 7, 1935, p .7059; 
and Rand to Henry Morgenthau, J r . ,  20 May 1935, Sexauer papers.
103u. s . .  Congressional Record, 1st Sess., 74th Cong., May 7,  
1935, p. 7053.
lQ4 ib id . ,  p. 7068.
lOSjohn Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau D iaries: Years of
C ris is , 1928-1938 (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1959), pp. 249-259.
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Roosevelt possessed the qualities of the lion as well as the 
fox, and with encouragement from Morgenthau the President replaced 
equivocation with resolute opposition to the Patman b i l l .  On May 22, 
in a dramatic and unprecedented gesture, Roosevelt delivered his bonus 
veto message in person to a jo in t session of Congress. Broadcast over 
national radio, the President's speech admitted the "good faith" of the 
opposition but denied that able-bodied veterans deserved special indul­
gences from the government. After reviewing the post-war history of 
the bonus controversy, Roosevelt employed nearly a fourth of the speech 
denouncing the evils of currency in fla tio n . While admitting that the 
expenditures called for in the measure could be funded, Roosevelt 
warned that "printing-press money" might prove equally seductive to 
other special interest groups. I f  abused the too generous issuance of 
treasury notes would lead to "uncontrolled prices and the destruction 
of the value of savings that w ill strike most cruelly those like  the 
veterans who seem to be temporarily b e n e f i t e d . R o o s e v e l t ' s  ortho­
doxy recalled that sim ilar admonitions against currency tinkering had 
e a rlie r been directed at the administration.
Within minutes of the delivery of the veto message, the House 
voted 322 to 98 to override, but the Senate, the bane of the bonus 
since 1932, sustained the President 54 ayes to 40 nays on May 23. 
Several thought that had the Patman b i l l  omitted the controversial
^^^The veto message is printed in U. S ., Congressional Record, 
1st Sess., 74th Cong., May 22, 1935, pp. 7993-7995.
TO^ The House vote is U. S ., Congressional Record, 1st Sess., 
74th Cong., May 22, 1935, p. 7997; the Senate vote is Ib id . , May 23, 
1935, pp. 8066-8067.
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currency provision, the measure might have secured the eight Senate
108votes needed for approval. The episode marked a setback for Green- 
backism. But the bonus, stripped of the currency feature, and a fter  
additional Roosevelt wavering, overcame a half-hearted veto in January 
1936. Solons undoubtedly recalled the fate of the last po litic ian  to 
offend veterans during a presidential election year.^^^
The th ird  issue to arouse in fla tion is ts  during the eight month 
opening session of the Seventy-Fourth Congress concerned the fate of 
the Federal Reserve System. By 1935 demands to reform or replace the 
Reserve received almost universal support from those who identified  
themselves as progressives. The farm organizations. Senators Thomas, 
Borah, Bronson Cutting, Huey Long, and such disparate personalities as 
Amos Pinchot, William Lemke, Father Coughlin and Ezra Pound, commonly 
critic ized  the R e s e r v e . W i t h i n  the administration, Roosevelt, 
Wallace, and Morgenthau discovered faults in the System. In the fa ll  
of 1934, Roosevelt selected Utah banker Marriner S. Eccles as the new 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The Westerner accepted the 
appointment based on Roosevelt's pledge that the administration would 
work to overhaul the Wilsonian in stitu tio n .
^^^See Arthur Krock, New York Times, 23 May 1935, p. 22.
TO^Blum, Morgenthau D iaries, pp. 256-259; Daniels, Bonus March, 
pp. 240-41.
^^%ee Coughlin to Thomas, 8 February 1935, Thomas papers;
Cutting to Mack, 20 February 1935; Robert Owen to Cutting, 21 February
1935; Pound to Cutting, 12 June Anno X II, Cutting papers. Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington; Borah to Yingst, 16 March 
1935, Borah papers.
TT^Marriner S. Eccles, and Sidney Hyman (ed. ) ,  Beckoning Fron­
t ie rs ; Public and Personal Recollections (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
T966T, pp. 165-176.
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Eccles' nomination as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board 
pleased the Committee for the Nation and its  farmer a ll ie s . The banker 
appreciated stabilization doctrine and had joined the Committee, under­
signed the Five Next Steps, and donated $750 to the Rand group during 
1933. In numerous le tters  to the Committee, Eccles explained he shared 
the view that the Reserve ineptly responded to the crash of 1929, that
frozen deposits in closed banks ought to be quickly released, and that
112the nation's money and credit should be rationally  managed. Eccles
fa ile d , however, to accept a ll Committee dogma, for he believed the
113Warren gold e l ix ir  pointless and probably dangerous. S t i l l  in 
August 1934, when rumors of his impending nomination surfaced, Rand 
praised the Westerner to Roosevelt and Rumely reviewed his correspon­
dence with the Utah banker and reported, "Our f ile s  show a long record
of c o o p e ra tio n ."114
After weeks of intramural bickering the administration revealed 
its  proposed "Banking Act of 1935" on February 5 .H ^  T itles  I and I I I
11^Rumely to Directing Committee, 12 November 1934, DIP, con­
tains excerpts from ten Eccles le tters  to the Committee spanning 1933 
and the f i r s t  half of 1934.
ll^Eccles personally debated gold with Warren in January 1934. 
See Beckoning Frontiers, pp. 137-38.
ll^Rand to Roosevelt, 22 August 1934 and Rumely to Board of 
Directors, 6 September 1934, DIP.
ll^Helen M. Burns, The American Banking Community and New Deal 
Banking Reform, 1933-1935 (Wesport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1974), 
pp. 139-147. Three f ir s t  person accounts of these negotiations are 
Blum. From the Morgenthau D iaries, pp. 343-54; Eccles, Beckoning Fron­
t ie rs , pp. 165-99; and J. F. T. O'Connor, The Banking Crisis and 
Recovery Under the Roosevelt AdministratiorTTChicago: Callaghan and
c v . ,  1 9 3 8 /, pp. 23-25.
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of the suggested legislation liberalized provisions for the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and c la rifie d  technical provisions of the 
Banking Act of 1933. The heart of the b i l l ,  T it le  I I ,  required funda-
116mental changes in the Reserve and clearly indicated Eccles' influence.
To expedite monetary management the b i l l  reorganized the system and
centralized power in the Federal Reserve Board. Board members salaries
were elevated to cabinet rank and the selection of governors and vice-
governors of the Federal Reserve banks were made subject to Board
approval. Aside from gaining new prerogatives over personnel, the
Board received unprecedented responsibility to manage the nation's
credit and monetary machinery. A Board dominated open market committee
would henceforth formulate policy "binding on the Federal Reserve banks"
and "in order to prevent injurious credit expansion or contraction"
117the Board received the right to a lte r  reserve requirements. The 
measure indicated that Eccles shared Roosevelt's b e lie f that monetary 
and banking policy must be subject to greater public regulation. Eccles 
wrote Henry Wallace that i f  Congress would approve the b i l l ,  " I believe 
that a ll which could be accomplished through a central bank can be
11 O
accomplished through the Federal Reserve System."
TlGgccles influence may be measured by comparing a memo he wrote 
fo r Roosevelt en titled , "Desirable Changes in the Administration of the 
Federal Reserve System," November 2, 1934, 3 pages, with the fin a l b i l l .  
A copy of the memo is in the Morgenthau Diary, Book I I ,  pp. 155-157.
TT7$ee S. 1715, by Fletcher, U. S ., Congressional Record, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess., February 6, 1935, pp. 1514-1523. Fletcher summarized 
the b i l l  in Ib id . ,  pp. 1523-24.
118Eccles to Wallace, 8 February 1935, Secretary of Agriculture, 
Record Group 16, "Banks," National Archives, Washington, D. C.
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Aware of the administration review of banking and monetary
policy, the Committee and its  friends sought to formulate th e ir own
proposals during the early weeks of 1935. After consulting Vanderlip,
Warren and Pearson, the mid-January National Agricultural Conference,
and others, the Committee published its  "1935 Program." The new agenda
proved but an abstract of past Committee recommendations as the Rand
organization again advocated the restoration of 1925 price levels and
then currency stab iliza tio n . The Committee s t i l l  believed the honest
dollar could be achieved through abandonment of a fixed gold do llar,
development of a domestic gold and s ilver market and the establishment
of federal monetary authority. Pending adoption of such measures, the
Committee urged the President to raise the price of gold to the legal
maximum of $41.34.^^^
The February 5 release of the administration bank b i l l  stirred
the Committee and its  farmer a llie s  to renew the struggle for a federal
monetary s tab ilization  agency. During February, Vanderlip presented the
Committee program to the Senate Agricultural Committee and to a national 
120radio audience. The Committee plan, a modification of the Vanderlip- 
Goldsborough Federal Monetary Authority B ill of 1934, urged Congress to 
create a government bureau with exclusive control over currency issue. 
The membership of the Authority, like  appointees to the Supreme Court,
^^%ee Rumely to Directing Committee, 8 January 1935; Rumely to 
Wood, 18 January 1935 and 22 January 1935; Rumely to Vanderlip, 18 Jan­
uary 1935; Committee to Cabinet Members, et , 15 January 1935; 
Committee, "1935 Program," 6 pages, and "Statement of the National 
Agricultural Conference," 14 January 1935, DLP; and Progressive Farmer, 
L (March 1935), p. 13.
^^^Rum ely to  D ir e c t in g  C om m ittee, 7 F e b rua ry  1935, DLP.
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would serve for l i f e  to diminish po litica l meddling. Once Congress
determined the level of prices best for the country, the Authority
would wield the powers thought necessary to achieve the targeted price
plateau. The plan retained the Federal Reserve as a privately owned
in stitu tio n , but limited its  function to that of holding cash reserves
1 P Iand rediscounting the commercial paper of member banks.
Rumely and the Committee detected important differences in the 
Eccles B ill and the monetary authority approach. They complained the 
administration b i l l  fa iled  to include a gold repricing mechanism or 
establish a free gold and s ilver market. A strong, presidentially  
appointed Board also might p o litic ize  the Reserve and bring about the 
"socializing" of money, cred it and investment in contrast to the Com­
mittee's dual system which retained private enterprize banking and 
nationalized only the control of monetary p o l i c y . on February 19 
Eccles and Vanderlip shared a speaking appointment at the Harvard Club 
in New York City. Vanderlip reported Eccles' speech " p it ifu l."
"Instead of logic or insight, he presented a simile 'pump priming.'
I t  is a big pump and you cannot pump i t  with a tr ic k le ."  To the disgust 
of Vanderlip, Eccles advocated a counter-cyclical fiscal program taxing 
in times of prosperity and spending in times of depression, while grant­
ing only "left-handed admission" that the value of money ought to
121 Radio address by Vanderlip, "Tomorrow's Money," February 19,
1935 and Rumely to Directing Committee, 5 February 1935, DLP 
1 ?? Rumely to  D ir e c t in g  C om m ittee, 11 February 193
a ry  1935, and Rumely to  V a n d e r lip ,  11 F ebrua ry  1935, DLP.
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be re g u la te d .123 Eccles, though s t i l l  a s tab iliza tio n is t, had le f t  
the narrower world of the monetarists.
In spite of doubts about Eccles, Rumely believed the President 
possessed "enough money insight" that he might be won to the Committee 
program .124 Roosevelt had submitted the Eccles b i l l  to Congress in 
March as a tentative proposal and subsequently allowed subordinates
125and the Congressional committees to resolve differences on the b i l l .
In early May, even the House Democratic Steering Committee seemed unable 
to determine the President's attitude towards the measure, and not
un til June did Roosevelt label the Eccles b i l l  an administration mea-
126sure. Roosevelt's fa c il ity  on the issue encouraged Rumely and the 
Committee for the Nation to undertake a major drive to include s ta b ili­
zationist objectives in the omnibus banking package. As for strategy, 
Rumely, mindful of the v it r io lic  radio language of Coughlin, urged the 
Committee to employ "private meetings" and "temperate statements"
rather than "controversy in the press" in its  approach to the adminis- 
127tra tion . To reinforce such appeals the Committee again staged 
dinners, radio appearances, seminars and published thousands of pieces 
of lite ra tu re . To finance the campaign, Rumely incessantly canvassed
IZ^Quoted in Rumely to Directing Committee, 20 February 1935, DLP. 
T24Rumely to Directing Committee, 11 February and 28 March 1935,
DLP.
125Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
pp. 159-60. Burns, The American Banking Community and New Deal Banking 
Reforms, p. 140, unconvincingly portrays the Eccles b il l  as "nothing 
less than a Roosevelt measure."
T26g. s . .  Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 May 
1935, p. 7168.
T27Rumely to  D ire c t in g  C om m ittee, 5 March 1935, DLP.
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supporters though contributions amounted to about two-thirds that of
the previous year. S t i l l  the Committee spent approximately $4,250 per
month during the f i r s t  half of 1935, the period coinciding with the
1 ?Rheight of the Congressional battles for money and banking reform.
The f i r s t  opportunity to gain Congressional support for the 
Federal Monetary Authority came as the Eccles b i l l  lay in the House 
Banking and Currency Committee. The Committee's ranking Democrat,
Thomas Alan Goldsborough, once again led House stab ilization  forces. 
Goldsborough proved popular among farm groups because of his commodity 
dollar convictions. O'Neal recalled that when the Farm Bureau decided 
to push for the honest do llar, "We went down to Washington . . . and 
we had a hell of a time to find somebody who would lis ten  to our cause. 
Well we got this staunch, red-headed s tra ig h t-fig h tin ', straight-1iquor 
drinkin' congressman from the Eastern shore of Maryland . . . Mr. Golds­
b o r o u g h . T h e  Democrat's honest do llar enthusiasm dating back to 
1922, actually preceded those of the Farm Bureau. Eccles also admired
Goldsborough and considered him the in tellectual leader of the House
1Banking and Currency Committee. During hearings on the banking b i l l  
in March and A p ril, Goldsborough arranged for Irving Fisher, O'Neal,
T28%he Committee received gross income of $59,767.61 during 
1935 and spent $44,725.20, the balance being applied to the previous 
year's debt. See "Committee for the Nation Financial Statement for the 
Year 1935," attached to Rumely to Sexauer, 12 January 1936. Also, 
Rumely to Directing Committee, 8 June 1935, DLP.
^^^O'Neal address to the 17th Annual Convention of the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, December 9-11, 1935, pp. 108-109.
T30Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers, pp. 181, 200, 219-221.
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Sexauer and E. S. Foster to te s tify  at great length in favor of sta­
b i l i z a t i o n . R u m e l y  considered the House hearings crucial to the 
e ffo rt to secure monetary reform and arranged to distribute 10,000 
copies of the testimony.^^2
The leadership of Goldsborough, the tactics of the Committee 
fo r the Nation, and the lobbying of organized agriculturd appeared to 
have some effect on the administration. During the las t week of March 
O'Neal met with Roosevelt and asked for further gold devaluation and 
an amendment to the banking b i l l  granting the commodity d o lla r .^33 
The farm spokesman reported that the President indicated "he may not 
be firm ly committed to the b i l l  as i t  s t a n d s . O v e r c o m i n g  in it ia l  
d iff ic u lt ie s , Rumely managed to have Chairman Steagall, an administra­
tive  a lly , reopen the House Banking and Currency Committee hearings on
1April 8 to allow testimony from Rand and Vanderlip. The evening 
before the Rand-Vanderlip Steagall Committee appearance Eccles met with 
Committee for the Nation o ffic ia ls  for a private but congenial five  
hour session. Afterwards Rumely reported that the Reserve Board
^31Rumely to Directing Committee, 18 March 1935 and Rumely to 
Sexauer, 13 March 1935, DLP. See also U. S ., Congress, House Committee 
on Banking and Currency, Banking Act of 1935; Hearings on H. 5357,
74th Cong., 1st Sess., February, March and April 1935, 882 pages.
T32Rumely to Directing Committee, 1 April and 27 April 1935, DLP.
T33o'Neal to President, 23 March 1935, OF 229, FDR Library; 
"A.F.B.F. Seeks Establishment of Commodity Dollar," O ffic ia l News Letter, 
XIV (April 2, 1935), pp. 1, 4.
T^^Quoted in Rumely to Directing Committee, 28 March 1935, DLP.
135gteagall to  Committee, 28 March 1935 and Committee to  S te a g a ll ,  
1 April 1935; Rumely to  D ire c tin g  Committee, 1 A p ril 1935, DLP.
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Chairman "seemed desirous of having the Committee's cooperation in 
connection with the Banking Bill."^^®
The Eccles session convinced the Committee that the administra­
tion might agree to compromise on monetary issues. The day following 
the conversation with the Reserve Board Chairman, Rand and Vanderlip 
praised Roosevelt's monetary leadership to the House Banking and Cur­
rency Committee and even dropped demands for a separate federal 
monetary a g e n c y . instead, Committee o ffic ia ls  agreed the Eccles 
b i l l  might be acceptable i f  properly altered and within days the Com­
mittee and its  a llie s  produced the Goldsborough Amendment of 1935. The 
la tes t Goldsborough e ffo rt condensed in two b rie f paragraphs the 
matured creed of the decade-and-a-half long honest dollar crusade.
The measure demanded refla tion  of wholesale prices, stabilization of 
the dollar tied to a commodity index, creation of "a free and open" gold 
and s ilver market, and the delegation of appropriate monetary responsi­
b i l i t ie s  to the Reserve Board and the Treasury. The Committee 
anticipated the Goldsborough Amendment would be attached to T it le  I I  
of the omnibus bank bill.^^B
T36Rumely to Directing Committee, 8 April 1935 and 9 April 1935; 
Eccles to Rand, 15 April 1935, DLP.
s. .  Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Banking Act of 1935, Hearings on H. R. 5357, 8 April 1935, pp. 825-59, 
876. See also Rand to Roosevelt, 9 April 1935; and Rand to Eccles,
10 April 1935, DLP.
^^^Rumely to Directing Committee, 10 April 1935 and 15 April 
1935, DLP; Rumely to Sexauer, 13 April 1935, Sexauer papers. An early 
draft of the Amendment is Rumely to Sexauer, 13 April 1935, Sexauer 
papers, while the fin a l text is printed in U. S ., Congressional Record, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess., May 8, 1935, p. 7163. See also Rand to Roose­
v e lt , 15 April 1935, DLP.
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In spite of appearances that i t  wished to have the Committee's
cooperation, the administration rejected the Goldsborough Amendment.
In a telephone conversation on April 15, Eccles informed the Committee
"He would not be w illing to go along as head of the Federal Reserve
Board under a price level mandate from Congress because he did not see
how i t  could possibly be carried out." The Reserve o ffic ia l also pro-
1tested the Warren free gold market e l ix ir .  After the Eccles rebuff 
the Committee concluded "The White House must be convinced of the p o lit­
ical expediency of meeting the wishes of the agricultural West and 
S o u t h . D i s a p p o i n t e d  at a former Committee associate, s tab iliza - 
tionists again turned to the President and Congress.
Within a week of Eccles' rejection of the Goldsborough Amend­
ment the New Dealer convinced the House Banking and Currency Committee 
to attach a stabilization declaration to the bank b i l l .  The amendment 
ordered the Federal Reserve Board to exercise its  powers "to promote 
business s ta b ility  . . .  so fa r as may be possible within the scope of 
monetary action and credit administration." Though Eccles opposed a 
Congressionally mandated price level he favored a generic statement 
supporting stabilization as a goal of Reserve policy. The New York 
Times explained that Eccles and the President had approved the s ta b ili­
zation clause because "a number of businessmen and financiers want it"  
and because the administration hoped the measure might relieve strong 
sentiment among House Banking and Currency Committee members for the
'^%lemo from Earl Harding to Directing Committee, 15 April 1935, 
Warren papers.
140ibid.
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Federal Monetary Authority. Whatever the motive, the Committee rejected 
the Monetary Authority, but only a fte r i t  accepted the administration's 
stabilization substitute.
Dissatisfied with the Eccles compromise, the Committee deter­
mined to figh t for the Goldsborough Amendment on the House floor.
During the next few weeks the Committee did everything possible to stim­
ulate organized agriculture to fight for the Goldsborough Amendment.
Fred Sexauer, the Committee's contact man with agriculture, organized 
the National Cooperative Council, the American Farm Bureau, the Grange, 
and the farm press in a mass appeal to W a s h i n g t o n . O n  May 1 the 
Committee and the farm organizations hosted 65 Congressmen at a Wash­
ington dinner that featured Sexauer, O'Neal, and other advocates of the
143stabilization cause. Though the campaign drew notice from the press
14lNew York Times, 22 April 1935, 25:1.
142Examples of the dozens of le tters  in the Sexauer and Dairy­
men's League Papers that relate to the 1935 campaign are Sexauer to 
Directors, et ^ . , 20 April 1935; Committee to Each Member and Supporter, 
22 April 1935; Sexauer to Congressmen, 27 April 1935; Committee to a ll 
Members of Senate, House, et ^ . , 30 April 1935; Herbert P. King, Pres­
ident of NYSFB to Congress, 17 April 1935; Charles W. Holman, To Members 
of Congress, 4 May 1935; Vanderlip "Open Letter" to Eccles, 6 May 1935; 
Rand to Farm Leaders, Editors of Agricultural Papers, 1 May 1935;
Rumely to Directing Committee, 26 April 1935; Chart, "The Banking B ill 
of 1935—With and Without the Goldsborough Amendment," and Rand, "Con­
gress and the Dollar," radio address over WEAF, May 8, 1935, 5 pages; 
Congressman Clukin to Sexauer, 29 April 1935, a ll in DLP. See also 
Rand to McIntyre, 6 May 1935, and Vanderlip to Howe, 3 May 1935, FDR 
Library; Gannett to Roosevelt, 6 May 1935, Gannett papers, Cornell;
Amos Pinchot to Thomas, 7 May 1935, Thomas papers. University of Okla­
homa; and O ffic ia l News Lette r, XIV (April 23, 1935), p. 1.
T43Rumely to Directing Committee, 27 April and 30 April 1935,
DLP. See also "Address by Sexauer at Dinner of farm organization lead­
ers and Congressmen," 1 May 1935, 5 pages, Sexauer papers; "Address by 
Frank E. Gannett at Dinner," May 1, 1935, 9 pages, Gannett papers; 
"Statement Issued by Senator Elmer Thomas," 3 May 1935, and Rumely to 
Sexauer, 4 May 1935, DLP.
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and support from Congressmen, i t  fa iled  to secure the backing of the 
administration. S t i l l  Rumely thought the amendment had a " fa ir  chance" 
in the House, though Ed Foster believed that without the President's 
support the amendment would f a i l ,  but that "our only hope of ever get­
ting the type of monetary legislation we want lies  along the line of 
everlasting hammering toward our goal."^^^
The House voted on the Goldsborough Amendment May 8. Observers 
recalled that the last Goldsborough b il l  to reach the floor of the 
House overcame adamant Hoover Administration opposition with a vote of 
289 to 60. In 1935 with the Roosevelt Administration maintaining what
one journalist reported as "quiet opposition," the Goldsborough Amend-
145ment met defeat 128 to 122. The following day in a parliamentary
maneuver aimed at keeping the amendment a liv e , the Goldsborough forces
again lost 221 to 159.^^^ Meanwhile the House defeated a Republican
e ffo rt to delete the stab ilization  policy declaration from the b il l  
14785 to 68. The Goldsborough e ffo rt had shown greater strength than 
any of the various attempts to modify the Eccles b il l  in the House and
T44poster to Board of Directors, New York State Farm Bureau 
Federation, 4 May 1935, Gannett papers; and Rumely to Directing Commit­
tee, 30 April 1935, DLP.
S ., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., May 8, 
1935, p. 7181; New York Times, 9 May 1935; and James McMullin, "The 
National Whirligig: News Behind the News," McClure Newspaper Syndicate,
May 7, 1935.
s . , Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., May 8,
1935, p. 7182.
s.. Congressional Record, 74th Cong, 1st Sess., May 8,
p. 7182.
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stab ilization is ts  expressed the conviction that without administration
1ARintervention the measure would have received approval.
With the indefatigable s p ir it  of true believers the Committee
and its  agricultural a llie s  next attempted to have the Senate accomplish
what the House had nearly done--attach the Goldsborough Amendment to
the Eccles B i l l .  According to the envisioned s tab iliza tio n is t scenario
i f  the Senate passed the Goldsborough B ill the House would agree to i t
in conference, placing great pressure on the President to approve the 
149measure. Unfortunately for s tab iliza tio n is ts , the vision collided  
with Carter Glass of V irginia. Glass, defender of Reserve orthodoxy 
and nemesis of honest moneyites since the early 1920s, chaired the 
Senate subcommittee considering the omnibus bank b i l l .  Under the V ir­
ginian's leadership the Committee not only rejected the Goldsborough 
Amendment, but eliminated the House approved stab ilization  policy clause. 
Confronted with an intransigent committee, stabilizaxionists concen­
trated on winning once the Eccles B ill got to the Senate floor. Again, 
honest moneyites deluged solons with le tte rs , lite ra tu re , petitions, 
and the farm press, especially Frank Gannett's American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, 
C lifford Gregory's Prairie Farmer, and Clarence Poe's Progressive
T48$tabilizationist reactions to the defeat are: Rumely to
Ward, 15 May 1935; Congressman H ill to Rand, 10 May 1935, DLP; E. S. 
Foster to Sexauer, 15 May 1935; Sexauer to Foster, 16 May 1935, Sexauer 
papers; "Toward an Honest Dollar," Wallaces' Farmer, LX (May 25, 1935), 
p. 320; and Prairie Farmer, CVII (June 22, 1935), p. 4.
T49Rumely to Directing Committee, 20 May 1935, Sexauer papers; 
and Rumely to Directing Committee, 29 June 1935, DLP.
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150Farmer offered strong ed ito ria l support. On June 27 and July 15, 
the Farm Bureau, the Grange, the National Cooperative Council, the 
National Milk Producer's Federation, and the Farmer's Grain Corporation 
petitioned the Senate to add the Goldsborough Amendment to the bank 
b i l l .  The Committee fo r the Nation and Rumely remained the v ita liz in g  
force behind these and other efforts to gain Senate approval for the 
honest dollar.^~^
T ^Rumely to Directing Committee, 18 July 1935, DIP; Poe to 
Thomas, Thomas papers; Poe to Senator J. li. Bailey, 17 July 1935 and 
Poe to Borah, Borah papers. Library of Congress; Gannett to Bulkley,
4 June 1935, Gannett papers; Gannett to Senators Bulkly and Couzens,
10 June 1935, OLP; "Monetary Program Administration's Only Chance," 
American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXII (June 8, 1935), p. 1; Gannett, "We 
Need an Honest Dollar," American A g ricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXII (July 6, 1935), 
p. 2; Committee to All News Editors and Publishers of Cotton Growing 
States, 5 July 1935, DIP. See also Capper, "The People Must Decide," 
Capper's Weekly, LX (June 15, 1935), p. 2; Capper, "Two Big Battles 
S t i l l  Face Congress," Capper's Weekly, LX (June 29, 1935), p. 2; "Honest 
Dollar Upheld," Progressive Farmer, L (April 1935), p. 5; Poe, "In ter­
preting the World's News," Progressive Farmer, L (May 1935), p. 50; 
"Production Control vs. Dollar Devaluation," Progressive Farmer, L 
(August 1935), p. 3, 33.
T51"Petition of Organized Agriculture to a ll Members of Con­
gress," 27 June 1933, and Rumely to Directing Committee, 28 June 1935, 
DLP; "Farmer Groups Urge Stabilized Dollar," New York Times, 1 July 
1935; American Farm Bureau, et , to Thomas, 15 July 1935, Thomas 
papers. The campaign to win the Senate to the Goldsborough Amendment 
may be traced in the following: Rumely to Directing Committee, 28 May,
3 June, 4 June, 6 June, 25 June, 29 June, 2 July, 9 July, 10 July,
22 July, 23 July, 1935, a ll in DLP. See also Rumely to Rand, 20 May 
1935, and Rand to Hearst, 21 May 1935, Sexauer papers; "What the Golds­
borough Amendment Does," Committee pamphlet, June 1935; Rumely to 
O'Neal, 4 June 1935; Rumely to Sexauer, 14 June; Committee to Members
of Congress, 21 June 1935; "Memorandum from Earl Harding," to Committee,
9 July 1935; Rumely to Harding, 11 July 1935; Rand to Roosevelt, 26 July 
1935; and McIntyre to Rand, 31 July 1935, a ll in DLP. See also C. W. 
Lawrance to Sexauer, 7 June 1935; Committee to Fletcher and Steagall,
21 June 1935, Sexauer papers; Rumely to Thomas, 21 June 1935; Sid White 
to Thomas, 28 May 1935, Thomas papers; Pinchot to Senators Fletcher, 
Borah, and Costigan, 6 July 1925; "Statement by the Committee to Mem­
bers of the United States Senate Banking and Currency Committee,"
25 July 1935, Warren papers and Bendix to All Friends of the Committee,
13 July 1935, Rumely Collection, Indiana University.
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Stabilizationists recruited William Borah of Idaho to lead the
Goldsborough forces in Senate debate. On June 29, the Senator's
seventieth birthday, delegates from the major farm organizations and
the Committee met for a strategy session in the Westerner's Washington 
152o ffice . The Senator agreed to sponsor the "Borah-Goldsborough" 
Amendment which he introduced on July 26. The work of Professor John R. 
ConFions, the amendment called for the Federal Reserve Board to restore 
prices to pre-crash averages and stab ilize  them "within reasonable 
margins of v a ria b ility ."  The Commons statement dropped the demand for 
a free gold market but ordered the Reserve Board to construct an index 
comprised of "the average of prices weighted in proportion to the 
sources of demand from substantially a ll of the economic interests in
1 A?the United States for credit money and legal-tender money." Though 
personally committed to s tab iliza tio n , Borah never seemed enthusiastic 
about the proposition's chances in the Senate and ultimately refused 
to allow the amendment to stand the test of a vote.^^^ He explained to 
Committee for the Nation supporter Frank Gannett that since the Eccles 
b il l  enjoyed the unanimous support of the Senate Banking Committee and
^^^Borah's association with the Goldsborough Amendment may be 
traced in the following: Rumely to Directing Committee, 28 June 1935
and 2 July 1935, DLP; Rand to Borah, 8 May 1935; Poe to Borah, 23 July 
1935, Sexauer to Borah, 23 July 1935; Pinchot to Borah, 25 July 1935, 
Borah papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington.
Also Frazier to F. S. Rumely, 20 July 1935; Harding to Rand, 20 July 
1935, Rumely to S. Rumely, 25 July 1935, Rumelv papers, Indiana Univer­
s ity .
153U. S ., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., July 26,
1935, p. 11926; Borah's remarks are Ib id . , pp. 11907-11911.
154Borah to Gannett, 15 July 1935 and Borah to Poe, 18 July
1935, Borah papers.
7^1o/
the fu ll backing of the administration, "There was a feeling among a ll 
those who desired to secure amendments that the situation was hopeless 
. . .  i t  was concluded that we should not offer an amendment and have 
i t  overwhelmingly d e f e a t e d . "^^5 Devoid of a stabilization pronounce­
ment, the omnibus banking b ill  passed the Senate on a nonrecorded vote 
July 2 6 .TSG
As i t  became evident that efforts to secure the Goldsborough 
Amendment would f a i l ,  stab ilization ists  divided over the next course 
of action. Vanderlip, Borah, and Sears-Roebuck Chairman Robert Wood, 
believed the Committee and its  a llies  ought to work to k i l l  the banking 
b i l l . 157 Iron ically  the tactics of the obstructionist monetarists 
aligned them with an old enemy—the banking fra te rn ity , who opposed the 
Eccles b i l l  because of its  emphasis on public regulation of th e ir indus- 
try.158 Undoubtedly hoping that the pressure of an election year might 
coerce Congress to be more amenable to stab ilization  leg is la tion . Wood 
asked Roosevelt to delay a vote on the Eccles b i l l  until J a n u a r y . 1 5 9  
Roosevelt po lite ly  refused.1^  ^ After the Senate's fa ilu re  to act upon
15%orah to Gannett, 1 August 1935 and Gannett to Borah, 31 July 
1935, Ib id .
156u. S ., Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., July 26, 
1935, p. 11935.
157Harding "Memorandum," 9 July 1935 and Rumely to Directing 
Committee, 26 June 1935, DLP.
158Burns, American Banking Community and New Deal Banking 
Reforms, pp. 147, 150-151, 155-160.
IS^Wood to Roosevelt, 12 July 1935, RPF 1365, FDR Library, Hyde 
Park, New York.
160ppgs iden t to  Wood, 18 J u ly  1935, I b i d .
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the Borah-Goldsborough Amendment, Wood described the frustration of 
many stab ilization ists  when he wrote the President, "Those of us bus­
inessmen who are liberals  are very much in the position of the man 
without a country." The Sears o ffic ia l explained he did not want to 
"go back to the old order of things," but neither did he approve the 
President's course "during the las t three months."^^1 Meanwhile
Rumely urged Borah to contest Roosevelt for the Presidency in 1935 on
162the monetary issue.
More comfortable with leg is la tive  compromise. Congressman 
Goldsborough claimed achievement in spite of the fa ilu re  to pass sta­
b iliza tio n  leg islation. He believed immediate enactment of the Eccles 
b i l l ,  even without a stab ilization  declaration, important in order to 
break "the backbone of banking power over money." The Congressman 
informed the Committee for the Nation that passage of the administra­
tion measure would make i t  possible "to secure a price level mandate
1at the next session of Congress." Goldsborough proved indispensable 
to the success of the Eccles b i l l  as he became the most active member 
of the three-man House contingent to the Senate-House Conference Com­
m ittee. S k illfu lly  cooperating with Eccles, the Marylander overcame 
Senate-led objections and secured in Conference an effective central
TG^ Wood to President, 8 August 1935, Ib id .
^^^Runiely to Borah, 15 August 1935, Sexauer papers, and Rumely 
to Directing Committee, 24 August 1935, DLP.
^^^Q uoted in  Rumely to  D ire c t in g  C om m ittee, 26 June 1935; and
"H a rd in g  Memo," 9 J u ly  1935, DLP.
373
bank law. Eccles gratefu lly recalled, " i t  was no exaggeration to say 
that had i t  not been for Steagall and Goldsborough, the whole attempt 
to rev ita lize  the Reserve System would have been k ille d . . . ."164 
Both, .houses accepted the Conference Report on .August 19 and the Banking 
Act of 1935 received the President's signature August 23, 1935.
Roosevelt bore the ultimate responsibility for defeat of sta­
b iliza tio n  legislation during 1935. Yet as with other monetary issues, 
his stance seemed more pragmatic than unmitigated. When the Committee 
fo r the Nation mailed him a s ta b iliza tio n is t monograph he passed i t  on 
to a vacationing Morgenthau with the inscription, "H. M. Jr. to read 
while in swimming. This inspiring detective story w ill probably cause 
you to commit s u i c i d e ."1G6 Roosevelt's sardonic remarks may not have 
been directed at the book, but a t the inept monetary practices the 
volume exposed. During Senate hearings on the Eccles b i l l  in May, 
Morgenthau received Roosevelt's permission to advocate greater Reserve 
Board control over credit and open market operations and the govern­
ment purchase of Federal Reserve s t o c k . F o l l o w i n g  Morgenthau's 
testimony, Roosevelt, in an off-the-record press conference, agreed 
with the Secretary, asserting "I think i t  [n a tio n a liza tio n ] would solve 
a great many questions." Roosevelt explained that had Andrew Jackson
^^^Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers, p. 181.
TG^ New York Times, 20 August 1935 and 24 August 1935.
^GGpoosevelt to Morgenthau, 22 March 1935, PPF 357, FDR Library. 
The book was S ir Charles Morgan-Webb, Ten Years of Currency Revolution: 
1922-1932 (New York: Committee for the Nation, 1935).
TG^Morgenthau, Diary, Book IV , May 15, 1935, p. 114; New York 
Times, 19 May 1935.
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chosen to nationalize rather than destroy the Bank of the United States, 
" i t  would have solved the banking situation at that time in a much more 
satisfactory way."^^® By August, Roosevelt opposed "any attempt to 
include monetary policies, industrial control, or the maintenance of 
price levels" in the Eccles b i l l O n  August 23, the date the Eccles 
b i l l  became law, a reporter asked Roosevelt what he hoped the measure 
would accomplish. Roosevelt responded, "Read the t i t l e  of the b i l l ,
I  hope i t  w ill accomplish a ll those things." Then, perhaps in humor, 
he reminded the jo urna lis t, "The chief thing in the t i t l e  says, ' . . . 
and for other purposes.'" On monetary issues Roosevelt remained 
grandly opaque even in victory.
As the wearisome f i r s t  session of the Seventy-fourth Congress 
came to a close, in fla tion ists  continued to seek monetary action. In 
July Senator Thomas gathered the signatures of 46 Senators on a peti­
tion requesting that the Treasury administer the S ilver Purchase Act 
of June 1934 "enthusiastically."^^^ Thomas believed that Morgenthau 
had purchased only about half the amount of s ilver required under the
terms of the law and that "in the interest of cotton producers" the
172price of s ilver ought to be boosted. The Thomas complaint resulted
TGSpoosevelt Press Conference, #205, May 19, 1935, V, p. 287.
^^ "^Memo" by Hon. Jesse H. Jones on August 2, 1935, conference 
with Roosevelt, #229, FDR Library.
T^ORoosevelt Press Conference #232, August 23, 1935, IV, p. 110.
Thomas to Roosevelt, 22 July 1935, Thomas papers.
^^^Thomas to  P re s id e n t,  20 June 1935, Thomas papers.
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in the appointment of a Senate Special S ilver Committee and though its  
chairman Key Pittman muted the subsequent investigation, the episode
171demonstrated the latent nature of the s ilver issue. Meanwhile, 
Rumely overcame a threat from Sears-Roebuck, the Committee for the 
Nation's most generous sponsor, to withdraw financial support from the 
Rand g r o u p . I n s t e a d ,  Sears and the Committee prepared to renew the 
battle for monetary reform in the forthcoming national elections.
T73%homas to Ahurst, 7 August 1935; Thomas to Compton I .  White, 
20 August 1935 and White to Thomas, 26 August 1935, Thomas papers.
^^^During its  f i r s t  th irty  months (January 1933 to June 1935), 
the Committee had received $31,750 from Sears-Roebuck, $19,000 from 
Remington-Rand, $18,500 from General Baking Co., and $500 from the 
Dairymen's League. See Rumely to Wood, 23 July 1935, and Wood to Rand, 
22 July 1935 and 1 August 1935, DLP.
CHAPTER XI
FROM THE BATTLE FOR INFLATION TO INFLATION BY WAR:
FARMERS, THE NEW DEAL AND MONEY, 1936-1941
Two developments in early January 1936 revived the debate over 
monetary policy. On January 6, the Supreme Court declared the AAA 
unconstitutional and on January 10, Roosevelt extended presidential 
powers to devalue the dollar and to manage the two b illio n  s tab iliza ­
tion fund until January 1936. "The Supreme Court's decision has put 
the United States back to midsummer 1933," proclaimed the Committee for 
the Nation and within days in fla tio n is t congressmen, the farm organiza­
tions and the National Agricultural Conference demanded renewed 
monetary activism as an alternative to the defunct AAA.^
The approaching national elections also provided monetarists 
an opportunity to promote monetary reform. In August 1935, Edward A. 
Rumely of the Committee for the Nation endorsed septuagenarian Senator 
William Borah of Idaho for the Presidency. By January 1936, Committee 
supporter Frank E. Gannett of Rochester, New York, publisher of 
American Agriculturalist and owner of 19 northeastern newspapers.
^Committee for the Nation Press Release, 8 January 1936, DLP; 
Sexauer to farm heads, 8 January 1936; "Resolutions," National Coopera­
tive  Council, Washington, 0. C ., January 15, 1936, 4 pages, Sexauer 
papers; and "President O'Neal Presents Recommendations of APBF to 
National Agricultural Conference," O ffic ia l News Letter, XV (January 21; 
1936), p. 1.
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joined Rumely in pushing the Westerner's candidacy.^ Gannett hired 
Rumely to organize "The Farmers' and Business Men's National Committee 
fo r Borah" and contributed $25,000 to Borah and the honest dollar e ffo rt  
during the spring of 1936.3 Borah, the co-author of the 1935 Golds­
borough amendment, welcomed the support of Rumely and Gannett and during 
the Ohio primary announced that i f  nominated he would choose Gannett as 
his Vice Presidential running mate.* At the Republican convention in 
early June, the Idahoan gathered approximately 100 delegate votes, 
second only to Landon but not enough to prevent the nomination of the
5
Kansan on the f i r s t  ba llot.
Aside from the Borah campaign, monetarists worked to influence 
the formation of the Republican and Democratic monetary planks. In the 
weeks before the conventions, Fred Sexauer chaired the Monetary Commit­
tee of the National Cooperative Council—a committee that urged 
cooperatives and farm groups to contact local politicos regarding the 
money program and mailed pro-stabilization lite ra tu re  to each of the
^Gannett to Borah, 6 January 1936; 11 January 1936; and Rumely 
to Borah, 18 January 1936, Gannett papers, Cornell University. See 
also "Fiske Memorandum," 12 September 1935, Rumely Collection, Indiana 
University; Gannett to Hon. Henry P. Fletcher, Chairman, National Repub­
lican Committee, 20 September 1935; Gannett to Rumely, 27 September
1935, and Rumely to Directing Committee, 20 January 1936, DLP; and New 
York Times, 23 February, 30:3; 27 February, 9:1; and 28 February, 2:3,
1936.
^Gannett, Amos Pinchot and William Ziegler, J r . ,  to friends,
17 March 1936, Rumely Collection. Contributions of $7,052 are lis ted  
in "Borah Committee Finance," April 25, 1936, Ib id . The $25,000 figure  
is mentioned in Gannett to Wood, 20 June 1936, Sexauer papers.
*New York Times , March 1 , 1:4, 1936.
^Though they ignore the role of Gannett and Rumely, two accounts 
of the Borah campaign are Claudious 0. Johnson, Borah of Idaho (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1967), pp. xiv-xv, 469, 474; and 
Marian C. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1961), pp. 319-336.
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2,000 Republican and 1,900 Democratic delegates and alternates.G In 
April the dairy leader as head of the Monetary Committee journeyed to 
Topeka to assess Governor Landon's attitude towards monetary and agri­
cultural issues. The Kansan impressed Sexauer with his knowledge of 
the agricultural industry and though the Governor doubted i f  monetary 
management could be achieved "in a sprawling democracy such as ours," 
the Republican contender "implied a willingness . . .  to see the door 
to managed currency kept open in the p l a t f o r m . A t  the Cleveland 
Republican Convention Sexauer presented to the Platform Committee 
organized agriculture's jo in t monetary plank. The statement recognized 
the money question as "one of the most important issues confronting 
rural l i f e ,"  demanded a monetary authority and urged that commitments 
to international exchange stabilization be avoided should they place
O
domestic producers at a disadvantage.
The Cleveland convention responded ambivalently to agriculture's  
monetary demands. Borrowing language from the Democratic plank of 1932,
^Committee ac tiv ities  may be traced in numerous le tters  and 
memoranda in the Sexauer and Dairymen's League papers at Cornell. See 
especially Sexauer to M ille r , "A Brief Report of the Activities of Your 
Monetary Committee," 30 June 1936, 5 pages, Sexauer papers. Committee 
members were Sexauer, Earl W. Benjamin, General Manager of Pacific Egg 
Producers' Cooperative, Inc.; Charles G. Henry, General Manager of Mid- 
South Cotton Growers' Assoc.; Harry Hartke, member of the Executive 
Committee of National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation; Carlisle  
Thorpe, General Manager of California Walnut Growers' Assoc.; and 
Charles A. Ewing, President of National Livestock Marketing Association.
^Sexauer, "Impressions of Governor Landon After V isiting Him 
in April 1936 As the Chairman of the Monetary Committee of the National 
Cooperative Council," typewritten, 4 pages, Sexauer papers. See also 
Rumely to Sexauer, January 20, 1936, Rumely papers.
O
Sexauer, "Platform Is Born," typewritten speech, June 27,
1936, 8 pages, Sexauer papers.
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the GOP announced "We advocate a sound currency to be preserved a t a ll 
hazards." The platform proclaimed the " f irs t  requisite" to such a 
currency was obtaining a balanced budget, opposing further devaluation, 
repealing the President's discretionary monetary powers and negotiating 
international stabilization agreements "as soon as we can do so with 
regard for our national in terest." S ign ificantly , the money plank 
avoided a ll mention of the word "gold." Bowing to the Borah agricul­
tural forces. Republican platform makers had deleted a statement 
promising a return to the gold standard.^
Dissatisfied with the labor, money and c iv il service sections 
of the platform, Landon submitted "my interpretation" of the three 
planks in a telegram read to the convention prior to the Governor's 
nomination. The Landon corollary to the money plank added a "second 
requisite . . .  a currency expressed in terms of gold and convertible 
into gold." But the Kansan temporized the "second requisite must not 
be made effective unless i t  can be done . . . without injury to our 
producers of agricultural products."^0 The telegram disappointed O'Neal 
and other farm leaders and "stunned" B o r a h . S t i l l  Joseph Pew, a 
Republican mogul and member of the Philadelphia Sun Oil family and 
London's platform coordinator, Charles P. T a ft, assured monetarists
^The 1936 Platform is printed in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
(e d .). History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968, I I I  
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), p. 2862. See also Donald R.
McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966),
p. 254.
' N^ew York Times, 12 June, 1:8, and 1:2, 1936, and McCoy, Landon, 
pp. 256-257.
McKenna, Borah, p. 336.
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that the Governor's statement was intended as a conciliatory gesture
12to agricultural s tab ilization is ts .
Democrats assembled at Philadelphia in la te  June and organized 
agriculture presented the jo in t agricultural monetary proposal agreed 
upon at Cleveland to the Resolutions C o mmi t t e e . B u t  o ffic ia ls  in 
Washington rather than delegates at Philadelphia wrote the 1936 Demo­
cratic platform. On June 24, George F. Warren met with Morgenthau at 
the Capitol and the two reviewed a draft of the proposed money plank.
The Cornell professor recorded, " I t  included statements that our currency 
was the soundest in the world, that the world was investing here, great 
gold reserves, etc. At my suggestion he cut a ll of this out." Instead 
the Secretary and the professor wrote a statement that described New 
Deal monetary policy as "an important factor in recovery" and "approved 
ideas of stabilizing purchasing power in the future." Morgenthau then 
took the proposition to Roosevelt who "cut out 31 words" and approved 
i t .  The exorcised verbiage evidently referred to the role of monetary 
policy in speeding recovery and the promise of future stab ilization . 
Chagrined, Warren asked Morgenthau " i f  the President realized what the 
monetary policy had done." The Secretary responded, "not fu lly ,"  but 
that he [j'iorgenthaul had shown him a speech in which he gave fu ll  
credit to money and "the President raised no objection.
TZpew to Sexauer, 15 June 1936, Sexauer papers and Taft to 
Rumely, 23 June 1936, Rumely Collection, Indiana University.
^^Sexauer to M ille r , "Brief Report," p. 5, and AFBF, National 
Grange, and the NCC to Wagner, June 1935, Sexauer papers.
T^George F. W arren, D ia ry ,  June 2 4 , 1936, C o rn e ll U n iv e rs ity .
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The o ff ic ia l version of the Democratic money plank approved 
both a "sound" and "stabilized" currency, condemned "the former wide 
vluctuations in value" and asked fo r "a currency which w ill permit fu ll  
u tiliza tio n  of the country's resources." Overcoming Warren's objec­
tions, the plank boasted "today we have the soundest currency in the 
world." F inally , i f  "gold" plagued Republican platform shapers, "silver" 
discomfited Democrats who omitted a ll references to Administration pur­
chases of the white m etal. 5^
During the Presidential campaign monetarists continued efforts  
to convert Landon to managed currency. On several occasions farm 
spokesmen met with Landon to review the monetarist argument. Evidently 
the nominee hoped to use the honest do llar advocates to secure the long 
sought support of Senator Borah. After a New York conference with the 
candidate Gannett, Rumely and Sexauer separately appealed to the 
Idahoan to endorse the Landon-Knox tic ke t. Each of the three reported 
that Landon intended to interpret the Republican money plank lib e ra lly  
and in line with honest dollar demands i f  only Borah would openly sup­
port the Governor . Regardl ess of his friends assurances, Borah, 
believing Landon represented "men with whose views I cannot compromise," 
declined.
Borah's suspicions of the Landon overture seemed vindicated 
when Republican orators critic ized  Roosevelt's "currency tinkering" in
l^The 1935 Democratic platform is printed in Schlesinger, (ed. ) .  
History of American Presidential Elections, p. 2855.
^^Rumely to Borah, 13 October 1936 and 14 October 1936, DLP; 
Gannett to Borah, 13 October 1936, Gannett papers and Sexauer to Borah, 
15 October 1936, Sexauer papers.
T^Borah to  Rumely, 14 O ctober 1936, DLP.
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a series of campaign speeches during the fin a l weeks of the campaign 
October 29 provided the climax of the Landon campaign e ffo r t as the 
Kansan delivered the "No one can be sure" address to an appreciative 
partisan throng at Madison Square Garden. The speech contrasted the 
challenger's po litica l creed with the alleged equivocation of the Roose­
ve lt Administration on the principal issues. Regarding the currency 
Issue the Governor intoned, "There can be no confidence when the govern­
ment creates uncertainty about the value of money.
Regardless of Landon's suggestive hints to New York monetarists, 
currency reformers generally viewed the Governor as anathema to the 
honest do llar. Wallaces' Farmer, Progressive Farmer and publications 
of the American Farm Bureau Federation c ritic ize d  the Republican mone-
pD
ta ry stance. Even Gannett's American A gricu ltura lis t characterized
the Republican commitment to gold as "a slap in the face to the agri­
culture of America."21 By election day probably most honest do llar 
advocates would have agreed with N. C. Williamson, President of the
1936.
l^New York Times, 8 October, 18:5; 31 October, 1:6 and 4:3,
l^The speech is printed in Schlesinger, (ed. ) .  History of Amer­
ican Presidential Elections, pp. 2894-2899.
20"Comments by President Earl C. Smith on Party Planks,"
Il l in o is  Agricultural Association Record, XIV (July 1936), p. 23;
"Money Plank Disappointing," O ffic ia l News Letter (June 23, 1936), p. 4; 
O'Neal, "Goodbye! . . . Gold Standard," Nation's Agriculture (September 
1936), pp. 1, 11, 12; W. R. Ogg, Acting Secretary, American Farm Bureau 
Federation, "The Minute Man," mimeographed pamphlet, AFBF, Chicago, 
September 15, 1936, 13 pages; "Landon to Fight Against Honest Dollar," 
Wallaces' Farmer, LXI (May 9, 1936), p. 353; " S til l Worship the Gold 
Standard," Progressive Farmer, LI (October 1936), p. 5.
ZlE. R. Eastman, "A Good Way to Lose the Farmer Vote," American 
A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXIII (September 12, 1936), p. 30.
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American Cotton Cooperative Association and a member of Sexauer's Mone­
tary Committee that the Landon campaign offered monetarists " l i t t le  
hope.
I f  Landon occasionally muddied the monetary waters, Roosevelt 
walked on them and often in several directions simultaneously. In May 
1936, the quasi-officia l Business Advisory Council to the Department of 
Commerce, a brainchild of Commerce Secretary Daniel Roper, produced a 
study entitled  "A Permanent Monetary Policy for the United States. 
General Robert Wood of Sears-Roebuck and James H. Rand, J r .,  the prin­
cipal financiers of the Committee for the Nation, served as chairman 
and vice-chairman of the Business Advisory Council's monetary subcom­
mittee and, not surprisingly, that group recommended both a managed 
currency and the establishment of a Federal monetary authority.^4 
Secretary Roper, a friend of the commodity do llar, submitted the study 
to the President on May 4 with the request that i t  be given the "e a rli­
est possible release."25 On May 11, Roosevelt sent the Roper report 
to Morgenthau with instructions to "talk i t  over" with Eccles and 
Oliphant. The president added, "This is important and I think should
2^n . C. Williamson to Sexauer, 12 October 1936, Sexauer papers. 
Irving Fisher and Former Senator Robert Owen voted for Roosevelt. See 
Fisher to FDR, 13 January 1937, PPF 431, FDR Library and Owen to 
Coogan, 15 May 1936, Owen papers. Library of Congress.
2^Roper to President, 4 May 1936, OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
See also Norman Keiser, "Public Responsibility and Federal Advisory 
Groups: A Case Study," Western P olitical Quarterly, I I  (June 1958),
pp. 251-264.
24wood to President, July 12, 1935; Wood to McIntyre, 8 May 1936: 
and McIntyre to Wood, 18 May 1935, OF 229, Roosevelt Library.
ZSRoper to  P re s id e n t,  4 May 1936, I b i d .
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receive careful study. . . . The objective of a managed currency is , 
of course, in general line with what we have been doing for three 
y e a r s . " 2 6  i f  the President seriously considered the time had come for 
acceptance of the Goldsborough monetary authority, his primary monetary 
advisor Morgenthau was aghast. Roosevelt's Roper memorandum caught the 
Treasurer enjoying a weekend at his New York farm and Morgenthau 
quickly wired a subordinate, "get word to the President that under no 
circumstances do I want i t  released until I see the President on Mon-
p7
day--that I consider i t  absolutely fu ll of dynamite." The opposition 
of Morgenthau sufficed. The President buried the report and action on 
a Federal monetary authority was again deferred.
Democrats during the campaign of 1936, forced to defend the 
New Deal monetary and banking record, appeared more open and flex ib le  
on the money question than Republicans. Wallace, in the heart of War­
ren Country, praised the administration's gold policy at the Oneida 
County Fair in August and during the campaign both Morgenthau and Attor­
ney General Homer Cummings defended New Deal banking and currency 
adjustments.28 At a press conference on October 6 , Roosevelt announced 
that i f  re-elected he would seek another extension of the President's 
power to devalue the dollar and manage the stabilization fund. He ex­
plained that the primary purpose of the administration's currency
26Roosevelt, "Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury,"
11 May 1936, Ib id .
27Morgenthau, "Memorandum," 15 May 1936, Ib id .
28"Wallace Lists Gains From Farm Program in Northeastern Region," 
O ffic ia l News Letter (August 18, 1936), p. 2, and New York Times,
October 24, 10:2, and October 29, 14:1, 1936.
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program was "to retain our domestic values" and the government ought 
to reserve power over the gold content of the dollar should some "unex­
pected action on the part of another nation" threaten American price 
29levels. Observers believed the Interview Indicated the President 
no longer contemplated Implementing an Irving Fisher commodity do llar, 
but would devalue should International circumstances dictate.
The President o ff ic ia lly  began his re-election drive on Septem­
ber 29 and throughout the October campaign appearances confidently 
described America as a better, happier, more prosperous nation than I t  
had been four years e a rlie r . In major addresses at Omaha, Denver, Chica­
go, and New York City and In several whlstle-stop appearances, the 
campaigner Included monetary policy among those programs responsible 
fo r a higher, more stable price level that Increased equity between 
creditor and d e b t o r . A t  the end of the month In the climactic Madison 
Square Garden reto rt to Landon, Roosevelt charged that opponents of 
administration money and banking reform were chiefly Interested In pro­
tecting monopolies and speculators. "We know now," he warned, "that
Z^Roosevelt Press Conferences, #323, October 5, 1935, p. 134.
S N^ew York Times, 7 October, 1:5; 8  October, 22:2, 1936.
^^The addresses and a good sample of Roosevelt's extemporaneous 
remarks are published In Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, V, p. 383 f f .  Those that mention ending defla­
tion , monetary policy, or price s ta b ility  include: Address at Creston,
Iowa, October 10, p. 424; Address at Omaha, Nebraska, October 10, p. 
434; Address at Denver, Colorado, October 12, 1936, p. 448; Address at 
Garden C ity, Kansas, October 12, p. 454; Address at Florence, Kansas, 
October 13, p. 464; Address at Chicago, I l l in o is ,  October 14, p. 485; 
Radio address to "Dinners of Business Men Held Throughout the Nation," 
October 23, 1936, p. 535; Address at Camden, New Jersey, October 19, 
1936, pp. 555-556; Address at Brooklyn, New York, October 30, 1936, 
p. 560.
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government by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by 
organized mob," and he promised, "We w ill continue our successful 
efforts  to increase . . . purchasing power and keep i t  constant. " ^ 2  
Though Roosevelt refused to specify what future monetary techniques 
might be employed to maintain price s ta b ility , the debate over the New 
Deal monetary record allowed the President to s tiffen  his posture as 
the opponent of "economic royalists."
The money question, given fresh impetus with the price collapse 
of 1937, remained a viable issue during Roosevelt's second term. But 
i f  the issue remained, monetarists lost the in te llig en ts ia  that led the 
movement during the f i r s t  New Deal. In 1937, the Committee for the 
Nation dissolved into impotency and Warren died on May 24, 1938.
After spending more than $300,000 from 1933 through 1936, the 
Committee for the Nation found i ts e lf  impecunious in 1937.^3 Organized 
agriculture s t i l l  offered cooperation but claimed i t  "impractical," to 
quote O'Neal, to provide financial assistance to the Rand committee. 
Committee finances became c r it ic a l in la te  1936 and early 1937 when 
several members including Lessing J. Rosenwald and General Robert Wood 
of Sears-Roebuck, P. K. Wrigley and Vincent Bendix quit the Rand group. 
Bendix resigned because of personal financial reverses while the Sears
op
"Campaign Address at Madison Square Garden, New York C ity,"  
October 31, 1936, Ib id . , pp. 558, 572.
^^Rumely to Sexauer, 4 January 1937, DLP and Rumely to Vanderlip, 
15 March 1937, Gannett papers.
^^O'Neal to Rumely, 31 December 1936 and 13 June 1937; Rumely 
to M ille r , 4 December 1937, DLP.
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executives lost fa ith  in the efficacy of the Warren e l i x i r . ^ 5  internal 
dissension also contributed to the Committee's anemic status. Some 
complained of Rumely's constant "nagging" for funds and Sexauer con­
cluded that the Indianan was an inept o r g a n i z e r . Shortly before his 
death Warren, who disliked the Committee's flir ta tio n s  with Father 
Coughlin, warned Pearson "to stay away from Rumely.
The demise of the Committee for the Nation probably resulted as 
much from the introduction of new issues as from inherent weaknesses 
in the Rumely group. On February 14, 1937, Gannett and Rumely announced 
the formation of the National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Govern­
ment.^^ The new organization, though sympathetic to the commodity 
d o llar, professed to see a potential Roosevelt dictatorship as a peril 
to America and consequently emphasized opposition to the court-packing 
scheme, wage and hours legislation and the executive reorganization 
b i l l .  The N.C.U.C.G. attracted many like  Louis J. Taber, Frank A. 
Vanderlip and Amos Pinchot, who had e a rlie r  supported the Committee
^^Bendix to Rand, 15 February 1937; Rosenwald to Sexauer,
31 October 1936; Rumely to Wood, 4 November 1936, DLP. See also Wood 
to H. A. Wallace, 20 November 1937 and Wallace to Wood, 26 November 
1937, "Currency," Secretary of Agriculture, Record Group 16, National 
Archives, Washington, D. C. and Wood to Sexauer, 31 May 1938, Sexauer 
papers and Rumely to Sexauer, 21 June 1939, DLP.
36sexauer, "Program for the Committee for the Nation," 1937, 
p. 3, DLP.
37pearson interview with the author, 9 June 1968, 201 Worth 
Street, Ithaca, New York.
38press Release, National Committee to Uphold Constitutional 
Government, Times-Union Building, Rochester, New York, February 14, 
1937, Sexauer papers.
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fo r the Nation and absorbed most of the fund raising and organizational 
s k ills  of Rumely and Gannett from 1937-1940.39
Even the recession of 1937 fa iled  to revive the Committee for 
the Nation. In October, Rumely, in the name of the Committee, urged 
the President immediately to revalue the gold dollar from $35 to $41.34. 
But the Committee's favorite e l ix ir  to combat slumping commodity prices 
brought protest from within. General Robert Wood, who in addition to 
his Sears duties had become deputy chairman of the Chicago Federal 
Reserve Bank, publicly disavowed the Committee's telegram to the Presi­
dent, explaining to reporters he thought the organization moribund.
The episode forced from Rumely the embarrassed concession that several 
major contributors had le f t  the Committee.40
The Committee for the Nation never enjoyed an o ffic ia l obituary. 
The New York Times ignored the Rand organization a fter 1937. S t i l l  the 
Committee sporadically continued to urge monetary reform. On Novem­
ber 10, 1937, the Committee telegraphed Roosevelt, repeating its  
previous demands for gold devaluation.41 In January 1938, the Committee 
hosted a dinner for 90 Congressmen and Senators in Washington, D. C.
The dinner featured the British monetarist S ir Charles Morgan-Webb,
39pichard Pollenberg, "The National Committee to Uphold Consti­
tutional Government, 1937-1941," Journal of American History, L II 
(December 1965), pp. 582-598. Much of the above is repeated and placed 
in perspective in Pollenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government:
The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization, 1936-1939 (Cambrfdge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 263 pages.
40Rumely to Wood, 12 October 1937; Rumely to Rosenwald,
13 October 1937 and Rumely to Sexauer, 18 October 1937, DLP. See also 
New York Times, 7 October, 2:5, and 10 October, 31:4, 1937.
41committee for the N a tio n  to Roosevelt, 10 November 1937, DLP.
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whom the Committee sponsored on a m ulti-state lecture tour the follow- 
A?ing spring. Perhaps the las t public expression of the Committee 
came on June 29, 1939, when Sexauer, in the name of the Committee, 
issued a lengthy press release urging adoption of a federal monetary 
authority b ill.^ ^  The Committee maintained a lis tin g  in the New York 
City telephone book until 1940, but when economist Herbert Bratter 
visited the Rand group's 205 East Forty-Second Street address in Decem­
ber 1940, he found no sign of the Committee, only a door marked
44"Edward A. Rumely, Public Relations Counsel."
While the Committee for the Nation and its  business a llies  
cooled towards the monetarist cause, agriculture, burdened with the 
commodity price collapse of 1937, fa ith fu lly  i f  unimaginatively main­
tained allegiance to monetary reform. During Roosevelt's second 
administration the major farm organizations telescoped the monetary 
attitudes each had developed between 1932 and 1935 into annual resolu­
tions and a plethora of pamphlets, petitions, committees and farm 
journal a rtic les .
During the la tte r  1930s, the National Farmers Union maintained 
a stark neo-populist stance on the currency controversy. In 1937, the
42see the guest l i s t  for "Committee for the Nation Informal 
Dinner in Honor of S ir Charles Morgan-Webb at Washington Hotel, Wash­
ington, D. C ., January 14, 1938," DLP and Rumely Memorandum, 16 January 
1938; S. S. McClure to Sexauer, 17 January 1938; Rumely to Wood, 22 Jan­
uary 1938; Sexauer to Wood, 29 January 1938, and "Lecture Engagements 
of Sir Charles Morgan-Webb as of February 3, 1938," DLP.
43press Release, Committee for the Nation, 29 January 1939,
2 pages, DLP. See also Rumely to Sexauer, 10 January 1940, Sexauer 
papers, and Rumely "Memorandum," 25 February 1942, and & February 1945,DLP.
^^Herbert M. Bratter, "The Committee for the Nation: A Case
History in Monetary Propaganda." Journal of P o litica l Economy, XLIX 
[August 1941), p. 555.
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Union characterized the money question as the "paramount issue" and 
predicted "there can never be any substantial reform so long as money 
and credit are under private control." The Union damned the Federal 
Reserve as a "money racket" designed to bolster the privileged "money 
power" and hoped to replace the Wilsonian institu tion  with a government 
"owned, operated and controlled" central bank.^S Responding to the 
recession of 1937, the National Union Farmer, the organization's princi­
pal journalistic  organ, headlined "Awake America: How Long Will Man 
Made Depressions Continue? Just As Long As Usury Grabbers Control the 
C u r r e n c y . "46 The Union believed the restoration of commodity prices 
depended upon cost of production leg is la tion , bimetallism and generous 
Issues of f ia t  currency.4?
The monetary recommendations of the National Grange also showed 
no marked change from those issued during the f i r s t  half of the decade. 
In 1936, National Master Louis J. Taber defended the honest dollar as 
"the heart of any policy for the betterment of agriculture," and during
45o ffic ia l Minutes of the 33rd Annual Convention of the Farmers 
Educational and Cooperative Union of America, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
November 16-18, 1937, p. 32.
4^National Union Farmer, XVI (September 1, 1937), p. 1.
470 ffic ia l Minutes of the 32d Annual Convention of the Farmers 
Educational and Cooperative Union of America, Des Moines, Iowa, Novem­
ber 17-18, 1936, pp. 37, 40; Ib id . , 43rd Annual Convention, Madison, 
Wisconsin, November 15-17, 1938, pp. 15-17; Ib id . , 35th Annual Conven­
tion , Omaha, Nebraska, November 20-22, 1939, p. 59; and Ib id . , 36th 
Annual Convention, Denver, Colorado, November 18-20, 1940, p. 65. See 
also, "The True Story of the Crime of May 18, 1920, As Taken From the 
'Manufacturers Record' of February 22, 1933," National Union Farmer,
XVI (February 1, 1937), p. 3; "Court Reform or Money Reform," National 
Union Farmer, XVI (April 15, 1937), p. 3; E. H. Everson, "What Is Our 
Government's Financial Policy?," National Union Farmer, XVI (May 15, 
1937), p. 4; and "The Money Racket," National Union Farmer, XVI (Octo­
ber 1 , 1937), pp. 1: 3.
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the la tte r  th irtie s  the farm leader routinely endorsed the monetary 
cause though he joined Gannett's National Committee to Uphold Consti­
tutional Government and the America F irs t Committee.^ 8  The 1937 Annual 
Grange Session heard Earl Harding, spokesman for the Committee for the 
Nation, and appointed a five  member special committee to review national 
money and banking policies. The special committee released its  report 
the following year. The report and Taber's 1938 Presidential Address 
illu s tra ted  that the nation's oldest national farm organization s t i l l  
favored a dollar "reasonably constant in debt-paying and purchasing 
power," a monetary authority and banking services "suited" to agricul­
tural needs.49 The Grange continued to endorse stab ilization  doctrine 
into the early 1940s.^0
President O'Neal informed the December 1936 convention of the 
National Farm Bureau, "Next to production control the biggest issue
48journal of Proceedings of the Patrons of Husbandry, 70th
Annual Session, Columbus, Ohio, November 11-19, 1936, pp. 19, 160.
See also Taber to Hon. James Ludlow, 13 October 1937, and Taber to Wood, 
15 November 1941, LJT papers.
49journal of Proceedings of the Patrons of Husbandry, 71st 
Annual Session, November 10-18, 1937, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, p. 94; 
"Report of Special Committee on Banking and Monetary Policy," Ib id . ,
72d Annual Session, November 16-24, 1938, Portland, Oregon, pp. 180,
20, and Address by Earl Harding, November 12, 1937, typewritten 4 pages, 
DLP; New York Times, 28 November, 1:2, 1938, and 11 December I I I ,  1:3, 
1938.
SOjournal of Proceedings of the Patrons of Husbandry, 73d Annual
Session, November 15-23, Peoria, I l l in o is ,  p. 22; Ib id . , 74th Annual
Session, November 1940. Rumely to Taber, 1 November 1939, Sexauer 
papers; former Oklahoma Senator Robert L. Owen spoke on monetary issues 
over the Grange Hour, February 15, 1941.
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fo r agriculture is the question of honest m o n e y . T h e  sentence 
summarized the Bureau's attitude toward the money question during Roose­
v e lt's  second term. While placing greater emphasis on production 
controls and the second AM, the Farm Bureau remained committed to the 
commodity do llar. Between 1936 and 1940 the Bureau supported the 
retention of the Presidential prerogatives to devalue the dollar and 
manage the currency, and the organization included monetary remedies 
among suggestions for a llev ia ting  the price slump of 1937. On June 7, 
1937, the Executive Committee of the Bureau called for the establish­
ment of a "s c ien tifica lly  managed currency" through a monetary 
authority .52 The December 1937 national convention repeated the 
organization's frequent endorsement of the commodity d o llar, gold
CO
repricing and the monetary authority. During June 1938, the Bureau's 
Board of Directors met a t Chicago with three advocates of managed money; 
Professor Pearson of Cornell, Chester Davis, the new "farmer represen­
tative" on the Federal Reserve Board, and Dr. E. A. Goldenwiser, a 
Federal Reserve s ta tis tic ian . The conference urged the Bureau's Execu­
tive Committee to study the money question and prepare a plan for
51"The Annual Address of the President O'Neal to the 18th Annual 
Convention of the A .F.B .F.," December 9, 1936, Pasadena, C aliforn ia , 
Farm Bureau pamphlet, p. 8 .
52"statement Adopted by Executive Committee of the A .F.B .F.,"  
June 7, 1937, typewritten, 2 pages, DLP; "For An Honest Dollar,"
Il l in o is  Agricultural Association Record, XV (July 1937), p. 26.
^^"Resolutions Adopted at A.F.B.F. Convention," Nation's Agri­
culture (January 1938), p. 6 .
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54leg is la tive  action. After further deliberations the Bureau in 1939
asked Congress to create a special committee to study the "problem of
fluctuating basic commodity prices" and "to ascertain the effect of
55money policy on basic conmodity price levels." The request eventually 
resulted in the appointment of a monetary investigation committee under 
the chairmanship of Senator Robert Wagner of New York.^G In December 
1941, when the re a lity  of war-spurred in fla tion  had replaced fears of 
deflation, the Bureau proved its  f id e lity  to stabilization theory when 
i t  again asked Congress to create a monetary authority to avoid price 
upheavals and promote the honest d o l la r . 7^
Northeastern farmers especially remained fa ith fu l to monetarist 
convictions during the la tte r  1930s. The farmers of Vermont, under the 
leadership of Arthur H. Packard, President of the Vermont Farm Bureau, 
sponsored several meetings with Rumely and Earl Harding of the Commit­
tee for the Nation during 1938 and 1 9 3 9 . ^ 8  Packard, a friend of Sexauer,
S^O'Neal to Rumely, 13 June 1938, and W. R. Ogg to Rumely,
22 June 1938, DLP.
^^"Resolutions Adopted at AFBF Convention," Nation's Agricul­
ture (January 1939), p. 6  and "21st Annual Convention's Resolutions," 
Ib id . (January 1940), p. 23.
S^See S. Res. 125, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., April 17, 1939;
O'Neal to Sexauer, 15 June 1939, and Rumely to O'Neal, 7 October 1939, 
DLP, and New York Times, 16 May, 40:1, 1940.
57"Monetary and Credit Policy," Nation's Agriculture (January 
1941), p. 20 and "Resolutions Adopted at 23rd A.F.B.F. Convention," 
Ib id . , (January 1942), p. 12. See also H. J. Wigham, "Rise and Fall 
of the Gold Standard," Nation's Agriculture (February 1937), p. 3, and 
Chester H. Gray, "Keeping Tab on Washington," Ib id . , (April 1937), p. 6  
and (April 1938), p. 6 .
58Rumely to Sexauer, 5 April and 7 April 1938, Packard to 
Sexauer, 24 November 1937, Sexauer papers.
384
and the Vermont Farm Bureau closely followed the monetary doctrines 
emanating from Ithaca. In 1938 the Vermont Farm Bureau petitioned 
Congress to establish a free market for gold, to revalue gold and to 
restore 1926 price level s . A m o n g  others Vermont monetarists converted 
Governor George D. Aiken and on March 2, 1939, the state legislature  
approved a jo in t resolution petitioning Congress to establish a special 
committee to investigate the monetary reasons for the "grave disparity  
that now exists" between agricultural and non-farm prices.GO
Farm leaders in New York also remained loyal to the efficacy  
of gold manipulation and monetary s tab ilization . Sexauer's Dairymen's 
League approved strong monetary resolutions in 1936, 1938, 1939 and 
1940.^^ American A gricu ltu ra lis t, the section's leading farm journal, 
the New York Farm Bureau, the New York Grange and the New York State 
Conference Board of Farm Organizations repeatedly urged upon the state 
leg is la ture . Congress and the President the necessity of raising the
G^committee for the Nation Press Release, May 12, 1938, type­
w ritten, 2 pages, Sexauer papers. See also Packard to Gannett, 8  May 
1939, DIP.
GOjoint Resolution Number 25, "Relating to Investigation of 
Monetary System of the United States," and "Statement of Governor Aiken 
on Signing the Monetary Resolution of the Vermont Legislature," 2 March
1939, Sexauer papers. See also Harding to Aiken, 2 March 1939; Aiken 
to Harding, 3 March 1939; Sexauer to Aiken, 24 March 1939, and Packard 
to Glenn Frank, Chairman, National Republican Program Committee, April
1940, Sexauer papers.
^^Dairymen's League Cooperative Association, In c ., Annual Meet­
ing, Resolution Number Seven, June 1938; Ib id . , Resolution Number Five, 
June 15, 1939, and Ib id . , Resolution Number Ten, June 20, 1940, Gannett 
papers.
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price of gold and establishing a national monetary authority.®^ In 
1940, the principal New York farm organizations created yet another 
monetary organization—"The New York Farmers Committee to Bring Back 
Prices and Buying Power for Agriculture." The committee hoped to 
influence the monetary plank in the 1940 Republican p l a t f o r m . I n  
January 1940, a questionnaire mailed to 1000 Northeastern farm leaders 
(258 replies) indicated that 96 per cent agreed Congress ought to 
stab ilize  the value of money and that 93 per cent approved the monetary 
resolutions of the National Grange, the National Farm Bureau and the 
Cooperative C o u n c i l . ^4 The monetary pedagogy of Professor Warren s t i l l  
influenced Northeastern agriculture.
As the Committee for the Nation suffered increasing impairment, 
the leadership of the monetarist cause passed to Fred H. Sexauer, 
Chairman of the Cooperative Council's Monetary Committee. Between 1936
GZMinutes of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting, New York State 
Farm Bureau Federation, Syracuse, November 11-12, 1936, pp. 2-3, and 
Resolution Number Seventeen; Minutes of the Twenty-Second Annual Meet­
ing, NYSFBF, Buffalo, November 17, 1938, p. 4, and "Minutes, Board of 
Directors Meeting, NYSFBF," August 31, 1938, and September 26, 1938, 
Gannett papers. Foster to Board of Directors, NYSFBF, 1 April 1937,
26 April 1938 and 8  June 1939, Gannett papers; Foster to Sexauer,
20 August 1938, DLP. See also "Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 
New York State Conference Board of Farm Organizations," Ithaca, 26 Sep­
tember 1938 and "Legislative Program, 1939," New York State Conference 
Board of Farm Organizations, DLP; and Gannett, "This Is No Time to 
Lower the Price of Gold," American A gricu ltu ra lis t, CXXXIV (May 22, 
1937), p. 1.
G^Warren Hawley, Vice President, NYSFBF; Harold Stanley, Secre­
tary , New York State Grange, and E. R. Eastman, President, American 
A g ricu ltu ra lis t, headed the committee. See Sexauer to Hawley, 14 May 
1940; Eastman, Hawley and Stanley to Dear Friend, 24 May 1940, and 
Eastman, Hawley and Stanley to Sexauer, 12 June 1940, Sexauer papers.
G'^ The two responses were contained in a 13 part questionnaire. 
See "Report of Survey of Farm Opinion," January 3, 1940, DLP.
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and 1941, the dairy leader served a watch-dog role for the honest 
dollar campaign. He corresponded with dozens of farm leaders regarding 
the money issue, stimulated monetary memorials to Congress and the 
President, produced speeches and artic les on behalf of the Warren e l ix ir  
and challenged journalis tic  attacks on honest do llar ideology.65 
Sexauer also visited with o ffic ia ls  of the government and the Federal 
Reserve--especially former AAA administrator Chester C. Davis. After 
a series of friendly contacts Davis told Sexauer in September 1938 
that while the Reserve agreed with organized agriculture on the neces­
s ity  of "fa ir" farm prices and that commodity prices impacted on 
business ac tiv ity  and employment, the Board, the President and the 
Treasury no longer believed that gold manipulation e ffective ly  stimu­
lated price l e v e l s . S e x a u e r ' s  monetary exertions must have added 
strain to a man also confronted with considerable crises in the dairy 
industry.67 on one occasion Sexauer confided, "I wonder at times 
whether I'm becoming an absolute nut on this Fmonetary ]^. proposition.
65Examples of the dozens of such items in the Sexauer papers: 
Sexauer to Farm Leaders, 18 November 1937, 14 February 1938 and April 
1938; Sexauer to Malcolm Muir, 31 August 1938 and Muir to Sexauer,
28 September 1938; Sexauer to Wall Street Journal, 17 July 1939; and 
"Report of the Monetary Committee of the National Cooperative Council," 
January 1937.
6 6 $exauer to Davis, 28 January 1937, 1 February 1938, 21 March 
1938, 7 April 1938, 13 September 1939, and Davis to Sexauer, 16 January 
1937, 27 January 1937, 10 February 1938, and 12 August 1939, Sexauer 
papers. See also E llio t  Thurston to Sexauer, 19 January 1937, Sexauer 
to Thurston, 26 January 1937, Sexauer to E. S. Foster, 30 September 1938; 
Sexauer to Morgenthau, 14 January 1937, Wallace to Sexauer, 28 August 
1937 and Sexauer to Roosevelt, 6  April 1938, Sexauer papers.
^^Lowell K. Dyson, "The Milk Strike of 1939 and the Destruction 
of the Dairy Farmers Union," New York H istory, LI (October 1970), 
pp. 523-543.
6 &Sexauer to Lincoln, 31 December 1937, and Sexauer to Dairymen's 
League Executive Committee, 9 April 1938, Sexauer papers.
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Yet such doubts evaporated, replaced with the farm leader's fa ith  that 
capitalism, individual freedom and a prosperous agriculture were inexr 
tricab ly  bound to the money problem.^9
The boom-bust cycle of 1935-1937— the third since the war— 
inevitably reactivated congressional interest in stab ilization  and 
monetary leg islation. In April 1938 the New York Times fretted  about 
would-be Washington monetary magicians and in the spring of 1939 Busi­
ness Week observed that leg is la tive  hoppers "are crawling with money 
and banking b i l ls . "^0 From 1937 until the war diverted attention to 
other issues, congressmen introduced dozens of money b ills  and resolu­
tions and f i l le d  hundreds of pages of the Congressional Record with 
in fla tio n is t rhetoric.
During the las t three years of the decade interest in the 
monetary remedy approached the intensity the issue generated in 1932 
and 1933. Progressive Farmer editor Clarence Poe, concerned with the 
plight of Southern agriculture and the necessity for in fla tio n  wired 
Roosevelt in February 1938, "I am sure you have decided upon the right 
medicine. Now please make the dose big e n o u g h A l a b a m a  Senator 
John H. Bankhead urged the President, "Do what you did in 1933," and
'"The best summary of the dairy leader's views is Sexauer,
"The Relation of Monetary Policy to Price Levels of Basic Commodities," 
typewritten address before the American In s titu te  of Cooperation, 
University of Chicago, August 9, 1939, 39 pages, DLP.
®^New York Times, 5 A p ril, 20:1, 1938 and Business Week (June 14, 
1939), pp. 15-16.
^Tpoe to FDR, 18 February 1938, FDR Library. See also New York 
Times, 8  February, 1:8, 1938; and Poe to Wallace, 20 November 1937,
Record Group 16, Secretary of Agriculture, Archives.
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in June 1938 Representative John Rankin of Mississippi organized a 
dozen colleagues in an e ffo rt to block adjournment until "something is 
done to expand the c u rre n c y .S u m m e r brought l i t t l e  re lie f  and in 
the Autumn of 1938 South Carolinian "Cotton Ed" Smith, Chairman of the 
Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee, led a delegation of cotton 
politicians into Secretary Wallace's o ffice to demand higher loan rates 
fo r the southern staple and that more money be put into circulation.^^  
In fla tion  pressures continued into 1939. In February the Idaho State 
Grange pleaded with Roosevelt for an "ADEQUATE supply of the LIFE GIVING 
something called MONEY to the end that every hungry stomach in America 
may be f i l le d  to the MAXIMUM a b ility  of the American farmer to so 
supply [s ic l."^ ^  Hard times and constituent interest--especially the 
attachment of rural America to the issue prompted solons to again review 
and pose the money question.
The price collapse of 1937 prompted congressional monetarists 
to renew criticism  of the Federal Reserve. Solons added to the l is t  of 
monetary felonies "The Crime of 1937" and compared with disdain the
^^Bankhead to Roosevelt, 7 June 1938, Ib id . , and New York Times, 
5 June, I I I ,  1:8, 1938 and 9 June, 11:2, 1938.
^ N^ew York Times, 2 October, 1:2, 1938.
74idaho State Grange Banking and Currency Committee to Roose­
v e lt, 2 February 1939, OF 229, FDR Library. See also Governor Richard 
Kirnian of Nevada to Roosevelt, 6 December 1938, Ib id .
^^Representative C lifford  Hope of Kansas, Thomas F. Ford of 
California and Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma received dozens of 
comments from citizens interest in money reform during the la tte r  1930s. 
See "Legislative Correspondence, 1937-1938," Hope papers, Kansas State 
Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas; Thomas papers. University of Okla­
homa and Ford to Roosevelt, 11 April 1939, OF 229, FDR Library.
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Federal Reserve's alleged mismanagement of monetary policy in 1920,
1929 and 1937. Faultfinding congressmen believed that Reserve and 
Treasury o ff ic ia ls , fearful of in fla tio n , miscalculated when they 
raised bank reserve requirements and s terilized  "excess" gold from mone­
tary stocks in 1 9 3 6 . ^ 6  Several demanded the resignation of Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Marriner Eccles.^? Even the loyal New Dealer 
Key Pittman complained to Roosevelt that he hoped Morgenthau and Eccles 
avoided having "another nightmare that there is going to be in flation  
while twelve m illion people are idle."^®
As in previous deflation eras the House appeared sensitive to 
in fla tio n  demands. Speaker William B. Bankhead of Alabama endorsed 
currency expansion in 1938, the House Banking and Currency Committee 
investigated a variety of monetary proposals and in 1937, 1939 and 1941 
representatives easily extended the Presidential money prerogatives 
f i r s t  granted in the Thomas Amendment to the AAA and the Gold Reserve 
A ct.79 But the House refused independent action and approved only 
monetary legislation receiving administration sanction. S t i l l  the
7%ee the comments of the following representatives: Binderup,
U. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., March 4, 1937, 
p. 1894, and Ib id . , March 19, 1937, pp. 2527-2531; Dorsey, Ib id . , 
August 21, 1937, pp. 9622-23; Patman, Ib id . , 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 
January 19, 1938, pp. 802-804; Rankin, Ib id . , May 4, 1938, p. 5241-42; 
and Senator Elmer Thomas, Ib id . , March 31, 1938, p. 4460-59.
77Robert Owen to Patman, 19 January 1938 and Representative 
Finley Gray to Owen, 3 March 1938, Owen papers. Library of Congress.
78pittman to Roosevelt, 23 July 1938, Pittman papers. Library 
of Congress.
79Bankhead to Robert L. Owen, 27 January 1938, Owen papers. 
Library of Congress.
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monetarist cause benefited from the leadership of four Democratic con­
gressmen who believed a show of stamina and an appropriate time and 
circumstance might win administration approval of the honest do lla r.
The quartet represented d is tric ts  with significant agricultural in te r­
ests and included T. Alan Goldsborough of Maryland, Wright Patman of
80Texas, Charles E. Binderup of Nebraska and Jerry Voorhis of C alifornia.
Goldsborough enjoyed seniority among stab iliza tio n is ts  having
served the cause since 1920 and ranked second only to Chairman Steagall
on the Banking and Currency Committee. During 1937-1938 the Marylander
authored a complicated b i l l  that would have created a Federal Credit
Commission and tied currency issue to the potential productive capacity 
81of the nation. S t i l l  urging monetary action the Congressman resigned 
on April 5, 1939 to accept a federal d is tr ic t  court judgeship—an
Brother Representatives to introduce monetarist leg islation  
included: Usher L. Burdick, North Dakota, see H. R. 7600, U. S .,
Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., October 26, 1939, p. 888; 
Knute H i l l ,  Washington, H. R. 7290, Ib id . , 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,
July 19, 1939, p. 9543; John Hunter, Ohio, H. R. 2387, Ib id . , March 21, 
1939, p. 3065; John E. Rankin, Mississippi, New York Times, 9 June, 
11:2, 1938, and U. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.,
April 28, 1938, p. 5961 and H. R. 3426, Ib id . , 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
January 30, 1939, p. 967; Robert Ramsey, West V irg in ia , H. R. 52, 75th 
Cong., 1st Sess., January 5, 1937, p. 24; and Brent Spence, Kentucky,
H. R. 2542, Ib id . , 76th Cong., 1st Sess., January 13, 1939, p. 2542.
See also New York Times, 8 February, 1:8, 1938, and 2 October, 1:2, 
1938, and Representative Ed V. Izac to Owen, 28 January 1938, Owen 
papers. Library of Congress.
B^See H. R. 7188, U. S. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st 
Sess., March 21, 1937, p. 4943; Ib id . , June 8, 1937, pp. 5438-5442; 
Ib id . , Appendix 1729-34; H. R. 10086, Ib id . , 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 
March 30, 1938, p. 4418; H. R. 2181, Ib id . , 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
January 10, 1939, p. 184 and H. R. 5520, Ib id . , April 4, 1939, p. 3826.
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appointment that eventually propelled him to national attention as the 
ju d ic ia l tamer of John L. Lewis.
During 1937 and 1938, Democrat Representatives Wright Patman of 
Texas and Charles G. Binderup of Nebraska organized about 150 colleagues 
into the "House Steering Committee for Monetary Reform." The group 
held several meetings and agreed the Federal Reserve had fa iled  to curb 
banking monopoly, had fa iled  to d irect monetary policy so as to avoid 
booms and depressions and that as a consequence the government ought to 
nationalize the Reserve system and assume exclusive authority over cur­
rency issue and monetary policy.83 While in agreement on the evils of 
the status quo, the monetary group divided over suggestions for reme­
dial leg is la tion . A majority of monetarist congressmen supported a 
Patman b i l l  to nationalize the Reserve while a minority insisted on 
Binderup's more radical and comprehensive proposals.
Wright Patman, co-author of the Patman-Robinson Act and cham­
pion of the veteran's bonus cause, s k il l fu l ly  combined antimonopolism
82u. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., April 5, 
1939, pp. 3829-3834.
83u. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., December 16, 
1937, Appendix 491; Ib id . , November 17, 1937, Appendix 76; Ib id . , 
November 24, 1937, pp. 362-63; Ib id . , 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 801-802.
B^Horace Jeremiah (Jerry) Voorhis, Confessions of a Congressman 
(Garden C ity , New York: Doubleday & Co., In c ., 1948), pp. 164-68.
Two nonfarm monetarist groups to support the Patman-Binderup e ffo rt  
were: "Honest Money Founders, In c .,"  J. E. Bistor, President, Chicago,
Il l in o is ;  and the "National Monetary Conference," Andrae B. Nordskog, 
Chairman, organized at the Northwestern University Law School, Novem­
ber 28-30, 1938, Chicago, I l l in o is . See Bistor to Owen, 27 May 1937,
Owen papers; Bistor to Thomas, 8 June 1937, Thomas papers; Bistor to 
Roosevelt, 16 February 1938, OF 229, FDR Library and Nordskog to 
McIntyre, 29 December 1938, OF 229, FDR Library and "Resolutions of the 
National Monetary Conference," U. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 
1st Sess., January 13, 1939, Appendix 124-125.
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and reflationism to become the leading neopopulist in the Lower House 
during the la t te r  1930s. The Texan believed the New Deal had made sub­
stantial progress but had fa iled  to destroy financial monopoly and had 
yet to recover public control over currency and cred it. The congress­
man favored government issue of noninterest bearing notes rather than 
in terest bearing ones as a means of regaining control over currency 
expansion and forcing the Federal Reserve banks into a subservient 
position.85 in 1937 and 1938 Patman introduced a b i l l  designed to 
eliminate "private banker domination" of the Reserve System. The b i l l  
removed the fiv e  banker members of the open-market committee, abolished 
the Federal Advisory Committee to the Board of Governors, secured for 
the government the stock of the twelve Federal Reserve banks and 
required the Board to adopt a mandate to restore the 1925 price level. 
The b i l l  also granted e ither House the power to remove any member of 
the Board of Governors fa ilin g  to enforce the re fla tion  and s tab iliza ­
tion mandate. One hundred sixty representatives, including a majority 
of the House Steering Committee for Monetary Reform, co-sponsored the 
Patman b ill.^ ^  The New York Times, with a shudder, speculated on its  
passage and the Banking and Currency Committee which included Patman as
0 7
a member held hearings on the measure during March and April 1938.°'
85u. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 802-804 
and Ib id . , 77th Cong., 1st Sess., January 16, 1941, pp. 175-77 and 247-51.
85h. R. 5010, U. S. Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
February 23, 1937, p. 1517; H. R. 7230, Ib id . , 75th Cong., 2d Sess., 
November 17, 1937, Appendix 76; Ib id . , November 24, 1937, pp. 362-63;
Ib id . , 75th Cong., 3d Sess., Appendix 1823, 1547, and 1101; Ib id . ,
January 4, 1938, pp. 17-25.
8^U. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., February 28, 
1938, p. 2538 and New York Times, 14 A p ril, 37:1, 1937, and 29 August, 
I I I ,  1:4, 1937.
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S t i l l  a frustrated Patman fa iled  to get the b il l  to the House floor and
though reintroduced in subsequent sessions, administration opposition
88effective ly  stymied the proposal.
Representative Charles G. Binderup, a dairy farmer from Hastings 
County, Nebraska, proved an enthusiastic monetarist during his tenure 
in office from 1935-1939. An advocate of the quantity theory of money, 
the Nebraskan relied on the in tellectual concepts of Irving Fisher and 
the advice of former Oklahoma Senator Robert L. Owen.89 A vigorous 
propagandist for the monetarist cause, Binderup on one occasion placed 
five  charts twenty-five feet by eight feet in the lobby of the Capitol 
to explain monetarist proposals. During 1937 and 1938 the Westerner 
published a weekly newsletter en titled , "Uncle Sam's Hospital Chart," 
which illustra ted  the monetary origins of 25 American recessions, in ter­
viewed government o ffic ia ls  and enjoyed a t least one cordial private 
money session with R o o s e v e lt.D e fe a te d  in 1938, the congressman 
organized the "Constitutional Money League of America." During the 
spring of 1939 the league sponsored a Tuesday morning "congressional
BBu. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., H. R, 195, 
January 3, 1939, p. 28; Ib id . , April 3, 1939, pp. 3747-54; Ib id . , 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess., January 25, 1940, pp. 692-95; H. R. 116, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess., January 3, 1941, p. 13. Eccles answered Batman's demands in 
Ib id . , Appendix 1342.
B^Binderup to Owen, 23 June 1937 and 17 January 1938, Owen 
papers. Library of Congress; Fisher to Roosevelt, 1 February 1938,
OF 229, FDR Library; and Binderup to Sexauer, 19 November 1937, Sexauer 
papers, and U. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., June 3, 
1938, p. 8181.
^%inderup to Roosevelt, 28 February 1938, OF 229, FDR Library; 
Binderup to Hope, 1937, Hope papers, Kansas State Historical Society 
and New York Times, 8 February, 1:8, 1938.
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breakfast broadcast" which featured an informal discussion of monetary
and banking issues between Binderup and such monetarists as Senators
Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota, Guy M. G ille tte  of Iowa and George
Norris of Nebraska, and Representatives Knute H ill of Washington, Walter
Pierce of Oregon and Compton I .  White of Idaho. The program also
hosted Irving Fisher and Robert Owen- The broadcasts were e le c tric a lly
91transcribed and played on 105 radio stations across the nation.
California Democrat Jerry Voorhis continued Binderup's leg is la ­
tive  program in the House a fte r 1938. A Phi Beta Kappa Yale graduate, 
Voorhis proved a d iligent but maverick congressman whose advanced
reformist stance earned him a place among the "Neo-New Dealers"--those
92congressmen considered le f t  of the administration. Voorhis cooperated 
with Fisher, Owen, Sexauer and other monetarists and in March 1938 
introduced the "Binderup-Voorhis Monetary Control B i l l ."  The b i l l  sum­
marized two decades of monetary activism. I t  provided that the 
government purchase the capital stock of the Federal Reserve banks, and 
that a new Reserve Board be created with enlarged powers over currency 
and credit resources. Monies needed fo r old-age pensions, public works 
and other recovery efforts would be secured through the issuance of 
noninterest bearing notes. Monetary expansion would continue until the 
restoration of fu ll employment or 1926 price levels. The b i l l  also
Binderup to Roosevelt, 27 March 1939 and Binderup to "Dear 
Colleague," 27 March 1939, OF 229, FDR Library. Several of the radio 
programs are reprinted in the Congressional Record. See 75th Cong., 
3d Sess., Appendix 1153, 1477, 1488, 1735-36; 1806; 2012, 2087 and 
Ib id . , 76th Cong., 1st Sess., April 19, 1939, p. 4472.
^^Stanley High, "The Neo-New Dealers," Saturday Evening Post, 
209 (May 22, 1937), p. 11.
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extended government guaranty to time deposits, and implemented Profes­
sor Fisher's "100% Money" scheme. Voorhis believed his b i l l  "the f i r s t  
and fundamental step" necessary for recovery.
The "100% Money" scheme employed in the Binderup-Voorhis b il l  
emanated from an Irving Fisher monograph published in 1935. According 
to the Yale economist, the fractional reserve system ought to be 
replaced with one that required that demand deposits be protected one 
hundred per cent with cash reserves or instantly convertible government 
bonds. The reform would eliminate the practice of tying currency 
expansion to increased debt. Fisher explained, "Our national circula­
ting medium is now at the mercy of loan transactions of banks; and our 
thousands of checking banks are, in e ffe c t, so many irresponsible p ri­
vate mints." When combined with a national monetary authority, advocates 
of "100% Money" believed the scheme would obviate the necessity of 
branch banking and government insurance of check book deposits, re s tric t  
banks to the function of lending and warehousing money and return to 
the government the monetary function of expanding and contracting money 
and cred it. Given exclusive authority to in fla te  or deflate the nation's
money supply, the government could promote s tab ilization  and restrain
94booms and depressions.
93H. R. 4931, U. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
March 14, 1939, p. 2722; Ib id . , March 10, 1939, pp. 2592-93; New York 
Times, March 11, 30:2, 1939. See also Voorhis to Roosevelt, 7 February 
1938 and 8 July 1939; Roosevelt to Voorhis, 9 March 1938, OF 229, FDR 
Library and Voorhis to Owen, 30 January 1939, Owen papers. Library of 
Congress. Voorhis explained the merits of the b i l l  in Confessions of 
a Congressman, pp. 171-173.
^^Fisher, 100% Money: Designed to Keep Checking Banks 100%
Liquid; to Prevent In flation  and Deflation; Largely to Cure or Prevent 
Depressions; and to Wipe Out Much of the National Debt (New York:
Adelphi Co., 1935T7 212 pages.
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The Fisher-Binderup-Voorhis proposals received the scrutiny of 
the administration. A fter a December 1937 conference between members 
of his s ta ff and Fisher, Secretary Wallace recommended "100% Money" to 
Roosevelt, who ordered an administration study of the p r o p o s a l . B u t  
in September 1938 Roosevelt sent a terse note to the Yale professor 
which without explanation dismissed the plan as "financia lly  unsound. 
Sometime a fte r Voorhis introduced the monetary b il l  in March 1939, the 
Californian secured an audience with Roosevelt, who delighted the con­
gressman when he agreed the time had come to nationalize the Federal 
Reserve. Roosevelt told Voorhis to inform the Chairmen of the House 
and Senate Banking and Currency Committees to prepare the necessary 
leg is la tion . Exhilarated, the congressman le f t  the Oval O ffice, 
returned to Capitol H ill where he shared the news with several members 
of the House Banking and Currency Committee. The Californian's elation  
lasted but a few hours as General Edwin Watson, an aid to the President, 
telephoned Voorhis and requested him not to "say anything about what 
the President told you." Watson explained that a fte r the Voorhis in te r­
view the President and Eccles met and decided to refer the matter to 
others before announcing a fin a l d e c is io n .^7 a second approval fa iled  
to come. But Voorhis continued to press for monetary reform until
GSpisher to Owen, 26 November 1937, Owen papers, Library of 
Congress; Mordecai Ezekiel, "Memorandum fo r the Secretary," 6 December 
1937; Fisher to Wallace, 10 December 1937 and Wallace to President,
22 December 1937, Record Group 16, Secretary of Agriculture, National 
Archives; and Roosevelt to Wallace, 23 December 1937, OF 229, FDR 
Library.
^^Roosevelt to Fisher, 12 September 1938, OF 229, FDR Library. 
^^Confessions of a Congressman, pp. 174-177.
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his 1946 defeat in a campaign that featured, in part, his unorthodox 
monetary views and resulted in the in it ia l  p o litic a l victory of 
Richard M. Nixon.^8
Elmer Thomas continued to lead Senate in fla tio n is ts  during the 
la t te r  1930s.^9 The recession of 1937 and debate over the second AAA 
provided the Oklahoman further opportunity to demand monetary action.
In March 1937, Thomas introduced yet another b i l l  that equated agricul­
tural r e l ie f  with money reform. The b i l l  established a monetary 
authority, proposed monetary and s tab ilization  guidelines and granted 
the government new managerial powers over money and credit so that the 
stab iliza tio n  of commodity prices might be a c h i e v e d . A  Thomas-led 
subcommittee of the Senate Agricultural and Forestry Committee held 
hearings on the b i l l  in the summer of 1937 and the Senator arranged for 
the usual parade of farm spokesmen and monetarists to te s tify  on behalf 
of the b i l l .  At the hearings Thomas released a le tte r  from Roosevelt 
that expressed "sympathy" fo r the measure's objectives but that '
98see H. R. 8206, U. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3d 
Sess., January 30, 1940, p. 814; H. R. 9658, Ib id . , May 3, 1940, p. 5509; 
H. R. 166, Ib id . , 77th Cong., 1st Sess., January 3, 1941 and H. J. Res. 
30, Ib id . , January 3, 1941, p. 21. Regarding the money issue and the 
1946 campaign see Paul Bullock, ‘"Rabbits and Radical s'--Richard Nixon's 
1946 Campaign Against Jerry Voorhis," Southern California Quarterly, LV 
(F a ll, 1973), pp. 319-359.
S^Kentuckian Marvel M ills  Logan was the only senator aside from 
Thomas to sponsor significant s tab ilization  legislation during the 
la t te r  1930s. Logan, who died in October 1939, relied on the expertise 
of former Oklahoma Senator Robert L. Owen. See S. 31 and S. 2606, 76th 
Cong., 1st Sess., and New York Times, 1 A p ril, 27:2, 1938 and 13 March, 
1:3, 1939.
TO^S. 1990, U. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 
March 25, 1937, pp. 2744-53; Thomas to R. N. Joseph, 29 February 1937, 
Thomas papers and New York Times, 11 November, 18:5, 1937.
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characterized the proposal as "premature" due to the "complexity of the
rapidly shifting international s c e n e . L e s s  gently the Treasury and
102the Federal Reserve Board firm ly opposed the b i l l .
During the November and December 1937 special congressional 
session called to consider the farm b i l l ,  Thomas stimulated further 
interest in his March monetary b i l l .  On November 25 the Agricultural 
and Forestry Committee attached to the report on the Agricultural 
Adjustment b i l l  of 1937 a Thomas authored addendum endorsing the 
Oklahoman's stabilization proposal. The Agricultural and Forestry Com­
m ittee, responsible for adding the Thomas Amendment to the AAA of 1933, 
s t i l l  believed that refla tion  must accompany production control to 
assure the rehabilitation of American agricu lture.^^3 S t i l l  Thomas 
and the Agricultural committee allowed the stab ilization  measure
endorsed in the report to be referred to the Banking and Currency Corn-
104mittee where opponents successfully prevented action on the matter.
With the beginning of a new congressional session in January 
1938, Thomas made another e ffo rt to push the administration towards a 
reflationary policy. The Westerner introduced Senate Resolution 216 
which deplored the "unprecedented drop in basic commodity prices from
TOlThe le t te r  is reproduced in New York Times, 4 August, 6:2, 
1937. See Thomas to B istor, 12 June 1937, Thomas papers and New York 
Times, 6 July, 31:6, 1937.
T^^Eccles to Senator Smith, 29 July 1937 and Wayne C. Taylor,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury, to Smith, 7 August 1937, Legislative
Records, S. 1990, Archives, Washington, D. C.
T^^S. 2787, U. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 2d Sess.,
26 November 1937, pp. 405-406 and New York Times, 26 November, 1:3, 1937.
TO^ ib i d . ,  1 December 1937, p . 601.
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March to December 1937" and declared "the sense of the Senate" to be 
that the government "adjust the purchasing power of the dollar . . . 
to attain  within the next 12 months the 1926 price level of wholesale 
commodities, including farm p r o d u c t s . "^^5 jq a ttrac t the broadest 
possible support the resolution avoided specifying any particular 
reflationary technique. Thomas explained to monetarist friends that 
he once participated in building a country club in which the group 
bought the land, erected the building, furnished the clubhouse, but 
engaged in a desparate figh t over the color of paint used. Thomas 
advised monetarists in early 1938 to look beyond details and attempt to 
commit the administration to the principal of monetary action.
Though the Oklahoman's eclectic in flationary approach aroused suspi­
cions among the more doctrinaire Warrenites, the major monetarists 
groups including the Committee for the Nation, the National Agricul­
tural Conference and the National Cooperative Council endorsed the 
Thomas R e s o l u t i o n . T h e  National Cooperative Council sponsored a 
le t te r  writing campaign on behalf of the proposal and the Senate Agri­
cultural and Forestry Committee with but minor revision approved the
T05u. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 7 January 
1938, p. 136.
T^^Committee for the Nation, "Confidential Memorandum,"
January 1938, 4 pages, Sexauer papers.
TO^Rumely to Gannett, 17 November 1937, Sexauer to Rumely,
18 November 1937, DLP; Vanderlip to Thomas, 12 March 1937, Gannett 
papers; "Uncorrected Minutes of the Annual Assembly of Delegates of the 
National Cooperative Council," Washington, D. C ., January 5-7, 1938, 
p. 16; M ille r to Thomas, 11 January 1938; Thomas to Sexauer, 22 January 
1938 and Sexauer to Thomas, 2 February 1938, Sexauer papers; "Resolu­
tions of National Agricultural Conference, June 2, 1938," U. S ., 
Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 3 June 1938, pp. 8183-8137, 
and "Farm Chiefs Map Nationwide Drive to Increase Prices," New York 
Journal American, 6 June, 2:1, 2, 1938.
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108measure on February 9. Again Thomas appealed d irectly  to the Presi­
dent to support refla tion  and again Roosevelt expressed sympathy for 
the Senator's o b j e c t i v e s R o o s e v e l t  agreed that "undue fluctuation  
in the price level" ought to be avoided and that "measures ought to be 
adopted for the purpose of reversing the existing deflationary trend." 
S t i l l  the President opposed the 1926 mandate as arb itrary , argued that 
re fla tion  depended upon nonmonetary as well as monetary actions and 
cautioned that the international situation made i t  imperative to avoid 
"any rig id  course which might hamper . . . the administration program. 
Devoid of New Deal support the Thomas Resolution met Senate defeat 
29 to 39 when the measure f in a lly  came to a vote in June 1939.
Thomas remained the irrepressible in fla tio n is t until World War I I  
transformed the issue into an anachronism. In January 1939, the Okla­
homan authored another omnibus monetary b i l l —one that contained at 
least seven proposals to cheapen the do llar. The b i l l  followed a 
fam iliar leg is la tive  history. In i t ia l ly  i t  received a favorable report 
from the Agricultural and Forestry Committee, only to be referred to
TOSRobin Hood to Members of the Council, 17 January 1938, 
Sexauer papers; U. S ., Congressional Record, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.,
9 February 1938, p. 182; Ib id . , 16 February 1938, pp. 2016-2020.
Twenty supportive le tters  are printed in Ib id . , pp. 2021-2022.
TOSyhomas to President, 4 March 1938, Thomas papers.
^Roosevelt to Thomas, 30 March 1938, FDR Library.
S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 June
1939, p. 7874.
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112the Banking and Currency Committee where i t  suffered oblivion. In 
June 1939 Thomas joined Senator Patrick A. McCarran of Nevada in an 
e ffo rt to restore the historic agricu lture-s ilveri te in fla tio n is t bloc. 
The Thomas-McCarran Amendment provided fo r issuing $2 b illio n  in new 
currency, raised the price of domestic s ilve r from 64.64 cents to $1.04 
per ounce and directed the Treasury to purchase foreign s ilver tendered 
in payment for American farm exports at a premium 25 per cent above the 
New York price fo r foreign s ilver. Though the amendment placed a c e il­
ing on $1.29 on such Treasury purchases, both the s ilver and agricultural 
industries expected to benefit from the disguised subsidy. The Thomas- 
McCarran e ffo r t met with administration opposition and fa iled  in part
because si 1 vérités struck an independent bargain with the administra-
113tion to raise the price of the white metal to 71.11 cents per ounce. 
Thomas continued leg is la tive  efforts on behalf of money reform until 
defeated for re-election in 1950. With the coming of the war the 
Oklahoman replaced demands for in fla tio n  with requests that monetary 
management promote price s t a b i l i z a t i o n . S t i l l  the Senator had l i t t l e  
hope that price s ta b ility  would characterize the post-war era.
^^^S. 1855, U. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
27 January 1939, pp. 863-979; S. Report 180, Ib id ., 20 March 1939, 
pp. 2928-2932.
T^^New York Times, 16 June, 1:5, 1939; 17 June, 1:6, 1939 and 
21 June, 1:4, 1939; "Money Puzzles Congress," Business Week (June 24, 
1939), pp. 15-16; U. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
June 15, 1939, pp. 7206-7207.
^^^"Senator Elmer Thomas' Voice and Vote Raised for Monetary 
Programs," Social Justice (February 19, 1940), p. 1; New York Times,
5 March, 39:1, 1940; and Thomas to McCarran, February 7, 1950, Thomas 
papers.
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In August 1945, a fte r noting the unprecedented accumulation of war debt, 
the monetarist predicted, "we w ill never see prices in this country as 
low again as they are t o d a y . T h e  Senator's price theory at last 
reflected the times.
Compared to the f i r s t  term, the second Roosevelt Administration 
cast monetary policy in a less heroic role. Whenever the New Deal 
resorted to monetary action between 1935 and 1941, i t  did so aware that 
the monetary mechanism was but one of several useful instruments 
necessary to create a prosperous and balanced economy. Roosevelt 
acknowledged in October 1937, "monetary powers possess no peculiar 
magic. They are not o m n i p o t e n t . W h i l e  monetary measures lost 
appeal during the la tte r  1930s, the administration s t i l l  refused to ease 
control over the formulation of money and credit policy. Former Sen­
ator Robert Owen exaggerated when he claimed the Federal Reserve Board 
"acted lik e  well behaved children to father Roosevelt," but Eccles 
made few moves without consulting the administration and Roosevelt con­
tinued to boast that he had transferred the control of monetary policy 
from Wall Street to Washington.
New Dealers continued to believe that proper monetary manage­
ment contributed to the s ta b ility  of prices and values. In February 
1937, Morgenthau lis ted  eight goals of American monetary policy.
TTSyhomas to Herman E. Gieske, 1 August 1945, Thomas papers.
^ l N^ew York Times, 2 October, 1:4, 1937. See also Roosevelt 
to Representative Ford, 11 April 1939, FDR Library.
TT^ Owen to Patman, 19 January 1933, Owen papers. Library of 
Congress; Roosevelt Press Conference #558, June 27, 1939, p. 469.
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Each Morgenthau objective referred to the stab ilization  of price or
118income relationships either domestically or in ternationally . During 
the la tte r  1930s, Roosevelt, too, frequently expressed the hope that 
New Deal credit and monetary programs might contribute to "s ta b ility  
within lim its" and a balanced economic o r d e r . Y e t  s ta b ility  
remained an elusive abstraction during the second term and the ro lle r ­
coaster economy of 1937-1940 burdened the New Deal with one of its  most 
frustrating disappointments.
During the la tte r  half of 1936 the administration began to fear 
that the economy suffered from in flationary and speculative forces.
In response, the New Deal sharply reduced government spending for re lie f  
and public works and on August 15, 1936 and January 30, 1937, the Board 
of Governors announced substantial increases in member bank reserve 
requirements.T20 Meanwhile a large flow of gold imports from war 
frightened Europe concerned Treasury o ffic ia ls  who feared the gold 
avalanch of 1935 and 1936 might spur undue in fla tio n . On December 21, 
1936, Morgenthau announced a gold s te riliza tio n  program. Under the new 
policy the Treasury isolated imported gold in an account in the general 
fund and refused to deposit gold certifica tes  with the Federal Reserve.
^Morgenthau, "Outline of Monetary Developments and Policies 
of the United States, March 1933 to February 1937," FDR Library.
^Roosevelt Press Conference, #366, May 13, 1937, p. 366 and 
#584, September 29, 1939, p. 201; Roosevelt to Thomas, 4 March 1938, 
FDR Library and New York Times, 4 August, 6:2, 1937.
^^^Marriner S. Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers: Public and Per­
sonal Recollections (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 287-291.
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S terilized , the imported gold could not a ffect the credit base of the 
121nation. In April 1937, the President joined those warning against
in fla tion  as he cautioned against price increases in the durable goods 
122industries.
During the winter of 1937-1938 the New Deal replaced in fla tion  
concerns with alarm that the economy had again plummeted into recession. 
In response to the erratic  in flation-déflation  cycle Roosevelt, on 
February 15, 1938, released a lengthy statement regarding New Deal 
price objectives. The work of Secretaries Morgenthau, Wallace and 
Perkins and Federal Reserve Governor Eccles, the administration price 
statement admitted "a moderate rise in the general price level is desir­
able." But the document argued that monopolistic industries and those
enjoying administered prices needed less refla tion  than competitive
123industries such as agriculture. On the f i f th  anniversary of the 
New Deal, Roosevelt attempted to c la r ify  the inconsistencies of the 
April 1937 warning against in fla tion  and the February 1938 admission 
that prices were too low. He explained that in both instances "the Old 
Ship of State was on the same course." When in flation  threatened in 
early 1937, "we put the helm of the ship hard a-starboard to prevent 
the ship because of the fluctuation of the wind from leaving her course.
TZljohn Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau D iaries: Years of
C ris is , 1928-1938 (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1959), pp. 358-355.
T22Roosevelt Press Conference #357, April 2, 1937, pp. 239-242.
TZSlb id . , #434, February 15, 1938, pp. 159-162. See also Ib id . , 
#427, January 21, 1938, pp. 111-112.
415
. . . Last autumn, the wind shifted and . . .  we shifted the helm of
1the ship hard a-port. . . ."
Though the President seemed determined to steer the country 
towards recovery and s ta b ility , his advisors differed over how much 
economic sail might be needed to do the job. In early 1937 the "fisca l- 
is ts ,"  including Harry Hopkins and Eccles, urged the Keynesian approach 
with its  emphasis on budgetary defic its  as a stimulus to the e c o n o m y . ^25 
Morgenthau and Treasury experts advised balancing the budget and a 
reliance on monetary action. At a February 7, 1938 s ta ff meeting, 
Morgenthau recalled the Warren gold experiment of 1933 and predicted 
that i f  a sim ilar "shot in the arm" were not forthcoming the fisca lis ts  
would persuade the President to spend b i l l  i o n s . T r e a s u r y  General 
Counsel Herman Oliphant, a confidant of Warren's during the 1933 gold 
experiment, compiled a l i s t  of available monetary alternatives for 
Morgenthau in an April 12 memorandum. The Treasury o ff ic ia l suggested 
the Board of Governors lower reserve requirements and the Treasury 
desterilize  gold. In addition. Oliphant noted the President might 
desterilize  nearly $925 m illion of s ilver seigniorage, transfer the 
$1 . 8  b illio n  deposited in the stab ilization  fund to cash, devalue gold 
another 10 points and issue $3 b illio n  in greenbacks under authority of 
the 1933 Thomas Amendment. Though Morgenthau pushed the monetary a lte r ­
native during administration deliberations to the point he threatened
124ib id . , #439, March 4, 1938, pp. 208-209. 
^25Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers, pp. 294-312. 
TZ^Blum, Morgenthau D iaries, p. 405.
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resignation, Roosevelt sided with the f i s c a l i s t s . ^27 On April 14, the 
President announced the inauguration of massive new spending programs. 
S t i l l  Roosevelt did not ignore monetary incentives altogether. The 
Treasury p a rtia lly  desterilized gold, the Board of Governors reduced 
reserve requirements and the administration publicly pursued an easy 
money policy.^28
While avoiding the dramatic monetary gesture, the New Deal 
between 1937 and 1941 jealously maintained the Presidential money pre­
rogatives granted in the Thomas Amendment of 1933 and the Gold Reserve 
Act of 1934. The administration continued to manage the $2 b illio n  
fund created from the gold p ro fit taken from the devaluation of 1934 
principally to s tab ilize  international exchange rates. Roosevelt also 
held in reserve the right to vary the gold content of the dollar between 
the lim its of 50 and 60 per cent of its  pre-1933 weight and the right 
to issue $3 b illio n  in f ia t  currency. In 1939 when conservatives 
fu t i le ly  urged repeal of the $3 b illio n  currency feature Roosevelt 
defended the measure explaining, " i t  was a good thing to have a club
T27%bid., pp. 4 2 2 -4 2 5 .
^^ N^ew York Times, 15 A p ril, 1:6-8, 1938. The monetary maneu­
vers of the New Deal are reviewed in Arthur Whipple Crawford, Monetary 
Management Under the New Deal : The Evolution of à Managed Currency
System—Its  Problems and Results (Washington, D. C .: American Council
on Public A ffa irs , 1940), 376 pages; James Daniel Paris, Monetary Pol­
icies of the United States, 1932-1938 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1938), 198 pages, and Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz ; 
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1961), pp. 420-544.
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tucked away in the closet sometime."129 Meanwhile a January 1936
Presidential Proclamation extended Roosevelt's authority to a lte r  the
price of gold and the S tab ilization Fund for one year. In January 1937
Congress renewed both powers through June 30, 1939.
In early 1939, Roosevelt asked Congress to prolong his a b ility
to change the price of gold and manage the Stabilization Fund from
1 nJune 30; 1939 to January 15, 1941, In defense of the request the 
President cited the "international monetary and economic situation" and 
Secretary Morgenthau te s tified  before a House committee that the money 
powers served as "a weapon in reserve" and were "as important as a 
powerful navy" in deterring foreign aggression against the United 
States.132 Heeding the administration argument the House on an unre­
corded vote on April 21 agreed to extend the money powers to June 30, 
1941.133
The 1939 e ffo rt to renew the presidential money prerogatives 
ran into d iff ic u lty  in the Senate where c ritic s  of the measure included 
monetarists, s ilverites  and gold standard conservatives. In succession 
monetarists sponsored the Thomas-McCarran s ilve r amendment, a Thomas 
amendment mandating the restoration of 1926 prices, and a Thomas
129Roosevelt Press Conference, #530, March 14, 1939, p. 194.
130crawford, Monetary Management Under the New Deal, pp. 89-94.
13lNew York Times, 20 January, 27:8, 1939.
132ib id . ,  4 A pril, 14:6, 1939; and 24 March, 33:8, 1939.
133Before the voice vote the House had voted against recommital 
225 to 158. See U. S ., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
April 21, 1939, p. 4635.
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proposal to release $1% b illio n  of the S tab ilization Fund for general 
revenue p u r p o s e s I m p a t i e n t  with the President, monetarists wanted 
to replace Roosevelt's discretionary money powers with leg islation  
binding reflationary currency action upon the administration. S t i l l  a 
combination of administration Democrats and hard money Republicans 
prevented adoption of the in fla tion  amendments and monetarists had 
l i t t l e  choice but to support a continuance of the President's money
prerogatives.135
A more serious challenge to the administration attempt to pro­
long the l i f e  of the money powers came from a curious coalition of gold 
standard Republicans and Western s ilv e rite s . Republicans, strengthened 
as a result of victories in the 1938 bi-elections and anticipating the 
1940 presidential contest seemed anxious to embarrass Roosevelt, 
reassert congressional control over money and prepare for a return to 
the gold standard. S ilver Senators simply wanted a greater subsidy for 
the mining industry. On June 25, the hard-money/soft-money coalition  
voted to s trip  the President of the gold devaluation authority but 
agreed to raise the subsidy on domestic s ilver 13 c e n t s ! 136 [astern
134 ib id . ,  June 15, 1939, pp. 7206-7207; June 2 6 , 193 9 , p. 7868 
and June 26, 1939, p. 7881. See also New York Times, 16 June, 1:5 and 
17 June, 1:9, 1939.
135xhe Thomas-McCarran Amendment fa iled  to come to a vote. The
vote on the restoration of the 1926 price level fa iled  29-39 and the
vote on removing $1% b illio n  from the S tab ilization Fund fa iled  19-45. 
See Ib id . , June 26, 1939, p. 7874 and p. 7891.
l^^"Congress Threads Money Maze," Business Week (July 1, 1939), 
p. 14; "Silver and Spite," Nation, 149 (July 8 , 1939), p. 31; "Monetary
Ghosts," New Republic, 99 (July 12, 1939), pp. 264-265; New York Times,
2 February, 27:5; 23 A pril, 11:1; 8  June, 23:8; 27 June, 1:7 and 1 July, 
1:7, 1939; Committee for the Nation Press Release, June 29, 1939, DLP; 
and Allen Seymour Everest, Morgenthau, The New Deal and S ilv e r: A
Study of Pressure Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),
pp. 70-75.
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Republicans and Western s i lvérités once again exchanged votes to achieve 
individual ends. But the "Silver and Spite" coalition soon disintegrated 
before a determined Roosevelt counterattack. On June 27, the President 
informed reporters that devaluation was not at issue, but rather the 
Republican determination to return American monetary policy to the con­
tro l of Wall Street. He claimed the odds against the administration 
devaluing the dollar were at least " 1 0  to 1 " and asserted that the only 
circumstance that would trigger such a move would be i f  foreign nations 
"start to take a crack at us the way they did in 1930 and 1 9 3 1 ."^^7 
White House pressure, the loyalty of the Lower House and f in a lly  a com­
promise granting s ilver senators nearly a six cent an ounce boost in 
the domestic price of the white metal forced the Senate to reverse 
i ts e lf .  On July 5, a 43-39 pro-administration vote extended the Presi­
dential money powers un til June 30, 1 9 4 1 . ^ ^ 8
The President's victory in retaining the in flationary monetary 
prerogatives soon proved redundant. With the outbreak of the European 
War, Roosevelt replaced fears of deflation with concern that prices be 
kept "from going through the roo f."1^9 in May 1940, the President 
recalled the "vicious upward spiral" of prices during the World War and 
warned that price ceilings might be imposed on "wheat, copper, capital
^^^Roosevelt Press Conference #556, June 27, 1939, pp. 466-473. 
See also New York Times, 27 June, 22:2; 28 June, 1:6-8 and 2 July, 1:1, 
1939.
138f^ ew York Times, 29 June, 1:8; 30 June, 1:6; 6  July, 1:1; and 
7 July, 3:1, 1939.
^89R ooseve lt P ress C onference #584, September 19 , 1939, p. 201.
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140and labor." During the same month Roosevelt revived the Advisory
Commission of the Council of National Defense and appointed Leon Hender-
141son a stab ilization  watchdog over the prices of raw materials. Within 
months the Treasury and Federal Reserve followed the President's lead 
with an ti-in fla tion ary  in itia tiv e s  of th e ir own.^^Z once again the time 
had come to put the economy "hard a-starboard."
Monetarists, more out of habit than genuine hope, looked to the 
election of 1940 as another opportunity to press the honest do llar  
credo. But the European v/ar overshadowed a ll domestic issues. Though 
some monetarists urged monetary regulation as a means of preventing 
wars, the connection seemed obtuse to citizens reading about the Fall of 
France or the Battle of B rita in .^^ 3 s t i l l  the monetary events of the 
1930s had been su ffic ien tly  unsettling that interest in the subject 
remained keen. Professor Henry Steele Commager reminded students in 
1940 of Gladstone's dictum that "the study of the money question was 
the shortest route to madness." Commager cryptica lly  added that "Anyone 
who attempts to penetrate the mysteries of the money policy of our 
government today is inclined to agree with him."^^^ The sagacity of 
Gladstone and Commager appeared vindicated in May when the Senate
T4Tlb id . ,  #647, May 28, 1940, p. 390; and #647-A, May 30, 1940,
140lb id., #645-A, May 23, 1940, pp. 357-370.
Tlbid., ,
p. 397.
1 A p
John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau D iaries: Years of
Urgency, 1938-1941 (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1965), pp. 311-318;
Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers, pp. 344-368.
^43[\jew York Times, 13 September, 10:6, 1939.
144Henry Steele Commager, "The Money Question," Scholastic 
XXXVI (February 19, 1940), p. 7.
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Banking and Currency Committee inaugurated a major new study of money 
and cred it. The f i r s t  action of the committee was to invite  witnesses 
to respond to an 83-page questionnaire.^^5
Monetarists began contemplating th e ir  role in the 1940 campaign 
as early as 1938. During the bi-election year the Republican Party 
created a program committee to compose appropriate GOP policy statements 
on the principal issues before the countryJ^^ In June 1938» William 
Hard, Secretary to the committee, asked Sexauer to present organized 
agriculture's monetary program to the policy review g r o u p . ^^7 Sexauer, 
an acquaintance of Hard's and a life -lo n g  Republican, declined the 
invitation but assessed the relationship between agriculture and the 
two major parties. The dairy leader believed the Democratic Party had 
proved more responsive to organized agriculture than the GOP. "The 
opportunities," Sexauer observed, "which were offered to the Republican 
Party at the las t convention and which made no impression on them what­
soever are to quite a degree being seized upon by the present 
administration. . . . "  Rather than try  to convert "hard-shall Repub­
licans" the farm leader predicted organized agriculture would continue 
to work "on a friendly basis with the present administration." ^ ^ 8  
S t i l l  a Sexauer associate, John Brandt, F irs t Vice President of the
T^S e^w York Times, 16 May, 40:1, 1940.
^^^Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell W illkie  
(Urbana: University of Il l in o is  Press, 1960), pp. 22-24.
T47Hard to Rumely, 8  June 1938, and Rumely to Sexauer, 11 June
1938, Sexauer papers.
T48$exauer to Hard, 23 August 1938, Ib id . See also Sexauer to
Hard, 7 July 1938, and Hard to Sexauer, 15 July 1938, Ib id.
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National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation, presented the honest 
dollar argument to the Hard conference and in 1939 Sexauer received a 
conroitment from Kenneth F. Simpson, New York Republican National Com­
mitteeman, to oppose a "Simon-pure gold standard" plank in the 1940
platform.149
The report of the Republican Program Committee, published in 
February 1940, substantiated monetarist pessimism regarding the GOP.
The document called for terminating the President's discretionary money 
powers and for a return to a fixed gold s t a n d a r d . I n  response, 
Sexauer mailed hundreds of copies of a le t te r  from Vermont Farm Bureau 
President Arthur H. Packard to the Republican Program Committee which 
blasted the committee fo r its  monetary stand, argued for re fla tio n , 
urged gold devaluation and praised managed currency systems.1^ 1 The 
Packard le t te r  distributed under the sponsorship of the Monetary Com­
mittee of the National Conference of Farmer Cooperatives brought Sexauer
dozens of le tters  from cooperative o ffic ia ls  from Vermont to Califor- 
152
nia. Collectively the le tters  urged the Monetary Committee Chairman 
to continue the fig h t for the honest dollar and perhaps because of the 
impending war, expressed strong pessimism about the future of the indus­
try  and skepticism regarding the a b ility  of either p o litica l party to
^49simpson to Sexauer, 20 July 1933, Ib id .
150Johnson, The Republican Party, pp. 41-42.
T^^Packard to Glenn Frank, April 1940. See also Sexauer to 
Hartke, 25 April 1940, Sexauer papers.
152previously the National Cooperative Council. Ezra Taft 
Benson served as the organization's new Executive Secretary.
423
afford agriculture effective r e l i e f A s  a fin a l e ffo rt to convert 
the Republican Party to monetarism, Sexauer endorsed the candidacy of 
Frank Gannett fo r the GOP presidential nomination.
Monetarists hoped the campaign of wealthy up-state New York 
newspaper publisher Frank Gannett might provide them opportunities 
sim ilar to the Borah e ffo rt of 1936. Few believed Gannett would win 
the nomination but as Louis o. Taber phrased i t ,  "the speeches Mr. 
Gannett has been making up and down this nation w ill probably do as 
much to give us a sound and constructive (jRepublicanl platform as any­
thing else. . . Again monetarists turned to a dark-horse
candidate to force compromise upon the shapers of the party platform.
A monetarist and a former Director of the Committee for the Nation, 
Gannett named Edward A. Rumely campaign manager. The Rumely campaign 
pictured Gannett as "The man who led every defeat of the New Deal," 
especially the rejection of the court-packing and executive reorganiza­
tion proposals. As for farm r e l ie f ,  Gannett and Rumely s t i l l  equated 
monetary reform with agricultural prosperity and even considered 
Congressman William Lemke a lik e ly  ally.T^S Gannett, publisher of 
American A gricu ltu ra lis t, insisted the farm problem "is essentially a
^^^There are approximately three dozen such le tters  in the 
Sexauer papers.
^^^Taber to Rumely, 11 April 1940, Sexauer papers.
TS^Gannett to Rumely, 19 February 1940, Rumely to Sexauer,
19 February 1940; Sexauer to Gannett, 5 April 1940; Babcock to Gannett,
5 April 1940, Sexauer papers. See also Rumely to Gannett, 14 November 
1939, OLP. The Gannett papers contain several campaign pamphlets 
including: "Save Agriculture to Save America," "17 Points to Recovery,"
and "Your Job in 1940."
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price problem" and opposed governmental crop restriction programs.
Aside from low interest rates, cooperative buying, cheap transportation 
and research, the candidate advocated a monetary authority, refla tion  
and stab ilization  of the d o lla r .156 Though he spent a half m illion  
dollars in the e ffo rt to acquire the nomination and stationed three 
liv e  elephants outside the Philadelphia Republican convention h a ll, 
Gannett received a meager 33 of 1000 delegate votes on the f i r s t  
b a llo t .157 Altogether, the elephants caused greater commotion than 
the publisher from New York.
Regardless of Gannett's disappointing delegate count, the Repub­
lican convention rejected the e a rlie r recommendations of the Program 
Committee fo r a return to a s tr ic t  gold standard. The 1940 Republican 
money plank called for the withdrawal of the President's emergency 
monetary powers including repeal of the Thomas Amendment of 1933 and 
the S ilver Purchase Act of 1934. Republicans also promised to "take 
a ll possible steps to preserve the value of the government's huge hold­
ings of gold and reintroduce gold into c i r c u l a t i o n . S e x a u e r  
described the plank as a "negative victory" for while the statement 
fa iled  to re fle c t the program of organized agriculture, the hard money- 
ites had also been unsuccessful in securing a commitment to a fixed
T56wew York Times, 6 A pril, 18:6, 1940. See also Polenberg, 
Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government, pp. 58-62.
^57nerbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never Again: A Pres­
ident Runs for a Third Term (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 145-159;
Johnson, The Republican Party, pp. 95-100.
^55jhe platform is printed in Schlesinger, et , The History 
of American Presidential Elections, V, pp. 2958-2966.
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gold standard. The dairy leader believed the plank su ffic ien tly  fle x ­
ib le  to allow for a managed currency should such a program gain national
acceptance.T59
Senator Elmer Thomas carried the monetarist banner before the 
1940  Democratic platform committee at Chicago. Thomas urged Democrats 
to endorse stab ilization  and a "Supreme Court of Money" but the party 
seemed content with the status quo and repeated much of the language 
of the 1936 money p l a n k . T h e  Democratic platform again boasted that 
the New Deal had regulated banking, the stock market and security 
exchanges on behalf of the public in terest, had revived the nation's 
financial institutions and had provided low interest to ordinary c i t i ­
zens. As for money the Chicago convention asserted, "We have steered 
a steady course between a bankruptcy-producing deflation and a th r i f t -  
destroying in fla tion  so that the dollar is the most stable and sought 
a fte r  currency in the world. . .
The money question remained a subterranean issue until the 
fin a l and surprisingly vituperative two weeks of the 1940 campaign.
On October 22 at Chicago W illkie accused "Mr. Third Term Candidate" of 
committing a host of monetary fo llie s . The Republican nominee con­
trasted the 1932 Democratic pledge to preserve a sound currency with 
Roosevelt's subsequent suspension of the gold standard and "that unsound 
experiment"—the Warren gold scheme. W illk ie  described the President's
TSSgexauer to Bausman, 16 July 1940, Sexauer papers.
^^ *^ New York Times, 6  July, 5:6, 1940.
TGlyhe platform is printed in Schlesinger, et a /[., History of 
American Presidential Elections, V, pp. 2947-2957.
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discretionary money powers as putting American monetary policy "on a 
twenty-four hour basis" and complained that the President "k illed  the 
London Economic Conference." In the candidate's opinion, "no act of 
any government in the world during that period did so much to destroy 
the hope of democracy in the Old World and give an opportunity for the 
rise of dictatorships."^^2 The following day at the Herald Tribune 
Forum, the Republican nominee presented a more insidious interpretation  
of the Roosevelt monetary program. W illk ie  believed "The identical 
process which wrecked the lib e rtie s  of Europe has been going on here in 
America right before our eyes." The "stealthy concentration of power" 
under Roosevelt was no better illu s tra ted  than in the administration 
control of money and banking for the e ffo rt to dominate national finan­
cia l policy followed the pattern of "Lenin and other revolutionaries. 
Willkie continued to link the themes of broken promises, dictatorship  
and financial fo lly  with New Deal monetary policy at speeches in Akron, 
Ohio and in the Republican campaign's climactic wind-up address at 
Madison Square Garden on November 2.^64
Morgenthau delivered the New Deal response to the W illkie mone­
tary offensive at a press conference on October 24. The Secretary 
described the American dollar as "the standard of international trade" 
and accused Willkie of possessing "a memory conveniently short."
^^ N^ew York Times, 23 October, 16:3, 1940.
TGSlb id . ,  24 October, 16:3, 1940.
■ Ib id . , 25 October, 1:1, 1940 and "Speech by Wendell L. W illk ie , 
New York C ity," November 2, 1940, printed in Schlesinger, et a l . .
History of American Presidential Elections, pp. 2999-3005.
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Recalling the deflation of 1932, the bank panic and the absence of 
p ro fits , Morgenthau credited administration monetary action for stop­
ping deflation and producing a dollar that "has remained extraordinarily  
stable." F inally , Morgenthau accused W illkie of simply being a front" 
fo r his friends in Wall Street" who resented "the fact that monetary 
control had been . . . placed in the hands of the people of the United 
States,"165
Regardless of the emotional outburst that punctuated the last 
days of the campaign, the money question had but negligible influence 
on the outcome of the 1940 election and would generally be forgotten 
amidst the crises of impending war.^^^ Though Roosevelt requested and 
received another extension of the monetary powers in 1941, they became 
increasingly i r r e l e v a n t . T h e  coming of war underscored the in ter­
national nature of economic issues for as the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference indicated, no one nation could solve the money question for 
i ts e lf .  In April 1943, the administration asked Congress for a fourth 
extension of the money powers though Morgenthau conceded the issue was 
not "a matter of l i f e  and death." Congress, as requested, renewed the 
S tabilization Fund to June 1945. But the Senate, concerned with
ISSf^ ew York Times, 25 October, 7:1 , 1940.
TGGparmet and Hecht, Never Again, pp. 226-227, named voter 
attitudes towards "interventionism in the war" the key determinate in 
the campaign.
167The 1941 vote on renewal closely followed party lines. The 
House voted 226-139 and the Senate voted 42-20 to extend the money 
powers. See U. S ., Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., May 11, 
1941, p. 4481; and Ib id . , June 28, 1941, p. 5644; New York Times,
28 May, 1:1, 1941; 29 June, 1:3 and 1 July, 19:1, 1941; and Blum, Years 
of Urgency, p. 298.
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in flation  and fearing that debate over the gold devaluation power might 
hamper the progress of the $13 b illio n  Second War Loan Drive, unanimously 
dropped the President's power to a lte r  the gold content of the d o lla r .^^8 
When the House and the administration concurred in the Senate action, 
the gold experiment begun a decade e a rlie r  o f f ic ia lly  came to an end.^^S 
The Presidential campaign of 1944 v ir tu a lly  ignored the money question. 
The 1944 Democratic Platform fa iled  to contain a single reference to 
money and currency and the Republican money plank simply asserted that 
the President's "unnecessary powers over currency" ought to be 
r e p e a l e d . T h e  farm organizations, too caught up in concerns regard­
ing the post-war world, looked to other issues. By the mid-1940s, 
the money controversy entered an era of quiescence.
TG^ New York Times, 2 A p ril, 1:6, 17 A p ril, 1:1, and 20 A pril, 
18:2, 1943.
lG 9lb id ., 30 A p ril, 11:3, 1943.
^^^The 1944 Republican Platform is printed in Schlesinger, 
e t ^ . , History of Presidential Elections, V, p. 3048.
EPILOGUE
I  ri the 1950s, monetarists reminisced about the attempt to 
resolve the money question during the Great Depression. At Frank A. 
Pearson's retirement dinner in 1958, the Cornell professor facetiously 
dismissed his contributions to the honest dollar cause. Though "Farm 
Management was my f i r s t  love," recalled Warren's collaborator, "the 
grass in the Price Pasture looked greener so I jumped the fence; [b u t]  
about a ll I accomplished was to rip  my pants, co llect burrs, and get 
gored by other b u l l s . T h e  same year the co-author of Gold and Prices 
confessed, "the power of man to control prices is greatly overrated 
. . . "  and a decade la te r in an interview with the author Pearson pes­
sim istica lly  concluded that "as for any e ffect on world economic policy, 
we [Warren and Pearson] had very l i t t l e . "  S t i l l  other monetarists 
lik e  Fred Sexauer and Ed Foster tenaciously clung to the b e lie f in 
monetary action and revived the gold devaluation e l ix ir  during the 
farm recession of the la tte r  1950s. Meanwhile the po litic ian  and the 
propagandist, Elmer Thomas and Edward A. Rumely, optim istically recol-
3
lected that monetarists had saved the country and ended the depression!
Tpearson, "This and That," address delivered at Warren H all, 
February 24, 1958, Pearson papers.
Zpearson to George Burton, 15 January 1958, Ib id . Pearson 
interview with author, 9 June 1968, Ithaca, New York
^Foster to McConnell, 26 June and 30 June 1953, and McConnell 
to Foster, 29 June 1953, New York State Farm Bureau papers, Cornell. 
Sexauer interview with author, June 10, 1968, Auburn, New York; Rumely,
429
430
The achievements of the honest do llar crusade l ie  between the 
good natured cynicism of Pearson and the too serious boasting of Thomas 
and Rumely. Though much of the farm monetary rhetoric between 1920 
and 1941 thoughtlessly reiterated populist in fla tio n is t and free s ilver  
dogma, the critic ism  of organized agriculture also hastened the adop­
tion of 0. managed monetary system. By 1940 agriculture had generally 
discarded the neo-populism of Tom Heflin and John A. Simpson for the 
more studied concepts of Congressmen Goldsborough and Strong and 
Professors Fisher, Commons and Warren. The monetarist coalition of 
farmer and professor forced the financial and academic worlds to examine 
the p o ten tia lities  and responsibilities of monetary management. That 
investigation and the consequences of the Great Depression led to 
fundamental changes in American monetary and banking policy. At its  
most sophisticated leve l, agriculture's concern fo r stable money con­
tributed to the demise of the rig id  gold standard and such banking 
reform as FDIC and the creation of a genuine central banking system in 
1935.
Both the New Deal and organized agriculture considered monetary 
and banking policy too significant to remain the exclusive province of 
financiers. While farm interests provided much of the impetus the New 
Deal contributed the p o litic a l leadership that transferred control of 
monetary and banking policy from Wall Street to Washington. But that 
transaction contained irony. Though monetarists pushed the Roosevelt
"How the United States Ended the Great Depression," July 1958, 8 pages, 
Gannett papers; Thomas, "40 Years a Legislator," typed manuscript, 
p. 182; and Thomas to Jeannette P. Nichols, 19 April 1950, Thomas papers. 
University of Oklahoma.
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administration towards greater monetary activism, New Deal monetary 
maneuvers demonstrated the inherent lim itations of monetary policy as 
a sole s ta b ilize r for the economy. S t i l l  monetarists participated in 
a dominate theme of American economic history between the wars--the 
death of la issez-fa ire  and increased reliance on governmental manage­
ment whether in the area of monetary and banking policy or elsewhere. 
Regardless of the controversy surrounding the issue, one lesson seemed 
clear: the las t voice to raise the money question had yet to be
heard from.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
Manuscripts
The most significant collection regarding organized agricul­
ture's involvement in the honest dollar cause is the Dairymen's League 
Papers (cited as DLP) at Cornell University. The collection of approx­
imately 200 linear feet is divided into the general papers of the 
organization and the Fred A. Sexauer personal f i l e .  The collection  
contains correspondence between League o ffic ia ls  and other monetarists, 
resolutions, pamphlets and memoranda. The Sexauer f i le  includes hun­
dreds of letters between the man who served as President of the 
Dairymen's League from 1928-1947 and other in fla tio n is ts , data regard­
ing the finances and strategy of the Committee for the Nation, minutes 
and correspondence of the Monetary Committee of the National Cooperative 
Council and information on Sexauer's role as a monetary lobbyist.
Sexauer also possessed four f i le  drawers of correspondence and 
printed material at his home in Auburn, New York. The Sexauer private 
papers included correspondence regarding the various monetary campaigns 
and a complete set of the National Industrial Conference Board reports 
commissioned by the Committee for the Nation. These papers have been 
transferred to Cornell University.
The Chicago General Offices of the American Farm Bureau Federa­
tion possess the organization's annual policy resolutions, bound volumes 
of the Bureau's annual proceedings and a monetary f i le  containing tracts,
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pamphlets and news releases. The New York State Farm Bureau Papers at 
Cornell University provide insight into that farm group's zealous sup­
port of the Warren program. The collection features the correspondence 
of monetarist-farm leaders C. R. White, Fred Freestone and Ed Foster, 
resolutions of the organization and information on the state organiza­
tion 's  threat to secede from the American Farm Bureau unless greater 
emphasis was given the monetary remedy.
The most important papers regarding the monetary efforts of the 
Farmers Union are those of John A. Simpson who served as president of 
the organization from 1931-1934. Housed at the University of Oklahoma, 
the Simpson papers, though re la tive ly  sparse (four linear fe e t), trace 
the in fla tio n is t's  correspondence with Roosevelt, Senator Elmer Thomas, 
Henry Morgenthau, Huey Long and others. The collection contains the 
farm leader's daily logs which illu s tra te  the extent of Simpson's cam­
paign ac tiv ities  during 1932 and copies of his radio addresses. The 
Farmers Union national headquarters at Denver, Colorado possess the 
annual resolutions of the organization for 1933, 1934, 1935, 1937, 1938 
and 1939. In addition, they have a 35mm film  of the typed convention 
proceedings for 1921-1940, with two years omitted, 1935 and 1932.
Papers at the Washington, D. C. headquarters of the National 
Grange relating to that organization's monetary activism are limited  
to typed aud printed copies of the Journal of Proceedings of the 
National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry for each annual session.
The papers of National Master Louis J. Taber at Cornell University 
comprise 29 linear feet and contain resolutions, speeches and memoranda 
regarding the Grange contribution to the honest dollar e ffo rt.
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The collection Includes correspondence that illu s tra tes  Taber's involve­
ment in the Committee fo r the Nation and the Borah and Gannett campaigns, 
and pamphlets, newspaper clippings and photographs.
In addition to the ac tiv ities  of organized agriculture, farm 
politicians played key roles in the battle for monetary reform between 
1920 and 1941. The papers of the head of the Senate in fla tion ists  in 
the 1930s, Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma, comprise a massive collec­
tion of 508 linear feet at the University of Oklahoma. The collection  
contains the Senator's correspondence with Roosevelt, Father Coughlin, 
s ilv e rite s , bonus advocates, farm in fla tio n is ts  and the Committee for 
the Nation. Thomas' constituent mail illu s tra tes  the grass roots sup­
port for the money e l ix ir  and the pathetic economic condition of 
depression-ridden Oklahoma. Unfortunately, the collection fa ils  to 
contain a detailed account of the negotiations that led the Roosevelt 
Administration to accept the Thomas Amendment to the AAA. That de fi­
ciency is somewhat alleviated in a typed autobiographical essay, "40 
Years a Legislator," written in 1954, also at the University of Oklahoma.
The papers of the several farm state senators housed at the 
Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. add significant detail to the 
study of the money controversies of the 1920s and 1930s. They include 
the papers of Idahoan William Borah, Nebraskan George Norris, Oklahoman 
Robert L. Owen, Texan Tom Connally and s ilver bloc leader, Nevadan Key 
Pittman. The Library of Congress also provides access to the papers 
of Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico, Speaker Henry T. Rainey of 
I l l in o is ,  Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon and Senator Tom Walsh of 
Montana, each of whom played a part in the monetary struggles of the era.
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Unfortunately, the papers of Maryland Congressman Thomas Alan Golds­
borough and Kansas Representative James G. Strong have not survived.
The Kansas State Historical Society at Topeka possesses the 
papers of two of that state 's farm bloc po litic ians: Senator Arthur 
Capper and Representative C lifford  Hope. Though Capper advocated the 
honest do llar remedy, the Senator's papers contain but sparse informa­
tion related to monetary themes. The papers of Kansas Congressman 
C lifford  Hope are primarily useful to illu s tra te  that neo-populism 
s t i l l  flourished among farmers on the eve of World War I I .
Papers pertaining to the a c tiv itie s  of monetarist professors 
include the George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson collections at Cornell 
University. The main body of the Warren papers contain l i t t l e  more 
than speeches, published works and newspaper clippings. The inclusion 
of the Warren d iaries, however, makes the collection invaluable. The 
diaries are comprised of handwritten and typed loose lea f papers and 
though spotty are most complete for the years 1933-1935. The diaries  
report the monetary opinions and conversations of such key New Dealers 
as James Harvey Rogers, Morgenthau, Tugwell, Wallace and Roosevelt, 
and comprise a good behind-the-scenes source. The papers of Frank A. 
Pearson, the junior half of the Warren-Pearson team, contain a greater 
volume of Warren material than that found in the Warren papers.
Pearson collected considerable memorabilia and correspondence for a 
1957 essay on his friend and mentor. Among the Pearson papers is a 
twenty-two page le tte r  to Pearson from Henry A. Wallace explaining the 
former Secretary's relationship to Warren and the stable money cause.
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Other collections at Cornell University that bear upon organized 
agriculture's drive for the honest do llar include the Howard E. Babcock 
papers (60 linear feet) and the William I .  Myers papers (32 linear fe e t). 
The Frank E. Gannett papers at Cornell University contain correspondence 
relating to that wealthy publisher's role in the 1936 Borah Presidential 
campaign, the Committee for the Nation, and the Gannett bid for the 
Republican nomination in 1940.
In addition to the Sexauer papers mentioned e a r lie r , the best 
source on the Committee for the Nation is the Edward A. Rumely papers 
at Indiana University. The Rumely collection contains over n inety-five  
thousand items and offers indispensable testimony regarding the origin  
and organization of the Committee for the Nation. The Rumely papers 
include financial data of the Committee and Rumely's almost daily mem­
oranda to the group's Directing Committee. The collection reflects  
the wide range of Rumely contacts as i t  contains the Indianan's corres­
pondence with farm leaders, in d u s tr ia lis t, business and commercial 
leaders, po litic ians and European monetarists. Included in the collec­
tion are four three-hole notebooks en titled  "The Rumely Autobiography." 
Written in 1950 and 1951, the autobiography is comprised of typed and 
handwritten pages and has a section on the origins of the Committee for 
the Nation. Though the work frequently misspells names and confuses 
chronology, the Rumely reminiscences provide useful insights into an 
interesting career.
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York pos­
sesses voluminous and important papers relating to the New Deal's 
response to monetary and agricultural issues. The President's O ffic ia l
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File (OF) 229 f i l l s  13 boxes and 5,800 pages of material relating to 
prices, in fla tio n , gold repricing, the effects of in fla tion  on farmers, 
credit and monetary matters in general. OF 1, 17, 21, 150, 227, 230, 
327, 419, and 5707 also contain pertinent material. The President's 
Personal F ile  (PPF) includes letters  regarding monetary matters from 
Secretaries Wallace, Eccles, Woodin and Morgenthau and correspondence 
from such interested parties as Fisher, O'Neal, Moley, Oliphant and 
various politic ians. The President's Secretary's F ile (PSF) also pro­
vides information on the Committee for the Nation, White House monetary 
conferences and other memoranda related to monetary themes. Although 
f i l le d  with extraneous material, the Morgenthau diaries at Hyde Park 
re flec t the opinion and reporting of a close Roosevelt advisor. The 
diaries include the "Farm Credit Diary, April 27, 1933-November 16, 
1933," which offers an intimate view of the October gold machinations 
and the Morgenthau diaries which include f i f t y  volumes covering 1933- 
1936 and f if ty -fo u r  volumes for 1937.
The National Archives, Washington, D. C ., holds the Department 
of Agriculture Papers and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
Papers. Among the former, the file s  most pertinent to a study of 
agricultural monetary activism are: "Agricultural Finance," "Banks,"
"Cost of Production," "Currency," "Farm R elief," "General Correspon­
dence, 1923-1940," " In fla tion ," "Money-Money Orders," and "Secretary 
of Agriculture's Correspondence, 1933." The National Archives also 
possess the accompanying papers to the Goldsborough and Strong b ill  
hearings.
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Published Sources 
The U. S ., Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 1920 
through 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, provides an inexhaustible potpourri 
of monetary b i l ls ,  amendments, committee reports, le tte rs , speeches, 
and other memoranda relating to the monetary history of the era.
Herman E. Kross, (e d .). Documentary History of Banking and Currency in 
the United States, 4 vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers. 1969)
provides a convenient collection of the most significant monetary 
debates, proposals and acts of Congress. Volume four of the Kross work 
begins with the creation of the Federal Reserve System, includes 
reprints of the Strong b i l l  of 1926 and the Goldsborough b i l l  of 1932 
and reproduces most of the New Deal monetary leg islation.
The published record of organized agriculture's response to the 
money question is documented in the minutes of each group's annual 
national conventions. See Minutes of the American Farm Bureau Federa- 
tio n , Minutes of the Annual Session of the National Farmers' Educational 
and Cooperative Union of America, and Journal of Proceedings of the 
National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry for the years 1920-1940.
In addition to the agenda for each session these documents normally 
include presidential addresses, references to guest speakers and the 
text of adopted resolutions.
The most profound examination of American agriculture in the 
early 1920s is U. S ., Congress, House, Joint Commission of Agricultural 
Inquiry, Report of the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, pt. 1, 
"The Agricultural Crisis," pt. 2, "Credit," pt. 3, "Transportation," 
and pt. 4, "Distribution and Marketing," (issued from December 1921 to
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March 1923). Two other efforts to review the status of agriculture  
during the Harding farm depression include U. S ., Congress, Senate, 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Stabilizing the Prices of Cer­
ta in  Products; Hearing on S. 2964, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922) and 
U. S ., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, War Finance 
Corporation: Hearing, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922). The U. S ., Depart­
ment of Agriculture, Yearbook (Washington, D= C=, 1922, 1924, 1934 and 
1935), also provides useful insight on the status of agriculture. 
Appropriate quantitative material is available in U. S ., Bureau of the 
Census, Historical S tatistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1957 (Washington, D. C ., 1960) and U. S ., Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor S ta tis tics , Bulletin 1376, Wholesale Prices and Indexes, 1960 
(Washington, D. C ., 1963).
The House of Representatives began an investigation of stable 
money proposals well before the issue surfaced in the Senate. For the 
f i r s t  Goldsborough b il l  hearings see U. S ., Congress, House, Committee 
on Banking and Currency, S tab ilization of the Purchasing Power of Money, 
Hearings on H. R. 11788, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922). Testimony on 
the two Strong b ills  is contained in U. S ., Congress, House, Committee 
on Banking and Currency, S tab iliza tio n : Hearings on H. R. 7895, pts. 1
and 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926 and 1927), and U. S ., Congress, Com­
mittee on Banking and Currency, S tab iliza tio n : Hearings on H. R. 11806,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928). The hearings that preceded house adop­
tion of the 1932 Goldsborough b i l l  are U. S ., Congress, House, Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Banking and Currency, S tab ilization of Commodity 
Prices: Hearings on H. R. 10517, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
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Among the more significant Congressional attempts to examine 
the problem of agricultural r e lie f  during the Hoover Administration are 
U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings: 
Farm Relief Legislation Relative to Establishing a Federal Farm Board. 
71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929); U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings on the Agricultural S ituation, 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1931); U. S ., Congress. House, The Committee on Agri­
culture, Hearings on the Program of National Farm Organizations, 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932); U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking 
and Currency, Federal Refinancing of Farm Land Indebtedness: Hearings
on S. 1197, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1932 and 1933) and U. S ., Congress, 
Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Agricultural Adjustment 
R elief Plan: Hearings on H. R. 113991, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933).
The Senate f i r s t  wrestled with the stable money issue in U. S ., 
Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Hearings on H. R. 11499 and S. 4429, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
Within a year the Senate attempted much broader agricultural s tab iliza ­
tion with the f i r s t  AAA. See U. S ., Congress, Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings on H. R. 3835, An Act to Relieve the 
Existing National Emergency by Increasing Agricultural Purchasing Power, 
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). The Senate continued to investigate the 
depressed condition of American agriculture and to seek a monetary 
remedy. See U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry, Encourage Sale of American Agricultural Surplus Products 
Abroad; To Provide Payment Therefor in S ilv e r , and To Provide for Pur­
chase of S ilv e r, Report No. 697, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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The testimony that preceded the adoption of the Banking Act of 1935 is 
included in U. S ., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Banking Act of 1934, Hearings on H. R. 5357, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
Printed sources that re fle c t the varied a c tiv itie s  of the New 
Deal include E ll io t t  Roosevelt (e d .), £ . £ . £ . ,  His Personal Letters, 
1928-1945, 2 Vols. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), Edgar B.
Nixon (e d .), Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign A ffa irs , 3 Vols. (Cam­
bridge: Belknap Press, 1959) and Samuel I .  Rosenman (comp.), The Public
Papers and Addresses of Franklin £ . Roosevelt: With £  Special Introduc­
tion and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt, 4 Vols. (New York: 
Random House, 1938). Transcripts of the Press Conferences of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt For the Years 1933-1945, 12 Vols. (Hyde Park: 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 1956-1957) are indexed and provide Roose­
v e lt's  o ffic ia l and his "background" and "off-the-record" remarks.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (e d .). History of American Presidential 
Elections, 1789-1968, 5 Vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publisher, 1971)
reprints party platforms, major campaign addresses and furnishes the 
s ta tis tic a l results of American presidential contests.
Three interviews made available through the Cornell Program in 
Oral History contribute to an understanding of the farmer and academi­
cian in the debate over managed money: The interview of Edwin G.
Nourse by Joseph G. Knapp (1968); the interview of Fred Sexauer by Gould 
Colman and Leland Spencer (1963 and 1966); and the interview of Ed Foster 
by Gould Colman (1965). Nourse, an outstanding agricultural economist, 
recalls his early opposition to the Fisher compensated dollar scheme; 
Sexauer reminisces about Warren, the Committee for the Nation and
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organized agriculture's fight for the honest dollar; Foster, Secretary 
to the New York State Farm Bureau Federation reviews northeastern agri­
culture's adoration of Warren, its  h o s tility  to the AAA, and assesses 
such personalities as Sexauer, O'Neal, Babcock and Wallace.
Interviews
Interview with Frank A. Pearson, June 9, 1968, Ithaca, New York. 
Professor Pearson, a spry septuagenarian, provided an opinionated but 
Numerous reminiscence of the gold controversies of the 1930s. His 
loyalty to Warren remains unshaken.
Interview with Fred A. Sexauer, June 10, 1968, Auburn, New York. 
Though re tired , Sexauer appeared a man of energy and keen intelligence 
and generously offered the uninhibited use of his papers.
Farm Journals
The ed ito ria ls , columns and le tters  printed in farm journals 
re fle c t the interest of editors and subscribers in the money question 
between 1920 and 1941. Five general farm journals, each representing 
a unique geographical area, proved especially active in promoting the 
monetarist cause. Wallaces' Farmer (Des Moines) under its  editor 
Henry A. Wallace began introducing farmers to the Fisher compensated 
dollar as early as 1920 and remained an opponent of the "Jumping Jack 
Dollar" through the 1930s. Progressive Farmer and Southern Ruralist 
(Birmingham, Alabama) had been founded in 1386 by Colonel Leonidas L. 
Polk and had absorbed a dozen other publications to become the South's 
largest farm journal with over 900,000 subscribers in 1936. During 
the 1930s the magazine, under the editorship of Clarence Poe, offered
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profuse ed ito ria l support fo r s ilver remonetization and the monetarist 
remedy. American A gricu lturalist (New York) was a weekly published by 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. until January 1934 when the Secretary of the 
Treasury sold the magazine to Frank Gannett. The transfer of ownership 
made l i t t l e  difference in the ed ito ria l policy of American Agricul­
tu ra lis t on monetary issues. Both Morgenthau and Gannett admired Warren 
and generously promoted the professor's gold theories in the columns 
of the New York farm paper. Yet under Gannett the magazine became more 
narrowly sectional in its  ed itoria l outlook eventually opposing the 
AAA and NIRA. Prairie Farmer (Chicago, I l l in o is )  joined the monetarist 
cause in 1930 when its  articu late editor C lifford  V. Gregory became 
a convert to the honest dollar cause. In addition to Gregory's column. 
Prairie Farmer featured clever cartoons which reduced even the money 
question to humorous anecdotes. Capper's Weekly (Kansas) featured the 
column of its  owner, Kansas Republican Senator Arthur Capper. Capper, 
a leader of the farm bloc, campaigned for peace, prohibition, direct 
primaries, easy crddit, banking reform and the honest dollar. Altogether 
the five  journals provided the drive for re fla tion  and stabilization  
abundant and lite ra te  support.
Other farm journals also supported organized agriculture's drive 
fo r the honest do llar. Successful Farming (Des Moines) favored the 
veterans bonus, more abundant rural credits and printed several of 
Warren's gold a rtic les . Pacific Rural Press (San Francisco) favored 
easier credit fo r farmers and published an occasional in fla tio n is t  
essay. The Farmer (St. Paul) and the American Cattle Producer both 
favored monetary stab ilization , and The Cattleman, the organ of the
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Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers' Association, featured the mone­
ta r is t  arguments of Colonel George Washington Armstrong and C. 0. Moser.
Awed at the complexities of monetary issues, many of the farm 
papers seemed reluctant to express an opinion on the honest dollar 
controversy. S t i l l  the drama of the monetary events of the era could 
not be ignored. Farm journals reporting at least some of the monetary 
arguments and events of the period include American Creamery. Breeders' 
Gazette , California C ultivator, Country Gentleman, Hoard's Dairyman,
Milk Dealers, National Wool Grower, New Agricultural Review, Rural New 
Yorker and Southwestern M ille r .
Each of the big three farm organizations sponsored at least 
one o ffic ia l organ to re flec t its  views and communicate with its  member­
ship. The National Grange Monthly reported the highlights of the annual 
conventions, featured the comments of National Master Taber and allowed 
guest columnists lik e  farren to present th e ir views to the national 
membership. The Okl. ;oma Union Farmer and the National Union Farmer 
contained the news ;,id opinion of the National Farmers Union. Both 
papers reflected ne populist prejudices of the national organization 
and presented monetary issues in a sensationalist context. The Ameri­
can Farm Bureau's Weekly News Letter kept members informed on 
leg is la tive  developments and on the benefits of bureau membership. The 
news le tte r  began publishing every two weeks and changed its  name to 
the O ffic ia l News Letter in August 1932. The monthly Bureau Farmer 
also experienced metamorphosis becoming Nation's Agriculture in Decem­
ber 1937. The monthly magazine summarized the annual convention 
proceedings, presented news of the Bureau's lobbying ac tiv ities  and
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published artic les  of general in terest. The Il l in o is  Agricultural 
Association Record was the monthly publication of the powerful I l l in o is  
Agricultural Association, a Farm Bureau a f f i l ia te .  With association 
president Earl C. Smith playing a prominent role in the hierarchy of 
the Farm Bureau, the paper provided readers a thorough account of the 
e ffo rt to secure the honest do llar.
Selected Books and Articles
The most defin itive  monograph on the agricultural depression 
of 1920-1923 is James H. Shideler, Farm C ris is , 1919-1923 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1957). The depression is placed in 
broader chronological framework in Clarence Alton Wiley, Agriculture 
and the Business Cycle Since 1920: A Study in the Post War Disparity
of Prices (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Studies in the Social
Sciences and History, No. 15, 1930) and Theodore Saloutos and John D.
Hicks, Twentieth Century Populism: Agricultural Discontent in the 
Middle West, 1900-1939 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1951).
An incisive lecture series on the boom-bust cycle of 1919-1920 is 
printed an John D. Hicks, Rehearsal for Disaster (Gainesville: Univer­
s ity  of Florida Press, 1951). Works that set the farm problem in a 
broad historical context include Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of 
the United States, 1790-1950: A Study of Their Origins and Development
(New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953) and Edward Higbee, Farms
and Farmers in an Urban Age (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963).
Accounts of those who participated in the agrarian activism of 
the Dollar Decade include Arthur Capper's memoir. The Agricultural Bloc
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(New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1922) and Homer E. Socolofsky's
biography, Arthur Capper: Publisher, P o litic ian  and Philanthropist
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1962). The colorful lobbying
of Farmers' Union President Charles S. Barrett is recounted in his 
Uncle Reuben in Washington (Washington, D. C ., Farmers National Pub­
lishing Co., In c ., 1923) and Dale Kramer, The Wild Jackasses, The 
American Farmer in Revolt (New York: Hasting House Publishers, 1956)
relates anecdotes and provides verbal portra its of farm politic ians  
and leaders during the 1920s and 1930s. G ilbert C. F ite , Peter Norbeck: 
P rairie  Statesman (Columbia: University of Missouri Studies, XXII,
No. 2, 1948) and LeRoy Ashley, The Spearless Leader: Senator Borah
and the Progressive Movement in the 1920s (Urbana: University of
I l l in o is  Press, 1972) provide monographs on two important farm state 
po litic ian s . Reinhard H. Luthin, "Smith Wildman Brookhart of Iowa: 
Insurgent Agrarian P o litic ian ," Agricultural History, XXV (October 1951, 
pp. 190-192; R. T. Tucker, "Don Tom of Alabama," North American Review, 
CCXXVI (.August 1928), pp. 8, 57; Herlin D. M e rritt, "Incredible H eflin ,"  
Outlook, CXLVIII (February 1, 1928), p. 173; and William Davenport,
"Tom Quixote," C o llie rs , CLV (August 13, 1930), pp. 566-568, offer 
information on three important farm leaders of the era. A precis of 
farm bloc leader William S. Kenyon is John K. Barnes, "The Man Who Runs 
the Farm Bloc," World's Work, LXV (November 1922), p. 51. A quantita­
tiv e  evaluation of the cohesiveness of the farm bloc is presented in 
Patrick G. O'Brien, "A Reexamination of the Senate Farm Bloc, 1921-1933," 
Agricultural H istory, XLVII (July 1973), pp. 248-263.
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Two contemporary artic les that indicate the increased awareness 
of the urban press to the farm problem are "The Farmer is Waking Up," 
New Republic, XXXVIII (April 16, 1924), p. 198, and H. R. O'Brien, 
"Farmer Woes," Saturday Evening Post, XIX (October 22, 1921), while 
C lifford  B. Anderson, "The Metamorphosis of American Agrarian Idealism 
in the 1920s and 1930s," Agricultural History, XXXV (October 1961) 
emphasizes the growing class consciousness of rural Americans.
The post-war agricultural cris is  as seen from the view of 
o ffic ia l Washington is presented in Bernard Baruch, Bernard Baruch:
The Public Years, Vol. I I  (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); 
David F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920, Vol. I I  
(New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., In c ., 1926) and Donald L. Winters, 
Henry Cantwell Wallace as Secretary of Agriculture, 1921-1924 (Urbana: 
Univesity of I ll in o is  Press, 1970). Houston, Wilson's Secretary of 
Agriculture, frowned at the demands of farmers in 1920-1921 while 
Wallace encouraged the formation of the farm bloc and offered close 
cooperation to farm state congressmen.
Works that concern the history of the Federal Reserve during 
the contraction of 1920-1923 include Paul Warburg, The Federal Reserve 
System: Its  Origin and Development, Vol. I I  (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1930). Warburg, a defender of the Reserve, had been instrumental 
in the creation of the Wilsonian in stitu tio n . The memoir of Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman William Proctor Gould Harding, The Formative 
Period of the Federal Reserve System: During the World Crisis (Boston:
Houghton, M ifflin  Co., 1925) also strenuously defends the system from 
detractors. Two other f i r s t  person accounts of the early history of
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the Reserve System are E. A. Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., In c ., 1951) and Russell C. Leffing- 
w ell, "Discount Policy of the Federal Reserve Banks," American Economic 
Review, XI (March 1921), pp. 30-36. Goldenweiser served the Reserve 
System as an economist and Leffingwell had served as Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury under Wilson. A b r il l ia n t  biography of New York Federal 
Reserve Bank President Strong is Lester V. Chandler, Benjamin Strong, 
Central Banker (Washington, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1958). 
Governor Strong developed new techniques of monetary management but 
opposed the more extreme demands of the monetarists. Arthur S. Link, 
"The Federal Reserve Policy and the Agricultural Depression of 1920- 
1921," Agricultural History, XX (July 1946), pp. 166-175, defends the 
Reserve System by repeating most of the original arguments of W. P. G. 
Harding and Carter Glass. Among recent interpreters Milton Freedman 
and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 
1867-1960 (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1963) is c ritic a l
of the Reserve System's monetary maneuvers in 1919-1923. A contemporary 
populist critique of the Federal Reserve is George W. Armstrong, The 
Crime of '20: The Unpardonable Sin of Frenzied Finance (Dallas: Press
of the Venny Co., 1922).
The "Crime of 1920" has been investigated by several scholars. 
See George W. Dowrie, "Did Deflation Ruin the Farmer and Would In flation  
Save Him?," Journal of Farm Economics, V II (January 1925), pp. 67-95. 
Dowrie answered both questions in the negative. The diverse conclusions 
of contemporary academic economists regarding the use of the discount 
rates are reflected in H. G. Moulton, "Banking Policy and the Price
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Situation," American Economic Review, Proceedings Supplement, X (March
1920), pp. 156-175; 0. M. W. Sprague, "The Discount Policy of the 
Federal Reserve Banks," American Economic Review, XI (March 1921),
pp. 16-29; Clark Warburton, "Monetary Control Under the Federal Reserve 
Act," P o litica l Science Quarterly. LXI (December 1946), pp. 505-534; 
and Anna Youngman, "The Efficacy of Changes in the Discount Rates of 
the Federal Reserve Banks," American Economic Review, XI (September
1921), pp. 469-470. Monographs that re late to the same subject include 
W. R. Burgess, The Reserve Banks and the Money Market (New York:
Harper, 1927); C. 0. Hardy, Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve 
System (Washington: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1932); Harold Reed,
The Development of the Federal Reserve Policy (Boston: Houghton M ifflin
Co., 1922) and Winfield W. R ie fle r, Money Rates and Money Markets in 
the United States (New York: Harper, 1930).
For information on the election of 1922 see Chester H. Rowell, 
"Why the Middle West Went Radical," World's Work, LXVI (June 1923), 
pp. 265-274 and Rowell, "La F o lle tte , Shipstead and the Embattled 
Farmers," World's Work, LXVI (August 1923), pp. 408-415; "Election by 
Disgust," The Nation, CXV (November 22, 1922), p. 540; H. M. Hedges,
"The Liberal Sweep in the West," The Nation, CXV (November 22, 1922); 
"The Revolt of November 7," Current Opinion, LXXIII (December 1922), 
p. 702, and "Why the Voter Voted Discontent," Literary Digest, LXXV 
(November 25, 1922). Jerry Alvin Neprash, The Brookhart Campaigns in 
Iowa, 1920-1926: A Study in the Motivation of P o litica l Attitudes 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1932) offers quantitiative
evidence that rural hard times motivated voters to support more radical
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candidates. The 1922 Wisconsin campaign is recalled in Belle Case La 
Follette  and Fola La Follete, Robert M. La F o lle tte , Vol. I (New York: 
Macmillan and Co., 1953) and Robert L it t r e l l  examines the monetary views 
of another "radical in "Henrik Shipstead," New. Republic, XXXIII (Jan­
uary 3, 1923), pp. 146-147. Reporter Mark Sullivan, examines the 
temper of the Middle West in "The Corn Belt From a Car Window," World's 
Work, LXV (November 1922), p. 219 and Robert K. Murray, The Harding 
Er^: Warren G. Harding and His Administration (Minneapolis: Univer­
s ity  of Minnesota Press, 1969) places the election and agricultural 
issues within the context of the Harding Administration.
The farm cris is  of 1920-1923 resulted in demands for more 
libera l credit fa c il it ie s  for farmers. "To Sell Europe Our Surplus On 
a Tick," Literary Digest, LXVIII (January 22, 1921), p. 15, discusses 
the role of the War Finance Corporation. Information on the agricul­
tural credits leg islation is found in G. C. Henderson, "The Agricultural 
Credits Act of 1923," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXVII (May 1923), 
pp. 518-522; J. T. Holdsworth, "Farm Credits," Journal of Farm Economics, 
IV (January 1922), pp. 26-27; John W. Owens, "The Progressives," New 
Republic, XXXIV (March 14, 1923), pp. 61-62 and V. N. Valgreen, "The 
Agricultural Credits Act of 1923," American Economic Review, X III  
(September 1923), pp. 442-460. The principal monograph is Frieda Baird 
and Claude L. Benner, Ten Years of Federal Intermediate Credits (Washing­
ton, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1933).
The post-war agricultural cris is  gave impetus to the discipline 
of farm economics. See Albert G. Black, "Agricultural Policy and the 
Economist," Journal of Farm Economics, XVIII (May 1936), pp. 311-319;
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and George F. Warren, "The Origin and Development of Farm Economics in 
the United States," Journal of Farm Economics, XIV (January 1932), 
pp. 2-9. Both Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American C iv iliza ­
tio n : 1918-1933, IV (New York: The Viking Press, 1959} and Henry
Charles and Anne DeWees Taylor, The Story of Agricultural Economics in 
the United States, 1840-1932 (Ames: The Iowa State College Press,
1952) place the discipline in its  historical context.
The price gyrations of 1919-1923 gave impetus to a search for 
schemes that would assure future price s ta b ility . Relying on populist 
foundations, Henry Ford and Thomas Alva Edison proposed adoption of the 
commodity dollar. See Thomas A. Edison, A Proposed Amendment to the 
Federal Reserve Banking System: Plan and Notes (Orange, N. J . ,  1923)
and William Trufant Foster, "Edison-Ford Commodity Money," Proceedings 
of the Academy of P o litica l Science, X (January 1923), pp. 187-205.
Among economists, Yale University Professor Irving Fisher was 
foremost in searching fo r monetary s tab ilization  techniques. Fisher 
wrote at least 48 artic les  and 13 books on monetary themes. See Arthur D. 
Gayer, ed ., The Lessons of Monetary Experience: Essays in Honor of
Irving Fisher (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, In c ., 1937). Fisher's
work is cataloged in Irving Norton Fisher, A Bibliography of the Writ­
ings of Irving Fisher (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). The
best history of his crusade for monetary reform is Irving Fisher,
Stable Money, A History of the Movement, assisted by Hans R. L. Chorssen 
(New York: Adelphi Co., 1935). Irving Norton Fisher, My Father,
Irving Fisher (New York: Comet Press, 1956) provides useful family
history. Critics of Fisher include Joseph Stagg Lawrence, Stabilization
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of Prices: A C ritica l Study of the Various Plans Proposed for S ta b ili­
zation (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923); Joseph Reeves, Monetary 
Reform Movements (Washington, 1943); Max Sasuly, "Irving Fisher and 
Social Science," Econometrica, XV (October 1947); Joseph Alios 
Schumpter, Ten Great Economists from Marx to Keynes (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1951) and R. B. Westerfield and Paul H. Douglas, 
"Memorials," American Economic Review, XXXVII (September 1947).
Professor John Rogers Commons contributions to stabilization  
primarily concern his involvement in the Strong b il ls .  See Commons,
Myself (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934); Commons, "Farm Prices and 
the Value of Gold," North American Review, CCXXV (January-February
1928), pp. 196-211; Commons, "Price Stabilization and the Federal Reserve 
System," The Annalist, XXIX (April 1, 1927), pp. 459-462; and Commons, 
"Stabilization of Prices and Business," American Economic Review, XV 
(March 1925), pp. 43-52. The best monograph is Lafayette G. Harter,
J r . ,  John R. Commons: His Assault on Laissez-faire (Corvallis: Oregon
State University Press, 1962). A good summary of the principal argu­
ments regarding the desirab ility  of stab ilization  is contained in 
Charles 0. Hardy, Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve System 
(Washington, 0. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1932). Also consult 
"Stabilization of Prices and the Farmer's Income: The Need fo r Control
of the Farm Supply," The Annals of the American Academy, CXLII (March
1929), pp. 158-169; Arthur F. Burns, "The Quantity Theory and Price 
S tab ilization ," The American Economic Review, XIX (December 1929), 
pp. 561-79; Lionel D. Edie, "The 1928 Hearings on the Strong B il l ,"  
Journal of P olitical Economy, XXXVII (June 1929), pp. 340-54; and
453
M. K. Graham, "The Strong B il l ,"  Southwestern P olitical and Social 
Science Quarterly, X (March 1930), pp. 401-408.
Professors George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson of Cornell 
provided in te llig en ts ia  of the monetarists movement in the 1930s. Two 
a rtic le  length surveys of Warren's contribution are Frank A. Pearson 
and W. I .  Myers, "The Fact Finder," Farm Economics, Department of Agri­
cultural Economics, New York State College of Agriculture, Ithaca,
No. 208 (February 1957, pp. 5470-516) and Frank A. Pearson, W. I .  Myers, 
and A. R. Gans, "Gold and Prices," Farm Economics, Department of Agri­
cultural Economics, New York State College of Agriculture, Ithaca,
No. 209 (March 1957), pp. 5518-36. The a rtic le  that convinced Warren 
and Pearson that scarcity of gold had been a factor in the decline of 
world prices is Joseph Kitchen, Interim Report of the Gold Delegation 
of the Financial Committee, League of Nations, Document C 375, Septem­
ber 8, 1930, pp. 79-85. A discussion of their price theory is contained 
in Warren and Pearson, Prices (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1933;
and Warren and Pearson, Gold and Prices (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, In c ., 1935); Warren and Pearson, "The Future of the General 
Price Level," Journal of Farm Economics, XIV (January 1932), pp. 23-46; 
and Warren, "Some S tatistics  on the Gold Situation," American Economic 
Review Supplement, XXIV (March 1934), pp. 111-129. Two c r it ic a l reviews 
of the Warren Pearson price theory are Charles 0. Hardy, Is There 
Enough Gold? (Washington, D. C .: The Brookings In s titu tio n , 1936), as 
part I I  of the volume there is reprinted with some revisions Hardy's 
pamphlet, "The Warren-Pearson Price Theory," published in 1935; and 
Walter E. Spahr, The Monetary Theories of Warren and Pearson (New York:
454
Farrar and Rinehart Press, 1934). See also Paul A. Eke, "The Relation 
of AAA Reductions to Gold Prices and Purchasing Power of Cotton,"
Journal of Farm Economics, XVIII (November 1936) and James Harvey Rogers, 
America Weighs Her Gold (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931).
The Crash of 1929 renewed interest in in fla tion  and in the farm 
problem. John P. Gleason, "The Attitude of the Business Community 
Toward Agriculture during the McNary-Haugen Period," Agricultural His­
to ry , XXXII (April 1958), pp. 127-38, and Amy Gertrude S lich ter,
"Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Farm Problem," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, LX III (September 1956), pp. 238-258, illu s tra te  the 
increasing awareness of the farmer's p light. Bernard Ostrolenk, 
"In fla tion  Trends in America," Current History, XXXV (March 1932), 
pp. 773-780, acknowledges the growing support for the monetary remedy. 
John A. Simpson, President of the Farmers Union, raised one of the most 
strident voices for re fla tio n . See G ilbert C. F ite , "John A. Simpson:
The Southwest's M ilitan t Farm Leader," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, X:V (March 1949), pp. 563-84, and John A. Simpson, The M ilitan t 
Voice of Agriculture (Oklahoma City: Mrs. John A. Simpson Co., 1934).
S i lvérités also revived efforts to reintroduce the white metal into 
the nation's monetary system. See Herbert Bratter, "The S ilver Episode," 
Journal of P o litical Economy, XLVI (1938), pp. 609-621, and Fred L. 
Is rae l, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1963). A sketch of the s ilver issue from Hayes to Hoover is provided 
in Jeannette P. Nichols, "Silver Diplomacy," P o litica l Science Quarterly, 
XLVIII (December 1933), pp. 565-88. The Hoover depression also led 
Edward A. Rumely to organize the Committee for the Nation. For Rumely's
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